Haddon-Cave, Airworthiness, Sea King et al (merged)
Engines,
Thanks for you comments, and I understand exactly where you are coming from - and in 'normal' circumstances I would wholeheartedly agree, recommend and support your thoughts.
In your STF experience story you relate to the time when you joined that establishment and found the errant STF's. I would assume that at that time there was no War or Conflict? And that is when I would fully agree with you.
During times of War or Conflict however, there may be a need for drastic actions to be taken and some of these may involve trying some new ideas - and very quickly too.
Also in these times of conflict there is a move to military rules (Martial Law) and under Martial Law almost anything can happen, good or bad, and overruling "Normal" rules.
It is in these times AND places of Martial Law that the rules for testing URGENT operational requirements can be waived. The 1st line of your last Post said "ANY modification has to be adequately tested and cleared..." It is that "adequacy" that can be challenged during operational needs.
BUT! - Before those go-getters start crying for Val-Halla - In my translation of these rules - On return to "normal" Rules or "normal" locations the UORs are removed (not just inhibited) and replaced with properly tested and safe - APPROVED capability Mods.
Thanks for you comments, and I understand exactly where you are coming from - and in 'normal' circumstances I would wholeheartedly agree, recommend and support your thoughts.
In your STF experience story you relate to the time when you joined that establishment and found the errant STF's. I would assume that at that time there was no War or Conflict? And that is when I would fully agree with you.
During times of War or Conflict however, there may be a need for drastic actions to be taken and some of these may involve trying some new ideas - and very quickly too.
Also in these times of conflict there is a move to military rules (Martial Law) and under Martial Law almost anything can happen, good or bad, and overruling "Normal" rules.
It is in these times AND places of Martial Law that the rules for testing URGENT operational requirements can be waived. The 1st line of your last Post said "ANY modification has to be adequately tested and cleared..." It is that "adequacy" that can be challenged during operational needs.
BUT! - Before those go-getters start crying for Val-Halla - In my translation of these rules - On return to "normal" Rules or "normal" locations the UORs are removed (not just inhibited) and replaced with properly tested and safe - APPROVED capability Mods.
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Rigga,
I'm afraid I have to disagree - but gently, I hope.
The Navy's rule was 'train as you fight'. In engineering terms, that meant we were given the training and top cover to be able to execute service modifications in an operational scenario within the peacetime rules. All our modifications were approved at high level by a responsive and well trained Engineering Authority. It's a surprising fact that the RN, with its reputation for buccaneering and independent action, had a very tightly run engineering system. It worked during two wars. Damn big ones.
My experience of STFs was that once they were fitted (and they should have been SEMs) they were damned hard to take off. I could (but I won't here) name you several instances of RAF aircraft flying around for years with modifications fitted that were simply not fit for purpose. RAF aircrew were not willing to forgo any extra capabilities they may have offered, and RAF engineers just didn't have the clout to insist that they were taken off.
I have had multiple experiences of 'in theatre/operational/urgent' - choose your excuse - modifications being put on aircraft and causing significant risk to the aircrew (RN and RAF, by the way). This is the area that Tucumseh rightly identifies as 'just not on'. I agree with him.
But what I suppose I'm trying to say is that you can 'square the circle' between Tucumseh and Tourist - they are both right. You have to get the mods into service to meet the need, but you have to do the job properly first time to make sure that you know what is actually fitted to the aircraft and just what the hazards posed are. My view (unsurprisingly) is that engineers are the people who should run that part of the job, with aircrew support. It's also my view that in certain areas of the RAF, the engineers didn't have the necessary 'clout' to make sure that happened.
In my view, this was a systemic issue that, in part, contributed to the safety failings identified by the various ART reports, on to the Nimrod accident and on to Haddon-Cave.
Best Regards as ever
Enginesd
I'm afraid I have to disagree - but gently, I hope.
The Navy's rule was 'train as you fight'. In engineering terms, that meant we were given the training and top cover to be able to execute service modifications in an operational scenario within the peacetime rules. All our modifications were approved at high level by a responsive and well trained Engineering Authority. It's a surprising fact that the RN, with its reputation for buccaneering and independent action, had a very tightly run engineering system. It worked during two wars. Damn big ones.
