Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
Or, to be more pertinent, at waypoint change which is where the RO's decided that the pilots were guilty of gross negligence. Round and round we go - I do hope this is the last time.
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I agree with Pulse. Before posting again on weather or altimeter setting please go back and read all the other entries on this subject.
If you then still have something new to say on the subject, feel free to raise the issue.
Otherwise, please, please stop going around in circles.
I think it has been established beyond reasonable doubt:
1. The crew approached the Mull in poor but perfectly legal VFR. (Holbook)
2. The crew must have been ( at least technically) IFR at point of impact. ( Lighthouse Observers)
3. There is no way of knowing if the crew ever entered cloud and lost forward visibility.
Caz, as a pilot you must know that if the observers and the driver could not see the helicopter, they had no way of knowing the conditions the crew were experiencing. You can sit in a control tower reporting zero visibility while 100metres or so from you there are aircraft landing having picked up the lights at 20 miles.
That is the nature of cloud / fog banks.
If you then still have something new to say on the subject, feel free to raise the issue.
Otherwise, please, please stop going around in circles.
I think it has been established beyond reasonable doubt:
1. The crew approached the Mull in poor but perfectly legal VFR. (Holbook)
2. The crew must have been ( at least technically) IFR at point of impact. ( Lighthouse Observers)
3. There is no way of knowing if the crew ever entered cloud and lost forward visibility.
Caz, as a pilot you must know that if the observers and the driver could not see the helicopter, they had no way of knowing the conditions the crew were experiencing. You can sit in a control tower reporting zero visibility while 100metres or so from you there are aircraft landing having picked up the lights at 20 miles.
That is the nature of cloud / fog banks.
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SFFP
Mr Ellacott estimated the distance from himself to the crash site as not more than 100 yards - which is the normal length of a Soccer pitch. Mr Ellacott would have reached the crash in less than 1 minute.
Dalek
Mr Ellacott estimated the visibility as "nine or ten feet maximum" as the aircraft flew over him approx one second before impact. Impact speed was assessed as 150 kts which is 250 ft a second. 100 yards is 300 ft therefore they had 1.2 seconds to sight and avoid the high ground they impacted. The attitude of the aircraft at impact suggested an evasion manoeuvre was attempted - but all too late.
Mr Ellacott estimated the distance from himself to the crash site as not more than 100 yards - which is the normal length of a Soccer pitch. Mr Ellacott would have reached the crash in less than 1 minute.
Dalek
Mr Ellacott estimated the visibility as "nine or ten feet maximum" as the aircraft flew over him approx one second before impact. Impact speed was assessed as 150 kts which is 250 ft a second. 100 yards is 300 ft therefore they had 1.2 seconds to sight and avoid the high ground they impacted. The attitude of the aircraft at impact suggested an evasion manoeuvre was attempted - but all too late.
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Caz,
I take it from your last that you are confirming that nobody actually knows what the weather was at the crash site at the time of the impact, at last you seem to be getting there
I take it from your last that you are confirming that nobody actually knows what the weather was at the crash site at the time of the impact, at last you seem to be getting there
I think Caz is saying he knows exactly what the weather was like at the crash site as both witnesses were within meters of it. Surely the weather at the crash site is one of the indisputable facts?
What SFFP is asking is weather approaching the crash site? All this has been gone around ad infinitum in previous posts.
What SFFP is asking is weather approaching the crash site? All this has been gone around ad infinitum in previous posts.
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Chinook,
Driving home from Swindon yesterday I could see the rain falling about 100 yards in front of the car but we were still dry as the rain had not reached us.
There was no eye witness to the actual impact so therefore we can assume what ever we like but no one actually knows what the weather was at the crash site.
Like the accident as a whole there are so many things we do not know, and thats what makes the verdict reached so unjust.
Driving home from Swindon yesterday I could see the rain falling about 100 yards in front of the car but we were still dry as the rain had not reached us.
There was no eye witness to the actual impact so therefore we can assume what ever we like but no one actually knows what the weather was at the crash site.
Like the accident as a whole there are so many things we do not know, and thats what makes the verdict reached so unjust.
Is there any eyewitness evidence as to the actual weather at the crash site 
[Mr Ellacott estimated the visibility as "nine or ten feet maximum" as the aircraft flew over him approx one second before impact
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The weather at the point of impact is a bit of a red herring. Pointing an accusatory finger on the grounds of this evidence (lack of?) is as relevant as accusing the aircrew of breaking their authorised MSD in the final moments before the crash. If we are sticking with the weather, I think it is worth revisiting Day's & Wratten's assertions about the weather and how they came to these particular conclusions.
