Shytorque
I do not understand why you are changing the parameters from those described – I would be grateful for answers to some of those questions that I put to you as you would surely be able to answer them off the top of your head with your experience.
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<<the final flight parameters of this aircraft simply do not fit in with a crew attempting a landing ...>>
Baro Alt subscale appropriate QFE for altitude of LZ;
One RADALT warning set on minimum appropriate for imminent landing;
Deliberate turn to heading from position of waypoint change to LZ;
HP's course selector on that heading;
Slowing down;
Call sign appropriate for SAR exercise.
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<< ... especially in poor weather.>>
But what about the localised weather that I described? I maintain that it was not poor at low level over the sea.
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<<... a crew would never attempt to initially increase speed using maximum power to a high cruise speed and then use a maximum rate of slowing.>>
Where did that come from? - after a long leg at cruise speed they had started to slow down. As I asked you before, what distance would have been reasonable for a smooth slowing (thrust just balancing weight letting speed wash off with drag)?
Would they have been OK with ½ mile more?
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<<That type of equipment would not be used as the primary navigation aid in low level operations to a field landing site>>
mmmh .... that is one of the main reasons it is intended for, surely? It is even used to mark local hazards to temp landing zones/ Forwrad Air Fields/ whatever you call them – in other NATO countries anyway. Have you ever used it or at least are you familiar with it?
Very useful tool for insertion/resupply/extraction etc etc..
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<<... especially on unfamiliar, high ground in marginal weather. >>
It was not unfamiliar ground to mil helos who used to come over from NI to that site for training or rather perhaps drop off squaddies for training – Flt Lt Tapper had landed there before – it is quite spacious, the hazard being the very steeply rising ground ahead leaving no room for a wave off in that direction – at their angle of approach to the coast, a slight turn left would have kept them clear.
What do you know of the past use of this site? (You mention much time operating in the area.) - you'd hardly be causing a security problem now, would you?
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You see, you say you have all that experience and as no one else contadicts that I have to believe your claim – but some of what you say is in conflict with what others have said (in aviation but not on this forum and in the avionics business and in the field of navigation systems) and with common sense and with local knowledge (some personal local knowledge and a lot of locals' knowledge). Reasonable rebuttals that make sense would be gladly accepted as it would have saved so much time but you (plural here) so often dismiss certain points in a way ... well why don't I give an example of one issue at the end of this post?.
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There is no evidence whatsoever for an airworthiness problem if you analyse the flight in detail whereas everything that is known fits with an exercise (callsign) deliberately approaching a specific location that had been used by Chinooks before (waypoint A was the inner marker for it and they did a deliberate turn [course selector was same as track on final leg] towards it) being ready to land (alt s/scale per QFE, RADALT warning min, slowing down) and having a local reference of some kind in which they had more confidence than the SuperTANS (doesn't leave much, does it?).
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EXAMPLE OF DEBATE
This is from memory just now.
Remember the squawk code and the radar issue?
I asked was there any significance to the sqawk code as found (7760).
Ans, NO – probably got there while they were changing 7000(?) to an emergency one or perhaps got there due to impact – 7760 had no significance.
Oh, I thought, that's a shame because it could have been an important clue as to what they were doing – I had been told by someone in a position to know at EuroControl (as I recall it was) that the UK at the time was short of codes for special exercises and may use a code from its domestic allocation where there is no confusion – and 7760 being a domestic one for use in the area of the Channel Islands (so no confusion), this seemed worth following up.
My misgivings as to the practice of changing code in an immediate emergency and my doubts as to whether impact could have got to that combination aside, I asked what it had been earlier in the flight.
Ans, various like Aldergrove had no secondary radar at the time and Tyree was out of range.
Then I mentioned a report in the press by a reputable journalist that someone had seen recordings of the flight at Prestwick – said that the track looked like they had gone straight in or something like that (ie there must have been enough/multiple returns that were plenty enough to get a definite track).
Ans, various strenuous denials that it could have been possible, people claiming to have been there and there was no record or rather that there was nothing on the recordings that they saw – even someone making the puerile remark that Prestwick aerodrome radar would not have got it (obviously).
I pressed the journalist who could not give me the identity of his source but was adamant that the person was senior, in a position to know, and had seen recordings.
Now here is the important bit – no one here had mentioned Lowther Hill!
Fancy that – the main site for the area of interest and no one mentioned it – Lowther Hill feeds to the control centre at Prestwick.
So I ran a propagation model that uses actual topographic data from the shuttle for the terrain – you actually have line of site down to their cruising altitude from the point where they got their feet wet up to close to the Mull – at the range from Lowther and with the Chinook presenting just about broadside you'd expect a strong return on primary radar, never mind secondary.
For it to have been otherwise would beg the question "how could this area not have had radar cover, between the NI coast and the mainland, right down to low level, in those times?".
I also dug out a story about the air ambulance that crashed into the sea a good deal further away (west of Mac runway) which, though presenting its tail end (presumably a smaller radar cross-section than the broadside of a Chinook) was held with consistency by the primary radar as well as the secondary.
One would have thought that at least a couple of secondary returns would have come back from the Chinook which would have confirmed the squawk code.
So in this example, it is important to realise the sequence of the rebuttals and the omissions – a simple, reasonable answer in the first place would have saved so much time.
Oh and we still don't know what it was.