My experience of STFs was that once they were fitted (and they should have been SEMs) they were damned hard to take off. I could (but I won't here) name you several instances of RAF aircraft flying around for years with modifications fitted that were simply not fit for purpose. RAF aircrew were not willing to forgo any extra capabilities they may have offered, and RAF engineers just didn't have the clout to insist that they were taken off.
I have had multiple experiences of 'in theatre/operational/urgent' - choose your excuse - modifications being put on aircraft and causing significant risk to the aircrew (RN and RAF, by the way). This is the area that Tucumseh rightly identifies as 'just not on'. I agree with him.
But what I suppose I'm trying to say is that you can 'square the circle' between Tucumseh and Tourist - they are both right. You have to get the mods into service to meet the need, but you have to do the job properly first time to make sure that you know what is actually fitted to the aircraft and just what the hazards posed are. My view (unsurprisingly) is that engineers are the people who should run that part of the job, with aircrew support. It's also my view that in certain areas of the RAF, the engineers didn't have the necessary 'clout' to make sure that happened.
In my view, this was a systemic issue that, in part, contributed to the safety failings identified by the various ART reports, on to the Nimrod accident and on to Haddon-Cave.
Best Regards as ever
Enginesd
In my opinion, it's the time that is taken "doing it right first time" that is the nub of this sideline discussion.
Whilst I fully endorse the need to follow design, development and testing processes in normal times; Nothing increases research and development for new technology like a War does.
The trouble with real UOR's is that they don't have that time for "proper" development and testing, certification or even precise installation - and this used to be the time when BDR techniques were used to install new systems or requirements (a-La Nimrod / Falkland AAR and Self-Defence Mods)
Too much time testing and the need is lost - may as well forget it.
Too little testing is also dangerous - but as Tourist implies "War is War" and the risk of reduced testing may be outweighed by the advantages of requirement's early use.
Just an opinion, not something I could put into practice.
And you are utterly correct about RAF engineering being lead by donkeys.
Whilst I fully endorse the need to follow design, development and testing processes in normal times; Nothing increases research and development for new technology like a War does.
The trouble with real UOR's is that they don't have that time for "proper" development and testing, certification or even precise installation - and this used to be the time when BDR techniques were used to install new systems or requirements (a-La Nimrod / Falkland AAR and Self-Defence Mods)
Too much time testing and the need is lost - may as well forget it.
Too little testing is also dangerous - but as Tourist implies "War is War" and the risk of reduced testing may be outweighed by the advantages of requirement's early use.
Just an opinion, not something I could put into practice.
And you are utterly correct about RAF engineering being lead by donkeys.
Last edited by Rigga; 17th Sep 2011 at 20:05. Reason: Immer wortbuauen
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Rigga,
Appreciate your argument, but I'm afraid that 'using BDR techniques' to install new systems is just not on, whatever the reason. You can do it properly and fast - it's getting the agreement on what 'fast' is that's the trick.
Not enough time testing (and training) and people end up getting killed for no good reason. I had to pick up the pieces (literally) once or twice and I remain angry and disappointed at the people who failed in their professional duties on these occasions. I'm sorry to say that their reasons (actually excuses) for doing things to aircraft that were unsafe were the ones you are getting near to using.
I don't think I said that RAF engineering was led by donkeys. I rate RAF engineers very, very highly, especially at Chief tech level, and also further up the tree. My concern is that there is an institutionalised culture in that service that 'the pilots always know best' and 'must be given what they want'. Sometimes, you have to say no. I was lucky enough to be allowed to be an FAA engineer, and allowed to say no, and backed up when I had to. And here's the nub - it was the pilots who backed us up.
Best Regards as ever
Engines.
Appreciate your argument, but I'm afraid that 'using BDR techniques' to install new systems is just not on, whatever the reason. You can do it properly and fast - it's getting the agreement on what 'fast' is that's the trick.
Not enough time testing (and training) and people end up getting killed for no good reason. I had to pick up the pieces (literally) once or twice and I remain angry and disappointed at the people who failed in their professional duties on these occasions. I'm sorry to say that their reasons (actually excuses) for doing things to aircraft that were unsafe were the ones you are getting near to using.
