Haddon-Cave, Airworthiness, Sea King et al (merged)
Thread Starter
Join Date: Mar 2005
Location: On the outside looking in
Posts: 542
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Haddon-Cave, Airworthiness, Sea King et al (merged)
Having gone through the H-C report, and as Mick Smith has questioned this, wonder what the thoughts here (separate thread to avoid distorting the Nimrod thread) are on the H-C statement
supported by definitions from Def-Stan 0056 (Part1)/4 Annex A:
and
BP1201 (Risk Classification Table):
So, by the defintiions, H-C was correct - if you haven't made a Tolerable risk ALARP, then it is Intolerable.
However, are the definitions wrong? Take a purely risk based approach: the Intolerable (ie Unacceptable) / Tolerable boundary is based on a numerical probability value wrt the consequential loss of life. Def-Stan 0056 (Part1)/4 Annex A defines Unacceptable as
and Broadly Acceptable as
So, putting HSE numbers to it, a risk is Intolerable (ie Unacceptable) if the risk of death is more than 1:1000 per annum. A risk is Broadly Acceptable if the risk of death is less than 1:1 000 000.
If the risk of death was 1:999 999, it would be at the lower end of Tolerable. If the risk of death was 1:1001, it would be at the upper end of Tolerable (extremes used for emphasis), but according to H-C, unless ALARP, both would be considered Intolerable / Unacceptable.
Note again, this is a purely risk based argument. But does it seem reasonable to consider that a risk towards the lower end of the scale HAS to be considered Intolerable despite being only marginally more risky than something Broadly Acceptable?
and if not, does
then make sense in the real world beyond Def Stan definitions?
We can turn to the 'R' in ALARP later.
sw
There is no such thing as ‘tolerably safe but not ALARP. Risks are either ‘tolerable and ALARP’ or intolerable
Tolerable A level of risk between broadly acceptable and unacceptable that may be tolerated when it has been demonstrated to be ALARP.
BP1201 (Risk Classification Table):
‘C’ Tolerable - The residual risk is tolerable only if further risk reduction is impracticable or requires action that is grossly disproportionate in time, trouble and effort to the reduction in risk achieved.
However, are the definitions wrong? Take a purely risk based approach: the Intolerable (ie Unacceptable) / Tolerable boundary is based on a numerical probability value wrt the consequential loss of life. Def-Stan 0056 (Part1)/4 Annex A defines Unacceptable as
A level of risk that is tolerated only under exceptional circumstances.
A level of risk that is sufficiently low that it may be tolerated without
the need to demonstrate that the risk is ALARP.
the need to demonstrate that the risk is ALARP.
If the risk of death was 1:999 999, it would be at the lower end of Tolerable. If the risk of death was 1:1001, it would be at the upper end of Tolerable (extremes used for emphasis), but according to H-C, unless ALARP, both would be considered Intolerable / Unacceptable.
Note again, this is a purely risk based argument. But does it seem reasonable to consider that a risk towards the lower end of the scale HAS to be considered Intolerable despite being only marginally more risky than something Broadly Acceptable?
and if not, does
‘tolerably safe but not ALARP’
We can turn to the 'R' in ALARP later.
sw
Last edited by Safeware; 10th Nov 2009 at 17:31.
Thank God......I thought I was the only one!!!
Join Date: Mar 2005
Location: Falmouth
Posts: 1,651
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I used one of thos Air Landed Arming Refuel Point up at Stornoway many years ago. It was manned by 2 young WRAFs who were both very keen to impress and very free with their time and their...erm.... Oh happy times...
Join Date: Sep 2006
Location: Bridgwater Somerset
Posts: 459
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Take a look here http://www.hvrcsl.co.uk/esas2005/Pap...20Priciple.pdf it is what I sent to Mr Haddon-Cave last year Re ALARP. One of the statements in here is "A key aspect of demonstrating that a risk is ALARP is demonstrating that all credible risk reduction methods are impracticable. To do this, it is clearly first necessary to identify all
credible risk reduction methods."
Something that the IPT and BAE failed to do.
credible risk reduction methods."
Something that the IPT and BAE failed to do.
