Haddon-Cave, Airworthiness, Sea King et al (merged)
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Gentlemen
Just pause, sit back and take a look at your last couple of posts, and imagine the scorn from anyone who actually deploys at your little stories of woe.
Seriously.
"There was this one time. At band camp. where I had to work at the weekend....."
Just pause, sit back and take a look at your last couple of posts, and imagine the scorn from anyone who actually deploys at your little stories of woe.
Seriously.
"There was this one time. At band camp. where I had to work at the weekend....."
Tourist, you've misread tuc's and Nimbus's posts.
Neither are complaining that they worked weekends; it's that others didn't!
Neither are complaining that they worked weekends; it's that others didn't!
Last edited by BossEyed; 23rd Sep 2011 at 16:26. Reason: Clarification, and can't spell "Toursiut"
Tourist
The failure to provide the level of support Nimbus and Crab speak of is actually a significant airworthiness failing, under the "adequate resource and support" heading. It is closely related to the "savings at the expense of safety" ethos reiterated by Haddon-Cave. My own point was that in bygone days such support was automatic, as was implementation of all regs. I think those who serve, such as yourself, deserve better; the thrust of 99.9% of my posts here. My apologies if that was not clear.
The failure to provide the level of support Nimbus and Crab speak of is actually a significant airworthiness failing, under the "adequate resource and support" heading. It is closely related to the "savings at the expense of safety" ethos reiterated by Haddon-Cave. My own point was that in bygone days such support was automatic, as was implementation of all regs. I think those who serve, such as yourself, deserve better; the thrust of 99.9% of my posts here. My apologies if that was not clear.
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Rigga (Quote)
A friend tells me that a recent drive for maintenance efficiencies was thwarted by the lack of evidence to help remove unnecessary effort from scheduled maintenance - the "lack" seems to be caused by a "resistance" from service personnel to report anything properly and work around the issues instead. A self-defeating tactic if I ever heard of one.
I am not saying that there is a conspiracy to defeat the private sector, nor am I saying that tradesmen are doing things deliberately. This is all the way the MOD has allowed things to degrade over past decades and it has now become the "Norm" to do things in this way.
I can understand that this standard creep is partly due to being on Ops for over twenty years and that Front Line practices have bled through to normal line practices. I am not blaming anyone for doing bad things - just stating that, to get better, they have to change their strategy and tactics.
Spot on Rigga, the 'lack' to me is the lack of personnel to throw at the routine problems of everyday airworthiness. It has become the norm to have a lack of resources, either within the light blue suits, or the defence contractors (due to lack of funds, a la lack of resources / bodies). This leads to the adoption of a line of least resistance, in the hangar / in the planning / in the management / in the training, where poor understanding and compliance to the regulations then takes place. This then becomes the norm, which is the situation we now find ourselves in
A friend tells me that a recent drive for maintenance efficiencies was thwarted by the lack of evidence to help remove unnecessary effort from scheduled maintenance - the "lack" seems to be caused by a "resistance" from service personnel to report anything properly and work around the issues instead. A self-defeating tactic if I ever heard of one.
I am not saying that there is a conspiracy to defeat the private sector, nor am I saying that tradesmen are doing things deliberately. This is all the way the MOD has allowed things to degrade over past decades and it has now become the "Norm" to do things in this way.
I can understand that this standard creep is partly due to being on Ops for over twenty years and that Front Line practices have bled through to normal line practices. I am not blaming anyone for doing bad things - just stating that, to get better, they have to change their strategy and tactics.
Spot on Rigga, the 'lack' to me is the lack of personnel to throw at the routine problems of everyday airworthiness. It has become the norm to have a lack of resources, either within the light blue suits, or the defence contractors (due to lack of funds, a la lack of resources / bodies). This leads to the adoption of a line of least resistance, in the hangar / in the planning / in the management / in the training, where poor understanding and compliance to the regulations then takes place. This then becomes the norm, which is the situation we now find ourselves in
Tourist, you speak out angrily on behalf of those who face danger in the sky on behalf of us all, and well you might for they have been let down to a scandalous extent! The problem is, it seems to me, that you are angry with the wrong people.