I don't think I said that RAF engineering was led by donkeys. I rate RAF engineers very, very highly, especially at Chief tech level, and also further up the tree. My concern is that there is an institutionalised culture in that service that 'the pilots always know best' and 'must be given what they want'. Sometimes, you have to say no. I was lucky enough to be allowed to be an FAA engineer, and allowed to say no, and backed up when I had to. And here's the nub - it was the pilots who backed us up.
Best Regards as ever
Engines.
We should agree to disagree on UORs then?
The "donkeys" to which I refer are not the shop floor engineers, (I was there for 24 years) but their "clout-less" leaders, which all of the shop floor has plainly seen for years. So at least we agree there.
As Sir Peter Parker said quite some years ago..."Why would anyone mandate that a Train Driver should run British Rail? - What do they know about trains?"
The "donkeys" to which I refer are not the shop floor engineers, (I was there for 24 years) but their "clout-less" leaders, which all of the shop floor has plainly seen for years. So at least we agree there.
As Sir Peter Parker said quite some years ago..."Why would anyone mandate that a Train Driver should run British Rail? - What do they know about trains?"
I'm not going to be foolish enough to try to intervene is what is both an illuminating and uplifting discussion, other than to say that if UK Military Airworthiness had been kept in the hands of the likes of you two professional engineers it would not be in the terminal state that it is in today. That is the problem. The first thing that the wreckers did was to kick out the engineers. Thereafter it was in the hands of the barbarians, aka the blanket-stackers and bean-counters. Now it may well be that the "donkeys" of which Rigga speaks are trying to resuscitate its dormant corpse, it may even be that they can get back some signs of life, but they can just as easily be shoved aside at a whim as they were before. The MOD and the military is not divided up into seperate inviolate stacks, labelled "engineers", "aircrew", "cooks and bottle-washers", but organised into a chain of command. That is what makes things happen, including the shutting down of UK Military Airworthiness Provision. It will happen again unless it be moved outside of the MOD. Sign-writing "independent" up all over the place merely consumes paint.
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Rigga,
Always happy to agree to disagree - that's what makes these forums more civilised places.
Chugalug, thanks for your kind remarks, accepted on behalf of all the very many excellent engineers out there doing the job. I'm afraid I must gently disagree over the separation between aircrew and engineers in the RAF - it's especially marked in the fast jet area, but apparent everywhere else.
Personally, I'm more relaxed than you are about the way the MAA is formed up, but agree with almost all your points, which are well made. The reason I'm more relaxed is that at the end of the day, MAA are regulators. The correct balance of safety and operational risk is actually achieved and generated by the 'practitioners', guided by sensible regulations. Blind obedience and box ticking is always a bad place to end up.
My view is that at the end of the day, the responsibility for safety and airworthiness must rest with the practitioners (aircrew and engineers) all the way up and down the operational command and engineering chains. Regulations can help that process, but they can never substitute for it.
Best Regards as ever,
Engines
Always happy to agree to disagree - that's what makes these forums more civilised places.
Chugalug, thanks for your kind remarks, accepted on behalf of all the very many excellent engineers out there doing the job. I'm afraid I must gently disagree over the separation between aircrew and engineers in the RAF - it's especially marked in the fast jet area, but apparent everywhere else.
Personally, I'm more relaxed than you are about the way the MAA is formed up, but agree with almost all your points, which are well made. The reason I'm more relaxed is that at the end of the day, MAA are regulators. The correct balance of safety and operational risk is actually achieved and generated by the 'practitioners', guided by sensible regulations. Blind obedience and box ticking is always a bad place to end up.
My view is that at the end of the day, the responsibility for safety and airworthiness must rest with the practitioners (aircrew and engineers) all the way up and down the operational command and engineering chains. Regulations can help that process, but they can never substitute for it.
