Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
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paddyfactor
You don't have to make a choice between the full “conspiracy theory” and the airworthiness scenario – there is the analysis which points to an undisclosed activity near the Mull – just that part gets them cleared.
Of course, analysis pointing to a controlled approach that was misjudged for whatever reason does contradict the relatively innocuous airworthiness debate and leads to further questions as to how they were misled as to the range to their LZ.
And regarding your dismissal of any kind of “conspiracy”:
<<... my father was probably the biggest advocate of aggressive action. Despite this he was fully cogniscent of what was happening in the halls of NIO and had long ago resigned himself to the lack of political will in dealing with terrorists on our own soil. >>
Someone else had this view many years before – Airy Neave – consider for a moment his situation (very briefly):
he was to be Thatcher’s intelligence co-ordinator and had replacements lined up to head MI5 & MI6 (Christopher Tugendhat and Sir Christopher Sykes respectively);
he wanted a big move against the IRA, hard tactics and at least a big round up;
he was blown up in a secure underground car park, Sykes was shot dead outside his own home, and there was an attempt on the life of Tugendhat.
Now consider the team aboard ZD576:
despite your reassuring comments, they were also planning hard tactics including a possible mass round up and many of that team believed a military solution was both possible and needed.
Neither Neave et al nor the team on ZD576 could have been stopped as and when they were without “inside” help – certainly many well placed figures thought that about the Neave affair at the time.
“Stuff” happens.
You don't have to make a choice between the full “conspiracy theory” and the airworthiness scenario – there is the analysis which points to an undisclosed activity near the Mull – just that part gets them cleared.
Of course, analysis pointing to a controlled approach that was misjudged for whatever reason does contradict the relatively innocuous airworthiness debate and leads to further questions as to how they were misled as to the range to their LZ.
And regarding your dismissal of any kind of “conspiracy”:
<<... my father was probably the biggest advocate of aggressive action. Despite this he was fully cogniscent of what was happening in the halls of NIO and had long ago resigned himself to the lack of political will in dealing with terrorists on our own soil. >>
Someone else had this view many years before – Airy Neave – consider for a moment his situation (very briefly):
he was to be Thatcher’s intelligence co-ordinator and had replacements lined up to head MI5 & MI6 (Christopher Tugendhat and Sir Christopher Sykes respectively);
he wanted a big move against the IRA, hard tactics and at least a big round up;
he was blown up in a secure underground car park, Sykes was shot dead outside his own home, and there was an attempt on the life of Tugendhat.
Now consider the team aboard ZD576:
despite your reassuring comments, they were also planning hard tactics including a possible mass round up and many of that team believed a military solution was both possible and needed.
Neither Neave et al nor the team on ZD576 could have been stopped as and when they were without “inside” help – certainly many well placed figures thought that about the Neave affair at the time.
“Stuff” happens.
Last edited by walter kennedy; 11th Aug 2008 at 00:21. Reason: format
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Walter
You forgot about "THEM" being involved in the attempted assassination of Mrs Thatcher and other members of the Conservative Party at the Party Conference. Of course they also planned the attempted raid in WW 2 which gave rise to the book "The Eagle has landed". As for WW1 their forgery of the "Zimmerman Telegram" was a masterpiece which brought the USA into the war on the Allied side.
Now, may I suggest that you go back and read my post 3217 on 15th February 2008 and then count how many posts there are disagreeing with the content of that post.
You forgot about "THEM" being involved in the attempted assassination of Mrs Thatcher and other members of the Conservative Party at the Party Conference. Of course they also planned the attempted raid in WW 2 which gave rise to the book "The Eagle has landed". As for WW1 their forgery of the "Zimmerman Telegram" was a masterpiece which brought the USA into the war on the Allied side.
Now, may I suggest that you go back and read my post 3217 on 15th February 2008 and then count how many posts there are disagreeing with the content of that post.
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cazatou,
Sorry, what bit of equipment are we talking about here?
