Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)

[John Purdey]

Chinook

Chugalug. Your four questions; if you scroll back you will see that I have kept away from the airworthiness aspects of this sad tale on which you try to attack me, simply because I do not have the necessary expertise. I have stuck to airmanship matters, and in particular to the fact that this aircraft flew in IMC well below its safety altitude.

[tucumseh]

Beagle

Is it really possible that the 'Scottish Officer' might actually be called to account, tucumseh?

Let us at least hope he is asked to explain why, faced with firm statements from Boscombe that the aircraft was not airworthy, he issued the Release to Service in November 1993 saying it was. And, in doing so, failed to pass on vital evidence to aircrew, such as the software implementation in the new fuel computer was "positively dangerous". It was probably also quite important that the avionic systems were actually cleared for use, but apparently he didn't think so. Without such clearances, any document purporting to be a Master Airworthiness Reference is meaningless. To mislead aircrew like this on such an issue is, in my opinion, gross negligence and a failure of Duty of Care.

I acknowledge here that the MoD are now trying to distance ACAS from this decision, claiming that Sir Donald Spiers (Controller Aircraft) was the only person to sign a Release (his CA Release). This of course is nonsense, as various Ministers have, over the years, stated in writing that ACAS issued the RTS in November 1993.

This is a very serious anomaly which must be resolved. Equally, it is a very serious allegation to claim Sir Donald Spiers was soley responsible, which I hope is conveyed to him so he has the opportunity to rebut.

But it tells us what is making MoD nervous and, perhaps, explains the reported "private" nature of Lord Philip's review. However, MoD are living in the past if they think such evidence can be withheld from the public.

[Airborne Aircrew]

John Purdey:

I have kept away from the airworthiness aspects of this sad tale on which you try to attack me, simply because I do not have the necessary expertise. I have stuck to airmanship matters, and in particular to the fact that this aircraft flew in IMC well below its safety altitude.

So you are basing your position on the one portion of the whole that you understand; airmanship. One might think that the suggestion you would ignore what might be entirely relevant evidence because you don't understand it could demonstrate the relevance of your contributions to this thread.

[Seldomfitforpurpose]

Originally Posted by John Purdey

Chugalug. Your four questions; if you scroll back you will see that I have kept away from the airworthiness aspects of this sad tale on which you try to attack me, simply because I do not have the necessary expertise. I have stuck to airmanship matters, and in particular to the fact that this aircraft flew in IMC well below its safety altitude.

JP,

Sorry but from day 1 you have deliberately avoided any question to do with any of the airworthiness/serviceability issues that have been raised on here.

This has absolutely sod all to do with any "lack of expertise" but more to do with the fact that you have no idea if the aircraft was serviceable or unserviceble at the time of the crash and to openly acknowledge that fact introduces the very doubt you insist does not exist.

I have asked you on several previous occasions to prove to me beyond any doubt whatsoever that the aircraft was fully serviceable, under full control and IMC at the point of impact and because you dare not enter into that debate as with Chug you simply refuse to answer.

Classic 9mm to the foot stuff.

[John Blakeley]

JP,

Others have answered your continuing refusal to answer the fundamental questions, and what I assume you surely knew was a rhetorical question in response to my last post - I can only add that fortunately the new government have not been taken in by the bovine scatalogy regarding new and unused evidence being pedalled by MOD for the last 16 years or so. I think this extract from an item in the Argyll News sums up the situation with regard to the new Inquiry very nicely:

This review was announced to widespread welcome by Defence Secretary, Liam Fox, shortly after he took office in the coalition government formed after the general election of May this year (2010).

However, it is now being rumoured that the review is to be held in private.

It may well be that in the fierce internal rearguard action it will undoubtedly have been fighting against Liam Fox's decision, that the MoD would only ‘agree’ to an independent review if it were to be conducted in private.

In the real world, anyone under suspicion of improper behaviour would never be allowed to have a voice in the nature of an investigation into their actions.