Best Regards as ever,
Engines
Engines:
Then, sadly, we are doomed to disagree as well I fear. Regulators must be independent to do their job properly (one only has to think of the Press Complaints Commission to see how useless they are if they are not). If for instance the CAA divested all of its airline airworthiness regulatory functions into British Airways Engineering, with all sorts of Chinese walls erected to ensure its "independence", would that make it a Regulator? Not in my book it wouldn't, and I would soon be signing up to other airlines frequent flyers clubs who were still subject to an external independent regulator. Of course at the moment everyone involved is straining to make the MAA work, and I daresay will achieve much of what they set out to do. How long would it be though before the real world impinges on its independence? Events, dear boy, are forever popping up to prick our pretty balloons. If you cannot stand your ground and insist on compliance then you are not a regulator. I remember the howls of anguish when floor track lighting had to be installed in the entire British Civil Airliner Fleet at the costs involved. No wavering by the CAA though, "fit it or you are grounded", was the response. In contrast the RAF Flight Safety mantra that it was completely independent of the CoC, with direct access to the CAS, is shown as a hollow sham by the complete contempt with which its "ARTs" were treated. Inbuilt procedures, supposedly designed to ensure that no aircraft can be Released To Service unless it is fully airworthy as confirmed by the award of a Controller Aircraft Release were suborned with ease in the case of the Chinook HC2. You may relaxed at the sight of the Military Regulator, but just take a good look at his clothes. I don't see any. Am I alone?
The reason I'm more relaxed is that at the end of the day, MAA are regulators.
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This is what the NART said about the misuse of STFs in 1998
"in some instances, formal mod action·had never been taken to supersede STFs, even though the installation of the equipments concerned on ac had became commonplace. Overall, a significant number of the 24 currently extant STFs had been in existence for a considerable time and were no longer being managed as temporary trial fits iaw the regulations in AP100B-Ol, Order 1120. Furthermore, some other STFs were routinely resurrected as required, normally on a yearly basis and for particular detachments."
And what an inquest (XV230) witness said about the misuse of STFs in 2008
"my interpretation would be you had an urgent operation requirement, special trials fit onto an aircraft, take it to theatre, get the job done, bring it back, take the equipment off. Whereas, we were doing go to theatre, take it back, on to a different aircraft, that goes out. ....... Okay, what had happened was when we first arrived in theatre, the problem is you do not have ready access to this equipment in the UK. So you often arrive out in theatre to an aircraft that has got, in this case I believe it was four or five separate special trials fits fitted to it, and that is the first time you have really got, to get to grips with it again. Somebody at Kinross had tried to be helpful when they produced like a local briefing package where they had in the back of the release to service document for each special trials fit they made, sort of make a waiver of, if you are going to do air to air refuelling you need to pull the circuit breaker or not use this particular item."
The misuse of STFs was also mentioned in the CHART report of 1992,
"STFs do not generate formal follow-up engineering documentation nor CA release and aircrew manual amendment action. Furthermore, there have been instances where tradesmen have been compelled to rectity faults on STFs without adequate support documentation (eg wiring diagrams ). Whilst the STF process is a legitimate means of introducing changes to an ac , it should be a short term expedient . However; the system bas been abused and a case was noted where an STF had existed without a SD or a cover modification for over 8 yrs. There is the potential for airworthiness to be compromised by these procedures ".
It is little wonder we lost aircraft and brave men.
DV
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DV,
Thank you for the response. I'm not exaggerating when I say that the abuse of STFs was a significant and wholly inexcusable failure of the part of the Service staffs involved.
This contributed to avoidable incidents and accidents and in some cases loss of life.
Note I'm not advocating a witch hunt. But even now, there are those in the Service who think the abuse of STFs (or their bastard child, 'in theater modifications') can still be justified. They need to learn some big lessons quite quickly. If they don't, the MAA are (rightly) going to start throwing some serious hand grenades around.
Best Regards as ever to all those out there doing the job,
Engines
Thank you for the response. I'm not exaggerating when I say that the abuse of STFs was a significant and wholly inexcusable failure of the part of the Service staffs involved.
This contributed to avoidable incidents and accidents and in some cases loss of life.
Note I'm not advocating a witch hunt. But even now, there are those in the Service who think the abuse of STFs (or their bastard child, 'in theater modifications') can still be justified. They need to learn some big lessons quite quickly. If they don't, the MAA are (rightly) going to start throwing some serious hand grenades around.
