Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
Caz
Got me there I'm afraid. I confess I don't know what was going on on the flight deck or what they could see. I bow in awe to those who do.
As for the clearances of avionic equipment, I'm simply passing on what MoD provided under FoI. That is, they ignored the regulations by not clearing the equipment for use, and all that this entails, before issuing the RTS. That breaks so many regulations you could write a book; and constitutes gross negligence. But I'm sure the ACAS of the day will explain this for the first time if interviewed by Lord Philip.
Best wishes
Got me there I'm afraid. I confess I don't know what was going on on the flight deck or what they could see. I bow in awe to those who do.
As for the clearances of avionic equipment, I'm simply passing on what MoD provided under FoI. That is, they ignored the regulations by not clearing the equipment for use, and all that this entails, before issuing the RTS. That breaks so many regulations you could write a book; and constitutes gross negligence. But I'm sure the ACAS of the day will explain this for the first time if interviewed by Lord Philip.
Best wishes
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tucumseh
I don't doubt that you believe that your assertions are correct in respect of navigation equipment limitations - however they were meant to be flying VFR. If they were complying with VFR requirements then they should have had ample warning of the hazardous situation that they were in and they should certainly not have been proceeding at such a high speed whilst approaching fog enshrouded high ground . If they were unable to comply with VFR weather limitations then they should have climbed to at least Safety Altitude whilst turning away from the high ground- NO "ifs" and NO "buts".
There is also the question as to whether they were aware as to the actual position of the turning point in relation to the high ground.
I don't doubt that you believe that your assertions are correct in respect of navigation equipment limitations - however they were meant to be flying VFR. If they were complying with VFR requirements then they should have had ample warning of the hazardous situation that they were in and they should certainly not have been proceeding at such a high speed whilst approaching fog enshrouded high ground . If they were unable to comply with VFR weather limitations then they should have climbed to at least Safety Altitude whilst turning away from the high ground- NO "ifs" and NO "buts".
There is also the question as to whether they were aware as to the actual position of the turning point in relation to the high ground.
But what if they were completely legal with regards to the weather, had planned to make the turn as you suggest and at the last moment had some sort of aircraft malfunction that precluded making the turn and caused the aircraft to crash?
I am not saying that is what happened but can you hand on heart tell me without any shadow of a doubt that it didn't
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sffp -
- Caz knows. We bow.
Originally Posted by tuc/above
Got me there I'm afraid. I confess I don't know what was going on on the flight deck or what they could see. I bow in awe to those who do.
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Chinook
SFFP. Please yourself. I said that I was offering the most plausible theory, and, as we Rip van Winkles insist, they should not have been where they were in those weather conditions. THAT was the negligence, and it is difficult to understand why an experienced Chinook pilot (as I take you to be from your numerous posts here) cannot see that. But never mind. regards JP
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Chinook
SFFP. Do we really have to go through this yet again? The weather conditions described by the lighthouse-keeper, his wife and something like ten other folk on the hillside at that time. Please sy what other evidence as to the visibility you think is needed. JP
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Seldom old bean -
just read the posts - there's a good chap. The aircraft nearly hit one of the witnesses to the weather conditions at the time..............
Pilot error still looks good to me. Both heads down perhaps, yes, perhaps, but the outcome was pretty dramatic............negligence still has not grabbed me as a decent decision, but as Caz says we were not at all these briefings and so on.............nice to see the oozlem thingy still flying high - VMC I hope.......
What weather conditions
Pilot error still looks good to me. Both heads down perhaps, yes, perhaps, but the outcome was pretty dramatic............negligence still has not grabbed me as a decent decision, but as Caz says we were not at all these briefings and so on.............nice to see the oozlem thingy still flying high - VMC I hope.......
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Bas,
Old chap I did read the posts, so if the witness testifies to the fact that the visibility was so poor they could only see 10 yards in front of them and they could not see the Chinook, how would they know it almost him them
Old chap I did read the posts, so if the witness testifies to the fact that the visibility was so poor they could only see 10 yards in front of them and they could not see the Chinook, how would they know it almost him them
If we're going to argue weather once again, please let us stick to the issue.