Join Date: Jul 2002
Location: UK Sometimes
Posts: 1,062
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
What worries me is who apportions the 10p-6 or 10p-5 etc for the MoD airworthiness processes involving catestrophic failures eg Herc Fuel Tanks, Nimrod Dry Bays, Sea King HISLS, Chinook FADECS etc?
Where do these probabilities come from?
Were they ever assessed at all and based on what?
Anyway, surely many of such probability figures are conjecture and therefore, to be taken with a bucketful of salt - ie is this not objective 'probability v risk' but actually subjective 'pure guesswork v uncertainty' - ALARP or not?
"If someone tells me the probability of failure is 1 in 100,000, then I know he is full of cr@p"
attributed to Dr Richard Feynmann - Nobel Prizewinner and who investigated the Challenger Shuttle Tragedy.
flipster
Where do these probabilities come from?
Were they ever assessed at all and based on what?
Anyway, surely many of such probability figures are conjecture and therefore, to be taken with a bucketful of salt - ie is this not objective 'probability v risk' but actually subjective 'pure guesswork v uncertainty' - ALARP or not?
"If someone tells me the probability of failure is 1 in 100,000, then I know he is full of cr@p"
attributed to Dr Richard Feynmann - Nobel Prizewinner and who investigated the Challenger Shuttle Tragedy.
flipster
Join Date: Jul 2002
Location: UK Sometimes
Posts: 1,062
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Haddon-Cave, Airworthiness, Sea King et al
The Haddon Cave Report has been described as
"The biggest condemnation of the MoD and the Govt - IN LIVING MEMORY."
It underlines the failings surrounding the tragic losses of the Nimrod and Hercules. However, I find it strange that this has been only mentioned 'en passant' in other threads. The likelihood is that further failings of the system will be unearthed by a re-examination of other ac losses.
Now that the Sea King thread was prematurely closed and despite the likelihood of me upsetting the non-believers who may be in denial about the lack of effective airworthiness processes in the MoD, I believe there may be significant mileage in continuing the discussions relating to assertions that there be significant substance in Mr Haddon-Cave's Report and its further ramifications.
Such questions might include:
Could the H-C report have gone even further, wider and deeper?
Why - did the MoD limit his TORs on purpose?
Why is there a delay in the MoD response?
How many other instances are there of a lack of implementation of the airworthiness regulations? Sea King HISL? Tornado IFF? Chinook FADEC? Puma Anticipators?
When? By Whom? Going Back how far? Why? Do they have a common denominator?
What relevance is this to current aircraft and systems?
Why would some crews ignore the inherent lack of functional safety of their steeds?
Why would the high-paid help at MoD seek to suppress this - safety is everyone's concern and functional safety = better operational effectiveness = less chance of someone's son or daughter coming home to Lyneham in a coffin on a C-17?
If the HC recs are implemented in full will that correct the obvious deficiencies in the system - or do even more peope have to go to the high court before the MoD accept their responsibilities and their duty to prevent recurrence?
How can the MoD dither any more - especially if there are further suspicions about other losses?
Bottom-line in my opinion:
The MoD has accepted there was a lack of airwothiness in the Nimrod and the Hercules. It just cannot wait any longer. If any other cases rear their heads, the MoD will look even more ridiculous. It is patently obvious that the MoD have no wriggle-room on the HC recommendations and should implement them forthwith. God forbid there should be any more instances and losses.
"The biggest condemnation of the MoD and the Govt - IN LIVING MEMORY."
It underlines the failings surrounding the tragic losses of the Nimrod and Hercules. However, I find it strange that this has been only mentioned 'en passant' in other threads. The likelihood is that further failings of the system will be unearthed by a re-examination of other ac losses.
Now that the Sea King thread was prematurely closed and despite the likelihood of me upsetting the non-believers who may be in denial about the lack of effective airworthiness processes in the MoD, I believe there may be significant mileage in continuing the discussions relating to assertions that there be significant substance in Mr Haddon-Cave's Report and its further ramifications.
Such questions might include:
Could the H-C report have gone even further, wider and deeper?
Why - did the MoD limit his TORs on purpose?
Why is there a delay in the MoD response?
How many other instances are there of a lack of implementation of the airworthiness regulations? Sea King HISL? Tornado IFF? Chinook FADEC? Puma Anticipators?
