Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)

[tucumseh]

VSF

Rather like proving anything you want with statistics, if you really wanted to, you could probably find enough evidence to declare every aircraft type on the inventory non-airworthy.

I agree with this. But this raises the question of the 2 extremes – you either completely ignore the mandated regulations, or you implement assiduously. It would seem many here support the MoD’s policy that it vaguely aims somewhere in between (so why have mandated regs?) but, also like MoD, are unwilling to say to what degree the regs should be implemented or ignored.

Having been systematically denied funding to maintain airworthiness since this policy change in the early 90s (the financial cuts were applied over a 3 year period) I simply repeat my age old question – What components of airworthiness do you think are unnecessary, or can be deferred indefinitely?

[Vie sans frontieres]

On whose authority do you speak?

What authority do you need to empathise with the bereaved? The only qualification I can think of is membership of an organisation called the human race.

Is your collective tunnel vision such that only the feelings two-twentyninths of the bereaved families merit our concern? Will the dormant pain of the others be routinely re-awakened over the next fifteen years as you wait for a few titbits to be released under the thirty year rule? It's time to drop it. John Day didn't get to be CAS. Consider that to be your victory because it's as good as it's going to get.

[Chugalug2]

VSF, I tried to answer everyone of your questions but my answers were seemingly ignored by you, other than to be advised to calm down. tucumseh also dealt with the issues you raised, though with far more authority and detail than I. He was ignored. Is that what you bring to this thread, lots of rhetoric but no discussion? I find such broadcast homilies both arrogant and ignorant, I'm afraid. In your posts you have in turn claimed:

my thoughts on this entire issue are not uncommon throughout the aviation world.

and asked:

Is your collective tunnel vision such that only the feelings two-twentyninths of the bereaved families merit our concern?

As to the latter I think I'll take a leaf out of your book and ignore it with the contempt it deserves. Re the former see my comments above. Your most interesting comments though are:

you're grasping at straws in the forlorn hope that someone will reverse previous decisions. Face facts, it's not going to happen.

and

The MoD aren't for changing, surely you must all realise that by now.

Is that the message you bring, vsf? Is that why you post here? The MOD has to change, big time. Not to accommodate we who seek justice but to serve this nation. Just like many of its aircraft it is unfit for purpose, and must be reformed in order to do its job properly. That will happen sooner than this campaign ceases. Could you be a good chap and just pass that message on?

[Brian Dixon]

Hi everyone.

I was going to stay out of this current debate, as it's nothing more than the typical post-MoD decision "why not leave it guys" argument that always happens. However, I want to clear up a few points.

VSF, the Campaign has never said that the guys didn't get it wrong. They may well have done. However, the point in question is that the rules in place forbid the finding of negligence (let alone gross negligence) unless there is absolutely no doubt whatsoever. Wratten, himself, acknlwledged that there was a degree of speculation in this case (although stated that it was futile to speculate in another case). There was no CVR or ADR on the Chinook, so the bottom line is no one will ever know with absolute certainty what happened. The list of problems with the Chinook fleet, in particular, this aircraft, the limited post accident evidence and witness testimony is all on this thread and even collectively, does not provide a definitive answer.

With regards the point of keeping the wounds open for others, I have received many emails of support from family members of others lost in the accident, so your two twenty-ninths is not quite accurate. I do feel I can speak on behalf of a number, but accept not all, of them.

So John Day didn't get CAS. Well boo hoo. He did walk out into the BAE Senior Military Advisor's post immediately upon leaving the RAF, despite the independent watchdog who monitors the movement of officials to companies recommending that he should wait a year before taking up his new BAE job. The Prime Minister, Tony Blair personally overruled them stating it was "in the national interest" for him to do so I don't think I'll be reaching for the kleenex too soon for him.

The bottom line is that no one knows what happened that day and the burden of proof required to find deceased pilots negligent has not been met.

Have a safe 2009.
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[Vie sans frontieres]

Tucumseh's knowledge of the detail regarding airworthiness is clearly vast. However, if his assertion regarding funding is true :

"...Having been systematically denied funding to maintain airworthiness since this policy change in the early 90s (the financial cuts were applied over a 3 year period)..."

and if the tired and emotional Chugalug2's views :

"...Just like many of its aircraft it [the MoD] is unfit for purpose..."

are to be taken at all seriously, the lack of airworthiness in RAF Aircraft since the mid-90s will be borne out by statistics, will it not?