Unlike you I was not let down, well nowhere near to your degree at least, for the RAF Flight Safety System (I can only speak of the RAF) was a fully functional system operating at every level, from back office to flight line. The former was of no interest to me, I was scarcely aware of it, nor of the people who laboured there on my behalf. I suppose if I had tried to imagine them it would be as "boffins" wearing the ubiquitous tweed jacket with leather elbow patches, ie BOF's! I now realise how important those BOF's were in keeping me, my crew, and my pax alive, and in keeping my aircraft flying and capable of carrying out its military tasks.
By the 1980's I was long gone and now protected by similarly self effacing and dedicated people in the CAA though, being an ingrate, resenting the fees that I and my employers had to keep pumping into their coffers. However, those I left behind in Military Aviation were about to be betrayed by their own High Command, for it was there that the orders originated that initiated the inexorable yet hidden unpicking of the engineering expertise that ensured airworthy military aircraft that would do what they were meant to do, rather than doing what they should not. That is where your anger should be directed, that is why Haddon-Cave called for an MAA to be created, because (to borrow a naval phrase) "there was something wrong with our bloody aircraft". There still is, and there still will be until the MAA can change things. The catch is, for me at least, that they can't do that until they change themselves into becoming a truly independent regulator. Easy to say, I know, but very difficult to do, yet do it they must or our military aircraft will become ever more infected by this invisible and seemingly imaginary bug that is unairworthiness. It's real, it kills, and it seriously depletes our military capability.
Yes, get angry, but get angry with those who really did bring us to this parlous state!
Unlike you I was not let down, well nowhere near to your degree at least, for the RAF Flight Safety System (I can only speak of the RAF) was a fully functional system operating at every level, from back office to flight line. The former was of no interest to me, I was scarcely aware of it, nor of the people who laboured there on my behalf. I suppose if I had tried to imagine them it would be as "boffins" wearing the ubiquitous tweed jacket with leather elbow patches, ie BOF's! I now realise how important those BOF's were in keeping me, my crew, and my pax alive, and in keeping my aircraft flying and capable of carrying out its military tasks.
By the 1980's I was long gone and now protected by similarly self effacing and dedicated people in the CAA though, being an ingrate, resenting the fees that I and my employers had to keep pumping into their coffers. However, those I left behind in Military Aviation were about to be betrayed by their own High Command, for it was there that the orders originated that initiated the inexorable yet hidden unpicking of the engineering expertise that ensured airworthy military aircraft that would do what they were meant to do, rather than doing what they should not. That is where your anger should be directed, that is why Haddon-Cave called for an MAA to be created, because (to borrow a naval phrase) "there was something wrong with our bloody aircraft". There still is, and there still will be until the MAA can change things. The catch is, for me at least, that they can't do that until they change themselves into becoming a truly independent regulator. Easy to say, I know, but very difficult to do, yet do it they must or our military aircraft will become ever more infected by this invisible and seemingly imaginary bug that is unairworthiness. It's real, it kills, and it seriously depletes our military capability.
Yes, get angry, but get angry with those who really did bring us to this parlous state!
Brilliant post Chug.
All that history and your tangible feelings, just enough detail to keep attention going for more, and then all wrapped up in a simple sentence at the end.
I just hope the right people read it.
Rigga
All that history and your tangible feelings, just enough detail to keep attention going for more, and then all wrapped up in a simple sentence at the end.
I just hope the right people read it.
Rigga
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Does anyone know whether members of PTs/MAA are required to undergo Human Factors Training, as any reference to a requirement does not seem to appear in the MAA document set?
They probably do - but likely only to the MOD standard.