When? By Whom? Going Back how far? Why? Do they have a common denominator?
What relevance is this to current aircraft and systems?
Why would some crews ignore the inherent lack of functional safety of their steeds?
Why would the high-paid help at MoD seek to suppress this - safety is everyone's concern and functional safety = better operational effectiveness = less chance of someone's son or daughter coming home to Lyneham in a coffin on a C-17?
If the HC recs are implemented in full will that correct the obvious deficiencies in the system - or do even more peope have to go to the high court before the MoD accept their responsibilities and their duty to prevent recurrence?
How can the MoD dither any more - especially if there are further suspicions about other losses?
Bottom-line in my opinion:
The MoD has accepted there was a lack of airwothiness in the Nimrod and the Hercules. It just cannot wait any longer. If any other cases rear their heads, the MoD will look even more ridiculous. It is patently obvious that the MoD have no wriggle-room on the HC recommendations and should implement them forthwith. God forbid there should be any more instances and losses.
Last edited by flipster; 12th Nov 2009 at 17:20. Reason: spolling errers
Tourist, I'm afraid you sound like the IPT Leader who told me, if I didn't like being told to ignore the regulations, I should find another job.
However, I don't think you ARE him, because he later acknowledged the error of his ways, expressing regret he encouraged a staff member to issue these orders.
Unfortunately, that was after the funerals.
However, I don't think you ARE him, because he later acknowledged the error of his ways, expressing regret he encouraged a staff member to issue these orders.
Unfortunately, that was after the funerals.
Join Date: Mar 2006
Location: wilts
Posts: 1,667
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
A few encouraging noises Flip. A person in the CofC told me the other day, that Haddon-Cave has changed everything. He said Haddon-Cave's report is having an effect across the board, he said from the moment we get up, even when we are brushing our teeth we are thinking about H-C.
If you want to be totally astonished, search the name "Frank Walsh" in the report.
I suggest to that foul-mouthed contributor Tourist, that he reads some of Frank Walsh's specials, he might realise then, how dangerous the total disregard for airworthiness appears to have become.
For example, at one meeting, the QQ rep was actually booed.
Lets, flesh out choice bits of the report on this thread. Most people don't have the time to read hundreds of pages of a report of this nature.
Might surprise a few of the idiots lurking here.
If you want to be totally astonished, search the name "Frank Walsh" in the report.
I suggest to that foul-mouthed contributor Tourist, that he reads some of Frank Walsh's specials, he might realise then, how dangerous the total disregard for airworthiness appears to have become.
For example, at one meeting, the QQ rep was actually booed.
Lets, flesh out choice bits of the report on this thread. Most people don't have the time to read hundreds of pages of a report of this nature.
Might surprise a few of the idiots lurking here.
Join Date: Jan 2008
Location: UK
Posts: 1,515
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Tourist, I'm afraid you sound like the IPT Leader who told me, if I didn't like being told to ignore the regulations, I should find another job.
Know he doesn't, he sounds like an aircrew mate that is sick to the back teeth of being patronised on his own forum by a bunch of people who think they have all the answers and who fundamentally don't know squat about the philosophy and professional judgement of people who fly combat aircraft for a living.
Don't bother replying because as with all the other threads that have gone down this road... the aircrew (or in my case ex aircrew) have already left the building.
Bye Bye
Join Date: Feb 2001
Location: South
Posts: 41
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The Nimrod Review was made public from the date of release. It hit everyone's desk at the same time. In my view, this is good; a report like this usually goes first to those implicated, who then get a finite time to get their story straight before the document is made public.
The MoD, and others involved, have had as much time as we have to read and digest. A response has been promised.
No Review can answer all your questions. I'm not even going to try and assess whether or not they are relevant. I do know that the Review has stated what many felt, but couldn't put a finger on. I suggest that we give the Review a chance before all response, answers, fact finding committees and implementation groups are rubbished here. It is a step on the correct, open and honest path and I sincerely hope the path is long.
The MoD, and others involved, have had as much time as we have to read and digest. A response has been promised.