Now I don't have the stats to hand and I can only speak for helicopters, but the vast majority of the military helicopter accidents that I can think of since the mid-90s (presumably when Tucumseh's lack of funding started to take effect) have been down to Human Factors, not a lack of airworthiness. So there's a paradox to chew over.

[nigegilb]

Not really true, training constitutes a very important part of airworthiness and a number of recent helo fatalities have been as a result of inadequate aircrew training and experience, coupled with complex operational missions. You will probably never understand what drives some people to correct a wrong or effect change. After all, it is so much easier simply to carry on and pretend it never happened. Not sure if you are aware how seriously MoD are now treating airworthiness issues, particularly with regard to legacy aircraft. Next year MoD will be in Court over the deaths of the Nimrod crew over Afghanistan. This issue isn't going away, so get used to it.

And if you really do think campaigners should just drop it, then please read the following accout of the success of the "shot at dawn" campaign started 72 years after the relatives of combat stressed soldiers were executed by their colleagues.

Must be great in your world...

Families to mark pardons with march past Cenotaph



The families of 306 first world war soldiers executed for desertion and cowardice will march past the Cenotaph on Remembrance Sunday in celebration of their pardons, one of their leading campaigners said yesterday.John Hipkin, 80, a retired Newcastle schoolteacher and founder of the Shot At Dawn group, said he was overjoyed at the pardons. "It is great news. I could not believe it. It is long overdue."
He believed the government could not stand any more of the criticism that arose every time a case for a pardoned soldier came to court. Last year, the high court said there was "room for argument" that the soldiers had been wrongly refused a conditional posthumous pardon.
Mr Hipkin said the fact John Reid was no longer defence secretary may have helped the decision. He added: "The German army was twice the size of the British army but only shot 25 soldiers for the same offences that we shot 305. Tell me which was the more brutal army?"
Members of the Shot At Dawn campaign, set up in 1990 after the military records of those shot were published, have said they do not wish to rewrite history, but to get justice for those who were denied it.
Des Browne, the defence secretary, said in a statement yesterday: "Although this is a historical matter, I am conscious of how the families of these men feel today. They have had to endure a stigma for decades. That makes this a moral issue too, and having reviewed it, I believe it is appropriate to seek a statutory pardon." This could be by an amendment to the armed forces bill going through parliament.

[tucumseh]

VSF

Thank you for giving my post some thought but please don’t use the historical argument.

The MoD’s own rules regarding safety management (and airworthiness is all about safety) state they are not allowed to use non-occurrence to later justify a deliberate decision not to apply the regulations. They are required to be proactive. Yet, disappointingly, this is the MoD party line, adopted by Hutton, Ainsworth and others. They say “We haven’t lost another Chinook in 14 years” – but take care to conveniently compartmentalise the issue and ignore the fact that the regulations apply to all aircraft; with the cumulative effect across all fleets there for all to see.

While most Board of Inquiry reports have not used the word “airworthiness”, nevertheless the Nimrod, Hercules, Sea King, Puma and Tornado/Patriot reports (that I know of) have all quite clearly criticised the (lack of) implementation of the regs and procedures. (If I tell you today is Sunday, you shouldn’t need to be told tomorrow is Monday, but perhaps they should start spelling it out). I actually believe if you read many reports to the author and said “What you’re actually talking about is airworthiness”, they’d be astonished as few seem to understand the subject. Too many equate it to the ability of the aircraft to take off and land safely. They’d also probably cringe because, by definition, they are highlighting a fundamental breakdown in the delegation chain, which flows down from SofS.

Nor do they understand that “fitness for purpose” is very often a far higher standard than that granted Military Aircraft Release – they tend to claim “Military Risk” and think FFP is always a lesser standard. We saw this at the C130 inquest, when clearly a far higher standard was required for the aircraft to be fit for that particular purpose. This thinking didn’t exist 20 years ago, as people were taught properly and, by and large, had funding to implement the regs. But successive generations in MoD have now been brought up to think airworthiness and Duty of Care can be ignored.

And that is why ACM Sir Clive Loader is to be applauded, for spelling out the lack of implementation in the Nimrod report. And it is also why I am deeply suspicious of the motives of, for example, the Mull Reviewing Officers and MoD. What is the phrase? Nemo iudex in causa sua. It is the basis of natural justice that no one should judge their own case. Forgive me if I’m wrong, but is that not precisely what has happened here? Those who have knowingly compromised airworthiness have said “Not us Guv, it was the pilots”. “Guv” being the SofS who dishes out their airworthiness delegation. The only truly independent inquiries, by the Paisley Sheriff and the House of Lords, have taken the opposite view.

