Haddon-Cave, Airworthiness, Sea King et al (merged)
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Is there a correct legal definiton of Operations, Combat or Battle?
Even Rigga's 'Combat Zone', as a definition, may be clouding things a bit, as admin moves/support work can be done in a combat zone by people not under direct military threat - without the urgency or immediacy of battle conditions - in this case, their ac must be fit for the job they are doing.
This is a very grey area for sure and one that will tax the legal lot a tad! However, might it not be better to define 'combat operations' as
'Under direct attack by the enemy, IN BATTLE'.
In any other situation, to lose an ac because of a lack of airworthiness is doing our enemies' job for them...surely?
As an example, an Apache/Tornado providing covering fire for our own troops would, of course, be 'in combat' - as would be an SH or AT 'Medevac' in a firefight. Whereas an adminstrative/logistical move of personnel/equipment in SH or AT, even in the 'badlands', would not necessarily be 'in combat'.
In my opinion, I do not consider our flying in and out of AFG in Hercs, Tristars and C-17s etc as 'combat' per se. Dangerous, risky and perhaps stupid, yes - but not combat. And as such, the crews (and, most importantly, their passengers) should be able to trust that 'the system' would ensure that the aircraft was both airworthy and fit for purpose before ordering, authorising and conducting such ops - without infringing one's human right to life.
Interestingly enough, although the Human Rights Act may not apply in combat, the Health & Safety at Work Act may do - as MoD policy has makes no distinction between ops or not! Perhaps someone could explain that one?
Even Rigga's 'Combat Zone', as a definition, may be clouding things a bit, as admin moves/support work can be done in a combat zone by people not under direct military threat - without the urgency or immediacy of battle conditions - in this case, their ac must be fit for the job they are doing.
This is a very grey area for sure and one that will tax the legal lot a tad! However, might it not be better to define 'combat operations' as
'Under direct attack by the enemy, IN BATTLE'.
In any other situation, to lose an ac because of a lack of airworthiness is doing our enemies' job for them...surely?
As an example, an Apache/Tornado providing covering fire for our own troops would, of course, be 'in combat' - as would be an SH or AT 'Medevac' in a firefight. Whereas an adminstrative/logistical move of personnel/equipment in SH or AT, even in the 'badlands', would not necessarily be 'in combat'.
In my opinion, I do not consider our flying in and out of AFG in Hercs, Tristars and C-17s etc as 'combat' per se. Dangerous, risky and perhaps stupid, yes - but not combat. And as such, the crews (and, most importantly, their passengers) should be able to trust that 'the system' would ensure that the aircraft was both airworthy and fit for purpose before ordering, authorising and conducting such ops - without infringing one's human right to life.
Interestingly enough, although the Human Rights Act may not apply in combat, the Health & Safety at Work Act may do - as MoD policy has makes no distinction between ops or not! Perhaps someone could explain that one?
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I've recently seen some post-Haddon Cave AP Amendments
The documents have 'to the best of my knowledge' and 'as far as I am aware' inserted above the signature block.
That's progress for you. Legal get-outs on airwothiness documents.
Maybe we should employ people who know what they're doing.
The documents have 'to the best of my knowledge' and 'as far as I am aware' inserted above the signature block.
That's progress for you. Legal get-outs on airwothiness documents.
Maybe we should employ people who know what they're doing.
SPHLC
In a perverse way, this IS progress. Those who sign these documents (and for other components of airworthiness) are now acutely aware the baseline is so untrustworthy, so dated, they cannot be sure that what they are adding is valid.
Companies have been doing this on MoD contracts for decades - prefacing the contract with a caveat that the design is Under Ministry Control and, because MoD acknowledge they have not maintained the design (although Adam Ingram denied this when advised of the problems before the Nimrod crash), there is an assumption the design is safe - but if it turns out it isn't, it is MoD's liability.
"All" Haddon-Cave did was recognise this simple fact and bring it to the fore.