That said, this argument has been wrung out before - a couple of times.
That said, this argument has been wrung out before - a couple of times.
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
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As CGB and many many others have said, the weather at the impact point is irrelevant and it would be really good if we could just get on and accept that. I'm pretty sure 100% of forum observers would accept posts 6347 and 6351 and agree that it is only 'negligent' to deliberately fly below SA in IMC in open airspace.
We keep on having the Rip van Winkles wake up and shout 'they were IMC when they crashed' and 'they should not have been there'. Nice if they would just slumber gently on, really.
Could the RvW's accept we (probably) all agree? Could they accept that what we would actually like to know is why they were 'there'. Wratten and Day do not know.
We keep on having the Rip van Winkles wake up and shout 'they were IMC when they crashed' and 'they should not have been there'. Nice if they would just slumber gently on, really.
Could the RvW's accept we (probably) all agree? Could they accept that what we would actually like to know is why they were 'there'. Wratten and Day do not know.
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BOAC
Why they were there? Perhaps this is "Why".
Almost everybody (except WK) has assumed that the Lighthouse was the planned turning point (because the structure could be seen from a considerable distance in clear weather) and had been misplotted - something highlighted by the BOI.
The initial planning for the sortie was apparently initiated by Lt K and completed by Flt Lt Tapper. Years ago, in the early days of this PPrune saga, it was stated that Flt Lt Tapper had landed several times at the HLS on the Mull which - if true - would suggest that there was perhaps a "standard flight log" for Aldergrove -Mull and return. If so, it is therefore possible that an outbound standard routing for a Chinook to the Mull HLS was inserted into the initial part of the planning for the outbound sortie to Inverness via the Mull - saves a lot of work. This would have brought the aircraft much closer to the high ground than if they had used the Lighthouse as a turning point.
I cannot offer any proof - but it could explain the "Misplot" and why the Crew did not turn immediately when they switched waypoints.
Remember the Flight Safety slogan - "Don't assume - CHECK".
Why they were there? Perhaps this is "Why".
Almost everybody (except WK) has assumed that the Lighthouse was the planned turning point (because the structure could be seen from a considerable distance in clear weather) and had been misplotted - something highlighted by the BOI.
The initial planning for the sortie was apparently initiated by Lt K and completed by Flt Lt Tapper. Years ago, in the early days of this PPrune saga, it was stated that Flt Lt Tapper had landed several times at the HLS on the Mull which - if true - would suggest that there was perhaps a "standard flight log" for Aldergrove -Mull and return. If so, it is therefore possible that an outbound standard routing for a Chinook to the Mull HLS was inserted into the initial part of the planning for the outbound sortie to Inverness via the Mull - saves a lot of work. This would have brought the aircraft much closer to the high ground than if they had used the Lighthouse as a turning point.
I cannot offer any proof - but it could explain the "Misplot" and why the Crew did not turn immediately when they switched waypoints.
Remember the Flight Safety slogan - "Don't assume - CHECK".
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Chinook
Dalek. Since we are looking up past references, please see 5455 on page 318. Regards. JP
Correction: please ignore page number, Item number is correct. JP
Correction: please ignore page number, Item number is correct. JP
Last edited by John Purdey; 10th Aug 2010 at 18:34. Reason: Page numbers wrong.
Caz
As you are referring, in part, to the SuperTANS and its associated systems, GPS, Doppler and HEA, it is always worth adding, just to place matters in context;
SuperTANS – Crew were told to ignore “Error” messages as “meaningless” and, in any case, the lead AAIB investigator stated it was off at impact – perhaps because of such meaningless information being presented to the crew.
GPS – No Initial Operating Clearance
Doppler – Inaccurate over water (as they all are)
HEA – The tube run was overly long, through many bulkheads and with many joins, which were prone to leakages and, hence, incorrect height data.
Four out of four with significant problems. The first three, although mentioned in the Release to Service (RTS), did not have clearance for use. The last isn’t mentioned at all. We all know why MoD hasn’t tried the angle “The crew were negligent because they used equipment that wasn’t cleared for use”. It is because the very existence of the RTS is a gross misrepresentation of the formal advice from Boscombe Down – that the aircraft was not airworthy and should not have been be released – and incriminates the man who signed it. (Beags – I won’t bother this time!).