[Chugalug2]

VSF:

the tired and emotional Chugalug2's views :

Lol! Clever play on words there, if I may say so, by implying an inebriated state cleverly linked to my user name. 7...no, 8 out of 10 for creative writing! But we still need to grasp the idea here. You make a sweeping statement to counter others' posts, your forte if I may say so, in this case suggesting that tuc's and my preoccupation with airworthiness does not match your observation of accidents, particularly those of helicopters. That is then countered in turn, with authority if I may say so, by nigegilb and tucumseh. The idea then is to answer their posts in turn with your detailed answers, or perhaps, though unlikely I must admit, to concede their points. What is quickly rumbled around here, though, is to drop that line and start another on a completely different tack, the sort of tactics that, for instance, the MOD delight in. Oh, wait a minute, oh I see...
Season's Greetings to you VSF,...Cheers!...Doh!

[Tandemrotor]

Vsf

It must indeed be disturbing for the relatives of all those on board to read items such as this:

7. As a trials organisation, A&AEE has always been keenly aware of the risks associated with operating the Chinook HC2 and has tailored sortie profiles accordingly. Crews of the RAF have no such luxury and are likely at higher risk than the A&AEE crews. As such, RWTS deem it imperative that, in the strongest possible terms, the RAF should be provided with a recommendation to cease Chinook HC2 operations until the conditions established in paragraph 6 are satisfied

Written on the day of the accident.

It must also be disturbing for them that every independent revue of this case has found it impossible to criticise the pilots due to lack of factual evidence.

Unlike you, I do not feel this campaign is doing any of them a disservice. Quite the opposite. My response is; shame on the MOD for their deceipt!

Since again, unlike you, people here actually KNOW some of the families involved, I shall, in all things prefer their view to yours!

Should you wish to discuss 'facts' rather than making opinionated (but ignorant) statements I am sure many here will happily respond.

Care to talk 'facts', or are you just a bag of wind?

[Tappers Dad]

Vie sans frontieres

Here are some sobering statistics for you.
UKDS 2005 - Chapter 4 - Aircraft Losses, Casualties and Flying Hours

42-Sea King Mk 1/2/5/6/72 lost from 1969 to 2004
63-Gazelle AH1 lost from 1973 to 2004
etc.....

These are accidents that happened after the aircrew had taken responsibility for the aircraft. They include accidents during military operations, but exclude aircraft losses caused by ‘hostile action’

[Vie sans frontieres]

Sobering maybe but the stats make no reference to what proportion involve Human Factors. Tucumseh and Chugalug2 have been suggesting that military flying is less safe than it used to be because of a reduction in airworthiness whereas my contention is that the proportion of helicopter accidents that involve Human Factors has increased, indicating that technical faults are less prevalent than they once were. Additionally, the general trends for all aircraft appear to be downward so surely that suggests a general improved airworthiness throughout the various fleets.

For nigegilb to suddenly suggest that the training of aircrew contributes to the airworthiness of the machine is changing the goalposts somewhat. I thought we were talking about the airworthiness of inanimate objects here, not the chaps who fly them.

Some of the vitriolic responses generated here are an indication of how wrapped up in their self-righteousness some members of this campaign are. You clearly can't see the wood for the trees in some respects. I say again. The silent majority in the aviation world think that this has gone on too long and that it's about time it was dropped. Start listening to reason.

[Brian Dixon]

I say again. The silent majority in the aviation world think that this has gone on too long and that it's about time it was dropped. Start listening to reason.

And I say again, the vast majority of people in the aviation world I have spoken to support the campaign and are encouraging us to continue. Perhaps the MoD should start listening to the rules in place at the time of the accident.

Kind regards,
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[Tandemrotor]

Vsf

I see you don't wish to discuss the facts of this case. Not surprising. I imagine you are blissfully unaware of many of them.

Your sort have wandered this way before. Opinionated, but ignorant. Too arrogant or idle to introduce yourselves to the detail.

In future, please try to limit your pontifications to your "silent majority". Amongst the chattering classes, judgements are easy where ignorance prevails!

But if you decide to post on here, you will be challenged to support your position with reasoned arguments. As I said earlier, if you can't do that, you just look like a bag of wind.