Waypoint change was 1.75 km from the crash scene. Surely, all you can say with any degree of certainty is that at least part of the high ground near the lighthouse and the crash site were obscured by cloud and fog.
Wratten has said* that the pilots were grossly negligent AT WAY POINT CHANGE because they were going too fast under the conditions i.e. with some high ground obscured 1.75 km away.
Walter's photos (6644 or 6651) could meet these conditions so the inference is that it would be negligent to fly within 1.75 km of high ground obscured by cloud when VFR rules stipulate 1500m horizontally or "clear of cloud".
Wratten has argued that whatever may have happened after waypoint change is not pertinent to his judgement. That is the basis for the findings of the RO's as described by Wratten himself.
*Pilot Magazine article
Waypoint change was 1.75 km from the crash scene. Surely, all you can say with any degree of certainty is that at least part of the high ground near the lighthouse and the crash site were obscured by cloud and fog.
Wratten has said* that the pilots were grossly negligent AT WAY POINT CHANGE because they were going too fast under the conditions i.e. with some high ground obscured 1.75 km away.
Walter's photos (6644 or 6651) could meet these conditions so the inference is that it would be negligent to fly within 1.75 km of high ground obscured by cloud when VFR rules stipulate 1500m horizontally or "clear of cloud".
Wratten has argued that whatever may have happened after waypoint change is not pertinent to his judgement. That is the basis for the findings of the RO's as described by Wratten himself.
*Pilot Magazine article
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Chinook
Seldom Fit For Purpose. As an experienced Chinook pilot, and no doubt familiar with the weather to be exoected over those hills, what do you guess the forward visibility might have been at the point of impact?
baston:
As ever, I'm afraid that I have to disagree with you baston. Sorry! Negligence grabs it for me as a decent decision. Indeed Gross Negligence grabs it even better. The mistake made though was to level it at the wrong people!
High time this accident got the accident investigation it deserved, ie one that looks for the most probable cause of it happening, bearing in mind the technical state of it and its sister Mk2's since entering RAF service. The fact that 16 years after ZD576 crashed taking with it 29 lives we are still waiting for the RAF to properly investigate this accident is a disgrace and a scandal. If the RAF will not do its duty to carry out a proper accident investigation, then someone else should do so.
It is not so much that the evidence taken by the BoI has no merit, it is rather that the evidence not taken by the BoI has more. Most of that evidence would be found by calling witnesses that the BoI failed to call. They could still be called. They should be.
negligence still has not grabbed me as a decent decision, but as Caz says we were not at all these briefings and so on.
High time this accident got the accident investigation it deserved, ie one that looks for the most probable cause of it happening, bearing in mind the technical state of it and its sister Mk2's since entering RAF service. The fact that 16 years after ZD576 crashed taking with it 29 lives we are still waiting for the RAF to properly investigate this accident is a disgrace and a scandal. If the RAF will not do its duty to carry out a proper accident investigation, then someone else should do so.
It is not so much that the evidence taken by the BoI has no merit, it is rather that the evidence not taken by the BoI has more. Most of that evidence would be found by calling witnesses that the BoI failed to call. They could still be called. They should be.
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THE WEATHER
The ironic thing about the weather is that by all accounts the weather affecting this a/c was generated by a fixed feature and is very common at certain times of the year so you could have spent some time up there and got a feel for what the Mull most probably looked like as they approached it then perhaps you would understand the idea that you can see it from a distance but judging closing range would be very difficult at speed but to actually make the effort to go there seems too much for most of you anyway, it would be like reading the last page of a book that you like guessing the end of ...
HPT
It wasn't in route steer mode the change was made manually.