AA
unable to accept that the equipment at the crux of your theory was NOT fitted to the aircraft
I have also been shown evidence which indicates that ZD576 was carrying STF equipment on that fateful day
AA
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After 14 years there is one thing that most contributing to this thread would surely have to agree on and that is that after all this time there is nothing known publically that would justify the verdict of gross negligence to a “reasonable man” (in the legal sense) let alone to the required standard of absolutely no doubt.
Bearing in mind how soon after the event that verdict was pronounced, one has to wonder what made them so assertive – indecent haste springs to mind.
Further, let us recall how soon after the event it was stated that sabotage was not the cause – and how equally assertive that was.
Now, which came first?
Certainly, as time progressed, the perception of many was that as the pilots were said to have been grossly negligent, which implied “absolutely no doubt whatsoever”, any other cause, including sabotage, was not worth considering – but was it not the case that sabotage had been ruled out long before any fair inquiry could have taken place?
Does this not suggest a political decision? - perhaps to allay public concerns in view of who was on board?
I suggest that this could be a block to the Mull group's efforts to clear the pilots' names – it is necessary to go back to the earliest decision (who made it and why) to unblock the process – I suggest that this predates the BOI.
Surely the Mull group has the right to ask for a formal investigation into the origins of the decision – if the MOD insists it was made by the AVMs and not before, then the chronology of the statements regarding sabotage become important – if these statements predated the BOI and the AVMs' involvement you would know that you were not getting full disclosure and would need to press harder - who was the source? And on what grounds? Until you get to this you are likely to remain frustrated.
Bearing in mind how soon after the event that verdict was pronounced, one has to wonder what made them so assertive – indecent haste springs to mind.
Further, let us recall how soon after the event it was stated that sabotage was not the cause – and how equally assertive that was.
Now, which came first?
Certainly, as time progressed, the perception of many was that as the pilots were said to have been grossly negligent, which implied “absolutely no doubt whatsoever”, any other cause, including sabotage, was not worth considering – but was it not the case that sabotage had been ruled out long before any fair inquiry could have taken place?
Does this not suggest a political decision? - perhaps to allay public concerns in view of who was on board?
I suggest that this could be a block to the Mull group's efforts to clear the pilots' names – it is necessary to go back to the earliest decision (who made it and why) to unblock the process – I suggest that this predates the BOI.
Surely the Mull group has the right to ask for a formal investigation into the origins of the decision – if the MOD insists it was made by the AVMs and not before, then the chronology of the statements regarding sabotage become important – if these statements predated the BOI and the AVMs' involvement you would know that you were not getting full disclosure and would need to press harder - who was the source? And on what grounds? Until you get to this you are likely to remain frustrated.
Last edited by walter kennedy; 15th Aug 2008 at 21:23. Reason: spelling
one has to wonder what made them so assertive
Well exactly Walter. That is the question that has scarcely dared to speak its name on this thread, and I suspect that situation will continue. If any part of the picture that you paint is true then it means not only that the finding was a gross injustice and should be swept aside without delay but that it was a deliberate and cold blooded injustice perpetrated by senior officers of their own service. If that is indeed true it is a betrayal of trust and a misuse of power that would have ramifications extending far beyond this case. It would strike deep at the maintenance of morale and discipline in the Royal Air Force. It seems to me that no such admission will ever be made for these reasons, unless those with personal knowledge are prepared to reveal it themselves after all this time. One would have hoped that the pilots have now served their purpose and their reputations could thus now be rehabilitated. I suspect though that the calculation has been made that such a move would inevitably reopen the sort of speculation inherent in your thread. So where to now? This injustice will not go away, and in time the truth will out, it always does. If there is any advice for those in the corridors of power, for my part it would be to give these pilots back the reputation that was so summarily and unjustly torn from them without further delay. Whatever other dark secrets remain will be your preoccupation and purpose to keep hidden, at least you will have done a decent thing albeit long overdue.
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Ancient Aviator,
Apologies for a tardy reply but we had unexpected "Guests" when a Niece and her Family came to stay having been forced to abandon the flooded Camp Site in Brittany at which they had been staying.
