Haddon-Cave, Airworthiness, Sea King et al (merged)
Wally
For pity's sake please produce your evidence or give up.
Those who said the Mk2 was not airworthy produced their evidence and were proven correct, with Lord Philips confirming the crews were not allowed to rely on any navigation and communications systems, which meant the Release to Service was in every way illegal. Did your theory receive such a confirmation from the Review? If not, there may be an obvious reason.
At no time has anyone claimed the lack of airworthiness caused the crash.
For pity's sake please produce your evidence or give up.
Those who said the Mk2 was not airworthy produced their evidence and were proven correct, with Lord Philips confirming the crews were not allowed to rely on any navigation and communications systems, which meant the Release to Service was in every way illegal. Did your theory receive such a confirmation from the Review? If not, there may be an obvious reason.
At no time has anyone claimed the lack of airworthiness caused the crash.
Strange no one has commented on the MAA’s annual report. Assuming most aircrew here agree that avoiding wire strikes is rightfully high on their priority list, I think there should be immense concern over;
1. The technical solution was sought about 25 years ago through R&D.
2. MoD’s own scientists said the specification could be met with existing technology; they could immediately progress to full development. (From memory, the MoD sought to detect 3cm at about 1.5 miles and display on HUD, and were immediately offered 1cm at 3 miles – I’m probably a little out but you get the idea. Sorry, mixed imperial/metric but that was the way it was expressed).
3. Jump forward 20 years and in 2008 it is flagged as a high priority.
4. In 2011 the MAA report says it is still a high priority, with R&D still required.
Am I the only one who is thinking WTF’s going on?
MoD has a section responsible for delivering technology. It is surely unsatisfactory for the MAA report to simply note a long standing problem without offering some explanation. Their report would have been circulated in draft to, among others, the section responsible for overseeing technology development/delivery. That section has a self professed expert in this very field, having “worked” in the R&D section that delivered the above multi-function device, and who would surely have been expected to contribute his experience. Even if that device or technology had proved to be unsuitable, it is surely in the MAA’s interest to add a sentence explaining that they have actively explored solutions and have narrowed it down in a technological sense by omitting this technology or system. It would at least make it look as if the MAA were trying to do something. As it stands, the complete disconnect screams at you from every page.
This is not just about wire detection. This one issue encapsulates all that is wrong with “acquisition”. 25 years ago project managers didn’t have e-mail or PCs and had to make scores of phone calls to track down any possible R&D that would help them deliver. But 10 years ago there was a system whereby you simply typed in key words (like “wire” and “avoidance”) and any R&D programmes would pop up. It is called avoiding reinventing the wheel. The system seems never to have been used. The MAA seem frozen in time when it comes to practical implementation, but romping ahead with re-writing regulations which, while dated, sometimes complex and often contradictory, remained fit for purpose when used by trained staffs. Ah, trained staffs. MoD stopped doing that 20 years ago.
But, 2 years on, it seems little progress is being; this lack of practical experience means many are scared to sign anything. And, it has finally been recognised after 20 years of warnings that many with delegation had no right to it (or were self-appointed) so there are many fewer to do the same amount of work. These problems have not been caused by those who wanted airworthiness regulations enforced; they have been caused by those who didn’t. And that neatly gets us back to the above, and why key information has apparently been withheld from the MAA. I wonder if their boss ever asks whose actions brought this **** storm down on MoD and just who among his so called colleagues is working against him. He now knows the answer (as I know he reads pprune!).
What should be uppermost in the MAA’s mind is the answer to this question...... Could all the problems noted by the various Airworthiness Review Teams and Audits have been avoided by implementing existing airworthiness regulations?
YES, with the only real complication being the cultural and behavioural failings that manifested themselves as consistent rulings that implementing these regulations was a waste of money and an offence. (In fact, most could be avoided by implementing one key Def Stan, now cancelled without replacement. We now have 5 ARTs plus various audit reports and the similarities are there for all to see). It follows that this should be the starting point, but it has been conveniently swept under the carpet. The “new” regulations offer little hint that the old ones even existed. It wasn’t that the old ones were poor, it was that key senior staffs, especially the RAF Chief Engineer and CDP, oversaw a regime which refused to countenance them being implemented properly.
1. The technical solution was sought about 25 years ago through R&D.
2. MoD’s own scientists said the specification could be met with existing technology; they could immediately progress to full development. (From memory, the MoD sought to detect 3cm at about 1.5 miles and display on HUD, and were immediately offered 1cm at 3 miles – I’m probably a little out but you get the idea. Sorry, mixed imperial/metric but that was the way it was expressed).