As always these days, I have to add the caveat that MoD now denies the existence of this RTS, saying the civilian Controller Aircraft signed the only Release used by the RAF. (Which no doubt makes the copies I have from November 1993 to January 1996, issued by ACAS, forgeries). I’m really looking forward to Lord Philip asking the obvious questions of those I mention, as neither has been interviewed before. (It follows their evidence will be “new”, which will presumably satisfy MoD’s criteria).
Best wishes
As you are referring, in part, to the SuperTANS and its associated systems, GPS, Doppler and HEA, it is always worth adding, just to place matters in context;
SuperTANS – Crew were told to ignore “Error” messages as “meaningless” and, in any case, the lead AAIB investigator stated it was off at impact – perhaps because of such meaningless information being presented to the crew.
GPS – No Initial Operating Clearance
Doppler – Inaccurate over water (as they all are)
HEA – The tube run was overly long, through many bulkheads and with many joins, which were prone to leakages and, hence, incorrect height data.
Four out of four with significant problems. The first three, although mentioned in the Release to Service (RTS), did not have clearance for use. The last isn’t mentioned at all. We all know why MoD hasn’t tried the angle “The crew were negligent because they used equipment that wasn’t cleared for use”. It is because the very existence of the RTS is a gross misrepresentation of the formal advice from Boscombe Down – that the aircraft was not airworthy and should not have been be released – and incriminates the man who signed it. (Beags – I won’t bother this time!).
As always these days, I have to add the caveat that MoD now denies the existence of this RTS, saying the civilian Controller Aircraft signed the only Release used by the RAF. (Which no doubt makes the copies I have from November 1993 to January 1996, issued by ACAS, forgeries). I’m really looking forward to Lord Philip asking the obvious questions of those I mention, as neither has been interviewed before. (It follows their evidence will be “new”, which will presumably satisfy MoD’s criteria).
Best wishes
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Caz
You have hit the nail on the head regarding pre-planning – I have explained in the past that other waypoint coords had their apparent accuracy from conversion from grid to lat/long of convenient line intersections and that it was waypoint A that did not fit this category and was right for that LZ – something even RACAL did not recognise in their report and none of the venerable aviators here picked up.
The lat/long for waypoint A was rounded just a little (didn't take much) for convenience as one would when actually being there on a previous occasion and noting a convenient set of lat/long coords with their own nav system (as opposed to relying on map accuracy).
Apart from waypoint A being a “marker” for the LZ, it was also the sensible point to aim for if intending to swing around the back of the lighthouse (these beasts have a significanty turning circle at cruising speed).
035 mag back then was the optimum approach for that LZ (long axis of LZ and lined up with a prominent feature that a lighthouse keeper told me they always crossed) such that if they either changed their mind about landing there (wanting to wave-off) or otherwise were just going to swing around the lighthouse they just started an nice banked turn (anything from 30 to 60 degrees) on crossing the shoreline at waypoint A and this kept them clear of the masts and the hillside – surely a well known point for crews dropping squaddies off on exercise from NI.
Just one thing, you wrote <<... but it could explain the "Misplot" and why the Crew did not turn immediately when they switched waypoints. >> - it does not explain at all why they did not turn immediately when they switched waypoints – waypoint A would still have been of use (as they still had some way to go to the location/shoreline) in the absence of any other reference system – and you well know my theory on that.
By the way, all, whether you like it or not, a piece of equipment that could have been used for a local navigation exercise/demonstration has been recognised as having been fitted to some HC2 Chinooks back then – some evidence (documentary and hearsay) suggests that it may have been fitted to ZD576; forget the waffle, after all these years should we not know whether it was fitted or not with absolute certainty? Doesn't matter what your feelings about the causes of this crash, was this kit fitted or not? How can anyone with sincere interest in this disaster possibly ignore this issue? - even mobile 'phones got consideration.
You have hit the nail on the head regarding pre-planning – I have explained in the past that other waypoint coords had their apparent accuracy from conversion from grid to lat/long of convenient line intersections and that it was waypoint A that did not fit this category and was right for that LZ – something even RACAL did not recognise in their report and none of the venerable aviators here picked up.
The lat/long for waypoint A was rounded just a little (didn't take much) for convenience as one would when actually being there on a previous occasion and noting a convenient set of lat/long coords with their own nav system (as opposed to relying on map accuracy).