The description of the MAA Staff qualifications and competencies are probably deep in MAA03 (MAA Regulatory Procedures) - not yet issued.
The description of the MAA Staff qualifications and competencies are probably deep in MAA03 (MAA Regulatory Procedures) - not yet issued.
It is gratifying that Human Factors training is back on the MoD agenda. Not so long ago, it was common practice to save money by cancelling HF risk mitigation contracts.
However, saying it is mandatory for LoA holders is like saying learning the alphabet is mandatory before becoming an English teacher. MoD need to get back to the stage whereby anyone being considered for any job in the MAA or delegation of any kind has not only “done the course”, but had experience of practical, successful implementation in 2 or 3 tours.
Just “doing the course” (or half day seminar) after appointment is one of the main reasons why we’re where we are. It is what led to classics like “It works on the bench, so it’ll work in any aircraft” as the excuse for not ensuring functional safety through systems integration. Or “If it passes TEMPEST, it’ll pass EMC, and vice versa”, which led to cancellation of EMC testing. Or “Def Stans aren’t mandatory”, which led to Critical Design Reviews and Safety Cases being waived. And people dying.
And still the MAA haven't sought out those in MoD who have the above experience, probably because it is too embarrassing that they are at so low a grade. Better to let people think the Haddon-Cave report means there isn't anyone suitable, so they have to reinvent every wheel. Hence, 18 months after being established, they have issued an Invitation to Tender seeking someone to train them.
It's going to be a long, slow road.
However, saying it is mandatory for LoA holders is like saying learning the alphabet is mandatory before becoming an English teacher. MoD need to get back to the stage whereby anyone being considered for any job in the MAA or delegation of any kind has not only “done the course”, but had experience of practical, successful implementation in 2 or 3 tours.
Just “doing the course” (or half day seminar) after appointment is one of the main reasons why we’re where we are. It is what led to classics like “It works on the bench, so it’ll work in any aircraft” as the excuse for not ensuring functional safety through systems integration. Or “If it passes TEMPEST, it’ll pass EMC, and vice versa”, which led to cancellation of EMC testing. Or “Def Stans aren’t mandatory”, which led to Critical Design Reviews and Safety Cases being waived. And people dying.
And still the MAA haven't sought out those in MoD who have the above experience, probably because it is too embarrassing that they are at so low a grade. Better to let people think the Haddon-Cave report means there isn't anyone suitable, so they have to reinvent every wheel. Hence, 18 months after being established, they have issued an Invitation to Tender seeking someone to train them.
It's going to be a long, slow road.
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Given that Haddon Cave suggested the system had been broken for some time, how current is the experience of those people likely to be. Surely it is better for them to build for the future in line with current thinking rather reinvent the wheels from 20+ years ago.
tff:
Which is exactly the thinking that made all the wheels fall off in the first place! You should only build on solid foundations. What solid foundations does "current thinking" build on, or is this year zero in the brave new world of revolutionary airworthiness? UK Military Aviation desperately needs airworthy aircraft. I suggest it looks to those who know how to achieve that in practise rather than trying for it out of thin air.
Surely it is better for them to build for the future in line with current thinking
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Chug, as always, I agree with you. When I say current thinking I don't mean current thinking in terms of within the services, as you say that's partly what has caused this mess. But given that the recent discussion was about training for MAA staff, surely this is better done by current experts who work with other regulators like EASA and the CAA. One the strengths of a good regulator is ensuring it's staff receive relevant training throughout their careers, even EASA and CAA staff receive Human Factors training.
thefodfather
The first point I'd make is that not a word of Haddon-Cave or any of the 90s "Airworthiness Review Team," reports I've read (Chinook, Wessex, Puma, Hercules and Nimrod) came as a surprise. They were spread over a 6 year period (92-98) and the startling feature is the repetition. Same old problems. Nothing was done. Who was in charge throughout this period? Same RAF Chief Engineer for a start.