3. Jump forward 20 years and in 2008 it is flagged as a high priority.
4. In 2011 the MAA report says it is still a high priority, with R&D still required.
Am I the only one who is thinking WTF’s going on?
MoD has a section responsible for delivering technology. It is surely unsatisfactory for the MAA report to simply note a long standing problem without offering some explanation. Their report would have been circulated in draft to, among others, the section responsible for overseeing technology development/delivery. That section has a self professed expert in this very field, having “worked” in the R&D section that delivered the above multi-function device, and who would surely have been expected to contribute his experience. Even if that device or technology had proved to be unsuitable, it is surely in the MAA’s interest to add a sentence explaining that they have actively explored solutions and have narrowed it down in a technological sense by omitting this technology or system. It would at least make it look as if the MAA were trying to do something. As it stands, the complete disconnect screams at you from every page.
This is not just about wire detection. This one issue encapsulates all that is wrong with “acquisition”. 25 years ago project managers didn’t have e-mail or PCs and had to make scores of phone calls to track down any possible R&D that would help them deliver. But 10 years ago there was a system whereby you simply typed in key words (like “wire” and “avoidance”) and any R&D programmes would pop up. It is called avoiding reinventing the wheel. The system seems never to have been used. The MAA seem frozen in time when it comes to practical implementation, but romping ahead with re-writing regulations which, while dated, sometimes complex and often contradictory, remained fit for purpose when used by trained staffs. Ah, trained staffs. MoD stopped doing that 20 years ago.
But, 2 years on, it seems little progress is being; this lack of practical experience means many are scared to sign anything. And, it has finally been recognised after 20 years of warnings that many with delegation had no right to it (or were self-appointed) so there are many fewer to do the same amount of work. These problems have not been caused by those who wanted airworthiness regulations enforced; they have been caused by those who didn’t. And that neatly gets us back to the above, and why key information has apparently been withheld from the MAA. I wonder if their boss ever asks whose actions brought this **** storm down on MoD and just who among his so called colleagues is working against him. He now knows the answer (as I know he reads pprune!).
What should be uppermost in the MAA’s mind is the answer to this question...... Could all the problems noted by the various Airworthiness Review Teams and Audits have been avoided by implementing existing airworthiness regulations?
YES, with the only real complication being the cultural and behavioural failings that manifested themselves as consistent rulings that implementing these regulations was a waste of money and an offence. (In fact, most could be avoided by implementing one key Def Stan, now cancelled without replacement. We now have 5 ARTs plus various audit reports and the similarities are there for all to see). It follows that this should be the starting point, but it has been conveniently swept under the carpet. The “new” regulations offer little hint that the old ones even existed. It wasn’t that the old ones were poor, it was that key senior staffs, especially the RAF Chief Engineer and CDP, oversaw a regime which refused to countenance them being implemented properly.
An informative and yet very depressing post, tuc, for it confirms what has been suspected ever since the MAA set about its task, that it brings with it the Brave New World of Air Safety, and that the Airworthiness calender has been reset to Year Zero. All that has gone before is reactionary and to be forgotten, only that which is now proclaimed is acceptable in their eyes. The only trouble of course is that it has everything to do with expediency, as they have no idea what went before as it was all jettisoned by the bean counters that preceded them, and nothing to do with Flight Safety which, particularly in the case of Airworthiness, is an evolutionary process that takes decades to build up though mere months to destroy.
So what is to be done? I see no other option than to remove the MAA from the MOD entirely. Having done that, the MAAIB should be removed from the MAA entirely, so that both are fully independent of the MOD and of each other. Then and only then can each set about regaining the levels of Airworthiness and Accident Investigation that have been so reduced by malevolent interference from the MOD and the RAF High Command. It would seem that the only practical way forward is for both the MAA and the MAAIB to be sistered with their respective civilian equivalents, the CAA and the AAIB, upon which they will have to lean heavily for the foreseeable future.
The MOD has to face up to the avoidable accidents and needless deaths that its gross negligence is responsible for. It is unlikely to do that while it still has a strangle hold on Airworthiness Provision and Air Accident Investigation.
So what is to be done? I see no other option than to remove the MAA from the MOD entirely. Having done that, the MAAIB should be removed from the MAA entirely, so that both are fully independent of the MOD and of each other. Then and only then can each set about regaining the levels of Airworthiness and Accident Investigation that have been so reduced by malevolent interference from the MOD and the RAF High Command. It would seem that the only practical way forward is for both the MAA and the MAAIB to be sistered with their respective civilian equivalents, the CAA and the AAIB, upon which they will have to lean heavily for the foreseeable future.
The MOD has to face up to the avoidable accidents and needless deaths that its gross negligence is responsible for. It is unlikely to do that while it still has a strangle hold on Airworthiness Provision and Air Accident Investigation.
