Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
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D246
I think you’ve found out the hard way that they are not at all tolerant here of looking into any aspects of navigation – they associate anything in that area with supporting the (rotten) verdict. I personally believe that all aspects should have been followed up some time ago and that there is nothing to lose as the strategy of arguing a legal technicality (“beyond any doubt…” etc) or pointing to a spurious technical fault/distraction in such a complex system (without clear evidence) has not borne fruit after 11 long years.
I personally do not believe that pilots of their calibre would have made an “unforced” error in those conditions – which brings me to address one of your statements
<<But these guys were flying at 135kts in mist / cloud in the vicinity of and towards a mountain. Why?>>
But they were not – they would have been in good VFR conditions until the actually entered the mist by which time, as it started just after the shoreline, they would have been in real trouble.
Is it not lamentable that, after 11 years, so many are confused as to the actual weather conditions on that approach to the Mull?
You say you flew SH in NI – did you ever do that route? – if so, are you not familiar with such local conditions that are so common at that time of year in the latter part of the day? The strong (prevailing) wind that formed the ground hugging mist as the ground rose also would have kept the air above the sea on the approach clear of sporadic patches – and that the air was clear between NI coast and the Mull (at low level below the cloud base) is confirmed by witnesses.
The required (timely) turn to the left was moderate (plot their approach on a chart and assume they were going up the coast) and there should have been no need to reduce their speed (which was a normal cruising speed optimum for a ferry flight) had they judged the start of their turn correctly.
The question is surely, what prevented them starting that moderate turn? – only two options are possible:
Tech probs with control or indicators (the politically correct option);
Judgment error as to the distance to go to their intended turning point (apparently taboo here).
I have argued (at length in previous posts) that the window of opportunity for the control/indicator problems was very short and in any case, if they knew where they actually were, distraction alone by spurious indications would not have stopped them avoiding what they would have known lay just ahead (eg if you were doing aeros and were pulling out of a loop with the ground coming up close, is there any indication whatsoever that would distract you from the task of pulling up?).
The judgment question has two aspects:
If they were purely visual and they did not have any clear reference on the (mist shrouded) Mull or any ground detail, then they could have made their approach angle to the shoreline a bit more oblique than it already was – again, this would not have necessarily required a decrease in speed;
The SuperTANS had already let them know that they were approximately (such is the nature of the SuperTANS after a sea crossing) at their turning point and so, if they were having trouble judging visually this would have been a good time to start a left turn – but at this point they made a small steer demand to the right.
If you have flown SH since that time, what can you tell the readers of this thread about Personnel Locator Systems? – how they work? – their initial introduction and evaluation? There’s no big secret about them in other NATO countries (esp in USA) but a big mystery in the UK. Did you realize that the section of US SEALS that were on the Mull at the time of the crash would have had the groundside equipment issued to just about every man? Did you realize that ZD576 would have been one of (if not) the first RAF Chinook (being an HC2 equivalent in this regard to 47D) that could have had the onboard module slotted easily into the Nav racks (via the 1553 bus) automatically displaying range and bearing to any PLS active in the area on the nav DCU as a waypoint? Some of the brown jobs on board would surely have been interested in such a demo and would hardly have objected. Provided the ground equipment was in the correct position, the system is intrinsically accurate and reliable using the principal of a UHF DME – something a helo pilot would perhaps trust above his own visual perception of range? – needed to be activated in the expected location though – ½ a mile up the hill and ….
Just a thought.
They could hardly have been guilty of gross negligence if they were tasked so and the responsibility should have rested with whoever set the test up.
I think you’ve found out the hard way that they are not at all tolerant here of looking into any aspects of navigation – they associate anything in that area with supporting the (rotten) verdict. I personally believe that all aspects should have been followed up some time ago and that there is nothing to lose as the strategy of arguing a legal technicality (“beyond any doubt…” etc) or pointing to a spurious technical fault/distraction in such a complex system (without clear evidence) has not borne fruit after 11 long years.
