Haddon-Cave, Airworthiness, Sea King et al (merged)
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AA
OK, why did they do it?
Lets treat this like an investigation.
What was the possible motive for a bunch of UK military to protect the blushes of Boeing?
I can only come up with either.
1. It's bollocks
2. They were bribed.
3. There was some larger political reason to not embarass Boeing at the time. We are only an instrument of policy for a government, and there may have been some deal on the cards.
If
1. then grow up.
2. then I will be first in line to pull the trigger on the b@stards
3. then grow up and accept the reality of political machinations.
OK, why did they do it?
Lets treat this like an investigation.
What was the possible motive for a bunch of UK military to protect the blushes of Boeing?
I can only come up with either.
1. It's bollocks
2. They were bribed.
3. There was some larger political reason to not embarass Boeing at the time. We are only an instrument of policy for a government, and there may have been some deal on the cards.
If
1. then grow up.
2. then I will be first in line to pull the trigger on the b@stards
3. then grow up and accept the reality of political machinations.
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Tourist:
1. It wasn't bollocks... I was personally told that we shouldn't...
2. The bribe is in already for all "starred" officers... It's called a nice pension and the promise of extracurricular employment.
3. Those "machinations" you so freely dismiss are there to line the pockets of the corporation and the politicians and, while I am all for corporations and profits, the line should be drawn when lining their pockets is done at the needless cost of good men and women.
1. It wasn't bollocks... I was personally told that we shouldn't...
2. The bribe is in already for all "starred" officers... It's called a nice pension and the promise of extracurricular employment.
3. Those "machinations" you so freely dismiss are there to line the pockets of the corporation and the politicians and, while I am all for corporations and profits, the line should be drawn when lining their pockets is done at the needless cost of good men and women.
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No, most political machinations are, misguidedly or not, in the interests of the nation, or at least were meant to be.
I have very little respect for most polititions intelligence or honestly, but I think you would be hard pressed to find one that actually meant the country ill.
Scamming their alllowances is one thing, but deliberately harming servicemen to line their pockets?
I think not.
If you have one shred of any realistic proof whatsoever that this happened, then give it to the telegraph, they will love it!
Put up or shut up.
I have very little respect for most polititions intelligence or honestly, but I think you would be hard pressed to find one that actually meant the country ill.
Scamming their alllowances is one thing, but deliberately harming servicemen to line their pockets?
I think not.
If you have one shred of any realistic proof whatsoever that this happened, then give it to the telegraph, they will love it!
Put up or shut up.
Last edited by Tourist; 15th Sep 2011 at 14:56.
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If you have one shred of any realistic proof whatsoever that this happened, then give it to the telegraph, they will love it!
Put up or shut up.
Put up or shut up.
As it stands, you appear to be calling me a liar.
Thanks...
Airborne Aircrew
I for one don't think you need to prove anything regarding the 1987 Falklands crash. What you say was repeated under oath during the Mull of Kintyre inquiries and MoD dared not challenge it. Sqn Ldr Burke, the Odiham test pilot, gave equally damning evidence about the same crash. ACM Jenner then misled the House of Commons about it (saying there had only been one previous Chinook crash, at Mannheim). And, finally, in 1993 Boscombe Down cited one of the contributory factors (DASH) as a reason for not recommending CAR for the Mk2, because an ESSENTIAL modification had not been progressed in SIX years.
Tourist - re the fag packet, no I do not think that a correct or even feasible way to design an aircraft with today's technology. I think you misunderstand airworthiness and fitness for purpose. It is a simple fact that the aircraft must be declared airworthy before it is released to service (Chinook Mk2 being the obvious exception in Nov 1993!!). Only then can you make the fitness for purpose judgment, given FFP is an operational term in this sense.