As you imply, how MoD copes with this legacy of negligence is the big question. From what you say, it would seem they haven't been funded to retrospectively update the publications. They never are - for example, there is a 3 year gap in many AP amendments from 1990-93. In another simple example, Merlin entered service in the 90s with over 50 modifications missing from the Topic 2 of a single LRU, making it impossible to repair said unit to specification. It is a huge task and I don't think the MAA have the will to fix it - flagging the problem up would merely implicate staffs who have simply changed post title and are in the MAA, and past senior officers.
That's progress for you. Legal get-outs on airworthiness documents.
Companies have been doing this on MoD contracts for decades - prefacing the contract with a caveat that the design is Under Ministry Control and, because MoD acknowledge they have not maintained the design (although Adam Ingram denied this when advised of the problems before the Nimrod crash), there is an assumption the design is safe - but if it turns out it isn't, it is MoD's liability.
"All" Haddon-Cave did was recognise this simple fact and bring it to the fore.
As you imply, how MoD copes with this legacy of negligence is the big question. From what you say, it would seem they haven't been funded to retrospectively update the publications. They never are - for example, there is a 3 year gap in many AP amendments from 1990-93. In another simple example, Merlin entered service in the 90s with over 50 modifications missing from the Topic 2 of a single LRU, making it impossible to repair said unit to specification. It is a huge task and I don't think the MAA have the will to fix it - flagging the problem up would merely implicate staffs who have simply changed post title and are in the MAA, and past senior officers.
SPHL:
Even if those weasel words had been included in the RTS of the Chinook HC2 or the Nimrod Mk2 they would still have been lies. Now it would seem that the legal position for those who sign for one of Her Majesty's aircraft pre-flight is on the basis of "Caveat Emptor", as it will only be airworthy "as far as I am aware". Feeling lucky? The more the "system" tries to accommodate itself to the consequences of its very own actions, the more it will be seen as a mass of hopeless contradictions. No magic wand will make the UK Military Fleet airworthy again. The very least the crews that fly them are owed is that Airworthiness be in independent and competent hands with the power and will to ground aircraft when necessary. The MAA, as presently constituted, does not meet that very least requirement.
Self Regulation never works and in Aviation it Kills!
'to the best of my knowledge' and 'as far as I am aware'
Self Regulation never works and in Aviation it Kills!
Never be airworthy again – pish!
For instance, a key submission was made in 2000 to DPA's Deputy Chief Executive (3 Star) making some detailed recommendations. DCE did not reply.
What is inescapable is that if one read H-C first, you are left asking "How do we implement these recommendations". But if one read the old submission first, and implemented the recommendations, H-C would have been unnecessary. Some may sneer at this, but the fact remains Adam Ingram was warned, in writing, of the failures reiterated by H-C - many months BEFORE XV230 crashed. He was advised by MoD to reject this warning, which he did 9 months AFTER the crash. That very simple, irrefutable fact, is the most damning thing about this tragedy.
Tuc said:
"No magic wand will make the UK Military Fleet airworthy again."
Neither is there a fairy godmother to do it.
Almost ALL the RAFs aircraft can be made airworthy - but they will need willpower and some funding (groan)
To make something as "small" as one Tornado airworthy will take approx two years to plan, act, check and issue an Airworthiness Certificate (and its first ARC if thats your aim)
First, you have to identify and plan the maintenance of major and even some minor components and get them all overhauled to a point when you can reliably state their known condition.
Second, the chosen aircraft is taken into Base maintenance for a Major Check. All components are stripped and sent for overhaul (for the next aircraft in), all repairs are checked for correct rivets, metal specs and Drawing compliance. A full structural integrity survey is carried out and defects repaired iaw OEM standards. An Ageing Aircraft survey is conducted alongside and elecrical integrity check, etc, etc.
Finally, all known-condition components are installed and all systems tested iaw OEM instructions including Check Flights.
All the aircraft and components documentation is retained for future reference/audit/investigation - for at least the In-Service-Life of the aircraft plus two years.
Once you have a full aircraft with known components and confirmed history start points (because all the previous historic documents are likely to have been thrown away iaw MOD rules!) a kind CAA surveyor MAY issue an Airworthiness Certificate...