I personally do not believe that pilots of their calibre would have made an “unforced” error in those conditions – which brings me to address one of your statements
<<But these guys were flying at 135kts in mist / cloud in the vicinity of and towards a mountain. Why?>>
But they were not – they would have been in good VFR conditions until the actually entered the mist by which time, as it started just after the shoreline, they would have been in real trouble.
Is it not lamentable that, after 11 years, so many are confused as to the actual weather conditions on that approach to the Mull?
You say you flew SH in NI – did you ever do that route? – if so, are you not familiar with such local conditions that are so common at that time of year in the latter part of the day? The strong (prevailing) wind that formed the ground hugging mist as the ground rose also would have kept the air above the sea on the approach clear of sporadic patches – and that the air was clear between NI coast and the Mull (at low level below the cloud base) is confirmed by witnesses.
The required (timely) turn to the left was moderate (plot their approach on a chart and assume they were going up the coast) and there should have been no need to reduce their speed (which was a normal cruising speed optimum for a ferry flight) had they judged the start of their turn correctly.
The question is surely, what prevented them starting that moderate turn? – only two options are possible:
Tech probs with control or indicators (the politically correct option);
Judgment error as to the distance to go to their intended turning point (apparently taboo here).
I have argued (at length in previous posts) that the window of opportunity for the control/indicator problems was very short and in any case, if they knew where they actually were, distraction alone by spurious indications would not have stopped them avoiding what they would have known lay just ahead (eg if you were doing aeros and were pulling out of a loop with the ground coming up close, is there any indication whatsoever that would distract you from the task of pulling up?).
The judgment question has two aspects:
If they were purely visual and they did not have any clear reference on the (mist shrouded) Mull or any ground detail, then they could have made their approach angle to the shoreline a bit more oblique than it already was – again, this would not have necessarily required a decrease in speed;
The SuperTANS had already let them know that they were approximately (such is the nature of the SuperTANS after a sea crossing) at their turning point and so, if they were having trouble judging visually this would have been a good time to start a left turn – but at this point they made a small steer demand to the right.
If you have flown SH since that time, what can you tell the readers of this thread about Personnel Locator Systems? – how they work? – their initial introduction and evaluation? There’s no big secret about them in other NATO countries (esp in USA) but a big mystery in the UK. Did you realize that the section of US SEALS that were on the Mull at the time of the crash would have had the groundside equipment issued to just about every man? Did you realize that ZD576 would have been one of (if not) the first RAF Chinook (being an HC2 equivalent in this regard to 47D) that could have had the onboard module slotted easily into the Nav racks (via the 1553 bus) automatically displaying range and bearing to any PLS active in the area on the nav DCU as a waypoint? Some of the brown jobs on board would surely have been interested in such a demo and would hardly have objected. Provided the ground equipment was in the correct position, the system is intrinsically accurate and reliable using the principal of a UHF DME – something a helo pilot would perhaps trust above his own visual perception of range? – needed to be activated in the expected location though – ½ a mile up the hill and ….
Just a thought.
They could hardly have been guilty of gross negligence if they were tasked so and the responsibility should have rested with whoever set the test up.
Walter Kennedy,
d246 has brought the focus of the main debate back to the real issue and I hope you will see how your interesting speculation about the use of navaids is not relevant and may be seen by some as distracting from that issue.**
Wratten has clearly justified his decision by claiming that ZD576 was travelling too fast for the conditions at waypoint change. This view has been clearly supported by several contributors including john purdey and, now it appears, d246 and cazatou. That is the sole issue upon which he bases his argument (Pilot article written by him)
The only evidence we have about that point in time is that, shortly before, they were seen by Mr Holbrook to be clear of cloud and in sunlight. He says that he could see the base of the lighthouse two miles away. We also know that the lighthouse keeper was in cloud. As you say, it is likely that this was orographic cloud and was extremely local to the upward slopes of the Mull.