I for one don't think you need to prove anything regarding the 1987 Falklands crash. What you say was repeated under oath during the Mull of Kintyre inquiries and MoD dared not challenge it. Sqn Ldr Burke, the Odiham test pilot, gave equally damning evidence about the same crash. ACM Jenner then misled the House of Commons about it (saying there had only been one previous Chinook crash, at Mannheim). And, finally, in 1993 Boscombe Down cited one of the contributory factors (DASH) as a reason for not recommending CAR for the Mk2, because an ESSENTIAL modification had not been progressed in SIX years.
Tourist - re the fag packet, no I do not think that a correct or even feasible way to design an aircraft with today's technology. I think you misunderstand airworthiness and fitness for purpose. It is a simple fact that the aircraft must be declared airworthy before it is released to service (Chinook Mk2 being the obvious exception in Nov 1993!!). Only then can you make the fitness for purpose judgment, given FFP is an operational term in this sense.
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No, not really, I am sure it probably happened, insofar as you were told to keep quiet.
You, however are accusing some others of far more serious crimes than just lying.
I strongly suspect that the reasons you ascribe to others are false, not because you are lying, but because there is more to the story than some simplistic cover up for bribe or whatever.
You, however are accusing some others of far more serious crimes than just lying.
I strongly suspect that the reasons you ascribe to others are false, not because you are lying, but because there is more to the story than some simplistic cover up for bribe or whatever.
Tourist
If an MoD employee, having responsibility for the safety of an aircraft, is formally advised that his actions or decisions WILL result in placing aircrew in immediate danger, and that person flatly REFUSES to make the aircraft safe, and instructs his subordinates likewise; then I'm afraid that is a conscious, quite deliberate act.
If is doubly worse when an employee is not an engineer (and so cannot have technical and financial approval or airworthiness delegation), but grants himself that delegation
and makes a series of false, fraudulent declarations.
And when the predicted has occurred and aircrew have died, MoD and Ministers still insist such staff did nothing wrong - then all hope is gone. This is the current, official MoD and Government position, as of 3 months ago. (Last time Minister confirmed it to my MP).
AA
I was taught long ago that if someone lies to you or instructs you to commit an offence, record all subsequent conversations. The proceedings of the hearing at which the above events I describe were aired, and the rulings handed down, is crystal clear. 
(MoD denied it took place when asked for the minutes!). Oops.
If an MoD employee, having responsibility for the safety of an aircraft, is formally advised that his actions or decisions WILL result in placing aircrew in immediate danger, and that person flatly REFUSES to make the aircraft safe, and instructs his subordinates likewise; then I'm afraid that is a conscious, quite deliberate act.
If is doubly worse when an employee is not an engineer (and so cannot have technical and financial approval or airworthiness delegation), but grants himself that delegation
and makes a series of false, fraudulent declarations. And when the predicted has occurred and aircrew have died, MoD and Ministers still insist such staff did nothing wrong - then all hope is gone. This is the current, official MoD and Government position, as of 3 months ago. (Last time Minister confirmed it to my MP).
AA
talking about a conversation that took place over twenty years ago that I failed to record
(MoD denied it took place when asked for the minutes!). Oops.
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"If an MoD employee, having responsibility for the safety of an aircraft, is formally advised that his actions or decisions WILL result in placing aircrew in immediate danger, and that person flatly REFUSES to make the aircraft safe, and instructs his subordinates likewise; then I'm afraid that is a conscious, quite deliberate act."
Nothing is ever quite so black and white.
How much immediate danger would be my question?
Is that danger justified by the need for the capability?
People have to make difficult decisions in the military.
Have you seen the estimate for the helicopter losses in the planning for Al Faw?
We still went ahead with that, and we would have lost a lot more than one Nimrods worth if the estimates had been right.
If losing a Nimrod every now and then is the price you pay for a capable military then that is a price worth paying.
Not because people did not make tragic mistakes, but because any system that can ensure there are no mistakes, ensures we cannot remain competetive in wartime.
Nothing is ever quite so black and white.
How much immediate danger would be my question?
Is that danger justified by the need for the capability?
People have to make difficult decisions in the military.
Have you seen the estimate for the helicopter losses in the planning for Al Faw?