And then, of course, after all that hard work, the aircraft returns to the Line for their "care and attention to accurate documentary detail"... Oh well...You can take a Horse to water...
Maybe the MAA do have the right attitude to Military maintenance standards?
Anyone got some really thin Paste for this cheap wallpaper?
"No magic wand will make the UK Military Fleet airworthy again."
Neither is there a fairy godmother to do it.
Almost ALL the RAFs aircraft can be made airworthy - but they will need willpower and some funding (groan)
To make something as "small" as one Tornado airworthy will take approx two years to plan, act, check and issue an Airworthiness Certificate (and its first ARC if thats your aim)
First, you have to identify and plan the maintenance of major and even some minor components and get them all overhauled to a point when you can reliably state their known condition.
Second, the chosen aircraft is taken into Base maintenance for a Major Check. All components are stripped and sent for overhaul (for the next aircraft in), all repairs are checked for correct rivets, metal specs and Drawing compliance. A full structural integrity survey is carried out and defects repaired iaw OEM standards. An Ageing Aircraft survey is conducted alongside and elecrical integrity check, etc, etc.
Finally, all known-condition components are installed and all systems tested iaw OEM instructions including Check Flights.
All the aircraft and components documentation is retained for future reference/audit/investigation - for at least the In-Service-Life of the aircraft plus two years.
Once you have a full aircraft with known components and confirmed history start points (because all the previous historic documents are likely to have been thrown away iaw MOD rules!) a kind CAA surveyor MAY issue an Airworthiness Certificate...
And then, of course, after all that hard work, the aircraft returns to the Line for their "care and attention to accurate documentary detail"... Oh well...You can take a Horse to water...
Maybe the MAA do have the right attitude to Military maintenance standards?
Anyone got some really thin Paste for this cheap wallpaper?
Rigga:
Actually I said it Rigga, but thank you for at least showing that I never used the word never! Neither do you I notice, but nevertheless you give your list of requirements for a CAA CofA. Fair enough and point taken, but as you will know and as no doubt others are about to remind you in short order, this thread is about Military Airworthiness, not Civil. That still means that the UK Military Airworthiness Regulations need to be fully applied again! Easy to say but not so easy to do, but stage one must be that application be truly independent. As I have posted before, if BA (or any other airline) were in charge of enforcing its own airworthiness regulations rather than complying with those of an independent regulator as now, I doubt if they'd attract many, if any, pax. Gnd tells us to put our faith in ALARP as we're (or in my case, were?) rough tough military, not numpty softy civvies (well OK he didn't, please excuse the artistic license). This has got nothing to do with military mores, but with avoiding needless waste of people and planes, so that there are more of both available to do the rough tough stuff. However, some very senior officers decided that was all too costly and took far too long. They have been shown to have been very very wrong, and it's time they were made to account for that.
Tuc said:
"No magic wand will make the UK Military Fleet airworthy again."
"No magic wand will make the UK Military Fleet airworthy again."
"So you're talking about assessing each aircraft against................?"
...The designed standards required by the Maintenance Manuals and the OEM to assure that the aircraft actually works as designed/expected.
There is nothing to stop the MAA (and the OEM) at any time recalculating the original and additional stresses and strains imposed by heavy modification programmes to produce revised Type Certificate Data Sheets (Possibly what you refer to as the Release To Service) Isn't that what happened to the Bucc?
However, to clarify things, Role/Mission Equipment includes items that may only affect "airworthiness" through changes to flying/handling properties, electrical load shifts or major structural changes affecting strength or airflow.
And yes, BBG, civil or military - the principles for airworthiness achievement are the same.
and again, it is nice to see some signs of "considered" responsibility at the top appearing in Manuals - Maybe the mist is clearing? - and they can now see the Tsunami coming their way.
G'Nite
...The designed standards required by the Maintenance Manuals and the OEM to assure that the aircraft actually works as designed/expected.
There is nothing to stop the MAA (and the OEM) at any time recalculating the original and additional stresses and strains imposed by heavy modification programmes to produce revised Type Certificate Data Sheets (Possibly what you refer to as the Release To Service) Isn't that what happened to the Bucc?