There is also clear evidence that ZD576 had experienced various technical problems which had not been solved at that time and anyone of these could have, at the least, led to serious distraction.
Everything else is speculation!
Many times, john purdey et al have been asked to explain how they know, beyond any doubt, what the exact conditions were at waypoint change, as seen from the cockpit by three very experienced aircrew. So far, they have refused to answer that question. Perhaps d246 will do so now.
Until they do, I remain in considerable doubt as to the safety of the Senior Officers judgement.
** wk, if you are suggesting that the crew of ZD576 deliberately flew 25 passengers into IMC below MSA with two conflicting navaids, you are indeed suggesting gross negligence, in my view.
d246 has brought the focus of the main debate back to the real issue and I hope you will see how your interesting speculation about the use of navaids is not relevant and may be seen by some as distracting from that issue.**
Wratten has clearly justified his decision by claiming that ZD576 was travelling too fast for the conditions at waypoint change. This view has been clearly supported by several contributors including john purdey and, now it appears, d246 and cazatou. That is the sole issue upon which he bases his argument (Pilot article written by him)
The only evidence we have about that point in time is that, shortly before, they were seen by Mr Holbrook to be clear of cloud and in sunlight. He says that he could see the base of the lighthouse two miles away. We also know that the lighthouse keeper was in cloud. As you say, it is likely that this was orographic cloud and was extremely local to the upward slopes of the Mull.
There is also clear evidence that ZD576 had experienced various technical problems which had not been solved at that time and anyone of these could have, at the least, led to serious distraction.
Everything else is speculation!
Many times, john purdey et al have been asked to explain how they know, beyond any doubt, what the exact conditions were at waypoint change, as seen from the cockpit by three very experienced aircrew. So far, they have refused to answer that question. Perhaps d246 will do so now.
Until they do, I remain in considerable doubt as to the safety of the Senior Officers judgement.
** wk, if you are suggesting that the crew of ZD576 deliberately flew 25 passengers into IMC below MSA with two conflicting navaids, you are indeed suggesting gross negligence, in my view.
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Chinook
d246. I concur.
Meanwhile, can we leave out of the discussion the suggestion that the three crew members were somehow distracted? One of the golden rules of airmanship (apart from the one about IMC and Safety Altitude) is - whatever happens, keep flying the aircraft. JP
Meanwhile, can we leave out of the discussion the suggestion that the three crew members were somehow distracted? One of the golden rules of airmanship (apart from the one about IMC and Safety Altitude) is - whatever happens, keep flying the aircraft. JP
jp,
I agree that all matters of speculation should be left out. Then please justify your certainty that they were going too fast at waypoint change without any speculation. I see that, once again, you ignore that question, as you have always done.
I agree that all matters of speculation should be left out. Then please justify your certainty that they were going too fast at waypoint change without any speculation. I see that, once again, you ignore that question, as you have always done.
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Chinook
pulse1. Not clear why you are so insistent on the exact speed at waypoint change (or later). They must surely have been flying at something (lets say) between 140 and 150. Please say what difference a margin of 20, 30 or even 50 kts would have made as they travelled towards the hillside. JP
John,
I don't know if you and cazatou are being deliberately evasive. The only reference I have made to speed is that given by Bill Wratten, as "too fast for the conditions". Unless we know exactly what the conditions were at waypoint change how can we determine what is "too fast"? If we could agree that, we would then need to know that they were going that fast.
For all I know, or anybody else as far as I can see, they may have been able to see clearly up the coast towards Gigha at that point.
Of course, it may be that you are saying that flying at an IAS of 135 kts within 1.75km of local cloud, regardless of what else you can see, is grossly negligent, even if they were intending to make a small heading change based on the new waypoint. I would disagree with you but my opinion on that would be of little value to this discussion.
p1
I don't know if you and cazatou are being deliberately evasive. The only reference I have made to speed is that given by Bill Wratten, as "too fast for the conditions". Unless we know exactly what the conditions were at waypoint change how can we determine what is "too fast"? If we could agree that, we would then need to know that they were going that fast.