We still went ahead with that, and we would have lost a lot more than one Nimrods worth if the estimates had been right.
If losing a Nimrod every now and then is the price you pay for a capable military then that is a price worth paying.
Not because people did not make tragic mistakes, but because any system that can ensure there are no mistakes, ensures we cannot remain competetive in wartime.
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Tourist,
Hear what you are saying, but my view of the estimate process is that it is sometimes too black and White. It may take into account how many we have got versus risk of losing one etc. What it does not know about is that all of the fleet have that same fundamental flaw, caused by ignorance and the neck in the sand attitude that went on prior to the nimrod crash.
The estimate cannot take into account what it does not know..
Hear what you are saying, but my view of the estimate process is that it is sometimes too black and White. It may take into account how many we have got versus risk of losing one etc. What it does not know about is that all of the fleet have that same fundamental flaw, caused by ignorance and the neck in the sand attitude that went on prior to the nimrod crash.
The estimate cannot take into account what it does not know..
Tourist said:
"If a civvy certified engineer can fit a wescam to a helicopter in about a week and a quick sketch on a fag packet then why can we not?!?!? "
That is pure and utter drivel and demonstrates your lack of knowledge of civil (and military?) practices and processes! Thats proabably your silliest quote yet.
I am one of those pesky "civvy certified engineers" and my last job was with a substantial Police ASU and believe me, this is NOT possible at all, not even from ECUK!
What you have probably misunderstood (again?) is their use of a fully AIRWORTHY and APPROVED Wescam Supplemental Type Certificated modification for one of many types of civil and military aircraft and several dozen AIRWORTHY and APPROVED adapters to choose from.
Those Wescam guys have a really good reputation to protect and they won't risk it on cutting their processes short just for a small MOD contract.
There will be a rush to complete the job - but not the Haste of recent MOD-type "airworthiness" - and the Job will be COMPLETE when finished, including the drawings, stress and elect load calculations, approvals, documentation and installation paperwork.
The "Fag Packet" you heard of was likely their commission being worked out.
"If a civvy certified engineer can fit a wescam to a helicopter in about a week and a quick sketch on a fag packet then why can we not?!?!? "
That is pure and utter drivel and demonstrates your lack of knowledge of civil (and military?) practices and processes! Thats proabably your silliest quote yet.
I am one of those pesky "civvy certified engineers" and my last job was with a substantial Police ASU and believe me, this is NOT possible at all, not even from ECUK!
What you have probably misunderstood (again?) is their use of a fully AIRWORTHY and APPROVED Wescam Supplemental Type Certificated modification for one of many types of civil and military aircraft and several dozen AIRWORTHY and APPROVED adapters to choose from.
Those Wescam guys have a really good reputation to protect and they won't risk it on cutting their processes short just for a small MOD contract.
There will be a rush to complete the job - but not the Haste of recent MOD-type "airworthiness" - and the Job will be COMPLETE when finished, including the drawings, stress and elect load calculations, approvals, documentation and installation paperwork.
The "Fag Packet" you heard of was likely their commission being worked out.
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Tourist and others,
I'd like to take the chance to contribute to this thread.
In my view, the boundary between airworthiness and safety is a fine one and probably doesn't even exist. I see 'airworthiness' as a subset of safety, and it would be better for everyone concerned if we let the term 'airworthiness' fade way. (Note that the submariners were very quick to replace 'seaworthy' with 'nuclear safety' and have done well as a result).
I agree with tourist that in the services the aim has to be to get aircraft into combat in a timely and affordable way. I also agree with Tourist that operational judgements have to belong to those engaged in that combat situation. Those can be very hard judgements and we must always respect the decisions made.
BUT, I also line up with Tucumseh and others when it comes to taking every reasonable means to ensure that the aircraft we send into combat are sufficiently safe. In my view, (and I think H-C backs this up) it just means 'doing the business properly'. What does 'properly' mean? I strongly agree with Tuc that configuration control is a 'must do'. He refers to 'build standard', I'd go with 'operating configuration', because after build, lots of maintenance, modifications and repairs take place.