The piece of equipment I was refering to was that which WK is so insistant was the cause of the crash. Persons who were present at Aldergrove, and who had walked out to the Aircraft with the Crew, have given testimony on this thread that such equipment was NOTfitted to the aircraft that day. No such equipment was recovered from the Crash Site.
Now we have WK suggesting that the investigation as to whether or not the crash was the result of sabotage is itself suspect. Given the situation in NI at the time, and the importance of the Personnel who were the aircrafts passengers, such investigation took the highest priority. There was no evidence of sabotage or any pre-impact explosion. Of course it is possible that the disparate altimeter subscale settings may have caused some confusion during the final desperate escape manouvre.
Incidentally, may I ask if you looked up the meaning of the word "Ancient" in a military sense before deciding on your user name. Try Shakespeare's Henry IV Part 1 Ch 4 V 2 & V 21.
Apologies for a tardy reply but we had unexpected "Guests" when a Niece and her Family came to stay having been forced to abandon the flooded Camp Site in Brittany at which they had been staying.
The piece of equipment I was refering to was that which WK is so insistant was the cause of the crash. Persons who were present at Aldergrove, and who had walked out to the Aircraft with the Crew, have given testimony on this thread that such equipment was NOTfitted to the aircraft that day. No such equipment was recovered from the Crash Site.
Now we have WK suggesting that the investigation as to whether or not the crash was the result of sabotage is itself suspect. Given the situation in NI at the time, and the importance of the Personnel who were the aircrafts passengers, such investigation took the highest priority. There was no evidence of sabotage or any pre-impact explosion. Of course it is possible that the disparate altimeter subscale settings may have caused some confusion during the final desperate escape manouvre.
Incidentally, may I ask if you looked up the meaning of the word "Ancient" in a military sense before deciding on your user name. Try Shakespeare's Henry IV Part 1 Ch 4 V 2 & V 21.
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Cazatou
<<Of course it is possible that the disparate altimeter subscale settings may have caused some confusion during the final desperate escape manouvre. >>
You described the requirements for altimeter settings some time ago such that those as found were not appropriate by regulation, practice, or common sense for the en route part of a simple ferry flight, even at low level.
If you maintain that they were not doing anything special in the area of the Mull, then are you saying that they were incompetent regarding their setting and use of the altimeters?
I am surprised that no one else has replied to this post of yours in this regard.
I find it hard to believe that they would have been using altimeters inappropriately given their experience and ability.
I have explained in great detail a possible explanation for the altimeter settings as found – they were entirely appropriate for a landing or close pass to ground at the elevation of the landing area I have described.
<<Of course it is possible that the disparate altimeter subscale settings may have caused some confusion during the final desperate escape manouvre. >>
You described the requirements for altimeter settings some time ago such that those as found were not appropriate by regulation, practice, or common sense for the en route part of a simple ferry flight, even at low level.
If you maintain that they were not doing anything special in the area of the Mull, then are you saying that they were incompetent regarding their setting and use of the altimeters?
I am surprised that no one else has replied to this post of yours in this regard.
I find it hard to believe that they would have been using altimeters inappropriately given their experience and ability.
I have explained in great detail a possible explanation for the altimeter settings as found – they were entirely appropriate for a landing or close pass to ground at the elevation of the landing area I have described.
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WK
You have repeated your theory many times so please explain why the Rad Alts were also not set in accordance with the SOP's; something that would have been essential if they were operating in accordance with your scenario.
In addition, perhaps you would explain why they had changed the Supertans waypoint to Corran thus removing reference to the HLP which would have been in the locality of the portable homing device.
Given that under your scenario they had never operated the equipment before, why did they carry out their first ever approach utilising said equipment flying directly towards high ground in poor visibility at a speed approaching 3 miles per minute?
Finally, who were the passengers who were on the flight deck for this demonstration?
You have repeated your theory many times so please explain why the Rad Alts were also not set in accordance with the SOP's; something that would have been essential if they were operating in accordance with your scenario.