For all I know, or anybody else as far as I can see, they may have been able to see clearly up the coast towards Gigha at that point.
Of course, it may be that you are saying that flying at an IAS of 135 kts within 1.75km of local cloud, regardless of what else you can see, is grossly negligent, even if they were intending to make a small heading change based on the new waypoint. I would disagree with you but my opinion on that would be of little value to this discussion.
p1
"serviceable" aircraft
D246
I think it's worth repeating that the AAIB and, more recently, the MoD have acknowledged the aircraft was NOT serviceable - and named the defective system. (Quite apart from all the other problems that have been recounted here). That this is at variance with a letter received by one member claiming that the aircraft was fully serviceable is yet another example of how the MoD don't know themselves what happened, or the state of the aircraft. The obvious questions, which so far the MoD have refused to answer, is "What did you do about the defective system and how long did you know about it before the crash?"
I think it's worth repeating that the AAIB and, more recently, the MoD have acknowledged the aircraft was NOT serviceable - and named the defective system. (Quite apart from all the other problems that have been recounted here). That this is at variance with a letter received by one member claiming that the aircraft was fully serviceable is yet another example of how the MoD don't know themselves what happened, or the state of the aircraft. The obvious questions, which so far the MoD have refused to answer, is "What did you do about the defective system and how long did you know about it before the crash?"
John,
I see that we have been here before. However, just for the record,
d246 said:
You said that you "concur" with d246.
In August 2004 you said:
Having said all that I do not understand why you say I was insistent on exact speed. I didn't mention speed in my original remark which was:
Obviously speed is related to the actual conditions and, in my view, until that question can be answered, there must be doubt.
Incidentally, information which has come into the public domain since then, referring also to dervish's post, might challenge your claim that the aircraft was serviceable.
I see that we have been here before. However, just for the record,
d246 said:
There are no circumstances that 'force' people to fly flat out into mist or mountains. Whatever may have happened they put themselves in a position from which they were going to hit the mountian regardless, you cannot fly into those conditions at that speed, full stop.
In August 2004 you said:
Meanwhile, no-one has explained why a serviceable aircraft (at waypoint change) should have continued at high speed and low level towards hills that were, according to the lighthouse keeper, covered in cloud.
Many times, john purdey et al have been asked to explain how they know, beyond any doubt, what the exact conditions were at waypoint change, as seen from the cockpit by three very experienced aircrew. So far, they have refused to answer that question. Perhaps d246 will do so now.
Incidentally, information which has come into the public domain since then, referring also to dervish's post, might challenge your claim that the aircraft was serviceable.
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Dervish
Please
For the benefit of us who come here only occasionally (I have read most of the thread and all of the BoI):
In what respect precisely was the aircraft unserviceable?
Sven
(unaware)
Please
For the benefit of us who come here only occasionally (I have read most of the thread and all of the BoI):
In what respect precisely was the aircraft unserviceable?
Sven
(unaware)
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Pulse1
You wrote:
<<** wk, if you are suggesting that the crew of ZD576 deliberately flew 25 passengers into IMC below MSA with two conflicting navaids, you are indeed suggesting gross negligence, in my view.>>
I think that if you read past posts you will find that I have consistently made the points, in my opinion, that:
they never intended to enter the mist/IMC;
they entered it because, for whatever reason, they misjudged their distance from it;
it is very difficult to visually judge one’s distance from a headland shrouded in mist;
the crux of the matter is, that while it is the responsibility of the crew in a VFR flight to ensure that collision avoidance can be effective relying upon the eyes only, I believe that I have previously described well enough how an available reading on a trusted instrument could bias one’s judgment to agree with that reading;
had they no other nav aid other than SuperTANS (of which this crew was aware of its inherent inaccuracies after a sea crossing), they should indeed have been prudent in their approach to the turning point.