This is where I get concerned about the state of some UK aircraft fleets. I have been involved for some time with a major RAF rotary wing fleet, and we recently encountered an issue with embodying a modification - we couldn't do it because there were airframe repairs in the way. That shouldn't have been an issue, but it was because we didn't know about them. That was because there was no entry for the repair in the airframe log card. This confused me - in my 28 years in the Navy as an AEO it was an article of faith that repairs were recorded in the log cards. However, i have been told that 'the RAF don't use airframe log cards'. This just does not compute. Note - there was nothing wrong with the repair, but - no log card entry, no weight changes, no regular inspections, no remedial action, no nothing. No good. I must stress that this is not an 'anti-RAF' dig - I could list out RN howlers as well. My problem is that it's happening and is, in my view, a systemic fault.
The other big issue is 'fleets within fleets'. When you get to the state that one aircraft fleet has so many combinations of modification fits embodied that it is just about impossible for the engineers or the aircrew to state with any certainty what the configuration of the aircraft is (and 'mods on mods' only makes the issue worse) then 'we have a problem, Houston'.
The point? It is, in my view, perfectly possible to build, maintain, modify and operate military aircraft to acceptable standards of safety and deliver operational capability into combat. To do that, you need to 'do the job properly'. It's not rocket science. It's not easy, but it's not impossible. Once you have done that, there will always be a significant element of operational risk that the aircrew then have to manage. You can minimise it as best you can, but it will, in my view, never go away. I agree with Tourist that we must respect the role of aircrew in that respect. It's a team approach, as ever.
Now the controversial bit. In my view only, the best way to active this is by a true teaming ethos between engineers and operators. An ethos that allows engineers to say 'no' to pilots when needed. An ethos that allows pilots to trust engineers and tell them the truth. An ethos that delivers senior officers (especially aircrew officers) to listen to their engineers and provide them with both operational direction and also top cover.
I have had the chance to do 'operational' engineering - a long time ago, but very serious, high tempo and demanding. In all that time, we stuck to our safety rules. All our modifications were cleared by our Engineering Authority (EA), and by our Command. We were bold AND careful by being professional. What we did not do was embody radio modifications in theatre and then tell the EA afterwards. That is happening frequently in certain units, and it gives me a very bad feeling. There appears to be an imbalance in the relationship between engineers and operators, where engineers are told what to do and expected to do it without the 'proper' precautions, oversight and basic thought. This imbalance also appears to be reflected in what happened to Tuc and his colleagues in the MoD all those years ago.
I hope these musings strike some chords, and help support constructive debate.
Best Regards as ever
Engines
I'd like to take the chance to contribute to this thread.
In my view, the boundary between airworthiness and safety is a fine one and probably doesn't even exist. I see 'airworthiness' as a subset of safety, and it would be better for everyone concerned if we let the term 'airworthiness' fade way. (Note that the submariners were very quick to replace 'seaworthy' with 'nuclear safety' and have done well as a result).
I agree with tourist that in the services the aim has to be to get aircraft into combat in a timely and affordable way. I also agree with Tourist that operational judgements have to belong to those engaged in that combat situation. Those can be very hard judgements and we must always respect the decisions made.
BUT, I also line up with Tucumseh and others when it comes to taking every reasonable means to ensure that the aircraft we send into combat are sufficiently safe. In my view, (and I think H-C backs this up) it just means 'doing the business properly'. What does 'properly' mean? I strongly agree with Tuc that configuration control is a 'must do'. He refers to 'build standard', I'd go with 'operating configuration', because after build, lots of maintenance, modifications and repairs take place.