The ARTs themselves merely repeated what MoD(PE) staffs had been telling AMSO and AML (especially) since January 1988. (See above, RAF CE was double hatted as AML from Janaury 1994). There were numerous other reports at regular intervals, culminating (for the purposes of pprune discussions) in Adam Ingram being advised of systemic breakdown and failure to implement airworthiness regulations in 2005 - the year before XV230 crashed.
Therefore, I submit there was, and remains, a knowledgeable body of Corporate Knowledge in MoD who fully understood what was wrong and, importantly, how to fix it. The key questions relate to why, in the face of so much damning evidence, did we reach a situation whereby a QC undertook a 2 year Review and simply had to collate and regurgitate previous reports and recommendations. And why, in response to the 2005 written warning, advised to him by an MP, was Ingram advised that everything was fine, specifically stating AFTER XV230 crashed that he was satisfied the regulations WERE being implemented properly. (A mantra repeated by D/Air Staffs - again, the same link to the same people).
Someone very senior knowingly lied to him. Why? My opinion is the answer lies in the list of names involved in the original reports and the actions they took in the late 80s/early 90s to cover up the fact they had wasted so much funding that the hitherto ring-fenced (for obvious reasons) "airworthiness pot" was systematically robbed to the extent that core airworthiness services were cancelled altogether.
This meant that the highly trained airworthiness staffs (i.e. those who implemented the regs on a daily basis) had little or nothing to do. Their posts were disbanded (mine was in June 1993, having spent 3 years warning of the failures H-C repeated in 2009) and we were dispersed to other parts of MoD. The expertise didn't disappear - it was/is too embarrassing to admit it existed.
If you study at all those ART reports, the solution to 95% of the problems is to resurrect that cancelled funding and implement a single, mandated Def Stan (which has now been cancelled without replacement).
My question today is how many of that highly trained team are in the MAA, or employed by them as advisors/consultants? I know the answer for certain fact. None. It is one thing to have regulations, but practical implementation is something taught though 4 or 5 promotions before being granted what is termed airworthiness delegation. What we are seeing now is reinventing of the regulatory wheel but how many in MoD are taught practical implementation?
My feeling is that the MAA is concentrating too much on the 1st/2nd line aspects (servicing etc) because, in simple terms, there have always been too many who confuse serviceability with airworthiness. But a typical "experienced" person would regard that as just the first career step. Most I knew had been (in ascending order) diagnosticians, workshop supervisors, worked in engineering/design department, Engineering Authority, ILS Manager, Requirements Manager, Project/Programme Manager, Technical Agency. There's a couple of those you don't need to do if you want airworthiness delegation (e.g ILSM, RqM), but they help. The last, TA, is fundamental. That experience doesn't come with 3 half day seminars and a promotion every 2 years into jobs that "monitor" or provide ashtray cleaning services.
Like I said, a long way to go to build up that level of expertise again. Can we afford to wait? I don't think so. Which is why I agree there should be greater independence. The "model" exists because the problem was recognised in the late 90s and at least one aircraft company made an unsolicited bid which would have sensibly managed the boundary between attaining/maintaining airworthiness and Fitness for Purpose (operational airworthiness). In fact, the greatest irony is that in 2001 this framework was applied successfully to another domain (i.e. not air) and the process continues to this day. (They issued yet another ITT last month, specifically citing this initiative and the need for bidders to comply). I wonder how many in MAA realise this, or that this initiative's Management Plan is based directly on mandated airworthiness regulations and procedures; and the contract calls up the aforementioned Def Stan that was cancelled 2 years ago! Now, someone drew up those Plans and staffed them to approval at 3 Star level, suggesting a level of knowledge the MAA should welcome. Use it!
The first point I'd make is that not a word of Haddon-Cave or any of the 90s "Airworthiness Review Team," reports I've read (Chinook, Wessex, Puma, Hercules and Nimrod) came as a surprise. They were spread over a 6 year period (92-98) and the startling feature is the repetition. Same old problems. Nothing was done. Who was in charge throughout this period? Same RAF Chief Engineer for a start.