No Review can answer all your questions. I'm not even going to try and assess whether or not they are relevant. I do know that the Review has stated what many felt, but couldn't put a finger on. I suggest that we give the Review a chance before all response, answers, fact finding committees and implementation groups are rubbished here. It is a step on the correct, open and honest path and I sincerely hope the path is long.
Join Date: Mar 2006
Location: wilts
Posts: 1,667
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Fat One, come back when you have read the report and have something to contribute. More than happy for the likes of you and Tourist to disappear from the thread.
Maybe we should tag it, grown ups only....
You are so twisted you are probably saddened by how seriously MoD are taking this report and how much change it is going to create.
Some of the main players are now being listened to and taken seriously at politically high levels. We aim to influence the decision makers of the future, so tough s**t, I suggest you go and twiddle with something else, so as to not raise your blood pressure unduly.......
Maybe we should tag it, grown ups only....
You are so twisted you are probably saddened by how seriously MoD are taking this report and how much change it is going to create.
Some of the main players are now being listened to and taken seriously at politically high levels. We aim to influence the decision makers of the future, so tough s**t, I suggest you go and twiddle with something else, so as to not raise your blood pressure unduly.......
Last edited by nigegilb; 12th Nov 2009 at 16:12.
Join Date: Jan 2008
Location: UK
Posts: 1,515
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
NigeGlib
Sorry, since you posted on top of me allow me a couple of bites before I clear off.
Comparing Tourists post to yours (and speaking as an idiot with a Masters Degree in English), I find yours to be a more "foul mouthed" post than his.
And you don't need to "flesh out" the HC report - I've read it. Four very good mates of mine were in the aircraft and I wanted to know the facts as presented by the QC - not through the filter of Pprune. It was an interesting report but it did not tell me anything about the aircraft I flew in for 27 years that I had not long since worked out myself. I could bang on about many things to do with HC, Nimrods and military aviation, but to do so would be to tread on my point. Which is simply this...
Try and get your head round the thinking and personality of military avaitors, and why they are willing to take risks, without insulting them.
HC wrote a chapter on the shuttle accidents. If NASA hadn't fixed a single thing and and Del Trotter had taken over as head of flight safety, do you not think there would not still be queue of aviators a mile long waiting to fly it?
Finally, if you can't get your head round any of that, at least acknowledge that this is supposed to be a pilot's forum in the first instance, so you might show the opinions of the fly boys and girls just a tiny bit more respect.
And now I'm outta here.
Sorry, since you posted on top of me allow me a couple of bites before I clear off.
Comparing Tourists post to yours (and speaking as an idiot with a Masters Degree in English), I find yours to be a more "foul mouthed" post than his.
And you don't need to "flesh out" the HC report - I've read it. Four very good mates of mine were in the aircraft and I wanted to know the facts as presented by the QC - not through the filter of Pprune. It was an interesting report but it did not tell me anything about the aircraft I flew in for 27 years that I had not long since worked out myself. I could bang on about many things to do with HC, Nimrods and military aviation, but to do so would be to tread on my point. Which is simply this...
Try and get your head round the thinking and personality of military avaitors, and why they are willing to take risks, without insulting them.
HC wrote a chapter on the shuttle accidents. If NASA hadn't fixed a single thing and and Del Trotter had taken over as head of flight safety, do you not think there would not still be queue of aviators a mile long waiting to fly it?
Finally, if you can't get your head round any of that, at least acknowledge that this is supposed to be a pilot's forum in the first instance, so you might show the opinions of the fly boys and girls just a tiny bit more respect.
And now I'm outta here.
Join Date: Feb 2009
Location: UK
Posts: 192
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
This thread has got off to a really bad start! Can we try and be constructive rather than destroy each others entries.
We do need to learn the lessons of HC as there is clearly something quite wrong with elements of the airworthiness regime. The buzzes that I hear are that such a process is well in hand. But that does not mean that errors will not occur in the future, especially when finance is tight and that ""must do" mod is not affordable.