In addition, perhaps you would explain why they had changed the Supertans waypoint to Corran thus removing reference to the HLP which would have been in the locality of the portable homing device.
Given that under your scenario they had never operated the equipment before, why did they carry out their first ever approach utilising said equipment flying directly towards high ground in poor visibility at a speed approaching 3 miles per minute?
Finally, who were the passengers who were on the flight deck for this demonstration?
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Cazatou
Must be your shift, eh?
I know you have read most all posts thoroughly so I'll reply very briefly just to jog your memory (and hopefully your conscience):
RADALT warning set on min was appropriate for an immediate landing in marginal conditions, was it not?;
re waypoint change, I have explained in detail several times why I thought they may have done so – had they the hindsight of the investigators and known that the SuperTANS had been accurate at the time despite their long sea crossing (and therefore beyond their expectations) their actions would most probably have been different – if you care to do the chartwork (as I have suggested to all interested in this case) you will see that the position of this waypoint change was already so close in that they should have turned away earlier (by some margin with Flt Lt Tapper's low regard for the SuperTANS) IN THE ABSENCE OF ANYTHING ELSE TELLING THEM DIFFERENTLY – instead they, whilst presumably under control, dump that important waypoint and turn onto a heading reflected in the handling pilot's HSI course selector setting which was a straight line to the crash site.
.
<<Given that ... they had never operated the equipment before, why did they carry out their first ever approach utilising said equipment flying directly towards high ground in poor visibility at a speed approaching 3 miles per minute?>>
I'd be surprised if they had not used it before – it was in ZD576 well before that flight – and wasn't Flt Lt Tapper one of the most up to date SH pilots re nav and avionics?
They were not in poor vis – it was on the ground obscurring detail and therefore visual cues as to range to the ground.
And it was not really high ground – just that the LZ was at foot of a steep slope and they were in a low power regime slowing down (Boeing's analysis) – distance to go would have been critical.
.
<<... who were the passengers who were on the flight deck for this demonstration?>>
I don't think you would have to have been on the flight deck to appreciate what the pilots told you – how the quicksmart approach to a hidden pinpoint was aided by the new gizmo – “here we are with no mucking about” sort of thing – I dunno – it was what it used for in many scenarios – a useful piece of kit when used properly.
Must be your shift, eh?
I know you have read most all posts thoroughly so I'll reply very briefly just to jog your memory (and hopefully your conscience):
RADALT warning set on min was appropriate for an immediate landing in marginal conditions, was it not?;
re waypoint change, I have explained in detail several times why I thought they may have done so – had they the hindsight of the investigators and known that the SuperTANS had been accurate at the time despite their long sea crossing (and therefore beyond their expectations) their actions would most probably have been different – if you care to do the chartwork (as I have suggested to all interested in this case) you will see that the position of this waypoint change was already so close in that they should have turned away earlier (by some margin with Flt Lt Tapper's low regard for the SuperTANS) IN THE ABSENCE OF ANYTHING ELSE TELLING THEM DIFFERENTLY – instead they, whilst presumably under control, dump that important waypoint and turn onto a heading reflected in the handling pilot's HSI course selector setting which was a straight line to the crash site.
.
<<Given that ... they had never operated the equipment before, why did they carry out their first ever approach utilising said equipment flying directly towards high ground in poor visibility at a speed approaching 3 miles per minute?>>
I'd be surprised if they had not used it before – it was in ZD576 well before that flight – and wasn't Flt Lt Tapper one of the most up to date SH pilots re nav and avionics?
They were not in poor vis – it was on the ground obscurring detail and therefore visual cues as to range to the ground.
And it was not really high ground – just that the LZ was at foot of a steep slope and they were in a low power regime slowing down (Boeing's analysis) – distance to go would have been critical.
.
<<... who were the passengers who were on the flight deck for this demonstration?>>
I don't think you would have to have been on the flight deck to appreciate what the pilots told you – how the quicksmart approach to a hidden pinpoint was aided by the new gizmo – “here we are with no mucking about” sort of thing – I dunno – it was what it used for in many scenarios – a useful piece of kit when used properly.