If it were the case that they thought, for whatever reason, that they were further away from the landmass than they actually were we may be able to quantify the size of their error by making an assumption about their reason for being in cruise climb:
Had they started the climb ½ to 1 mile further out, they would have been about 1000ft at the actual position of waypoint A – which would have put them in (radio) line of sight with the Macrihanish TACAN/DME (do a transaction on an OS map between waypoint A and the Mac aerodrome) to which their TACAN CU was set (ch107) – their heading put waypoint A and the MAC navaid approximately in line ahead which would have given them an accurate fix at that point; one would assume that there would have been no reason to get so accurately to waypoint A just to turn up the coast on a ferry flight – perhaps they were verifying the accuracy of another system that was supposed to be at waypoint A and which had misled them (by being ½ to 1 mile further up the hill)?
(Cruise climb in this case had nothing to do with an intention to go over the Mull as it would have had to have been initiated miles before it was to get to the safe altitude.)
Regarding the recent debate on speed, on a ferry flight in good VFR conditions the speed of ZD576 was entirely appropriate, was it not? They could hardly be expected to slow down in the vicinity of that mist which was FIXED ON THE LANDMASS provided that they believed that they could turn away from it – if there was no obligation to go to a specific, close in point there would have been no need to go so close as to require (for prudence, good airmanship, and staying within the guidelines for helos at low level) a reduction in speed – it only makes sense if they were required to go over a specific point which they believed was before the start of the mist.
You wrote:
<<** wk, if you are suggesting that the crew of ZD576 deliberately flew 25 passengers into IMC below MSA with two conflicting navaids, you are indeed suggesting gross negligence, in my view.>>
I think that if you read past posts you will find that I have consistently made the points, in my opinion, that:
they never intended to enter the mist/IMC;
they entered it because, for whatever reason, they misjudged their distance from it;
it is very difficult to visually judge one’s distance from a headland shrouded in mist;
the crux of the matter is, that while it is the responsibility of the crew in a VFR flight to ensure that collision avoidance can be effective relying upon the eyes only, I believe that I have previously described well enough how an available reading on a trusted instrument could bias one’s judgment to agree with that reading;
had they no other nav aid other than SuperTANS (of which this crew was aware of its inherent inaccuracies after a sea crossing), they should indeed have been prudent in their approach to the turning point.
If it were the case that they thought, for whatever reason, that they were further away from the landmass than they actually were we may be able to quantify the size of their error by making an assumption about their reason for being in cruise climb:
Had they started the climb ½ to 1 mile further out, they would have been about 1000ft at the actual position of waypoint A – which would have put them in (radio) line of sight with the Macrihanish TACAN/DME (do a transaction on an OS map between waypoint A and the Mac aerodrome) to which their TACAN CU was set (ch107) – their heading put waypoint A and the MAC navaid approximately in line ahead which would have given them an accurate fix at that point; one would assume that there would have been no reason to get so accurately to waypoint A just to turn up the coast on a ferry flight – perhaps they were verifying the accuracy of another system that was supposed to be at waypoint A and which had misled them (by being ½ to 1 mile further up the hill)?
(Cruise climb in this case had nothing to do with an intention to go over the Mull as it would have had to have been initiated miles before it was to get to the safe altitude.)
Regarding the recent debate on speed, on a ferry flight in good VFR conditions the speed of ZD576 was entirely appropriate, was it not? They could hardly be expected to slow down in the vicinity of that mist which was FIXED ON THE LANDMASS provided that they believed that they could turn away from it – if there was no obligation to go to a specific, close in point there would have been no need to go so close as to require (for prudence, good airmanship, and staying within the guidelines for helos at low level) a reduction in speed – it only makes sense if they were required to go over a specific point which they believed was before the start of the mist.