Regarding the other information, I am grateful for your thoughtful reply which has made it clear that there are some (understandable) misconceptions of what navigation system (or combination of such) the HoSI works off when you select TANS on the mode select panel, and for that matter how the suggested angle of bank (to get a nice turn onto the required track) is derived that is displayed by a pointer within the AI.
I suggest you (and anyone else interested in the navigation systems aspect) brush up on your theory and we try and get an agreed whole system description on the open forum don't delay for fear of minor errors, get on with it and doubtless others will correct it until we have an agreed understanding of the navigation systems (and the presentation of their data to the pilots) available to them when I get some more time, I'll kick it off if no one else starts first. Nothing secret here, forget CPLS for the moment, just the old Doppler and GPS systems, air data, etc, integration and display, etc basic stuff.
I do respect that you put forward your understanding very few on the thread have been willing to be open, preferring to put it in the too hard box.
Regarding the CPLS you state confidently that the RAF does not use it for navigation meaning, I take it, that it is not used for, say, approaching an LZ in the conditions I described, despite its use like this being a recognised attribute elsewhere further, very few here would touch the subject with a barge pole I can think of a good reason for this odd attitude towards a useful piece of kit this crash.
The ironic thing about the weather is that by all accounts the weather affecting this a/c was generated by a fixed feature and is very common at certain times of the year so you could have spent some time up there and got a feel for what the Mull most probably looked like as they approached it then perhaps you would understand the idea that you can see it from a distance but judging closing range would be very difficult at speed but to actually make the effort to go there seems too much for most of you anyway, it would be like reading the last page of a book that you like guessing the end of ...
HPT
It wasn't in route steer mode the change was made manually.
Regarding the other information, I am grateful for your thoughtful reply which has made it clear that there are some (understandable) misconceptions of what navigation system (or combination of such) the HoSI works off when you select TANS on the mode select panel, and for that matter how the suggested angle of bank (to get a nice turn onto the required track) is derived that is displayed by a pointer within the AI.
I suggest you (and anyone else interested in the navigation systems aspect) brush up on your theory and we try and get an agreed whole system description on the open forum don't delay for fear of minor errors, get on with it and doubtless others will correct it until we have an agreed understanding of the navigation systems (and the presentation of their data to the pilots) available to them when I get some more time, I'll kick it off if no one else starts first. Nothing secret here, forget CPLS for the moment, just the old Doppler and GPS systems, air data, etc, integration and display, etc basic stuff.
I do respect that you put forward your understanding very few on the thread have been willing to be open, preferring to put it in the too hard box.
Regarding the CPLS you state confidently that the RAF does not use it for navigation meaning, I take it, that it is not used for, say, approaching an LZ in the conditions I described, despite its use like this being a recognised attribute elsewhere further, very few here would touch the subject with a barge pole I can think of a good reason for this odd attitude towards a useful piece of kit this crash.
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Keeping the circular argument going, if it could be proven that the aircraft flew into the hill under IMC and there was nothing wrong with the aircraft, why did Wratten and Day reach a gross negligence conclusion when they were faced with very similar accident reports, containing far more accurate flight data information, whereby they did not reach the same conclusion? Double standards, hypocrisy or just trying to cloud more fundamental, embarrassing and damaging failures.
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Because gross negligence infers no doubt whatsoever, it was the necessary judgement at the time to prevent public disquiet at what would have to have been regarded as a suspicious crash unless it was presented that there was no doubt whatsoever that it was just a case of pilot error.
This means that this judgement is not going to be lightly reversed without proof of an alternative cause at least until the last embers of resistance to reform in NI are extinguished.
Get it yet?
The airworthiness argument isn't going to do it.
This means that this judgement is not going to be lightly reversed without proof of an alternative cause at least until the last embers of resistance to reform in NI are extinguished.
Get it yet?
The airworthiness argument isn't going to do it.
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As an ex Puma crewman and current Herc ALM, a fact you are perfectly aware of, I offer the following,
On that fateful day the forward visibility at the point of impact and at the time of impact would have been less than 10 feet and decreasing rapidly by the nano second.