This is where I get concerned about the state of some UK aircraft fleets. I have been involved for some time with a major RAF rotary wing fleet, and we recently encountered an issue with embodying a modification - we couldn't do it because there were airframe repairs in the way. That shouldn't have been an issue, but it was because we didn't know about them. That was because there was no entry for the repair in the airframe log card. This confused me - in my 28 years in the Navy as an AEO it was an article of faith that repairs were recorded in the log cards. However, i have been told that 'the RAF don't use airframe log cards'. This just does not compute. Note - there was nothing wrong with the repair, but - no log card entry, no weight changes, no regular inspections, no remedial action, no nothing. No good. I must stress that this is not an 'anti-RAF' dig - I could list out RN howlers as well. My problem is that it's happening and is, in my view, a systemic fault.
The other big issue is 'fleets within fleets'. When you get to the state that one aircraft fleet has so many combinations of modification fits embodied that it is just about impossible for the engineers or the aircrew to state with any certainty what the configuration of the aircraft is (and 'mods on mods' only makes the issue worse) then 'we have a problem, Houston'.
The point? It is, in my view, perfectly possible to build, maintain, modify and operate military aircraft to acceptable standards of safety and deliver operational capability into combat. To do that, you need to 'do the job properly'. It's not rocket science. It's not easy, but it's not impossible. Once you have done that, there will always be a significant element of operational risk that the aircrew then have to manage. You can minimise it as best you can, but it will, in my view, never go away. I agree with Tourist that we must respect the role of aircrew in that respect. It's a team approach, as ever.
Now the controversial bit. In my view only, the best way to active this is by a true teaming ethos between engineers and operators. An ethos that allows engineers to say 'no' to pilots when needed. An ethos that allows pilots to trust engineers and tell them the truth. An ethos that delivers senior officers (especially aircrew officers) to listen to their engineers and provide them with both operational direction and also top cover.
I have had the chance to do 'operational' engineering - a long time ago, but very serious, high tempo and demanding. In all that time, we stuck to our safety rules. All our modifications were cleared by our Engineering Authority (EA), and by our Command. We were bold AND careful by being professional. What we did not do was embody radio modifications in theatre and then tell the EA afterwards. That is happening frequently in certain units, and it gives me a very bad feeling. There appears to be an imbalance in the relationship between engineers and operators, where engineers are told what to do and expected to do it without the 'proper' precautions, oversight and basic thought. This imbalance also appears to be reflected in what happened to Tuc and his colleagues in the MoD all those years ago.
I hope these musings strike some chords, and help support constructive debate.
Best Regards as ever
Engines
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Engines,
I'm fairly sure I know the fleet to which you refer. Some mods are carried out on base, some at the original manufacturer and some in deep servicing establishment. Pretty difficult to config control when you have 3 organisations, each of whom blame each other for the sh!t state of the ac.
I'm fairly sure I know the fleet to which you refer. Some mods are carried out on base, some at the original manufacturer and some in deep servicing establishment. Pretty difficult to config control when you have 3 organisations, each of whom blame each other for the sh!t state of the ac.
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Engines:
Nice post...
I respectfully disagree. Airworthiness cannot "fade away" because it is the start of safety. Without it safety is impossible to judge. In theory, a signed RTS indicates that, accepting as yet unknowns, the airframe being inflicted upon the crews is safe and fit to fly. That the various systems function as advertized and, as far as can be reasonably tested, they don't interfere with the proper function of the other installed systems. It also lays down limits on how it should be flown and those limits allow for some "flex" to build in a safety buffer. There's the baseline of your "safety" right there.
From that point on every change, addition and subtraction, (as you noted yourself), should be tested and documented. There will be things that manifest themselves that weren't tested or couldn't be properly tested. These need to be properly fixed or mitigated, noted and included in the baseline. As you've seen yourself the lack of proper documentation causes all kinds of problems for the maintainers... It causes death in the operators.
Safety comes from the baseline and the baseline is the RTS that says this airframe, in it's current state is "fit" to fly with crews in it. Airworthiness is the mod state that is the sum of the fully documented changes to the RTS.
Nice post...
I see 'airworthiness' as a subset of safety, and it would be better for everyone concerned if we let the term 'airworthiness' fade way.
