Don't be daft Walter, no-one would have gone straight on over the mull in IMC at 500ft - as I said, that would have been suicidal, I think you would agree? But the WP change is clear evidence to many that the crew were sure of their position relative to the mull (ie they could see its position) and that they were moving their attention to navigating towards the next leg and next WP. Don't forget that a WP is only a 'statement of intent'; you DONT have to overfly every one and that a nav route is only a means to an end of getting to your destination!
As for the options available to the crew, they couldn't have climbed to the required SAlt of approx 6500ft (due to the icing limitation) - even if they had, they would have carried out a LL Abort/Emergency Climb (which they had recently practiced). If they had been becoming IMC, it is more likely they would have turned back or stopped. Instead, they were, in all probability, 'VMC below' at or about WP change (Holbrook confirms this) and would have been keeping clear of the clouded (if obvious) mass of the mull by intending to turn left to follow the coast (many experienced LL and SH pilots agree - inc BOI Pres later - IIRC). They didn't or couldn't make any of those choices - but why? No-one knows for certain; neither you nor I (nor also Rotten and Day).
However, there are people around who are desparate to keep the gross negligence label on the pilots (makes you wonder why, does it not?). However, anyone with a modicum of impartiality and the ability to reason can see that there may be other possible causes - dare I say it, even your unlikely CPLS theory raises questions and doubts. But because we don't know what the pilots could see from the cockpit and because there was no CVR/ADR fitted, no-one can define anything with the level of proof required for the 'verdict' to stand
However, it can be proven - with no doubt whatsoever - that the HC2 design and its MLU did not comply with the airworthiness regulations and that it was not fit for the purpose of a passenger flight out of theatre, let alone with VVIPs aboard. Higher-level negligence and/or incompetence occured way before this flight took-off. Perhaps that is why some people like JP and his friends are slightly concerned right now?
After the crash, this incompetence was compounded by a lack of honesty and openess, if not outright obstruction by the MoD (neither was the investiagtion aided by the out-of-date and flawed BOI process). But if I am to be fair, then it may be possible that Rotten and Day did not fully know of the parlous state of the HC2 design - but someone in the higher levels of MoD (Main Bldg) and MoD PE did (and also the BOI should have found this out).
But when all is said and done and whatever the operational imperative, it is abysmal leadership to order crews to fly an unsafe ac which had been described as 'positively dangerous' without informing them and without giving them the level of detail and knowledge required to recover safely from any forseen emergency situation.
Last edited by flipster; 14th Aug 2010 at 07:24.