If this review is held in private and if it eventually upholds the Wratten / Day judgment, no one will ever believe it.

The public need to hear all the evidence for themselves so that, whatever the conclusion, they can see where it is coming from. In the end, the only conclusion sure to chime with the by now well informed interested public, is one clearing the pilots of all blame and opening up the performance history of FADEC.

I am very surprised by your statement that you lack expertise on airworthiness and serviceability issues. Were you not running a very large department with responsibilities in this area at one point during your career? Indeed, weren't some of the drastic cuts to support running costs (imposed of course on you from above) that some might argue have contributed to the now very public airworthiness problems of the RAF made during that time? If I am wrong I do, of course, wholeheartedly apologise.

FAOTAAOT Many thanks.

JB

[John Purdey]

Chinook

SFFP. I had not realised that i was under an obligation to answer your questions.
John B. The rules have changed since my day, hence the lack of ( relevant) expertise. Your apology accepted. JP

[Seldomfitforpurpose]

JP,

It's a voluntary forum so you are under no obligation to answer any question from anyone at any time however, and as others have frequently pointed out, your silence speaks volumes.

[John Purdey]

Chinook

SFFP. Thanks. JP

[sycamore]

JP and OO, you seem to be saying anyone who pulls up and goes IMC below SA is `grossly negligent` ?Are you suggesting that one should not fly in a particular area if there are clouds below SA, in case one has to pull-out ? Surely it was taught throughout FTC as an escape manoeuvre in your time ? Did you also teach it was negligent so to do ?

[BOAC]

Sycamore - this may give you insight:

#4868
Boac
"JP - difficult to keep up with you guys as you change your facts and statements. I fully agree with your latest 'go' "because, as has been said here often enough before, they should not have been anywhere near those hills at low level in those met conditions." - what I differ from you about is your previous 'go' "they should not have been near that coast at low level in those met conditions."

I'm more than willing to "stick to the facts and to my suppositions," if we could determine what they are.

Which is it? Did you abort many of those 'sorties' of yours when you saw a cloud.........................."
#4882
JP
"BOAC. As to your question "Did you abort many of those 'sorties' of yours when you saw a cloud..........................?
If it was ahead of me, and I had the merest suspicion that it contained a hard centre, like for example the Mull of Kyntire, I most certainly would have aborted the low level aspect!
JP"
#4887
Boac
"
Quote:
Originally Posted by JP
If it was ahead of me, and I had the merest suspicion that it contained a hard centre, like for example the Mull of Kyntire, I most certainly would have aborted the low level aspect!

- is actually the WRONG answer, as any competent LL pilot will know. No, we would all attempt to find a way around the 'hard centre' (if necessary) and rejoin the route the other side, apart from which this route (and 'yours' from Aldergrove to INS) did not require flight over the Mull! So, 'turn left and follow the coast' is the right answer for this mission. DNCO for you! How did your "very many sorties in piston, medium multi-jet and in LL fast jet a/c near and over those sinister hills" go?"

Hmm! A good operational pilot there?

[Seldomfitforpurpose]

Originally Posted by sycamore

JP and OO, you seem to be saying anyone who pulls up and goes IMC below SA is `grossly negligent` ?Are you suggesting that one should not fly in a particular area if there are clouds below SA, in case one has to pull-out ? Surely it was taught throughout FTC as an escape manoeuvre in your time ? Did you also teach it was negligent so to do ?

BOAC,

JP himself at post 3213 has confessed on here that he has done the inadvertent IMC thing himself on more than one occasion but I never did find out if he considered himself grossly negligent for doing it.