The ARTs themselves merely repeated what MoD(PE) staffs had been telling AMSO and AML (especially) since January 1988. (See above, RAF CE was double hatted as AML from Janaury 1994). There were numerous other reports at regular intervals, culminating (for the purposes of pprune discussions) in Adam Ingram being advised of systemic breakdown and failure to implement airworthiness regulations in 2005 - the year before XV230 crashed.
Therefore, I submit there was, and remains, a knowledgeable body of Corporate Knowledge in MoD who fully understood what was wrong and, importantly, how to fix it. The key questions relate to why, in the face of so much damning evidence, did we reach a situation whereby a QC undertook a 2 year Review and simply had to collate and regurgitate previous reports and recommendations. And why, in response to the 2005 written warning, advised to him by an MP, was Ingram advised that everything was fine, specifically stating AFTER XV230 crashed that he was satisfied the regulations WERE being implemented properly. (A mantra repeated by D/Air Staffs - again, the same link to the same people).
Someone very senior knowingly lied to him. Why? My opinion is the answer lies in the list of names involved in the original reports and the actions they took in the late 80s/early 90s to cover up the fact they had wasted so much funding that the hitherto ring-fenced (for obvious reasons) "airworthiness pot" was systematically robbed to the extent that core airworthiness services were cancelled altogether.
This meant that the highly trained airworthiness staffs (i.e. those who implemented the regs on a daily basis) had little or nothing to do. Their posts were disbanded (mine was in June 1993, having spent 3 years warning of the failures H-C repeated in 2009) and we were dispersed to other parts of MoD. The expertise didn't disappear - it was/is too embarrassing to admit it existed.
If you study at all those ART reports, the solution to 95% of the problems is to resurrect that cancelled funding and implement a single, mandated Def Stan (which has now been cancelled without replacement).
My question today is how many of that highly trained team are in the MAA, or employed by them as advisors/consultants? I know the answer for certain fact. None. It is one thing to have regulations, but practical implementation is something taught though 4 or 5 promotions before being granted what is termed airworthiness delegation. What we are seeing now is reinventing of the regulatory wheel but how many in MoD are taught practical implementation?
My feeling is that the MAA is concentrating too much on the 1st/2nd line aspects (servicing etc) because, in simple terms, there have always been too many who confuse serviceability with airworthiness. But a typical "experienced" person would regard that as just the first career step. Most I knew had been (in ascending order) diagnosticians, workshop supervisors, worked in engineering/design department, Engineering Authority, ILS Manager, Requirements Manager, Project/Programme Manager, Technical Agency. There's a couple of those you don't need to do if you want airworthiness delegation (e.g ILSM, RqM), but they help. The last, TA, is fundamental. That experience doesn't come with 3 half day seminars and a promotion every 2 years into jobs that "monitor" or provide ashtray cleaning services.
Like I said, a long way to go to build up that level of expertise again. Can we afford to wait? I don't think so. Which is why I agree there should be greater independence. The "model" exists because the problem was recognised in the late 90s and at least one aircraft company made an unsolicited bid which would have sensibly managed the boundary between attaining/maintaining airworthiness and Fitness for Purpose (operational airworthiness). In fact, the greatest irony is that in 2001 this framework was applied successfully to another domain (i.e. not air) and the process continues to this day. (They issued yet another ITT last month, specifically citing this initiative and the need for bidders to comply). I wonder how many in MAA realise this, or that this initiative's Management Plan is based directly on mandated airworthiness regulations and procedures; and the contract calls up the aforementioned Def Stan that was cancelled 2 years ago! Now, someone drew up those Plans and staffed them to approval at 3 Star level, suggesting a level of knowledge the MAA should welcome. Use it!