However, to clarify things, Role/Mission Equipment includes items that may only affect "airworthiness" through changes to flying/handling properties, electrical load shifts or major structural changes affecting strength or airflow.
And yes, BBG, civil or military - the principles for airworthiness achievement are the same.
and again, it is nice to see some signs of "considered" responsibility at the top appearing in Manuals - Maybe the mist is clearing? - and they can now see the Tsunami coming their way.
G'Nite
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I have watched this debate with great interest because my day job involves sustaining the continued airworthiness of a worldwide civil fleet of over 1000 aircraft of various types.
Rigga is right about the maintenance actions that might be needed to re-establish the airworthiness of an individual aircraft if its integrity is in doubt. However, before that work can be carried out there must be a design audit of the type, which is where BGG is coming from.
It is all very well pulling off all the bits from the aircraft and replacing them with overhauled items, but before that can be done the integrity of the overhaul procedures must be established. So must the sources of spare parts, especially so-called alternatives, many of which seem to get approved by a storeman and not by a design assessment process carried out by engineers.
It is only after some form of design audit has been carried out that Rigga's checks can start. I'm not sure that I can get my head around doing a design audit on a modern military aircraft type - even the prospect of doing that on one of my little civvy puddle jumpers is daunting.
If there is any doubt that the integrity of an aircraft type has been compromised then that design audit must be carried out. The question remains - can the type be allowed to continue flying until that work is completed? An external regulator like a CAA will make sure that the right decisions are taken. I fear that a self-regulator may not be remote enough from the command chain to have the bottle to do that.
Edit: have just seen Rigga's most recent post:
A key outcome of a design audit will, of course, be any required revision of the aircraft data set so that those in the field are working with correct, up-to-date and accurate data. Moreover, it is so important for the staff in the field to feed back to the designers what they find when they carry out thie work, be it unapproved repairs, unapproved modifications, new faults or errors in the aircraft data set. Without this whole loop working as one, continued airworthiness cannot be assured.
Rigga is right about the maintenance actions that might be needed to re-establish the airworthiness of an individual aircraft if its integrity is in doubt. However, before that work can be carried out there must be a design audit of the type, which is where BGG is coming from.
It is all very well pulling off all the bits from the aircraft and replacing them with overhauled items, but before that can be done the integrity of the overhaul procedures must be established. So must the sources of spare parts, especially so-called alternatives, many of which seem to get approved by a storeman and not by a design assessment process carried out by engineers.
It is only after some form of design audit has been carried out that Rigga's checks can start. I'm not sure that I can get my head around doing a design audit on a modern military aircraft type - even the prospect of doing that on one of my little civvy puddle jumpers is daunting.
If there is any doubt that the integrity of an aircraft type has been compromised then that design audit must be carried out. The question remains - can the type be allowed to continue flying until that work is completed? An external regulator like a CAA will make sure that the right decisions are taken. I fear that a self-regulator may not be remote enough from the command chain to have the bottle to do that.
Edit: have just seen Rigga's most recent post:
A key outcome of a design audit will, of course, be any required revision of the aircraft data set so that those in the field are working with correct, up-to-date and accurate data. Moreover, it is so important for the staff in the field to feed back to the designers what they find when they carry out thie work, be it unapproved repairs, unapproved modifications, new faults or errors in the aircraft data set. Without this whole loop working as one, continued airworthiness cannot be assured.
Last edited by Mandator; 2nd Aug 2010 at 23:57.
Good, considered posts.
This was one of the recommendations I spoke of from 2000 (it is all mandated anyway), which repeated those from 91, 92 ......... In 2002 I was asked to present on this to a certain IPT. I was shouted down by the entire IPT, bar one old hand who had worked in D/Air Arm. "We don't do this. A complete waste of money". You've got to get past this ingrained ethos. Some of those who sat in front of me are now quite senior in DE&S (but, hopefully, not in the MAA which would be catastrophic).