From that point on every change, addition and subtraction, (as you noted yourself), should be tested and documented. There will be things that manifest themselves that weren't tested or couldn't be properly tested. These need to be properly fixed or mitigated, noted and included in the baseline. As you've seen yourself the lack of proper documentation causes all kinds of problems for the maintainers... It causes death in the operators.
Safety comes from the baseline and the baseline is the RTS that says this airframe, in it's current state is "fit" to fly with crews in it. Airworthiness is the mod state that is the sum of the fully documented changes to the RTS.
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Well said Engines (and AA)
As aircrew, I once believed that the engineering practices would keep me safe from being killed by the disintegration of the aircraft in flight, or similar. Once upon a time I WAS correct. But I didn't realise that those safety-conscious engineers like yourself and Tuc had had their hands tied behind their back for so long and that the airworthiness process had been almost totally dismantled.
That is what rankles - now that I have left the Services, it is students and friends of mine who are flying aircraft around in the pitiful state that you describe - makes my blood boil. I like Tourist's aggressive approach (but this is only wholly appropriate in the air, on ops IMHO). However, it is all pointless hot air should you operate aggressively only to lose an expensive aircraft and priceless crew just because it fell apart in the air (XV179, XV230 et al). F*cking pointless!
Neither do I believe Tourist's mantra that 'you have to lose a few to prove you are doing it right'. You are entitled to your opinion, old bean but that's absolute twaddle and a somewhat Melchett-esque thought-process that went out with the ark, or at least, trench warfare. Baaah! However, I know you will disagree but I hope one day you can realise there is another way; its up to you, of course. Good luck and FLY SAFE!
Flipster
As aircrew, I once believed that the engineering practices would keep me safe from being killed by the disintegration of the aircraft in flight, or similar. Once upon a time I WAS correct. But I didn't realise that those safety-conscious engineers like yourself and Tuc had had their hands tied behind their back for so long and that the airworthiness process had been almost totally dismantled.
That is what rankles - now that I have left the Services, it is students and friends of mine who are flying aircraft around in the pitiful state that you describe - makes my blood boil. I like Tourist's aggressive approach (but this is only wholly appropriate in the air, on ops IMHO). However, it is all pointless hot air should you operate aggressively only to lose an expensive aircraft and priceless crew just because it fell apart in the air (XV179, XV230 et al). F*cking pointless!
Neither do I believe Tourist's mantra that 'you have to lose a few to prove you are doing it right'. You are entitled to your opinion, old bean but that's absolute twaddle and a somewhat Melchett-esque thought-process that went out with the ark, or at least, trench warfare. Baaah! However, I know you will disagree but I hope one day you can realise there is another way; its up to you, of course. Good luck and FLY SAFE!
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Tourist:-
A bit of a mis-fire there. I appreciate that you're fielding challenges from all directions (and very patiently).
A peruse of my recent posts and you will see that I left on a Medical Discharge earlier this year. I hope that my loyalty was not in doubt. My spirit was broken over three years, trying & failing to come back from serious injury. That's another story, but suffice to say that I hold the IPT to blame for my situation.
Just a thought. May I hazard a guess that you believe the Sea King crews crashed two entirely serviceable* aircraft into each other with no contributary factors and the crews are therefore guilty of gross negligence?
*Airworthy, Fit for Purpose, ALARP, Tolerably Safe...etc
You've avoided this question a couple of times.
I find it horrifying that as a serving serviceman you seem almost proud to have lost your drive for excellence.
You should treat those who have no wish to do their job with scorn, and to ally yourself with those from countries which we all know won't be winning any wars any day soon is worrying.
You should treat those who have no wish to do their job with scorn, and to ally yourself with those from countries which we all know won't be winning any wars any day soon is worrying.
A peruse of my recent posts and you will see that I left on a Medical Discharge earlier this year. I hope that my loyalty was not in doubt. My spirit was broken over three years, trying & failing to come back from serious injury. That's another story, but suffice to say that I hold the IPT to blame for my situation.