Last edited by tucumseh; 12th Oct 2011 at 16:58.
tff, my apologies, I misunderstood what you meant. It seems (as always ;-) that we are in violent agreement! Whatever the solution to this very urgent problem it lies outside of the MOD.
Tuc, as ever you point the way. If there is a working model based on the "old" military airworthiness system, which is run by "people that know" in industry then surely it should be used to get military airworthiness working again? Pride, reputations, jealousy, or "we've never done it that way before", are just not good enough reasons to delay the urgent need to mend UK Military Airworthiness. Those who broke it have very much blood on their hands. Time is of the very essence if we are to avoid yet more blood being shed in its wake.
Tuc, as ever you point the way. If there is a working model based on the "old" military airworthiness system, which is run by "people that know" in industry then surely it should be used to get military airworthiness working again? Pride, reputations, jealousy, or "we've never done it that way before", are just not good enough reasons to delay the urgent need to mend UK Military Airworthiness. Those who broke it have very much blood on their hands. Time is of the very essence if we are to avoid yet more blood being shed in its wake.
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Having listened to the Inspector of RAF Flight Safety today at a conference, it appears that the work done with Baines Simmons has put a structure, aligned to the civvy model, in place. But as tuc suggests, it will be a long hard road to teach lessons on airworthiness to those who will advise the duty holder, and who have perhaps lived through an era where all those corners were cut. Do those people actually know what it takes to do the job right??
He seemed well aware of the need to rebuild a safety culture, and was open about the challenges ahead. It may just be a tad easier to gain compliance in the military, as opposed to a civvy company where the first and only question is 'How much does it cost'!
He seemed well aware of the need to rebuild a safety culture, and was open about the challenges ahead. It may just be a tad easier to gain compliance in the military, as opposed to a civvy company where the first and only question is 'How much does it cost'!
Small Spinner,
I wish I shared your optimism.
Pressures on the Defence budget will not go away, certainly not in the medium term and therefore "how much will it cost?" will not be confined to civil aviation.
In my view (and I speak as someone with senior (engineering) management experience in both military and civil aviation) the satisfactory future of military airworthiness will never be assured until the MAA is completely separated from the MoD. Simply appointing some senior RAF mate as Head of the MAA and giving him a direct voice to someone else senior in the MoD does not remove the strong "old boys" link and its inherent career implications.
Only an independent MAA will do. Despite the protestations at many aviation fora, that the current MAA is the way ahead it is a convenient con; the present arrangement is a fudge and, ultimately, it will not work.
I wish I shared your optimism.
Pressures on the Defence budget will not go away, certainly not in the medium term and therefore "how much will it cost?" will not be confined to civil aviation.
In my view (and I speak as someone with senior (engineering) management experience in both military and civil aviation) the satisfactory future of military airworthiness will never be assured until the MAA is completely separated from the MoD. Simply appointing some senior RAF mate as Head of the MAA and giving him a direct voice to someone else senior in the MoD does not remove the strong "old boys" link and its inherent career implications.
Only an independent MAA will do. Despite the protestations at many aviation fora, that the current MAA is the way ahead it is a convenient con; the present arrangement is a fudge and, ultimately, it will not work.
"It may just be a tad easier to gain compliance in the military, as opposed to a civvy company where the first and only question is 'How much does it cost'"
1st. I don't know of anyone, military or civil, who walks through any Camp/Station gate or door for no pay. If there was no money for it, no company would do it.
2nd. If, as Tuc suggests, there is no-one in the military who knows what to do, just where do you think this knowledge will come from? If you think this will be expensive - you have no idea of the real costs involved.
Flying of any sort is an expensive sport / hobby / career / lifestyle and nothing to do with it is free. Get over "the money thing" and talk about airworthiness or continued airworthiness.
1st. I don't know of anyone, military or civil, who walks through any Camp/Station gate or door for no pay. If there was no money for it, no company would do it.