To the issues raised by Rigga and BGG. They are complementary. I look at it this way (because I was taught to). There are core airworthiness components that are not volume related - they cost the same whether you have one or one thousand aircraft. Then there are volume related issues, like serviceability of a fleet. The former is a pre-requisite to the latter. A simple example is an accurate and maintained Aircraft Publication (the cost of printing isn't in the core - that delivers Camera Ready Copy, which is the boundary for output regardless of quantity).
It is vital that the monies are kept separate so that, if there is a fleet reduction, then proportionate cuts are not applied to the core.
A simple little concept but absolutely fundamental. The separate pot of money always makes you think - What is this for? Why is it so special that it is kept separate? The questions make you stop and think, daily, about airworthiness.
The basic problem stems from a FY 1990/91 decision to lump the two together, so that the fixed core took a hit every time there was an "efficiency" saving or fleet reduction - of which there have been many. In fact, what happened was the ability to maintain and sustain airworthiness was eroded in a series of large chunks over the next three years.
The MAA needs people who understand these real basics otherwise the "sustainability" is forfeited for short term gains (like caveats in APs). I sincerely doubt if they have anyone remotely junior enough to know all this. Their senior staffs will regard such detail as beneath them. That only washes if you have someone properly trained to delegate the detail to - a concept almost entirely lost on today's managers and leaders, because most of them haven't attained that experience themselves. Unfortunately, you can now count on one hand those in MoD who have direct experience of having done this properly.
A key outcome of a design audit will, of course, be any required revision of the aircraft data set so that those in the field are working with correct, up-to-date and accurate data. Moreover, it is so important for the staff in the field to feed back to the designers what they find when they carry out the work, be it unapproved repairs, unapproved modifications, new faults or errors in the aircraft data set. Without this whole loop working as one, continued airworthiness cannot be assured.
To the issues raised by Rigga and BGG. They are complementary. I look at it this way (because I was taught to). There are core airworthiness components that are not volume related - they cost the same whether you have one or one thousand aircraft. Then there are volume related issues, like serviceability of a fleet. The former is a pre-requisite to the latter. A simple example is an accurate and maintained Aircraft Publication (the cost of printing isn't in the core - that delivers Camera Ready Copy, which is the boundary for output regardless of quantity).
It is vital that the monies are kept separate so that, if there is a fleet reduction, then proportionate cuts are not applied to the core.
A simple little concept but absolutely fundamental. The separate pot of money always makes you think - What is this for? Why is it so special that it is kept separate? The questions make you stop and think, daily, about airworthiness.
The basic problem stems from a FY 1990/91 decision to lump the two together, so that the fixed core took a hit every time there was an "efficiency" saving or fleet reduction - of which there have been many. In fact, what happened was the ability to maintain and sustain airworthiness was eroded in a series of large chunks over the next three years.
The MAA needs people who understand these real basics otherwise the "sustainability" is forfeited for short term gains (like caveats in APs). I sincerely doubt if they have anyone remotely junior enough to know all this. Their senior staffs will regard such detail as beneath them. That only washes if you have someone properly trained to delegate the detail to - a concept almost entirely lost on today's managers and leaders, because most of them haven't attained that experience themselves. Unfortunately, you can now count on one hand those in MoD who have direct experience of having done this properly.
BGG:
Absolutely accepted, but this situation is peculiar to the entire Military Air Fleet. I cannot believe that the CAA would ever have caused such a massive problem with the Civilian one. In practical terms there is no way that the entire Military Fleet can be grounded whilst Rigga's process is carried out. This will take decades to put behind us even if we start right now. Some fleets will be compromised right up to withdrawal (indeed one already has been). So huge decisions will be needed about what flies and what doesn't and why, and where, and when. Those decisions must be made by the very best airworthiness professionals available, albeit in close consultation with the MOD. Bottom line is though they can say no to the MOD and mean it. This is plain chicken and egg, I cannot see how you can have the one without already ensuring the other, so when you say:
I would simply reply that you won't have a sensible discussion if it is not predicated with the vital need for a seperate and independent MAA.