Just a thought. May I hazard a guess that you believe the Sea King crews crashed two entirely serviceable* aircraft into each other with no contributary factors and the crews are therefore guilty of gross negligence?
*Airworthy, Fit for Purpose, ALARP, Tolerably Safe...etc
You've avoided this question a couple of times.
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Rigga
"That is pure and utter drivel and demonstrates your lack of knowledge of civil (and military?) practices and processes! Thats proabably your silliest quote yet."
Dont be a pedant, you know exactly what I am saying. Compared to the military system it is closer to the fag packet model.
"That is pure and utter drivel and demonstrates your lack of knowledge of civil (and military?) practices and processes! Thats proabably your silliest quote yet."
Dont be a pedant, you know exactly what I am saying. Compared to the military system it is closer to the fag packet model.
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Airborne
"In theory, a signed RTS indicates that, accepting as yet unknowns, the airframe being inflicted upon the crews is safe and fit to fly. That the various systems function as advertized and, as far as can be reasonably tested, they don't interfere with the proper function of the other installed systems. It also lays down limits on how it should be flown and those limits allow for some "flex" to build in a safety buffer. There's the baseline of your "safety" right there."
The problem is that "safety" is not absolute
If you asked an aeroengineer in 1920 what he considered "safe", it would be very different than if you asked one now.
Every shift in the baseline may save lives in accidents, but compromise effectiveness, so this needs to be incredibly closely monitored.
As I said before, the easy safety measures that were good bang-per-buck went a long time ago. We have just been throwing money and effectiveness down a well for 30 yrs.
I believe that the baseline of "safety" across all areas needs a very dramatic reset left.
The sine wave of safety has swung from very poor in the middle of last century where were were losing our ability to fight due to constant lose of men and machines, to a position now where we are too hamstrung to field competetive aircraft in affordable numbers.
Some of our platforms have become a shadow of what they could be due to regulatory silliness.
"In theory, a signed RTS indicates that, accepting as yet unknowns, the airframe being inflicted upon the crews is safe and fit to fly. That the various systems function as advertized and, as far as can be reasonably tested, they don't interfere with the proper function of the other installed systems. It also lays down limits on how it should be flown and those limits allow for some "flex" to build in a safety buffer. There's the baseline of your "safety" right there."
The problem is that "safety" is not absolute
If you asked an aeroengineer in 1920 what he considered "safe", it would be very different than if you asked one now.
Every shift in the baseline may save lives in accidents, but compromise effectiveness, so this needs to be incredibly closely monitored.
As I said before, the easy safety measures that were good bang-per-buck went a long time ago. We have just been throwing money and effectiveness down a well for 30 yrs.
I believe that the baseline of "safety" across all areas needs a very dramatic reset left.
The sine wave of safety has swung from very poor in the middle of last century where were were losing our ability to fight due to constant lose of men and machines, to a position now where we are too hamstrung to field competetive aircraft in affordable numbers.
Some of our platforms have become a shadow of what they could be due to regulatory silliness.
Tourist the Regulatory "silliness" that this thread is trying to explore is not the one that you propose. Far from your scenario of abject adherence to regulations that produce very little return in safety for ever increasing cost (which I think is your point) it is in contrast that the regulations were disregarded because of the cost/time factor that has led to a string of airworthiness related fatal military air accidents which have been the subject of numerous threads in this forum. Because the regulations were disregarded whole fleets have been compromised, as airworthiness provision cannot simply be switched off and on for it is a matter of continuous audit and principally of maintaining the build standard. If all this was done to maintain national security I can only say that it is now having quite the reverse effect. Of course we should conduct military operations in the most robust way possible, you are absolutely right. The problem is, as has been repeatedly pointed out, that becomes impossible if your aircraft spontaneously explodes because its fuel system was installed while contravening the regulations. That wasn't anything to do with our enemies or our determination to defeat them, but everything to do with decisions made at the highest levels years before and still not properly explored.