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Just to jog your memory
Walter,
So correct me if I am wrong but after all these years, all your investigation and all your posts you still do not have one single piece of substantiated evidence to support your theory
Walter,
So correct me if I am wrong but after all these years, all your investigation and all your posts you still do not have one single piece of substantiated evidence to support your theory
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Walter,
I hate to appear rude -
-but could your repeat that in ENGLISH please?
I seem to have been under the mistaken appreciation from your previous voluminous posts that you were convinced that you were the only person who knew exactly what had happened that evening - now you seem to be saying that it is just your opinion; one of many opinions expressed on this thread.
If the crew of this Chinook were merely expected to "try out" the system you consider was the root cause of the crash then there was absolutely no need whatsoever for the "trial" to have taken place on that transit flight. It would only have been necessary if the "trial" had already taken place and this was to have been a demonstration of the efficacy of the equipment. I would, however, point out that such a demonstration would have to have been sanctioned by AOC 1 Gp at the very least; indeed I would suggest that it would have needed, considering who the Passengers were, approval at C in C STC level under strictly controlled conditions. No such sanction would have been provided until the equipment had been approved for Service use by the appropriate Authorities such as the Controller of Aircraft and A&AEE.
Having said that; there is no evidence that such a demonstration had been sanctioned - nor that any such trial had taken place. If it were demonstrated that the Pilots of ZD576 had agreed, without approval from Higher Authority, to carry out a demonstration of equipment which had not been trialled on the Chinook Mk2; for which there was no CA Release nor Release to Service and of which they had NO experience; then there would be no dispute whatsoever on this thread as to the cause of this tragedy.
I hate to appear rude -
-but could your repeat that in ENGLISH please?I seem to have been under the mistaken appreciation from your previous voluminous posts that you were convinced that you were the only person who knew exactly what had happened that evening - now you seem to be saying that it is just your opinion; one of many opinions expressed on this thread.
If the crew of this Chinook were merely expected to "try out" the system you consider was the root cause of the crash then there was absolutely no need whatsoever for the "trial" to have taken place on that transit flight. It would only have been necessary if the "trial" had already taken place and this was to have been a demonstration of the efficacy of the equipment. I would, however, point out that such a demonstration would have to have been sanctioned by AOC 1 Gp at the very least; indeed I would suggest that it would have needed, considering who the Passengers were, approval at C in C STC level under strictly controlled conditions. No such sanction would have been provided until the equipment had been approved for Service use by the appropriate Authorities such as the Controller of Aircraft and A&AEE.
Having said that; there is no evidence that such a demonstration had been sanctioned - nor that any such trial had taken place. If it were demonstrated that the Pilots of ZD576 had agreed, without approval from Higher Authority, to carry out a demonstration of equipment which had not been trialled on the Chinook Mk2; for which there was no CA Release nor Release to Service and of which they had NO experience; then there would be no dispute whatsoever on this thread as to the cause of this tragedy.
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SFFP&Cazatou
Perhaps you can satisfy each other?
SFFP wants evidence and Cazatou, with his knowledge, can give him one piece by answering my recent query addressed to him (in response to a point he raised and to which he seems to be professing expert knowledge by his tone):
<<RADALT warning set on min was appropriate for an immediate landing in marginal conditions, was it not ?>>
Well, Cazatou, a simple answer will do.
Perhaps you can satisfy each other?
SFFP wants evidence and Cazatou, with his knowledge, can give him one piece by answering my recent query addressed to him (in response to a point he raised and to which he seems to be professing expert knowledge by his tone):
<<RADALT warning set on min was appropriate for an immediate landing in marginal conditions, was it not ?>>
Well, Cazatou, a simple answer will do.
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Walter,
I have deliberately not asked Cazatou any questions as, on this subject he and I are diametrically opposed as to the whys and wherefores.........