Chug said:
"...the Airworthiness calender has been reset to Year Zero. All that has gone before is reactionary and to be forgotten, only that which is now proclaimed is acceptable in their eyes."
Unfortunately very apparent in the new world MAA. I afraid the MAA is giving out signals of ignorance instead of intelligence. I'm not sure if they think there is some sort of Licence Fee to pay if they use a used/known system?
Take the ARC requirement for instance: A known system working world-wide, but the MAA can't accept that. Last year, one of their ilk had spent months finding out (through internet searches) how other nations, and some armed services, review the continuing airworthiness of their systems (only to proclaim "They're all doing the same stuff"). A phone call could have answered that in two minutes.
I am led to believe they are still no clearer in what is required for their ARC's or how to conduct them?
When they finally reveal what they want done for ARC assurance - I am sure it will involve some additional burocracy (it takes two or three signatures in civvy street) and new posts for officers doing what NCO's or SNCOs should actually do.
In a diminishing world of diminishing manpower it is always wise to increase complexity and burocracy and enable ambiguity.
"...the Airworthiness calender has been reset to Year Zero. All that has gone before is reactionary and to be forgotten, only that which is now proclaimed is acceptable in their eyes."
Unfortunately very apparent in the new world MAA. I afraid the MAA is giving out signals of ignorance instead of intelligence. I'm not sure if they think there is some sort of Licence Fee to pay if they use a used/known system?
Take the ARC requirement for instance: A known system working world-wide, but the MAA can't accept that. Last year, one of their ilk had spent months finding out (through internet searches) how other nations, and some armed services, review the continuing airworthiness of their systems (only to proclaim "They're all doing the same stuff"). A phone call could have answered that in two minutes.
I am led to believe they are still no clearer in what is required for their ARC's or how to conduct them?
When they finally reveal what they want done for ARC assurance - I am sure it will involve some additional burocracy (it takes two or three signatures in civvy street) and new posts for officers doing what NCO's or SNCOs should actually do.
In a diminishing world of diminishing manpower it is always wise to increase complexity and burocracy and enable ambiguity.
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[quote]I am led to believe they are still no clearer in what is required for their ARC's or how to conduct them?
When they finally reveal what they want done for ARC assurance - I am sure it will involve some additional burocracy (it takes two or three signatures in civvy street) and new posts for officers doing what NCO's or SNCOs should actually do. [/
I am a C certifier, hold an A and C and Part M licence and do the lot, so there is only one signatory in my case, I do the work, assess the amount of work required, the airworthiness requirements and comply with them and issue the ARC for the aircraft, one Civi Siggie, all be it written out multiple times..
Before you all jump onboard the civilian system as the way fwd, I am now looking at changing the maintainence programmes again, the third change in under 5 years because EASA bimbles from one seeming cock up to another, it is run by Bureaucrat who appear to have no engineering experience...
When they finally reveal what they want done for ARC assurance - I am sure it will involve some additional burocracy (it takes two or three signatures in civvy street) and new posts for officers doing what NCO's or SNCOs should actually do. [/
I am a C certifier, hold an A and C and Part M licence and do the lot, so there is only one signatory in my case, I do the work, assess the amount of work required, the airworthiness requirements and comply with them and issue the ARC for the aircraft, one Civi Siggie, all be it written out multiple times..
Before you all jump onboard the civilian system as the way fwd, I am now looking at changing the maintainence programmes again, the third change in under 5 years because EASA bimbles from one seeming cock up to another, it is run by Bureaucrat who appear to have no engineering experience...
Last edited by NutLoose; 3rd Mar 2012 at 22:06.
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MAA& MAAIB
Well said Tuc and Chug,
I remain astounded at the continuing unacceptable Airworthiness state in the Air Force, reflected in the various internal RAF Airworthiness Review Teams’ reports that have noted similar systemic Airworthiness failures situations across various fleets, such as Chinook, Nimrod, Hercules, Tornado, Sea King, et al; causing airworthiness-related accidents that unnecessarily killed over 60 people.
MoD applauds the achievements of the so-called independent MAA and MAAIB but cannot see that it is deluded in believing what it states; thinking the world out there accepts or believes what they propound.
I can only reiterate a parallel call for a fully independent MAA and MAAIB, totally removed from any MoD influence; an influence that continues to defend, indeed cloud, the abysmal result of years of Airworthiness incompetence, going back to the 1980s.
A truly free MAA is needed, able to operate without any MoD influence whatsoever. It would clean-up the ongoing mess and recover from the present problematic common Airworthiness failings situation; without being fettered by those who are still protecting the recent past leaders who can be thanked for this situation.