Chug, the points that Rigga made are still valid even though he refers to a civil model.
I can't disagree with your sentiments, but it does tend to distract from any other sensible discussion.
First, Many thanks to Mandator for clarifying BBGs points so well - even I understand it now! (Do I know you?)
In the civil world we have ETOPS aircraft and non-ETOPS aircraft.
Often worked on by the same (Ground and Flight) staff but the work is conducted using a separate ethos in the care of ETOPS with specific regard to certain checks and standards, all of which are to maintain levels of redundancy within specific systems and components using timely and accurate process adherances in actions and documentation.
These methods, developed to improve Twin Engined aircraft reliability for flights over large distances without suitable support, are so effective that many multi-engined aircraft types have also now adopted the rules and also improved their reliability.
I don't see any reason for not applying these types of practice changes to military maintenance while fleets go through their programmes of certification conversions - indeed to practice the new policies for all the fleets would help with subsequent Airworthiness Reviews and certifications.
If there is a "real" reason to fly (such as in a war for instance) then this would be DECLARED as an "Uncontrolled Environment" and any missing maintenance could be performed or re-checked on re-entry to a "Controlled Environment". It also requires honesty and willingness by all to operate with all the books open (no secret-squirrel domains)
Trouble is - this "dream" means that ALL the maintenance staff (IPT, EngO, SNCOs, Lineys and even Contractors) sticking to the rules and waiting for queries to be answered before allowing crews to punch holes in clouds.
The details quoted are civil but the practices can easily be adopted with a bit of willpower and some decent leadership. They cost nothing but training sessions, supervision and the enforcement of intended standards by REGULATORS, who know what is needed and what tricks are used to get around it, not short-term career climbers or long-term pension seekers.
As I stated before, there is no reason to cut short any maintenance checks - except for REAL reasons (and excercises at home or abroad aren't one of them)
...Rant over.
In the civil world we have ETOPS aircraft and non-ETOPS aircraft.
Often worked on by the same (Ground and Flight) staff but the work is conducted using a separate ethos in the care of ETOPS with specific regard to certain checks and standards, all of which are to maintain levels of redundancy within specific systems and components using timely and accurate process adherances in actions and documentation.
These methods, developed to improve Twin Engined aircraft reliability for flights over large distances without suitable support, are so effective that many multi-engined aircraft types have also now adopted the rules and also improved their reliability.
I don't see any reason for not applying these types of practice changes to military maintenance while fleets go through their programmes of certification conversions - indeed to practice the new policies for all the fleets would help with subsequent Airworthiness Reviews and certifications.
If there is a "real" reason to fly (such as in a war for instance) then this would be DECLARED as an "Uncontrolled Environment" and any missing maintenance could be performed or re-checked on re-entry to a "Controlled Environment". It also requires honesty and willingness by all to operate with all the books open (no secret-squirrel domains)
Trouble is - this "dream" means that ALL the maintenance staff (IPT, EngO, SNCOs, Lineys and even Contractors) sticking to the rules and waiting for queries to be answered before allowing crews to punch holes in clouds.
The details quoted are civil but the practices can easily be adopted with a bit of willpower and some decent leadership. They cost nothing but training sessions, supervision and the enforcement of intended standards by REGULATORS, who know what is needed and what tricks are used to get around it, not short-term career climbers or long-term pension seekers.
As I stated before, there is no reason to cut short any maintenance checks - except for REAL reasons (and excercises at home or abroad aren't one of them)
...Rant over.
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If there is a "real" reason to fly (such as in a war for instance) then this would be DECLARED as an "Uncontrolled Environment" and any missing maintenance could be performed or re-checked on re-entry to a "Controlled Environment". It also requires honesty and willingness by all to operate with all the books open (no secret-squirrel domains)
This to me is ALARP and the way forward - even Mr H-C seems to think so? Does that revoke the AW or MAR cert?
any missing maintenance could be performed or re-checked on re-entry to a "Controlled Environment".