However I have asked you on several occasions
"So correct me if I am wrong but after all these years, all your investigation and all your posts you still do not have one single piece of substantiated evidence to support your theory"
Have you an answer to that fairly unambiguous question?
I have deliberately not asked Cazatou any questions as, on this subject he and I are diametrically opposed as to the whys and wherefores.........
However I have asked you on several occasions
"So correct me if I am wrong but after all these years, all your investigation and all your posts you still do not have one single piece of substantiated evidence to support your theory"
Have you an answer to that fairly unambiguous question?
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I have previously laid out the analysis "voluminously" - even posting annotated map sections.
I have pointed out many parameters that had not been explained properly or dismissed as having no significance “officially” and attempted to put them in context in the light of information from other sources – hoping that “you” (“”=plural/many posters here) on this thread would hopefully recognise them and confirm their meaning in that context or otherwise give a reasoned, plausible explanation why they were not significant.
The altimeter settings and the RADALT alarm setting were good examples - another is the call sign – and so on.
As I have said so often, the evidence for their having been involved in something extra is that analysis – the specific equipment you seem to be hung up on is just my suggestion for a candidate that could explain them being misled in range, that a helo pilot would trust more than a TANS in approaching a point location, that could also have given them the bearing that the HP had on his course selector which they followed from the position of waypoint change to the crash site.
It is “you” that have failed to confirm or contradict the meaning of so many parameters that could have established beyond reasonable doubt whether they had been involved in an extra activity or not – I believe that I have presented more than enough to justify informed debate into this suggested possibility – I came to this site to get answers – and it will be to “your” shame if it was the case and you helped obstruct and delay the exposure of this.
I have pointed out many parameters that had not been explained properly or dismissed as having no significance “officially” and attempted to put them in context in the light of information from other sources – hoping that “you” (“”=plural/many posters here) on this thread would hopefully recognise them and confirm their meaning in that context or otherwise give a reasoned, plausible explanation why they were not significant.
The altimeter settings and the RADALT alarm setting were good examples - another is the call sign – and so on.
As I have said so often, the evidence for their having been involved in something extra is that analysis – the specific equipment you seem to be hung up on is just my suggestion for a candidate that could explain them being misled in range, that a helo pilot would trust more than a TANS in approaching a point location, that could also have given them the bearing that the HP had on his course selector which they followed from the position of waypoint change to the crash site.
It is “you” that have failed to confirm or contradict the meaning of so many parameters that could have established beyond reasonable doubt whether they had been involved in an extra activity or not – I believe that I have presented more than enough to justify informed debate into this suggested possibility – I came to this site to get answers – and it will be to “your” shame if it was the case and you helped obstruct and delay the exposure of this.
Avoid imitations
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Walter, I'll try to answer this question (despite your totally unwarranted invective last time I answered a question you posed; I would be grateful if you would refrain from this in future). Cazatou cannot answer with any certainty because he has never been a helicopter pilot and has no experience of the appropriate SH SOPs, rules or limits.
It isn't / wasn't normal to set a radalt bug to minimum for a landing in bad weather (I assume by 'minimum' you mean zero height, or close to it, depending on the individual aircraft installation). That would be rather like a parachute that opens on impact. It is normal to set the bug (to an SOP height) above ground level, whatever the stage of flight. This would have been covered in Chinook SF SOPs. It was normal during my time for the Handling Pilot (HP) to set the bug in transit to the minimum authorised transit height and the Non Handling Pilot (NHP) to set his slightly below the minimum authorised transit height, up to a maximum of 50 feet less. It is normal for the radalt needle to "flick" at low level, causing the HP's warning light to go on and off, but a steady warning would alert the crew that the aircraft was operating below the minimum height and the aircraft would be climbed to cancel the warning.
For an approach, 50 feet was an appropriate setting. Once the aircraft was below that, it was common to re-bug to a low hover height, again dependent on the actual aircraft installation, or a suitable height to keep an underslung load just clear of the ground. It must be stressed that the aircraft would be at very low airspeed, say 10 - 15 kts at this stage, certainly not the high speed at which this aircraft impacted.