[walter kennedy]

Tec
With all due respect, as a/c systems have become more complex it is surely becoming beyond the capabilities of “local” engineers to be able to comment on all systems of an imported a/c – unless you are capable of building such yourselves is it not the case that much has to be accepted “off the shelf”? Have not many problems arisen when an “off the shelf” a/c design has been subject to too much local change (eg HC3 Chinook)?
In the case of ZD576, you do not have a clear malfunction to assess – indeed, there is no evidence whatsoever of a malfunction contributing to the crash nor any window of opportunity for any such to have occurred during a phase of the flight where they had already put themselves in a situation that either was bad airmanship (the official view) or requires further inquiry into the reason for it (my view).
If a fraction of the effort put into the airworthiness aspect had been put into analysing the several anomalous flight parameters that to date have hardly been addressed at all perhaps the reasons for their actions would have become apparent.

[tucumseh]

VSF

For nigegilb to suddenly suggest that the training of aircrew contributes to the airworthiness of the machine is changing the goalposts somewhat. I thought we were talking about the airworthiness of inanimate objects here, not the chaps who fly them.

If you are seriously suggesting training is not a component of airworthiness, I suggest you read JSP553 (Military Airworthiness REGULATIONS).

Do a search for “training” and you’ll get multiple hits in each Chapter, and many Annexes. Here’s one, from Ch. 6;

6.14 The IPTL is to ensure that all Aircrew Publications, particularly the AM and FRCs, are available 6 months before the aircraft is due to commence flying in Service to enable timely Service aircrew training.

Evidence given to the various inquests/inquiries indicates this fundamental requirement was breached. The aircraft must be safe to fly (as you rightly say), but it must also be safely flown. Training of aircrew facilitates the latter.

However, as always, I concede various “Stars” in charge of Chinook over the years are on record as totally disagreeing with these regs, including the legal obligation to facilitate and maintain training. I happen to think the regs are correct.

[Bertie Thruster]

How long after June 1994 were the Mk2 FRC's made available?

[John Blakeley]

FRCs

BT,

There were FRCs available in June 1994, but this is what was said about them by witness 20 to the BOI and the BOI itself. Others will have to say when the situation on FRCs was "normalised" - I do not know.

Witness 20 was asked:

Question:

“Were these malfunctions covered by drills in the Chinook HC2 Flight Reference Cards (FRC)?”

Reply:

“No, the Chinook HC2 FRC were based primarily on the Chinook D model, which is not fitted with FADEC. Drills relating to FADEC were based on the best information on how the system would respond during certain malfunctions.”

Question:

“Were there any areas where the Chinook HC2 FRC, valid on 2 Jun 94, were confusing?”

Reply:

“Yes, a number of emergency drills, in particular electrical and hydraulic, were poorly laid out and required the crew to be familiar with the drill to avoid confusion. The shortfall in the Chinook HC2 FRC was discussed with crews during their conversion courses.”

In their findings the Board, at paragraph 46c comments:

“The relative inexperience of the crew on the Chinook HC2 could have amplified the degree of distraction created by even a relatively minor technical occurrence. Any distraction could have been further amplified by the poor guidance provided by the Chinook HC2 Flight Reference Cards.”

In their observations at paragraph 70a the Board states:

“The Chinook HC2 FRCs valid at the time of the accident were confusing.”

Despite the fact that the Board identified the FRCs as an issue (and the place of FRCs in the airworthiness “chain” is a key one) this shortfall is not followed up in any of the senior reviewing officers comments

I hope this provides at least part of the answer you were seeking.

JB

[ShyTorque]

VSF,

With regard to your post #3924; please expand further on which posts you see as vitriolic (your description).

All I see are measured replies to your own posts, some of which seem to be inflammatory.

[Lurking123]

VSF, one presumes you have been elected by the 'silent majority' to speak on their behalf?

PS. I personally believe that there is a reasonable chance that the crew got it wrong. But, I also stand by the fact that the MOD has not applied the 'test' in coming to it's conclusion of gross negligence.

PPS. I'm trying to find accident reports on two Jaguar crashes in the 70s/80s. One was of a chap who hit a sea-cliff and the other of a chap who hit a viaduct. There is also a crash of a Lossie Tornado which turned inverted and then rammed a Scottish hillside. I vaguely recollect unanswered questions about each of these occurrences but am mostly interested in the assessed cause of each accident.

[Bertie Thruster]

JB; Thank you for the FRC info.

I supervised a Mk2 Chinook unit for 6 months, Mar to Aug '94. The FRCs appeared to be Mk 1 Chinook with extra "MK2" bits stuck in, from signal format.

I just wondered when the proper MK2 FRCs were produced!