Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
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Waypoint change was only 600m from nearest shore.
They would have had to have turned left a few miles earlier to have a straight run to B while clearing the higher ground further up the Mull.
Neither the SuperTANS as a whole nor its component GPS on its own back in those days would have been considered reliable enough to have got that close at that speed while still heading towards the high ground.
The weather on the Mull was such that visual judgement of range would have been impossible to any degree of accuracy or certainty and in that respect their approach VFR would have been very wrong without some kind of electronic range measurement – and they did not have radar.
They did not simply fail to turn left, they actually turned right onto a track reflected in the handling pilot's HoSI and the altimeters were set so as to facilitate a close pass over a known LZ – and neither the a/c's attitude nor the engine states suggested anything other than cruising on straight and level until seconds before impact.
Whatever you say about the a/c's airworthiness, either they were negligent before waypoint change or they were using some other kit thus far not officially acknowledged – this argument led me to pursue candidate systems and eventually CPLS popped up.
I have given you on a plate a line of inquiry that could not only clear the pilots' names but also get real justice.
They would have had to have turned left a few miles earlier to have a straight run to B while clearing the higher ground further up the Mull.
Neither the SuperTANS as a whole nor its component GPS on its own back in those days would have been considered reliable enough to have got that close at that speed while still heading towards the high ground.
The weather on the Mull was such that visual judgement of range would have been impossible to any degree of accuracy or certainty and in that respect their approach VFR would have been very wrong without some kind of electronic range measurement – and they did not have radar.
They did not simply fail to turn left, they actually turned right onto a track reflected in the handling pilot's HoSI and the altimeters were set so as to facilitate a close pass over a known LZ – and neither the a/c's attitude nor the engine states suggested anything other than cruising on straight and level until seconds before impact.
Whatever you say about the a/c's airworthiness, either they were negligent before waypoint change or they were using some other kit thus far not officially acknowledged – this argument led me to pursue candidate systems and eventually CPLS popped up.
I have given you on a plate a line of inquiry that could not only clear the pilots' names but also get real justice.
Neither the SuperTANS as a whole nor its component GPS on its own back in those days would have been considered reliable enough to have got that close at that speed while still heading towards the high ground.
Whatever you say about the a/c's airworthiness,
(MoD admitted long ago Boscombe’s actions were taken on airworthiness grounds. The question, therefore, is: What was different about ZD576 that made her airworthy?)
But, nowhere has it been suggested that this lack of airworthiness is the sole reason for the crash. I cite it to make two main points.
1. There was a far greater degree of negligence committed by those senior staffs responsible for stating the Mk2 was airworthy, when they had been told it was NOT.
2. Any crash is usually the result of a series of events and there is abundant proof that the immaturity of the Mk2, at the time, caused Human Factors risks and hazards.
I have given you on a plate a line of inquiry that could not only clear the pilots' names but also get real justice.
What has been handed on a plate to campaigners is the fact the aircraft should not have been flying in the first place, in that configuration. My consistent view is that, had these Organisational Faults been investigated and openly reported, it is inconceivable the RO’s would have blamed the pilots. They’d be too busy trying to cover up the failings of their seniors. Oh, that’s what they did............ But, as many have said here, you can’t hide the truth forever. It has taken many years but eventually MoD have released the necessary papers, albeit probably accidentally. Witnessed by the panic stricken claim that the papers they released do not exist!
That’s what I call handing it on a plate.
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Sycamore
To the best of my recollection it was Mr Murchie (the Lighthouse Keeper) who telephoned the Emergency number to report the crash. It is possible that others on the Mull also called 999 on mobile phones; however they were hefty pieces of kit to lug around - being the size and weight of a standard house brick in those days.
Certainly the timing of the crash was logged by the Lighthouse keeper as a matter of routine. I was informed by HQSTC of the crash just after my arrival home that evening.
The SuperTANS recorded an initial power-down time of 16:59:36Z so I would suspect that the initial 999 call would have been made at approx 1700Z.
If you are desperate to find out definitively who dialled 999 from the Lighthouse then I suggest you contact Trinity House.
To the best of my recollection it was Mr Murchie (the Lighthouse Keeper) who telephoned the Emergency number to report the crash. It is possible that others on the Mull also called 999 on mobile phones; however they were hefty pieces of kit to lug around - being the size and weight of a standard house brick in those days.
Certainly the timing of the crash was logged by the Lighthouse keeper as a matter of routine. I was informed by HQSTC of the crash just after my arrival home that evening.