A really independent MAAIB would hopefully be able to investigate accidents without a repeat of the debacle that followed the Chinook Mull of Kintyre crash, compounded by the Reviewing Officers’ interferences. It took 17 years to clear the pilots, but as yet no one has addressed satisfactorily the Airworthiness aspects of the Chinook Mk2 at the time of its deployment into Service without the vital full Airworthiness clearance. It is essential to make sure that such a situation never reoccurs.
Ralph Kohn FRAeS
I remain astounded at the continuing unacceptable Airworthiness state in the Air Force, reflected in the various internal RAF Airworthiness Review Teams’ reports that have noted similar systemic Airworthiness failures situations across various fleets, such as Chinook, Nimrod, Hercules, Tornado, Sea King, et al; causing airworthiness-related accidents that unnecessarily killed over 60 people.
MoD applauds the achievements of the so-called independent MAA and MAAIB but cannot see that it is deluded in believing what it states; thinking the world out there accepts or believes what they propound.
I can only reiterate a parallel call for a fully independent MAA and MAAIB, totally removed from any MoD influence; an influence that continues to defend, indeed cloud, the abysmal result of years of Airworthiness incompetence, going back to the 1980s.
A truly free MAA is needed, able to operate without any MoD influence whatsoever. It would clean-up the ongoing mess and recover from the present problematic common Airworthiness failings situation; without being fettered by those who are still protecting the recent past leaders who can be thanked for this situation.
A really independent MAAIB would hopefully be able to investigate accidents without a repeat of the debacle that followed the Chinook Mull of Kintyre crash, compounded by the Reviewing Officers’ interferences. It took 17 years to clear the pilots, but as yet no one has addressed satisfactorily the Airworthiness aspects of the Chinook Mk2 at the time of its deployment into Service without the vital full Airworthiness clearance. It is essential to make sure that such a situation never reoccurs.
Ralph Kohn FRAeS
Nutloose:
"I am a C certifier, hold an A and C and Part M licence"
I assume you maintain military aircraft under PFI company rules - or you maintain privately-owned puddle-jumpers that might still use your BCAR A&C? - potentially looking forward to your new B3...
If you are an LAE you seem to be poorly informed of the titles of your qualifications - and would describe yourself as a Part 66 CAT C or CAT B1 & C with sub-part G authorisations.
FYI - there is no "Part M licence" in civvy strasse.
...and the 2nd sig for an ARC is the Authority's.
"I am a C certifier, hold an A and C and Part M licence"
I assume you maintain military aircraft under PFI company rules - or you maintain privately-owned puddle-jumpers that might still use your BCAR A&C? - potentially looking forward to your new B3...
If you are an LAE you seem to be poorly informed of the titles of your qualifications - and would describe yourself as a Part 66 CAT C or CAT B1 & C with sub-part G authorisations.
FYI - there is no "Part M licence" in civvy strasse.
...and the 2nd sig for an ARC is the Authority's.
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DECU Connectors
Under SI/Chinook/57 DECU connectors were marked with a white witness mark across both connector and DECU receptacles. This was carried out in order to check for unwinding of the connector. It is undertsood from the DECU manufacture that this was changed, and a white line was marked around the DECU receptical. Can anyone confirm that this is the current method of marking?
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AEOs & Relevance of the Nimrod Review to New Buys!
Enlightening discussion, all of this.
Though, Engines, when on exchange in the UK, an AEO was known as an Air Electronics Officer on the Nimrods (sometimes referred to as "Air Eating Officers" but don't quite know why).
Have a lot of time for the works of Mr Haddon-Cave, QC. Certainly knows his stuff and doesn't pull any punches.
Also think his works have a lot of relevance to future acquisition programs and that I am not alone in thinking this, as do some others.
F-35 JSF Program: Assessment of Top Level Programmatic Risks
Though, Engines, when on exchange in the UK, an AEO was known as an Air Electronics Officer on the Nimrods (sometimes referred to as "Air Eating Officers" but don't quite know why).
Have a lot of time for the works of Mr Haddon-Cave, QC. Certainly knows his stuff and doesn't pull any punches.
Also think his works have a lot of relevance to future acquisition programs and that I am not alone in thinking this, as do some others.
F-35 JSF Program: Assessment of Top Level Programmatic Risks
I didn't want to start a new Chinook thread. In any case this is the appropriate thread. I recommend this updated version of Susan Phoenix's book which adds a post-Chinook Inquiry chapter and includes links to the new evidence submitted to Philips. The bit I found disturbing was her being lied to by MoD only to receive an apology from a Minister after she reported the lie to Philips. As a legal eagle I don't suppose he was amused.