Apart from waypoint A being a “marker” for the LZ, it was also the sensible point to aim for if intending to swing around the back of the lighthouse (these beasts have a significanty turning circle at cruising speed).
035 mag back then was the optimum approach for that LZ (long axis of LZ and lined up with a prominent feature that a lighthouse keeper told me they always crossed) such that if they either changed their mind about landing there (wanting to wave-off) or otherwise were just going to swing around the lighthouse they just started an nice banked turn (anything from 30 to 60 degrees) on crossing the shoreline at waypoint A and this kept them clear of the masts and the hillside – surely a well known point for crews dropping squaddies off on exercise from NI.
Just one thing, you wrote <<... but it could explain the "Misplot" and why the Crew did not turn immediately when they switched waypoints. >> - it does not explain at all why they did not turn immediately when they switched waypoints – waypoint A would still have been of use (as they still had some way to go to the location/shoreline) in the absence of any other reference system – and you well know my theory on that.
By the way, all, whether you like it or not, a piece of equipment that could have been used for a local navigation exercise/demonstration has been recognised as having been fitted to some HC2 Chinooks back then – some evidence (documentary and hearsay) suggests that it may have been fitted to ZD576; forget the waffle, after all these years should we not know whether it was fitted or not with absolute certainty? Doesn't matter what your feelings about the causes of this crash, was this kit fitted or not? How can anyone with sincere interest in this disaster possibly ignore this issue? - even mobile 'phones got consideration.
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Walter, if the STANS was in route steer it would have switched over to the nexy WP in the route before actually getting to the waypoint, ie, it would try and make you cut the corner with a rate one turn. It was common practice not to turn to follow the steer bar if the waypoint was visual and you wanted to overfly it for whatever reason.
And as I told you in the PM, the CPLS was not and is not used by the RAF for navigation - why don't you listen....
HPT
And as I told you in the PM, the CPLS was not and is not used by the RAF for navigation - why don't you listen....
HPT
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Some folk will try anything to avoid the facts that without any doubt whatever (as we say) the crew should have turned away from that cloud-covered hill, if in fact the hill top as seen from the flight deck window was cloud covered; and without any doubt whatever, they failed to do so which because there are no survivors, no eye witnesses to the actual crash, no ADR and no CVR we simply cannot say hand on heart exactly why the crash happened. The most plausible, but unconfirmed theory for their failure to turn away is that they misidentified the Fog station compound on the clifftop, thinking it was the Lighthouse compound. This put them about 500 yds to the right of their intended track, which meant (have a look at the map) that the hill in fron of them was around 300-400 ft higher than they expected, and they could not avoid it in the very limited vi=sibility.
Such a failure to act as any reasonable person given the same theoretical corcumstances would do, in this case turning away, is the definition of negligence. However I should note that the set of circumstances above is nothing but conjecture, because like the two AM's I have no concrete evidence to substantiate my claims.
This wil attract a lot of flak, but no convincing counter arguments.
Regards. JP
Such a failure to act as any reasonable person given the same theoretical corcumstances would do, in this case turning away, is the definition of negligence. However I should note that the set of circumstances above is nothing but conjecture, because like the two AM's I have no concrete evidence to substantiate my claims.
This wil attract a lot of flak, but no convincing counter arguments.
Regards. JP
With regards to your 5455 no convincing counter argment is actually required to your theory but if read like this it certainly puts a differant spin on things.
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tucumseh
I don't doubt that you believe that your assertions are correct in respect of navigation equipment limitations - however they were meant to be flying VFR. If they were complying with VFR requirements then they should have had ample warning of the hazardous situation that they were in and they should certainly not have been proceeding at such a high speed whilst approaching fog enshrouded high ground . If they were unable to comply with VFR weather limitations then they should have climbed to at least Safety Altitude whilst turning away from the high ground- NO "ifs" and NO "buts".
There is also the question as to whether they were aware as to the actual position of the turning point in relation to the high ground.
I don't doubt that you believe that your assertions are correct in respect of navigation equipment limitations - however they were meant to be flying VFR. If they were complying with VFR requirements then they should have had ample warning of the hazardous situation that they were in and they should certainly not have been proceeding at such a high speed whilst approaching fog enshrouded high ground . If they were unable to comply with VFR weather limitations then they should have climbed to at least Safety Altitude whilst turning away from the high ground- NO "ifs" and NO "buts".
There is also the question as to whether they were aware as to the actual position of the turning point in relation to the high ground.