Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)

[BarbiesBoyfriend]

Chugalug.

Well, you're correct, I am a civvy pilot (ex Army though). I am beginning to understandthe differences in the way mil flying is regulated and you have my sympathy. I always understood that there was a great deal of trust involved in the military. ie you trust them to get you the right kit and training. It must be rotten to find that trust abused. For example, why no FDR or CVR?

I am grateful for the regulated and protected environment in which I operate. You overestimate my status though if you think I could help to bring that to my fellow pilots in the RAF- but I would if I could.

1.3 vstall

Sorry for being a twonk! maybe I ought to butt out.

What I was trying to put IS by nature contradictory but I'll give it a final go.

We'll never know for sure what happened. OK? firm.

If a PPL had had the same accident in his Cessna we'd never have known for sure either.

Somehow though, I'm sure people would be quite sure that the PPL had CFIT'd his aicraft and the matter would be considered closed.

Do you see what I'm driving at?

[ShyTorque]

We'll never know for sure what happened. OK? firm.

You agree with the main point behind the campaign.

Also, don't forget that a PPL would be lucky enough to be flying an aircraft with a Certificate of Airworthiness. The Chinook Mk2 had been grounded the day before by the department responsible for giving it the military equivalent of a C of A.

[Chugalug2]

Barbie, this isn't a matter of the RAF alone, for it shares that deprivation with its military sisters, ie it encompasses all UK Military Aviation. If you accept, or are at least prepared to read up on, my proposition that there is such deprivation, then my earnest appeal to you and indeed all other Professionals in Military or Civilian Aviation, whether serving or retired, is not to underestimate what you can achieve yourself. It is the old old adage that evil, and I use that word advisedly, will flourish when good men and women do nothing. PPRuNe has proved again and again that once the cudgels are taken up, a good cause is listened to and things happen. The things I want to see happen are the establishment of an independent and separate MAA (Military Aviation Authority) and MAAIB (Military Air Accident Investigation Board). Do you share that wish? If so join the party (well there isn't one as such, but who knows?) and post here and on other threads in support of bringing proper Airworthiness Provision and Accident Investigation to UK Military Aviation so that needless accidents and deaths can be avoided in future.
PS Your PPL Cessna accident would have happened almost certainly to an airworthy aircraft (as Shy Torque points out) and would have been the subject of an earnest and objective Accident Investigation by a Professional Investigating Team. Whatever could have been discovered would have been and then fully reported. None of that happened in this case, indeed it might be said quite the reverse did.

[pulse1]

BBF,

A few years ago, a C152 pilot flew into the mountains of North Wales. He was en route from Caernavon to Shobdon and, immediately before this, he had demonstrated sound airmanship by returning to Caernavon to take on enough fuel so that he could go round the mountains because of the clouds over Snowdon.

Although he survived the accident which, unfortunately, his passenger didn't, he is unable to remember anything about it. Months of speculation on Pprune and elswhere and an AAIB investigation were unable to explain why he flew into a mountain he must have known was there.

However, as far as I know, no-one has found it necessary to convict this pilot of anything. In the civilian world it seems that we are grown up enough to accept that we cannot explain everything and neither do we always have to.

I have never forgotten Wratten boasting to Paxman on Newsnight about how he did not shrink from his duty to find the Chinook pilots guilty of gross negligence. It seems a pity that he wasn't as diligent when it comes to the airworthiness of the equipment under his command.

[Cows getting bigger]

... and there lies the whole case. Hard rules require hard evidence. The lack of evidence (destroyed in the crash, contradictions, no accident data recorder etc) means that the hard rule (absolutely no doubt whatsoever) cannot be applied. That is why Wratten, Day and the MOD must still be taken to account. Instead of saying "no new evidence" they need to show the compelling, beyond any doubt, evidence that justified the judgement. I've never seen that.

[BarbiesBoyfriend]

Well Chugalug

I don't see how anybody could complain about your desire for a proper investigative authority for military incidents and accidents. So I'd support you in that.

Why not have the AAIB do it? They have a top notch reputation and expanding their remit to include the military would surely be straightforward and to the benefit of all concerned.

It remains my personal opinion, no more than that, that these guys screwed up badly by CFITing their a/c that day. I'm not doing them down. **** happens!

I'll leave you now, to do another 280 pages on why that may not be the case or why the charge laid against them should be removed and I sincerely wish you all the best in your endeavours.

Sometimes the simplest and most obvious solution turns out to be correct.

[Chugalug2]

Barbie, you may well be right that military "wings" of both the CAA and the AAIB are the way to go. There are obviously financial and manpower implications for both organisations as well as security considerations for the military. It won't be easy to do given the economic situation anyway, but somehow or other it has to be done because the provision of airworthiness to military aircraft is a broken system and, while with the MOD, irretrievably so.
I see you still insist on having your cake and eating it. You acknowledge that the MOD's position, as revealed by tucumseh is that the aircraft may well not have been under control after the waypoint, but insist that in your opinion it was clearly CFIT! It is that arbitrary form of military accident verdict that this thread has pointed up for the 280 pages that you deride. If it takes another 280 for the penny to drop that if such arbitrariness is unacceptable in civil aviation it is equally so in the military, then so be it. I find it depressing that those with a professional appreciation of this accident can hold such unprofessional opinions. Sorry, but there it is!