Olive,

Can you prove to me without any doubt what so ever what you assert

[cazatou]

sycamore

If you read the findings of the Investigating BOI as submitted to the AOC 1Gp you will find that they come to the following conclusions:-

para 16e " The weather was suitable for the flight but would have required flight in accordance with IFR in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre."

para 32c " in the forecast conditions, the icing clearance would have allowed an IMC pull-up from low level to Safety Altitude over the Mull of Kintyre."

para 45b " the Rad Alt setting procedures used by the crew were a contributory factor in the accident."

para 51 "Furthermore, any visual contact with the Mull or Lighthouse in the prevailing weather conditions should have prompted a reduction in height and speed well below those at impact

[tucumseh]

para 45b " the Rad Alt setting procedures used by the crew were a contributory factor in the accident."

Just as an example of reasonable questions one would ask, given the known facts;

As the Radar Altimeter was;

(a) Defective (e.g. components inserted he wrong way round)

(b) Faulty (e.g. components unserviceable and the Sensitivity Range Control improperly adjusted - a 15dB error, which is huge - meaning the Receiver would lose lock unexpectedly and freeze, more frequently, for upwards of 5 seconds), and,

(c) Not cleared for use anyway;

is there any proof the crew actually used the device in the first place?

Only when this level of very basic detail is addressed do you find gross negligence elsewhere. (b), in particular, reveals a lot. The AAIB report states RAF Odiham did not have the necessary test equipment to set up the Radar Altimeter properly, a widely known problem at the time, and extant since at least 1985. What was being done about that? AMSO had cut the necessary funding, so not a lot.

As many here would concede Caz, the pilots may have made an error. But no-one has ever suggested they deliberately flew into the hill. However, there are those (in AMSO, PE. RAF etc) who deliberately flouted the regulations knowing their actions would compromise safety. That is a far greater degree of negligence (in my opinion).


Regards

[John Blakeley]

Selective Quotations

Caz,

Everyone can play the selective quotations game - as examples:

Para 61: There were many potential causes of the accident and despite detailed and in depth analysis, the Board was unable to determine a
definite cause.

Para 67a: However, the Board concluded that the evidence regarding Flt Lt TAPPER'S preparations for IFR flight is insufficient to enable firm conclusions to be drawn and that he should not be criticised for any human failings during the flight planning stage of the sortie.

Para 67c: However, the Board could find no evidence that Flt Lt TAPPER had not approached and prepared for the sortie in anything other than a thorough and professional manner. The Board was unable to positively determine the sequence of events leading up to the accident, and therefore concluded that although it is likely that Flt Lt TAPPER made an Error of Judgement in the conduct of the attempted climb over the Mull of Kintyre, it would be incorrect to criticise him for human failings based on the available evidence.

Para 68: The Board concluded that there were no human failings with respect to Flt Lt COOK.

All part of the submission to AOC 1 Gp - so, not much here to lead to and support a "no doubt whatsoever" finding of Gross Negligence. And incidentally I am quoting from the conclusions - your selective quotes were from the investigatory comments - just a small point.

Still we now have the advantage that if MOD's TORs don't just limit his work to situating their appreciation Lord Philip can finally make the next full and independent assessment that this time MOD will not be able to ignore. In the meantime I will support the growing campaign for the Inquiry to be public and not private and I intend to submit my evidence under my own name. Will you?

JB

[BEagle]

para 16e " The weather was suitable for the flight but would have required flight in accordance with IFR in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre."

Which is bolleaux. If they meant 'would have required flight in IMC', then they should have said so. And what is the definition of 'in the vicinity'? A mile? A yard? An inch?

Another vague and imprecise piece of 'evidence' clearly open to challenge...

[sycamore]

Can anyone confirm the actual Take-off Time of the aircraft,not the time at the `fix`. I find it difficult to believe it is not readily `visible`.Also anybody confirm that all the Pax loaded at Aldergrove,and any idea of where the aircraft would normally have been parked ie outside the hangar,or on `E` dispersal behind the Tower. Any witnesses to it`s T/O and departure ?

[chinook240]

According to the BOI ZD576 took off at 1746 from the Air Movements Terminal. Witness 5&8 can confirm the pax loading and watched the ac takeoff. Annex L has the ATC log with times.