The SuperTANS recorded an initial power-down time of 16:59:36Z so I would suspect that the initial 999 call would have been made at approx 1700Z.
If you are desperate to find out definitively who dialled 999 from the Lighthouse then I suggest you contact Trinity House.
I wouldn't bother calling Trinity House if I were you - they'd point out that Scottish Lighthouses are the responsibility of the Northern Lighthouse Board.
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999 Call
Sycamore
Para 14 of the BOI states:
The alarm was raised by the first lighthouse keeper's wife, who alerted the Emergency Services by 999 telephone call at 1804 hrs.
JB
Para 14 of the BOI states:
The alarm was raised by the first lighthouse keeper's wife, who alerted the Emergency Services by 999 telephone call at 1804 hrs.
JB
Last edited by John Blakeley; 5th Sep 2010 at 19:25. Reason: Typo
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House bricks - mobile phones
@cazatou
My wife had one in those days 1994 - ish. Not the size of a house
brick, quite large nonetheless, was made by panasonic, maybe 7"*2*1 but is this the standard of your recollections ? Why do you even mention it ?
Of course I do doubt that the emergency call was made by mobile phone in such an area.
My wife had one in those days 1994 - ish. Not the size of a house
brick, quite large nonetheless, was made by panasonic, maybe 7"*2*1 but is this the standard of your recollections ? Why do you even mention it ?
Of course I do doubt that the emergency call was made by mobile phone in such an area.
Last edited by esa-aardvark; 5th Sep 2010 at 19:52. Reason: addressee
J-B,thank you very much..
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esa-aardvark
I did have a mobile phone on 2 June 1994 (and earlier) - and it was about the size I quoted and it also weighed about the same as a housebrick.
My memory is perfectly clear about that day as I was the Duty Contact for 32 Sqn that evening and I was contacted by STC Ops well before the BBC broadcast the news of the crash. I had to re-arrange the entire flying programme for the following day by phone to accommodate the plethora of new tasks associated with the Tragedy. After 2 or 3 hours sleep that night I was back in at Northolt at 0600 the following morning to ensure everything went smoothly.
I did have a mobile phone on 2 June 1994 (and earlier) - and it was about the size I quoted and it also weighed about the same as a housebrick.
My memory is perfectly clear about that day as I was the Duty Contact for 32 Sqn that evening and I was contacted by STC Ops well before the BBC broadcast the news of the crash. I had to re-arrange the entire flying programme for the following day by phone to accommodate the plethora of new tasks associated with the Tragedy. After 2 or 3 hours sleep that night I was back in at Northolt at 0600 the following morning to ensure everything went smoothly.
Sad but true in hindsight;How many in STC were rueing the fact that they had pushed an un-airworthy aircraft onto the `front pages`,and now had to deal with the aftermath.It could have all been done another way,an Andover,a Herc., or even a Mk1 Chinny....`Drag those branches Tonto,we don`t want to leave tracks`...
The first cellphone I had was a Panasonic E-series car phone in 1991 which was fitted to the brand new car I treated myself to after Gulf War 1. The phone cost Ł345.03, there was a handset and hands-free speaker cradle in the car; the transceiver was the size of a small book and was fitted in the boot. Excellent phone, but I wouldn't have wanted the so-called 'transportable' attachment as it was the size of a small brief case.
The old "Ya, OK, buy! Like the 911?" city-spiv-in-red-braces phones were certainly the size of a house brick, but the more compact Nokia phones and Motorola flip-phones were released long before 1994. Of course anyone issued with a mobile phone by the RAF in those days would probably have had to put up with the old house-brick-with-black-dick ex-yuppie phones...
Which brings me to the point of the post. When I first had a Nokia 2110 GSM phone (Ł276.13) and car kit (Ł258.50) in 1995, there were few if any rules governing use of such things in aircraft. Gone were the days of trying to contact Artichoke on HF with your arrival message, just ring them on the spiv phone whilst the other chap taxyed in. HM used to reimburse the bill for calls made for service reasons and several AAR trails was salvaged by my GSM phone loaned to the route AARC.
So, if there weren't any rules in 1995, just what rules were in force for important anti-terrorist police flying in a helicopter? And just what (excluding weird Wally's wacky wirelesses allegedly used by SEALS seducing the crew towards the rocks like some latter-day Sirens) were they carrying? Did one or more police pocket radios suddenly start 'hand shaking' with a terminal as the aircraft approached the Mull? And how much EMC testing had been done to assess the vulnerability of FADEC to RFI from such devices?