[tucumseh]

you may well be right that military "wings" of both the CAA and the AAIB are the way to go.

Greater minds than mine (again, not difficult) may well be pondering this now the Haddon-Cave report has been seen by MoD, but I think I’d add a legal component to any new structure.

Not least because MoD has consistently lied throughout this and other inquiries/inquests/investigations; and, as any copper will tell you, to get to the truth (or as near to it as possible in cases like this) you always follow the lies.

[Chugalug2]

tuc, I would imagine that the very least needed would be the processes that were involved in the formation of both the CAA and the AAIB. No doubt they were formed on the authority of a Civil Aviation Act and a similar Military Aviation Act would be required to authorise and empower both an MAA and an MAAIB. Thereafter the MOD would effectively become an "Air Operator" and have a similar relationship with both bodies as its civilian counterparts do with theirs. On that basis lying or falsifying records etc would be very serious offences, though what sanctions could then be imposed and upon whom would have to be both clearly laid out and rigorously enforced should the situation arise. As I said earlier this isn't going to be easy, but it has to happen if UK military aviation is not to be cursed with a never ending series of avoidable accidents.

[cazatou]

Shy Torque

Your # 5631

Please try to get it right. Boscombe Down did not "Ground" the Mk2 Chinook; it ceased Trials Flying until such time as clarification was provided in respect of engine control malfunctions that had occurred on the ground during start up checks. Such clarification was completed and accepted by Boscombe Down on 24 October 1994 and Test flying recommenced without any changes to the FADEC system.

Still, it makes a nice story the way you tell it - doesn't it?

[Cows getting bigger]

Caz, long breakfast? (My 5482 and your response at 5485)

[tucumseh]

Please try to get it right. Boscombe Down did not "Ground" the Mk2 Chinook; it ceased Trials Flying until such time as clarification was provided in respect of engine control malfunctions that had occurred on the ground during start up checks. Such clarification was completed and accepted by Boscombe Down on 24 October 1994 and Test flying recommenced without any changes to the FADEC system.

MoD have long acknowledged Boscombe, properly, stopped flying on airworthiness grounds. The many incidents occurred both on the ground and in the air. MoD at first denied the latter, but were soon found out. To quote MoD, Boscombe acted "within the proper exercise of airworthiness considerations".



And from the same letter (15.9.96) -



"In the period up to 2nd June 1994 there were a number of incidents involving AIRBORNE HC Mk2 of which approximately 5 (five) were due to FADEC malfunction whilst operating in normal mode. There had also been other incidents on the ground (since April 1994). The MoD(PE) Project Office sought explanations of the various incidents from the aircraft and engine manufacturers but in the absence of satisfactory explanations Boscombe Down suspended trials flying".




That is, the PE project offfice (Director Helicopter Projects) and Boscombe Down acted together when suspending flying. Given the grounded aircraft was PE's, not the RAF's, it would be highly unusual if they did not act together. This makes it all the more bizarre that DHP did not recommend the same action to the RAF, given the requirement of such trials is to present the aircraft at the in-service build standard; or as near as possible.



As ever, this is also important because MoD lied about it.





That there were (apparently) no subsequent changes to the FADEC system is completely and utterly irrelevant. The important and over-riding factor is that there did not exist the mandated degree of validation or verification of the software, nor a full understanding of how the system behaved (i.e. on the day of the crash the aircraft build standard was immature and still in the development phase). That uncertainty was seen, quite correctly, as a significant flight safety (and, by definition, airworthiness) risk by both PE and Boscombe; especially given the long history of unexplained incidents. That risk was, in time, mitigated by experience bringing a better understanding of what the malfunctions meant and how they affected the aircraft. This understanding was, presumably, translated into later amendments to the FRCs. The important point here is that, at the time of the crash, the FRCs did not contain any relevant information to help the pilots. (A significant breach of the airworthiness regulations).



MoD has consistently tried to shift the blame to Boscombe, claiming they “wanted to assess the design” (Lady Symons, March 2000) of the FADEC software; implying this was an unnecessary extravagance or they did so of their own volition. This, of course, is absolute bollox. The software is Safety Critical (eventually acknowledged by John Spellar, April 1999), therefore the regulations mandated Boscombe be tasked by MoD(PE) to do this. I don’t know if they were properly tasked, but they certainly did their job properly. The PE and RAF staffs who ignored them did not. And it is the protection afforded these staffs that has prevented an overturn. (Who was the Air Marshall who threatened to resign in early 2002, when MoD were seriously contemplating an overturn?).