[walter kennedy]

Sycamore
Some very pertinent questions, indeed.
There seems to be contradiction on a fundamental issue between the reports on the GPS equipment and the Racal system – the initialisation position.
Pretty basic, eh? I won't go into it just now but if anyone here who really knows the coords of V813 or where exactly it's meant to be, well here's your chance to clear things up.
Anyway, your questions:
they started up their avionics at about 6 mins past 5, initialising their nav computer one minute later, but take-off wasn't until 40 mins later – in your experience, is this a usual amount of time to hang around in a cockpit? – after you have already done a sortie that day and you are short of (duty) time for the next one?
The nav computer was initialised on the apron about 150 yds from the north end of the big hangar (recovered data for initialisation) – either Racal was wrong re the coords for V813 (a couple of miles away on their route) or was misleading for whatever reason in its report by saying that it was initialised at V813;
Unfortunately, there is nothing stored in the nav system that records when you actually leave the ground so that is down to the witnesses that Chinook240 mentions.
You ask <<... anybody confirm that all the Pax loaded at Aldergrove …>> - well there was at least one spare seat as they left Aldergrove, wasn't there?

[chinook240]

No cover-up, the ac started up on dispersal then moved to the air movements terminal to emplane the pax at 1720! In all it took 40 mins.

[sycamore]

A few questions that may be answered ,or not;
Was there ever an attempt by the BOI to obtain better weather info of the area;ie,Sat.pics; was there at that time an automated weather station at the Mull Lighthouse,and/or at the Foghorn site ? The foghorn is(was) automated and operates depending on a combination of visibilty/moisture content. Also were any witnesses asked if the foghorn was in operation at the time.This would also have provided a source of weather info.
C-240 gives a ref. for the T/O time of 1746/1646Z, but this is the time given by ATC as the time at the 027R/7 mile call fix . They cannot be the same.....
Was there a `Specialist Nav` co-opted on the Board ? ie Possibly the Station Nav; the `home` for most Spec Navs. used to be Nav.Radio Division at B-D.....!Reason- As an aircraft flew into a hillside,it may have occurred to someone that maybe the Nav.gear was at fault,and that an `expert` should be co-opted; this should have been sorted by the GFSO/Staff.Then the examination of the equipment could have been done with his observation,as happens with other AAIB investigations.Not only that but,someone from N-R at B-D would in all probability have had dealings with the Chinook clearances to date.
Another reason- The RACAL investigation and the later Mitchell report,although thoroughly done ,appear to have been `accepted`,and not scrutinised.
As Walter says,there are a lot of anomalies; Working on the assumption(always dangerous) that the S-TANS when switched ON,shows it`s last position at Power OFF,from the previous sortie, if you plot the position ,it is a field 022.5 deg/2.05 nm from the `E` dispersal at Aldergrove( I only use E as it`s behind ATC,where I used to park my Herk..) This is also the position entered/verified by the crew as taken from the Data Transfer Device as W Pt1/ V813. Sooo, nobody checked the DTD ,or the actual Lat/Long of the Dispersals ( these days most places have boards with it all on, but security then...)
Now ,that position was fixed,and a little later the Doppler was updated to it; however,as there is no WoW switch,we don`t know if the GPS had dragged itself to the `real `position at T/O or not.
Does it matter ? Well, the question should be why was the DTD not checked,and why was the GPS/S-TANS in error at the end of it`s previous sortie (assuming it did not land in that field and shutdown !). What was the `Snag` that had been reported, but not written up ?If a box change had taken place,then that too was in error(DTD). If the GPS was in error on t/o (at the `assumed` position,how does that affect the rest of the en-route navigation and timings ....I don`t know,but I`m sure there is an answer out there...
Another anomaly; in the Racal report there is a Waypoint `H`,given as WPt 81 in the Route plan; however, it is 300deg/16 nm from Aldgve, but the village is called `Curran`,; why was it in the route plan for the sortie ?
I`ll be back with another anomaly later....