Best Regards as ever to all those out there doing the job,
Engines
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Rigga
I have to agree with Engnes on this one. Although the STF may have been generated by operations/conflicts they were left on afterwards for theatre training.
Engines - I'm 99% certain I know who you are, as we have worked together.
Hope you are well
regards
retard
I have to agree with Engnes on this one. Although the STF may have been generated by operations/conflicts they were left on afterwards for theatre training.
Engines - I'm 99% certain I know who you are, as we have worked together.
Hope you are well
regards
retard
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tucumseh will be along shortly, to explain that procedures for Special Trial Fits (STF) were robust, with a review period before formal modification, and that these procedures were wilfully & negligently ignored.
Engines
I am. But that is fairly irrelevant. The MoD approaches flight safety by crossing its fingers and hoping for the best.
When it all goes wrong, it avoids scrutiny by admitting 100% liability (following a long period of obfuscation) and paying up.
Unfortunately, it is the no-win, no-fee lawyers who will hold them to account.
Engines
Note I'm not advocating a witch hunt.
When it all goes wrong, it avoids scrutiny by admitting 100% liability (following a long period of obfuscation) and paying up.
Unfortunately, it is the no-win, no-fee lawyers who will hold them to account.
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Engines;
I agree there is no need for a "witch hunt", because we know who the "witches" are; two CE's from the 1990's. In addition H-C needs to explain (but he never will) why the STF issues of 1992, 1998 and 2006 never got addressed in his report.
DV
I agree there is no need for a "witch hunt", because we know who the "witches" are; two CE's from the 1990's. In addition H-C needs to explain (but he never will) why the STF issues of 1992, 1998 and 2006 never got addressed in his report.
DV
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SPHLC,
My basic point about STFs is that the process was designed for use for trials, and trials only. The old RAF AP-100 regulations were quite clear on that. Unfortunately, over a period of time, and tacitly approved by those in charge, the STF came to be used for the following (bad) reasons:
- Not enough time to do a full SEM
- It's for operations
- it's for SF and needs to be highly classified
- it's for a trial, but needs to be deployed straight afterwards
- we can't use SEMs on this particular aircraft because it's multinational
This wasn't a 'MOD' issue - it was an RAF one, unfortunately. The unavoidable fact was that the RAF's own regulations said that STFs were not to be used for operations. They were, and the numbers involved ran into many hundreds. They extended into software as well as hardware, and caused significant dislocation at the front line as maintainers had to resort to locally produced 'little black books' to generate aircraft for missions.
It's a good thing that they are gone (or going) but their successors are the 'in theatre' modifications that are springing up.
I don't advocate a witch hunt. Not because I don't want those responsible to face the music - I'd love them to 'do the perp walk'. It's just that I'd prefer to see scarce resources put to making sure that the right lessons are learned and applied to the current challenges, so that our managers and engineers can deliver the mods needed quickly, effectively and safely. our aircrew deserve no less.
Best Regards as ever to the people doing the job out there in the sand
Engines
My basic point about STFs is that the process was designed for use for trials, and trials only. The old RAF AP-100 regulations were quite clear on that. Unfortunately, over a period of time, and tacitly approved by those in charge, the STF came to be used for the following (bad) reasons:
- Not enough time to do a full SEM
- It's for operations
- it's for SF and needs to be highly classified
- it's for a trial, but needs to be deployed straight afterwards
- we can't use SEMs on this particular aircraft because it's multinational
This wasn't a 'MOD' issue - it was an RAF one, unfortunately. The unavoidable fact was that the RAF's own regulations said that STFs were not to be used for operations. They were, and the numbers involved ran into many hundreds. They extended into software as well as hardware, and caused significant dislocation at the front line as maintainers had to resort to locally produced 'little black books' to generate aircraft for missions.
It's a good thing that they are gone (or going) but their successors are the 'in theatre' modifications that are springing up.
I don't advocate a witch hunt. Not because I don't want those responsible to face the music - I'd love them to 'do the perp walk'. It's just that I'd prefer to see scarce resources put to making sure that the right lessons are learned and applied to the current challenges, so that our managers and engineers can deliver the mods needed quickly, effectively and safely. our aircrew deserve no less.