[walter kennedy]

Tecumse
<<That there were (apparently) no subsequent changes to the FADEC system is completely and utterly irrelevant. >>
But very relevant to those trying to understand what could have happened here - the thousands of hours flown subsequently using that same software retrospectively make it unlikely that this could have been the cause - not forgetting that the engines were found matched and that there was no evidence whatsoever for engine control malfunction.
As I have said before, one type of FADEC fault that has been mentioned is an un-demanded run up, the immediate action for which would have been the hand of God that could have saved them; in a different case where had power not been had that was required, they were at sufficient height to have turned away back to sea had they not been so close for whatever reason.
Forget the FADEC.

[tucumseh]

But very relevant to those trying to understand what could have happened here

But Wratten & Day understood, allegedly. I believe they also understood the ramifications if it were revealed how the regulations were ignored when accepting the Mk2 (a) off contract and (b) into Service. That they didn’t understand and chose to ignore and/or suppress expert testimony is the whole point of this thread.


Forget the FADEC? Why? If known problems with any system introduce any doubt whatsoever, then the MoD’s position is undermined. Only MoD and their supporters want to forget FADEC. That’s why they lie or continue to be selective with the facts, even when MoD themselves have subsequently acknowledged the truth. For example, the ongoing claims that there had only been control malfunctions on the ground, 13 years after MoD admitted at least 5 in the 2 month period before the crash. That is a lot, regardless of how many Mk2s had been converted; or manufactured from new if Ingram is to be believed. (He isn’t). Why lie on such a simple point? It’s ludicrous, yet indicative of the depths to which MoD will go to hide the truth.

MoD UK were, I believe, the release customer for that FADEC/Software version. To have this rate of control malfunctions, coupled with hundreds of problems in the software, smacks of one thing. Design Immaturity. That is where MoD don’t want to go, for the simple reason that accepting a Safety Critical design off contract and into Service, knowing it to be immature, is gross negligence and failure of Duty of Care. As it also entails making a series of false statements, it could also be construed as fraud. That it continued to happen long after 1994, under the same stewardship in PE, is a further indictment. Precisely the same issues have cropped up with tragic regularity over recent years in Coroners’ Courts.

In summary, an immature design, one still in the development phase, was released to service in Nov 1993. You may, just, take a chance on such immaturity if there is an over-riding operational imperative. May I suggest such immaturity and the limitations it imposes rendered it unwise to use a Mk2 for that final VVIP flight? The pilots knew this.

[Bertie Thruster]

Forget the FADEC

Unfortunately in 1994 the Mk2 Fadec was not something that could be forgotten.

It was a new system being operated on the front line, prior to completion of trials. There was a great deal of uncertainty at the time on "what the fadecs would do next"

Freight weight above single engine capability was only allowed externally (so it could be jettisoned if the engines started playing up)

Icing trials could not be carried out until the Fadec trials were complete.

At Odiham in 1994, on the Mk1 to Mk2 differences course, crews were told that it was not possible to describe the way the fadecs worked as "no one knew".

"Gotchas" appeared out of the woodwork; for example that year a QHI decided to simulate an engine torque indicator failure, (by pulling a power supply circuit breaker.)

Both pilots saw the torque indicator of that engine drop to zero. Almost immediately the other engine ran down to zero torque then the first engine (without any torque indication) ran up to drive the blades. I read the incident signal and briefed the crews..."dont pull any circuit breakers"

Next day we all got a signal from Odiham......"don't pull any circuit breakers"!

So, at the time, lots going on on the front line with a very new and untried system.

[BOAC]

I wonder if I might propose a diversion from the thrust and parry of this current exchange?

My 3 'combatants' (Caz, JP and Baston, of course) all claim either by PM or on the thread a significant experience of 'operational' low flying. I would at this time like to put aside ANY questions of crew competence, negligence, secret beacons or whatever which creates such angst and have no bearing on the following. I have some basic questions for them, with their 'experienced' hats on, which I would expect they can easily answer:-

1) Given the various 'doubts' over the suitability of the Mk II for ops, including the deceased crew's request for a Mk I, do they think the flight was correctly tasked? Presumably the lack of available f/w indicates a reasonably short-notice task which might make it essential to use a heli?

2) Given the weather conditions (which we know in fair detail), how would they, as responsible officers, have expected the flight to be conducted? Indeed, how would they have conducted it themselves if so tasked - or would they have refused it?

To get the ball rolling, I'll kick off with my answers:-.

1) If there really was no question of a f/w or Mk I, then yes it was - for a high-priority short-notice task.

2) I would have expected the same route and plan - and accepted it as a qualified crew. I would have aimed to avoid the cloud-covered Mull and to remain at low-level for the whole route, as I'm sure they did.

[bast0n]

BOAC

Please refer to my 5468

All the best

[John Purdey]

Chinook

basTon. I concur. JP

[BOAC]

Interesting! 2/3 unwilling to answer. Just Caz to refuse now, I guess?

[tucumseh]

2/3 unwilling to answer

On the other hand, it's confirmation the right questions are being asked. MoD didn't like the answers then, and like them less now.