Given that Radio Free Europe used to cause Tornado UCMs at Panavia's Manching aerodrome - and that serious concern existed about truckers using illegal 'boots' (high-powered RF amplifiers) with CBs on the A1 under the approach to Cottesmore, has the possibility of passenger radio interference to the Chinook's systems ever been ruled out "with no doubt whatsoever"?
Thought not.....
The old "Ya, OK, buy! Like the 911?" city-spiv-in-red-braces phones were certainly the size of a house brick, but the more compact Nokia phones and Motorola flip-phones were released long before 1994. Of course anyone issued with a mobile phone by the RAF in those days would probably have had to put up with the old house-brick-with-black-dick ex-yuppie phones...
Which brings me to the point of the post. When I first had a Nokia 2110 GSM phone (Ł276.13) and car kit (Ł258.50) in 1995, there were few if any rules governing use of such things in aircraft. Gone were the days of trying to contact Artichoke on HF with your arrival message, just ring them on the spiv phone whilst the other chap taxyed in. HM used to reimburse the bill for calls made for service reasons and several AAR trails was salvaged by my GSM phone loaned to the route AARC.
So, if there weren't any rules in 1995, just what rules were in force for important anti-terrorist police flying in a helicopter? And just what (excluding weird Wally's wacky wirelesses allegedly used by SEALS seducing the crew towards the rocks like some latter-day Sirens) were they carrying? Did one or more police pocket radios suddenly start 'hand shaking' with a terminal as the aircraft approached the Mull? And how much EMC testing had been done to assess the vulnerability of FADEC to RFI from such devices?
Given that Radio Free Europe used to cause Tornado UCMs at Panavia's Manching aerodrome - and that serious concern existed about truckers using illegal 'boots' (high-powered RF amplifiers) with CBs on the A1 under the approach to Cottesmore, has the possibility of passenger radio interference to the Chinook's systems ever been ruled out "with no doubt whatsoever"?
Thought not.....
'The Board concluded that electromagnetic interference was not a factor in the accident.'
Hence, their reports are couched in terms that discuss “standard” equipment. If anyone was to have “non-standard” equipment, it would be those passengers. Even so, the Farnborough report states, for example, that transmitters in the aircraft could “easily” have generated the power levels required to interfere with GPS.
Indeed, MoD now claims they do not know what devices were recovered from the wreckage, despite the BoI confirming devices were recovered and a general requirement on MoD to retain, indefinitely, such information.
One should ask why both Boscombe and Farnborough had to be tasked to conduct this testing in late 1994, when it should have been completed satisfactorily before the CA Release Recommendations were signed by Boscombe. Nowhere do the BoI or DRA refer to prior testing.
The answer lies in this simple fact - Boscombe declined to sign formal CAR recommendations precisely because the aircraft testing regime was not complete. Why waste valuable REG (RF Environment Generator) time testing FADEC when the device hasn’t been validated or verified? You don’t. By definition, as the FADEC was not validated or verified on 2nd June 1994, nor was the EMC performance. I can just hear DRA’s reaction to this BoI tasking – “Now they want the thing tested, after the event and a year after we told them the thing wasn’t airworthy”. The bottom line is that the reports compiled for the BoI are very limited and, in my opinion, do not warrant the firm statement 'The Board concluded that electromagnetic interference was not a factor in the accident.'
Finally, the glaring omission is any investigation into the power interrupts reported by Boscombe and test pilots, and the effect any associated surges or spikes may have had on, for example, the AFCS. One must always recall the statement of 28th February 1994 that modifications (plural) are in hand to resolve numerous in-flight UFCMs. Nowhere else are these supposed modifications mentioned before the crash and at no time does the BoI indicate they have asked any relevant questions. For example, what caused the “Yaw kicks” and “very sharp uncommanded inputs to the yaw axis which result in rapid 3-4 degree change in aircraft heading in both hover and in forward flight, when the aircraft is subject to high levels of vibration”. This just happens to be the evidence Sqn Ldr Burke was prevented from giving.
So many questions. So much doubt.
Last edited by tucumseh; 7th Sep 2010 at 08:07.
Even if an aircraft passes its EMC testing, as far as I'm aware, that testing is conducted on a 'fresh-out-of-the-hangar' aircraft. Whereas in-service wear-and-tear can cause other issues....