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No Mr Purdey.
We have accepted that a waypoint change was made. Nothing else.
What we don't know, with absolutely no doubt whatsoever, are the following:
- What time was the waypoint change made?
- How far from landmass was the waypoint change made?
- Why a waypoint change was made, yet an apparrent change of direction was not made.
- What the intention of the pilots was (ah for the luxury of a cockpit voice recorder!).
- Whether something untoward happened with an aircraft (and fleet), notorious for problems (ah for the luxury of an accident data recorder!).
Too many unknowns for the required burden of proof of absolutely no doubt whatsoever being satisfied, I'm afraid.
That is why there is a Campaign.
Good to see you back on the thread.
My best, as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
We have accepted that a waypoint change was made. Nothing else.
What we don't know, with absolutely no doubt whatsoever, are the following:
- What time was the waypoint change made?
- How far from landmass was the waypoint change made?
- Why a waypoint change was made, yet an apparrent change of direction was not made.
- What the intention of the pilots was (ah for the luxury of a cockpit voice recorder!).
- Whether something untoward happened with an aircraft (and fleet), notorious for problems (ah for the luxury of an accident data recorder!).
Too many unknowns for the required burden of proof of absolutely no doubt whatsoever being satisfied, I'm afraid.
That is why there is a Campaign.
Good to see you back on the thread.
My best, as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
Just a numbered other
JP:
Is that the same 'cloud covered high ground' upon which Mr Holbrook could clearly see the light house and the Chinook approaching it in sunlight?
what is clear is that they were flying towards cloud covered high ground and that they pressed on,
John,
As BW decided that they were being grossly negligent at waypoint change, and you have clearly agreed with him. all I want to know is how you, and he, can have no doubt whatsoever what the conditions were, as seen from the cockpit by three aircrew, at that point.
You consistently ignore that question and have done so for the last two years.
Although it may be that technical problems could explain why they didn't turn onto their new heading having changed waypoint, I agree that it is not relevant to the justification given by Bill Wratten and yourself.
Personally I believe that whoever was responsible for using an aircraft in that state to carry passengers should be exposed, even if no accident had taken place (see John Blakely posts above). But that is another issue which is being pursued seperately. Perhaps it is the same person who decides that C130 aircraft can fly without suitable and available protection in Iraq.
As BW decided that they were being grossly negligent at waypoint change, and you have clearly agreed with him. all I want to know is how you, and he, can have no doubt whatsoever what the conditions were, as seen from the cockpit by three aircrew, at that point.
You consistently ignore that question and have done so for the last two years.
Although it may be that technical problems could explain why they didn't turn onto their new heading having changed waypoint, I agree that it is not relevant to the justification given by Bill Wratten and yourself.
Personally I believe that whoever was responsible for using an aircraft in that state to carry passengers should be exposed, even if no accident had taken place (see John Blakely posts above). But that is another issue which is being pursued seperately. Perhaps it is the same person who decides that C130 aircraft can fly without suitable and available protection in Iraq.
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JP
The significant difference in the pressure settings on the two pilots altimeters could also have created confusion during any attempted low level abort.
Incidentally, where did the "third" aircrew member come from? The BOI concluded that the 2 ALM's where in the passenger cabin at impact.
The significant difference in the pressure settings on the two pilots altimeters could also have created confusion during any attempted low level abort.
Incidentally, where did the "third" aircrew member come from? The BOI concluded that the 2 ALM's where in the passenger cabin at impact.
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As Sir John Day pointed out, there was no evidence from the behaviour of the crew of any distraction or malfunction approaching the way point. Has pointed out already here, if you put yourself in a position such that a distraction would cause you to fly into a mountain then you are grossly negligent. Let’s stop grasping at straws folks. If you cause an accident in your car due to excessive speed there is little point in discussing the esoterics of whether the brakes failed, the accident would have happened regardless.