Rigga
The details quoted are civil but the practices can easily be adopted with a bit of willpower and some decent leadership. They cost nothing but training sessions, supervision and the enforcement of intended standards by REGULATORS, who know what is needed and what tricks are used to get around it, not short-term career climbers or long-term pension seekers.
Tuc:
"Agreed. So, given the composition of MoD, you're advocating a totally independent MAA?"
Abso-Bloody-Lutely!
The minimum requirement for an effective "Competent Authority" is one with Teeth to enforce the standards required right from the start; to avoid individual and spurious interpretation of the rules; and to prevent independant officers (or contractors) from imposing their own standards for fleets of aircraft operations and maintenance.
Only this sort of direct and positive intervention can avoid the poor standards of today continuing into the new "regime". Evenso, the bleed of present standards into the future will take years to get corrected.
The only reason for not installing a fully independant authority is the ability of MOD to quietly corrupt it as time goes on and the reason for doing the right things becomes lost in budget arguments again.
The present proposition, of a breast-fed authority, can only result in yet more Chinooks, Sea Kings, Hercs, Nimrods, Torpedoes, Typhoons or F35s producing more unhappy relatives...
An independant authority will produce more hassle, but less accidents.
"Agreed. So, given the composition of MoD, you're advocating a totally independent MAA?"
Abso-Bloody-Lutely!
The minimum requirement for an effective "Competent Authority" is one with Teeth to enforce the standards required right from the start; to avoid individual and spurious interpretation of the rules; and to prevent independant officers (or contractors) from imposing their own standards for fleets of aircraft operations and maintenance.
Only this sort of direct and positive intervention can avoid the poor standards of today continuing into the new "regime". Evenso, the bleed of present standards into the future will take years to get corrected.
The only reason for not installing a fully independant authority is the ability of MOD to quietly corrupt it as time goes on and the reason for doing the right things becomes lost in budget arguments again.
The present proposition, of a breast-fed authority, can only result in yet more Chinooks, Sea Kings, Hercs, Nimrods, Torpedoes, Typhoons or F35s producing more unhappy relatives...
An independant authority will produce more hassle, but less accidents.
Rigga:
Nail, hammer; hammer, nail; just like that! 
An independant authority will produce more hassle, but less accidents.
Tappers Dad,
So unfair! You dangle that carrot in front of us, and it is only a "may have some news in the next few weeks to share with you", so we might not learn anything! Harsh!
I sincerely hope you will have some gems for us!
So unfair! You dangle that carrot in front of us, and it is only a "may have some news in the next few weeks to share with you", so we might not learn anything! Harsh!
I sincerely hope you will have some gems for us!
MAA
Short Interview with Director General of Military Aviation Authority.
First briefing for authority set up after fatal Nimrod crash | British Forces News
He doesn't say much, but omits something very important. In stating that MoD were not "joined up" and didn't manage from "cradle to grave" (implying they now do), he conveniently omits that MoD used to do precisely that until, for example, the specialist airworthiness sections and committees mandated by Secy of State, and which comprised the bulk of MoD's expertise and held most of their corporate knowledge (both important airworthiness components) were disbanded in 1993 by the RAF. Nor does he say that numerous recommendations to resurrect such a system were ignored throughout the 90s/early 00s, and it took this tragedy to drag MoD screaming into the 80s.
Nevertheless, the MAA now exists and they need our support. But without acknowledging the above, how do we know they are not simply reinventing the wheel?
First briefing for authority set up after fatal Nimrod crash | British Forces News
He doesn't say much, but omits something very important. In stating that MoD were not "joined up" and didn't manage from "cradle to grave" (implying they now do), he conveniently omits that MoD used to do precisely that until, for example, the specialist airworthiness sections and committees mandated by Secy of State, and which comprised the bulk of MoD's expertise and held most of their corporate knowledge (both important airworthiness components) were disbanded in 1993 by the RAF. Nor does he say that numerous recommendations to resurrect such a system were ignored throughout the 90s/early 00s, and it took this tragedy to drag MoD screaming into the 80s.
Nevertheless, the MAA now exists and they need our support. But without acknowledging the above, how do we know they are not simply reinventing the wheel?