I must stress that these figures are taken from my copies of SH SOPs, but not SF SOPs, which may be slightly different. If they were, someone's memory may be jogged to correct them.
Now, in return, please answer my own unambiguous question (now probably the fourth or fifth time of asking):
Walter, WHY do you NOT begin a separate thread on your theory? You have always totally ignored this request in the past. Please do not do so this time.
It isn't / wasn't normal to set a radalt bug to minimum for a landing in bad weather (I assume by 'minimum' you mean zero height, or close to it, depending on the individual aircraft installation). That would be rather like a parachute that opens on impact. It is normal to set the bug (to an SOP height) above ground level, whatever the stage of flight. This would have been covered in Chinook SF SOPs. It was normal during my time for the Handling Pilot (HP) to set the bug in transit to the minimum authorised transit height and the Non Handling Pilot (NHP) to set his slightly below the minimum authorised transit height, up to a maximum of 50 feet less. It is normal for the radalt needle to "flick" at low level, causing the HP's warning light to go on and off, but a steady warning would alert the crew that the aircraft was operating below the minimum height and the aircraft would be climbed to cancel the warning.
For an approach, 50 feet was an appropriate setting. Once the aircraft was below that, it was common to re-bug to a low hover height, again dependent on the actual aircraft installation, or a suitable height to keep an underslung load just clear of the ground. It must be stressed that the aircraft would be at very low airspeed, say 10 - 15 kts at this stage, certainly not the high speed at which this aircraft impacted.
I must stress that these figures are taken from my copies of SH SOPs, but not SF SOPs, which may be slightly different. If they were, someone's memory may be jogged to correct them.
Now, in return, please answer my own unambiguous question (now probably the fourth or fifth time of asking):
Walter, WHY do you NOT begin a separate thread on your theory? You have always totally ignored this request in the past. Please do not do so this time.
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Walter,
In tandem with Shy could I have an answer to my question.....
""So correct me if I am wrong but after all these years, all your investigation and all your posts you still do not have one single piece of substantiated evidence to support your theory"
Pretty please
In tandem with Shy could I have an answer to my question.....
""So correct me if I am wrong but after all these years, all your investigation and all your posts you still do not have one single piece of substantiated evidence to support your theory"
Pretty please
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ShyTorque
My thanks to you and, if I may, a warning to others.
Some time ago I replied to a PM from Walter and, as a courtesy, appended my name at the end of the message. That was a foolish thing to do as a few weeks later Walter telephoned me from inside France seeking to come and stay whilst he expounded his theories. I declined his "generous offer".
With my name and the information against my user name he had obtained my telephone number in France - not difficult as France Telecom operate an English Language Hotline (00 33 (0)1 55 78 60 56 ); there is also a Minitel directory enquiries in English: 3614 ED.
I suggest that everyone is very circumspect when communicating with Walter.
My thanks to you and, if I may, a warning to others.
Some time ago I replied to a PM from Walter and, as a courtesy, appended my name at the end of the message. That was a foolish thing to do as a few weeks later Walter telephoned me from inside France seeking to come and stay whilst he expounded his theories. I declined his "generous offer".
With my name and the information against my user name he had obtained my telephone number in France - not difficult as France Telecom operate an English Language Hotline (00 33 (0)1 55 78 60 56 ); there is also a Minitel directory enquiries in English: 3614 ED.
I suggest that everyone is very circumspect when communicating with Walter.
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dalek,
I did not correct your spelling, I merely suggested that you should (as a Teacher) pay more attention to it. Maybe I should have got my Wife to reply as she is the one with the Pilots Licence, MSc and B Ed.
Regarding the Airworthiness of the aircraft for its final sortie; the Crew had flown the aircraft for several hours already that day and had not raised any concerns regarding airworthiness or handling qualities of the aircraft - nor had they raised any paperwork regarding faults or defects. Moreover, the AAIB found no evidence of any technical fault which could have caused the crash.