Best Regards as ever to the people doing the job out there in the sand
Engines
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Engines
The only point where I would differ is that the approval was not tacit. The STF were signed off by at least a Gp Capt and the project was often directed to start with the STF as the basic premise.
Without getting too hung up over terminology, the old SEM system was open to abuse. There were cases of it being used as a fig leaf while the underlying process was no better than the STF.
regards
retard
The only point where I would differ is that the approval was not tacit. The STF were signed off by at least a Gp Capt and the project was often directed to start with the STF as the basic premise.
Without getting too hung up over terminology, the old SEM system was open to abuse. There were cases of it being used as a fig leaf while the underlying process was no better than the STF.
regards
retard
In all my 24 years in the mob I was not aware of (nor ever directed to read that) "The unavoidable fact was that the RAF's own regulations said that STFs were not to be used for operations."
If this was then or is now true; I will withdraw my argument. How could we prove that then? (I have to ask cos I'm a QAM!)
If this was then or is now true; I will withdraw my argument. How could we prove that then? (I have to ask cos I'm a QAM!)
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Is the clue in the words Special 'Trials' Fit, implying that this was a 'peacetime' procedure? In which case, it is understandable that things need updating because of the way the world has changed since the end of the cold war era?
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Guys,
Quite straightforward. The AP100 rules were quite clear that STFs were for trials only, and not to be released to operations. Nothing to do with peacetime, or cold war, or anything. STFs were for trials only. End of.
For ops, the mandated route was SEMs. Yes, it's possible and even probable that SEMs were abused, but the fact was that by the late 90s, STFs were endemic as a 'work around' the slightly more onerous SEM route. They were kept on RAF aircraft for years, while the RN EAs were having to justify the retention of NSMs (Navy equivalent of SEMs) every 6 months to a very hard nosed two star engineer. Note that the RN never even had such a thing as an STF.
I'm not making a 'dark blue vs light blue' point, by the way. My point is that the abuse of STFs became an institutionally approved practice, which should have been recognised and stopped long before it was, by issue of the new JAP100 regulations on service modifications. The RAF (and the various PTs) are still clearing up the results of that abuse.
Best regards as ever
Engines
Quite straightforward. The AP100 rules were quite clear that STFs were for trials only, and not to be released to operations. Nothing to do with peacetime, or cold war, or anything. STFs were for trials only. End of.
For ops, the mandated route was SEMs. Yes, it's possible and even probable that SEMs were abused, but the fact was that by the late 90s, STFs were endemic as a 'work around' the slightly more onerous SEM route. They were kept on RAF aircraft for years, while the RN EAs were having to justify the retention of NSMs (Navy equivalent of SEMs) every 6 months to a very hard nosed two star engineer. Note that the RN never even had such a thing as an STF.
I'm not making a 'dark blue vs light blue' point, by the way. My point is that the abuse of STFs became an institutionally approved practice, which should have been recognised and stopped long before it was, by issue of the new JAP100 regulations on service modifications. The RAF (and the various PTs) are still clearing up the results of that abuse.
Best regards as ever
Engines
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Rigga
Engines is absolutely correct. My recollection was that the regualtions were not specific about when (peacetime/operations) but were limited in application (numbers of aircraft) and for limited duration (for the duration of the trial) but have no way to prove it. SEMs could be just as easily applied as STFs, the evidential requirement was very loose.
DV
It was a systemic failure across the board, operators and engineers, driven by the pressures to not say no. Heads rolled if individuals spoke out, or they were worked around.
Engines
RAF instructions never got near 2 star but we were not as top heavy as the RN
Engines is absolutely correct. My recollection was that the regualtions were not specific about when (peacetime/operations) but were limited in application (numbers of aircraft) and for limited duration (for the duration of the trial) but have no way to prove it. SEMs could be just as easily applied as STFs, the evidential requirement was very loose.
DV
It was a systemic failure across the board, operators and engineers, driven by the pressures to not say no. Heads rolled if individuals spoke out, or they were worked around.
Engines
RAF instructions never got near 2 star but we were not as top heavy as the RN