2nd. If, as Tuc suggests, there is no-one in the military who knows what to do, just where do you think this knowledge will come from? If you think this will be expensive - you have no idea of the real costs involved.
Flying of any sort is an expensive sport / hobby / career / lifestyle and nothing to do with it is free. Get over "the money thing" and talk about airworthiness or continued airworthiness.
Rigga
I agree but I'd just like to make it clear I think there are some very good, knowledgeable people in both the Services and CS who know how to do this. It is just they are a diminishing breed because the capability has not been sustained over the years, not least because of the deliberate rundown of airworthiness ethos and funding. Time is running out to make use of this trained workforce because, by definition, too many are approaching retirement age.
I'm sorry, but a personal account. A few years ago, a very highly trained and (hitherto) competent project manager phoned me for advice. Inevitably, he'd been told to make a false declaration and had a decision to make. (Obey, or meet his legal obligation to PUS). His question was "What will happen to me if I refuse". The answer was harsh disciplinary action and no more promotion - a formal ruling handed down by the Chinook, Nimrod etc 2 Star and CDP. He chose to sign. Got his promotion. But, I suggest, for ever more he is between a rock and a hard place because everyone knows he did this. And, what does he tell his subordinates to do? Many will be young, direct entrant graduates who don't receive any other training (the problem with the "old" rules is they assume many years training and proven competence). Their first exposure to MoD is this ethos. It doesn't take long for it to be all pervading.
Ideal solution? Not just proper training, but wholesale dismissal of those staffs who have been complicit; something I acknowledge MoD will never do. So, yet another reason to take them out of the loop altogether. You always get back to independence. The "model" is a simple variation of the System Co-ordinating Design Authority (SCDA) concept, which is one of the fundamental building blocks of maintaining airworthiness anyway (as the SCDA maintains the Safety Cases of integrated systems of systems).
Oh, the decision my mate was told to make? Cancel an SCDA contract, and hence all work on Safety Cases, to save money. Good job all this was withheld from the subsequent BoI and Coroner's Inquest, eh? The BoI noted the (supposedly) integrated system of systems wasn't functionally safe, but didn't understand why.
I agree but I'd just like to make it clear I think there are some very good, knowledgeable people in both the Services and CS who know how to do this. It is just they are a diminishing breed because the capability has not been sustained over the years, not least because of the deliberate rundown of airworthiness ethos and funding. Time is running out to make use of this trained workforce because, by definition, too many are approaching retirement age.
I'm sorry, but a personal account. A few years ago, a very highly trained and (hitherto) competent project manager phoned me for advice. Inevitably, he'd been told to make a false declaration and had a decision to make. (Obey, or meet his legal obligation to PUS). His question was "What will happen to me if I refuse". The answer was harsh disciplinary action and no more promotion - a formal ruling handed down by the Chinook, Nimrod etc 2 Star and CDP. He chose to sign. Got his promotion. But, I suggest, for ever more he is between a rock and a hard place because everyone knows he did this. And, what does he tell his subordinates to do? Many will be young, direct entrant graduates who don't receive any other training (the problem with the "old" rules is they assume many years training and proven competence). Their first exposure to MoD is this ethos. It doesn't take long for it to be all pervading.
Ideal solution? Not just proper training, but wholesale dismissal of those staffs who have been complicit; something I acknowledge MoD will never do. So, yet another reason to take them out of the loop altogether. You always get back to independence. The "model" is a simple variation of the System Co-ordinating Design Authority (SCDA) concept, which is one of the fundamental building blocks of maintaining airworthiness anyway (as the SCDA maintains the Safety Cases of integrated systems of systems).
Oh, the decision my mate was told to make? Cancel an SCDA contract, and hence all work on Safety Cases, to save money. Good job all this was withheld from the subsequent BoI and Coroner's Inquest, eh? The BoI noted the (supposedly) integrated system of systems wasn't functionally safe, but didn't understand why.