On that fateful day the forward visibility at the point of impact prior to the time of impact is something you, I and everyone else who has an opinion on this matter, including your fellow * Officers will never ever know.
Or did I miss something here.
The airworthiness argument isn't going to do it.
What we are saying is that the decision to state the aircraft was airworthy, despite expert advice that it was not, is a proven degree of negligence far in excess of that which remains unproven against the pilots. Those responsible are guilty of an act of Commission.
This was compounded by the deliberate decision to misrepresent the facts by withholding vital, safety related information from Users. Those responsible are guilty of an act of Omission.
Unless both acts are assessed, one cannot reach a balanced view. The pilots may have committed an error. MoD has provided evidence senior staffs made errors (a charitable word) of Commission and Omission. But, given the evidence also shows they were advised of the impact and ploughed on, those errors swiftly became an act gross negligence and failure of Duty of Care. In my opinion.
tuc:
and, for what little it be worth tuc, my opinion as well. That is why a re-opened investigation into this accident is so important. Nothing that has happened in the intervening 16 years could prevent the appalling situation that you describe repeating over and over.
This forum has threads dedicated to military airworthiness related accidents, including this one, that account for the deaths of 62 people. It is possible that the total figure is many times greater because all military air accidents have one thing in common, they are investigated by the very operator that suffered the accident. They are also regulated by its immediate parent, the MOD. For both reasons such investigations are compromised from the very beginning. Mr H-C's MAA has done nothing to ameliorate that compromise.
That is why the "airworthiness argument" is so vital, Walter. As tuc says, it may or may not have been a cause of this accident, only a proper Air Accident Investigation can determine that, but it will be the cause of many more avoidable accidents and needless deaths unless and until it is addressed. This is a site for Professional Pilots, amongst others. Such considerations as these should be at the very forefront of our thoughts. Now is the time to hear them!
But, given the evidence also shows they were advised of the impact and ploughed on, those errors swiftly became an act gross negligence and failure of Duty of Care. In my opinion.
This forum has threads dedicated to military airworthiness related accidents, including this one, that account for the deaths of 62 people. It is possible that the total figure is many times greater because all military air accidents have one thing in common, they are investigated by the very operator that suffered the accident. They are also regulated by its immediate parent, the MOD. For both reasons such investigations are compromised from the very beginning. Mr H-C's MAA has done nothing to ameliorate that compromise.
That is why the "airworthiness argument" is so vital, Walter. As tuc says, it may or may not have been a cause of this accident, only a proper Air Accident Investigation can determine that, but it will be the cause of many more avoidable accidents and needless deaths unless and until it is addressed. This is a site for Professional Pilots, amongst others. Such considerations as these should be at the very forefront of our thoughts. Now is the time to hear them!
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Tuc is right when he says the gross negligence occured in the higher-level corridors of MoD and, after the event, negligence became wilful obsfuscation.
Of course, no-one knows for sure whether the catalogue of failures in rushing into service an aircraft with so many known faults had a bearing on the crash as there was so little of it left to investigate. Even the AAIB said evidence was sparse.
We would do well to remember that
"no evidence of failure" does not mean "evidence of no failure". That introduces doubt - mountains of it.
As to the assertion of Wratten + Day of 'too low, too fast, in poor weather' is nonsense. As others have said, no-one knows what they could see from the cockpit. What the lighthouse keepers saw or didn't is irrelevent. It is what the crew could see that matters - before or after WP change. As no-one knows this, with any certainty, the verdict of the ROs is a gross injustice.