I spent much of my career flying an aircraft that would not pass the H-C test - it sank on impact with the water for a start - but had many other shortcomings as well. But I knew about most of them and thus informed I was able to make a rational, risk based, decision on whether I wished to fly in such an aircraft. I accepted the risks and compensated for the majority in the the way I planned and executed missions, many in hostile situations. But at the end of the day I knew that if I ditched I had a less than 50/50 chance of survival, if I had a fire the risk was similar (no diversions at sea), the fuel tanks were not self sealing and the spare tank was effectively a single skinned jerry can in the back. Oh yes, if the hydraulics failed there was no connection between my flying controls and the rotor head. So what! it was great fun and a privilege to fly such a great machine.
Learn lessons but please stop moaning, know your aircraft and remember that the vast majority of military accidents are due to aircrew error, not the airframe - I suspect that includes the Mull Chinook as well (God rest their souls).
We do need to learn the lessons of HC as there is clearly something quite wrong with elements of the airworthiness regime. The buzzes that I hear are that such a process is well in hand. But that does not mean that errors will not occur in the future, especially when finance is tight and that ""must do" mod is not affordable.
I spent much of my career flying an aircraft that would not pass the H-C test - it sank on impact with the water for a start - but had many other shortcomings as well. But I knew about most of them and thus informed I was able to make a rational, risk based, decision on whether I wished to fly in such an aircraft. I accepted the risks and compensated for the majority in the the way I planned and executed missions, many in hostile situations. But at the end of the day I knew that if I ditched I had a less than 50/50 chance of survival, if I had a fire the risk was similar (no diversions at sea), the fuel tanks were not self sealing and the spare tank was effectively a single skinned jerry can in the back. Oh yes, if the hydraulics failed there was no connection between my flying controls and the rotor head. So what! it was great fun and a privilege to fly such a great machine.
Learn lessons but please stop moaning, know your aircraft and remember that the vast majority of military accidents are due to aircrew error, not the airframe - I suspect that includes the Mull Chinook as well (God rest their souls).
Join Date: Mar 2006
Location: wilts
Posts: 1,667
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Thanks for the balancer pheasant, please allow me to give my own perspective.
Flip and myself cut our teeth on ops in Afghanistan. We flew Hercules aircraft with hardly any protection bar the assist of flying at night, against regular ground fire in the early days of the op.
Did we accept the risks and crack on with the job? Of course, because we were military aviators and it was our job. I can understand where others are coming from, one thing you learn very quickly in the military is that nothing is EVER perfect.
Did our chain of command at the highest level (including defence ministers), ackowledge the risks we were taking and confront the situation with honesty? No it didn't. This lack of honesty led, in my opinion to the crew of XV179 taking risks beyond their knowledge and understanding. A simple tweak of tactics would have kept them safe, whilst FTP was installed. The recommend was sat on and so was the desperately important risk assessment.
Did the Nimrod crew have the knowledge that their aircraft was safe? No, due to outrageous, deliberate ignorance of airworthiness regulations they were led to believe their aircraft was safe.
I am in this for the long run. I want to see the culture changed in MOD, where people today have blood on their hands. The signs are good, a new generation of senior officers are taking over, but there is still work to be done. I won't be sitting on the sidelines, hoping it is going to happen.
I make no apology for my forthright approach, this is not a popularity contest.
Flip and myself cut our teeth on ops in Afghanistan. We flew Hercules aircraft with hardly any protection bar the assist of flying at night, against regular ground fire in the early days of the op.
Did we accept the risks and crack on with the job? Of course, because we were military aviators and it was our job. I can understand where others are coming from, one thing you learn very quickly in the military is that nothing is EVER perfect.
Did our chain of command at the highest level (including defence ministers), ackowledge the risks we were taking and confront the situation with honesty? No it didn't. This lack of honesty led, in my opinion to the crew of XV179 taking risks beyond their knowledge and understanding. A simple tweak of tactics would have kept them safe, whilst FTP was installed. The recommend was sat on and so was the desperately important risk assessment.
Did the Nimrod crew have the knowledge that their aircraft was safe? No, due to outrageous, deliberate ignorance of airworthiness regulations they were led to believe their aircraft was safe.
I am in this for the long run. I want to see the culture changed in MOD, where people today have blood on their hands. The signs are good, a new generation of senior officers are taking over, but there is still work to be done. I won't be sitting on the sidelines, hoping it is going to happen.
I make no apology for my forthright approach, this is not a popularity contest.