I recall flying a rogue VC10K whose rudder pedals would tremble and CCTV screen would flare whenever a transmission (or even 'blip tuning') was made on HF/SSB. Basically a leaking antenna feeder cable induced transients into the yaw damper system (and, with autopilot engaged, the rudder pedals) - the CCTV flare was equally obvious as being proportional to transmitted audio level (and hence SSB RF modulation level).
Boscombe published frequency restrictions for certain phases of flight for the VC10K; however, most aircrew just ignored them or accepted that "There might be a bit of intereference" with which they would cope....
I agree with tucumseh; the Board's comment is far too glib regarding the potential of RFI from unknown on-board transmitting PEDs causing UCMs.
I recall flying a rogue VC10K whose rudder pedals would tremble and CCTV screen would flare whenever a transmission (or even 'blip tuning') was made on HF/SSB. Basically a leaking antenna feeder cable induced transients into the yaw damper system (and, with autopilot engaged, the rudder pedals) - the CCTV flare was equally obvious as being proportional to transmitted audio level (and hence SSB RF modulation level).
Boscombe published frequency restrictions for certain phases of flight for the VC10K; however, most aircrew just ignored them or accepted that "There might be a bit of intereference" with which they would cope....
I agree with tucumseh; the Board's comment is far too glib regarding the potential of RFI from unknown on-board transmitting PEDs causing UCMs.
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So Beagle you reckon that one could have used a cell phone in a Chinook - did they have texting back then 'cause you would have heard damn all - and you call the idea of using the CPLS that was fitted to HC2 Chinooks back then "wacky".
Your turn on the roster to fill the thread with pulp, eh?
Your turn on the roster to fill the thread with pulp, eh?
1. No-one mentioned 'texting'. Analogue handshake bursts were well-known before digital GSM - one heard an occasional 'bzzzt' noise in the background of analogue yuppie-phone conversations.
2. Your obsession with some clandestine use of a landing site has been refuted dozens of time by those in the know. If you persist with this bizarre line of argument, it will merely detract from more informed debate.
2. Your obsession with some clandestine use of a landing site has been refuted dozens of time by those in the know. If you persist with this bizarre line of argument, it will merely detract from more informed debate.
Even if an aircraft passes its EMC testing, as far as I'm aware, that testing is conducted on a 'fresh-out-of-the-hangar' aircraft. Whereas in-service wear-and-tear can cause other issues....
Any comments or limitations in the RTS are based on the tail number presented to Boscombe for CAR Trials. To avoid testing every aircraft we have other processes for ensuring every tail number is, as far as reasonably practicable, to the same standard. Many of these come under the general heading “Quality Assurance” which is why QA is a vital core component of maintaining the build standard, in turn a prerequisite to airworthiness. What was happening to Director General Defence Quality Assurance at this time? That’s right, being disbanded. Waste of money. Instead of identifying problems before they reached the shop floor, in the space of a few months complete crap was being delivered from certain factories and ˝ Line didn’t have the resources to make good the aircraft; or even know about the differences in the first place. In EMC terms, the problem manifested itself as inconsistent/non-compliant wiring and routing and, worst of all, appalling primary and secondary bonding. If you have a Nav problem, what does the book tell you to check first? Bonding.
I recall flying a rogue VC10K whose rudder pedals would tremble and CCTV screen would flare whenever a transmission (or even 'blip tuning') was made on HF/SSB. Basically a leaking antenna feeder cable induced transients into the yaw damper system (and, with autopilot engaged, the rudder pedals) - the CCTV flare was equally obvious as being proportional to transmitted audio level (and hence SSB RF modulation level).
Raised by James Arbuthnott MP at Prime Ministers Questions today, Government stated that there will be an independant evidence review into the case by an as yet un-named barrister, who has no connection with the incident.
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1994 Chinook Crash - independent review announced
From today's PMQs:
"1220 Mr Clegg says there will be an independent review of the evidence of the Mull of Kintyre Chinook helicopter crash in 1994."
(BBC BBC News - Live: Prime Minister's questions)
"1220 Mr Clegg says there will be an independent review of the evidence of the Mull of Kintyre Chinook helicopter crash in 1994."
(BBC BBC News - Live: Prime Minister's questions)
Last edited by Unixman; 8th Sep 2010 at 11:38. Reason: Clearer thread title
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Good on him. It's about time this matter was properly and fairly investigated. The scapegoating, covering up and sweeping under the carpet that has gone on has been an absolute disgrace. The fact that approximately 15 years after the crash the matter is still so very contentious demonstrates exactly why an impartial investigation is so long overdue.