If the crew had flown wilfully into culmo-granite then yes, it would be suicidal and murderous. But for that reason, I don't believe anyone would have flown wilfully into the very obvious mass of the Mull. So that leaves the only logical explanations as:
1. Total loss of Situational Awareness - but the WP change belies this. Even if it were, this very human failing would not merit the label of 'gross negligence'.
or
2. Heads-down distraction by something major (even then I don't believe the crewman between the seats would have let them, such was his reputation).
or
3. For some reason (there are many possibilities), the aircraft wouldn't let them turn left. For example, don't forget that the inconceivable amount of left rudder (when the ac was turning/yawing slightly right) has never been satisfactorally explained - possibly because of the impact, possibly not). Additionally, such a phenomenon had recently occured with the ac, as had numerous false warnings.
Doubt, doubt, everywhere doubt.
But high-level negligence and incompetence 9 months before the crash......provable and certain. What do you think a judge will decide is relevant?
flipster
Of course, no-one knows for sure whether the catalogue of failures in rushing into service an aircraft with so many known faults had a bearing on the crash as there was so little of it left to investigate. Even the AAIB said evidence was sparse.
We would do well to remember that
"no evidence of failure" does not mean "evidence of no failure". That introduces doubt - mountains of it.
As to the assertion of Wratten + Day of 'too low, too fast, in poor weather' is nonsense. As others have said, no-one knows what they could see from the cockpit. What the lighthouse keepers saw or didn't is irrelevent. It is what the crew could see that matters - before or after WP change. As no-one knows this, with any certainty, the verdict of the ROs is a gross injustice.
If the crew had flown wilfully into culmo-granite then yes, it would be suicidal and murderous. But for that reason, I don't believe anyone would have flown wilfully into the very obvious mass of the Mull. So that leaves the only logical explanations as:
1. Total loss of Situational Awareness - but the WP change belies this. Even if it were, this very human failing would not merit the label of 'gross negligence'.
or
2. Heads-down distraction by something major (even then I don't believe the crewman between the seats would have let them, such was his reputation).
or
3. For some reason (there are many possibilities), the aircraft wouldn't let them turn left. For example, don't forget that the inconceivable amount of left rudder (when the ac was turning/yawing slightly right) has never been satisfactorally explained - possibly because of the impact, possibly not). Additionally, such a phenomenon had recently occured with the ac, as had numerous false warnings.
Doubt, doubt, everywhere doubt.
But high-level negligence and incompetence 9 months before the crash......provable and certain. What do you think a judge will decide is relevant?
flipster
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Flipster,
I agree with most of what you say, but if you are saying that Waypoint change shows the Situation Awareness was not compromised at that point, you may be wrong.
Mr Cable confirmed that the TANS was in the Off position when he examined the wreckage.
Crashes change many things (including altimeter sub - scale settings).
I have used several varieties of TANS. They all require the toggle switch to be pulled from a detente ON position, then turned, then lifted into the OFF position. I can't see how any crash deceleration could do this.
Since the Waypoints make sense for the planned route, we can assume that the kit was switched on and it was intended to be used for the whole route.
The only reason the crew would swich it off is if they thought it was feeding false information. Lack of confidence in the kit can be caused by equipment problems or perhaps because of false perception of position by the crew?
Does anyboby know if the TANS was swiched off before or after Waypoint change?
Even in the event of loss of GPS signal. The TANS in Doppler and ADS modes is still an improvement on HAT.
I agree with most of what you say, but if you are saying that Waypoint change shows the Situation Awareness was not compromised at that point, you may be wrong.
Mr Cable confirmed that the TANS was in the Off position when he examined the wreckage.
Crashes change many things (including altimeter sub - scale settings).
I have used several varieties of TANS. They all require the toggle switch to be pulled from a detente ON position, then turned, then lifted into the OFF position. I can't see how any crash deceleration could do this.
Since the Waypoints make sense for the planned route, we can assume that the kit was switched on and it was intended to be used for the whole route.
The only reason the crew would swich it off is if they thought it was feeding false information. Lack of confidence in the kit can be caused by equipment problems or perhaps because of false perception of position by the crew?
Does anyboby know if the TANS was swiched off before or after Waypoint change?
Even in the event of loss of GPS signal. The TANS in Doppler and ADS modes is still an improvement on HAT.