What we do know is that the crew had received every extension of Crew Duty time that was possible to enable them to complete the task and they were thrown even further behind schedule by the late arrival of their Pax. They therefore faced the possible embarassment of having to ask SRAFONI for a further (exceptional) extension of Crew Duty Time or exceptional permission to nightstop out of Theatre.
Perhaps the question you should be asking is "what was the Fleetwide Modification Programme that resulted from this accident to prevent it happening again?"
I did not correct your spelling, I merely suggested that you should (as a Teacher) pay more attention to it. Maybe I should have got my Wife to reply as she is the one with the Pilots Licence, MSc and B Ed.
Regarding the Airworthiness of the aircraft for its final sortie; the Crew had flown the aircraft for several hours already that day and had not raised any concerns regarding airworthiness or handling qualities of the aircraft - nor had they raised any paperwork regarding faults or defects. Moreover, the AAIB found no evidence of any technical fault which could have caused the crash.
What we do know is that the crew had received every extension of Crew Duty time that was possible to enable them to complete the task and they were thrown even further behind schedule by the late arrival of their Pax. They therefore faced the possible embarassment of having to ask SRAFONI for a further (exceptional) extension of Crew Duty Time or exceptional permission to nightstop out of Theatre.
Perhaps the question you should be asking is "what was the Fleetwide Modification Programme that resulted from this accident to prevent it happening again?"
Join Date: Feb 2003
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Cazatou
Rick Cook's final recorded words were caught in conversation before takeoff. He expressed concern about the engine control units. In addition, i) the PTiT guage was lagging during the Ballykindler sortie; ii) the satellite tracking ghosts caused Jon Tapper so many concerns that neither he nor ground crew got the answers they were looking for before take-off; iii) the AAIB didn't find any evidence of a technical fault but they were not able to rule it out either. Call me old fashioned but in an incident where the remaining aircraft is category scrap and 20% is obliterated entirely, that is not an unreasonable conclusion.
Extension to flight hours was a red herring then and is now. They were flying within permissible hours and Cook had an overnight bag should they have to stay away. SF can handle long days. It's what they do.
There are to this day no answers. Of course questions should continue to be asked. But don't suggest something that is demonstrably false.
The Mark Two crew fleet-wide were barely current. The potential Mark Three crews, and all the attendant dangers in Afghanistan today, are directly linked to the unexplained incident on Beinn na Lice. If we had the answer from 1994 those Mk 3 helis would be in flight in Helmand today helping. They can't be there in support to any real degree because of contractual disputes and risk assessments involving MoD legal services. Whitehall officials who declare cause of the Mull accident known (pilot gross negligence) also look to learn lessons from the Mull on how not to introduce such upgraded aircraft to service generally. You and they cannot have it both ways.
Rick Cook's final recorded words were caught in conversation before takeoff. He expressed concern about the engine control units. In addition, i) the PTiT guage was lagging during the Ballykindler sortie; ii) the satellite tracking ghosts caused Jon Tapper so many concerns that neither he nor ground crew got the answers they were looking for before take-off; iii) the AAIB didn't find any evidence of a technical fault but they were not able to rule it out either. Call me old fashioned but in an incident where the remaining aircraft is category scrap and 20% is obliterated entirely, that is not an unreasonable conclusion.
Extension to flight hours was a red herring then and is now. They were flying within permissible hours and Cook had an overnight bag should they have to stay away. SF can handle long days. It's what they do.
There are to this day no answers. Of course questions should continue to be asked. But don't suggest something that is demonstrably false.
The Mark Two crew fleet-wide were barely current. The potential Mark Three crews, and all the attendant dangers in Afghanistan today, are directly linked to the unexplained incident on Beinn na Lice. If we had the answer from 1994 those Mk 3 helis would be in flight in Helmand today helping. They can't be there in support to any real degree because of contractual disputes and risk assessments involving MoD legal services. Whitehall officials who declare cause of the Mull accident known (pilot gross negligence) also look to learn lessons from the Mull on how not to introduce such upgraded aircraft to service generally. You and they cannot have it both ways.