Wrong Facts Again
Caz,
There was no shortage of aviation expertise at the H of L Inquiry – they actually took the evidence of more Chinook experts than the BoI did. Four members of the Committee were distinguished lawyers, including a Law Lord, Lord Jauncey who chaired the Select Committee, a former chairman of the Bar council, Lord Brennan, a QC, Lord Hooson, and Lord Bowness, a solicitor. The fifth member, Lord Tombs was Chairman of Rolls Royce and a distinguished engineer. None were “self appointed” and all were independent of the Mull Group. Contrary to your comments Lord Chalfont was not a member of the Committee.
Even today I have recently heard an ACM make the outrageous comment that neither the H of L Committee members nor the Sherrif understood aviation, presumably in an attempt to justify the MOD position. However, I suggest that they were very well used to the accurate analysis of evidence placed before them, and they certainly knew a hell of a lot more about justice than MOD did.
For me this speech by Lord Brennan says it all:
Hansard 5 November 2002
Lord Brennan: My Lords, the Royal Air Force is the youngest of our services, but it quickly excited in all of us an admiration equal to that for the other services. The reason is clear, is it not? In peacetime or in war, air crew risk their lives in a particularly dramatic way. When things go wrong in an aeroplane, sudden death is often the outcome. Air crew, and pilots in particular, who run that risk and suffer death can surely expect two things of their country. The first is that the widow they might leave behind and their children, without a father, should not be left in need. The second is that their reputation should be protected. Those two expectations call for a system that provides a proper basis upon which to assess the presence or absence of negligence when the dead pilot cannot defend himself.
It was surely for that reason that the government of the day agreed that when such negligence might fall to be investigated, the standard of proof should be to the very high standard: "absolutely no doubt whatsoever". That is not legally complicated. It can be readily paraphrased: evidence as a result of which there is the conclusion of negligence or otherwise "completely without doubt of any kind". If that is the test, we should remember not only its nature but its objective: to do justice to dead servicemen.
That test is at the heart of this inquiry. It is not legal jargon. It is a concept of fairness and justice. It is with regard to that test that this House should consider our report and the conclusions that it chooses to draw from it.
I turn to the report. The five members of the committee all took the view that this was probably the most onerous committee task that any of us had undertaken in this House. We undertook it in a quasi-judicial manner. We examined all the evidence objectively as it existed at the time of the RAF's conclusion and as it exists now, after our further inquiry.
I stand by our unanimous conclusions. I have carefully considered the Government's response. Being a mere lawyer, and not enjoying the skills of my noble friend Lord Tombs, I am reminded of Mark Twain's response in The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn:
"The more you explain it, the more I don't understand it".
The facts were limited; the suppositions to be conceived were fragile. Our conclusion reflected that state of affairs; namely, that we were not of the view that the air marshals were justified, on the facts and suppositions that arose, in concluding that there was absolutely no doubt whatever about the negligence of the two pilots.
I propose to say no more about the detail of our report. This debate is surely complementary to it and not in substitution for it. What is significant to me are the concerns which arise, I hope, to fair-minded people from the investigation that we carried out—concerns of whose substance I gave prior notice to my noble friend the Minister. I shall deal with them briefly.
I understand that the investigation process within the RAF does not reflect the practice of the other two services. It was criticised in the Tench report years ago and has not been adequately reformed. It needs reform. It is a process designed to establish truth—in so far as that is feasible—to protect the dead and, if necessary, to find negligence if proven. That process demands standards higher than those that I found in the RAF system.
I turn to the search for evidence. Twenty-nine people died in the Chinook crash; it was a terrible disaster. We would expect, first, that simulations would be kept within their proper intellectual limits. Based on thin facts and fragile suppositions, they cannot be any stronger in suggesting what might have happened than the material that circumscribes their value. Secondly, why was the civilian investigating arm in air crashes not fully and completely involved in a military inquiry into an RAF crash in peacetime? I can see no reason why not, but I have formed the view—which, I readily concede, may be mistaken—that the Air Accident Investigation Branch, which is expert in the field, took a subservient role in the investigation by the RAF.
I was also concerned about the range of evidence pursued in the RAF inquiry. As a layman, I could not understand why the investigating officers had not consulted expert flyers who were used to the Chinook helicopter, who had experience of it and who could give their views about what may or may not have happened. One, soldier A, gave us his views. I have the leave of my noble friend Lord Hooson, who is absent, to confirm his view, which I share, that this was a most compelling and convincing witness: a serving soldier experienced with such aircraft who was sure that negligence had not been proven. In my view, the search for evidence was inadequate.
I turn to the role of the manufacturer and supplier. The use of—in this case, the sole reliance on—the expertise of those who provided the equipment that may have been at fault is surely unacceptable. It would not be acceptable in commercial life. There, outside experts would be used. They can and should be used in this form of military inquiry. That they were not may reflect an inevitable and perfectly understandable bureaucratic process within the Ministry of Defence, which is accustomed to long-term and regular dealings with its manufacturers and suppliers. That may be give great benefits, but when 29 people die, something more is required. To argue that there is no practical alternative—as I hope will not be argued—is to demean the aeronautical expertise in this country that produced the jet and radar.
I turn to the concept of the chain of command. That concept is essential to military efficiency. I see no basis for its involvement in a system of military justice. It is difficult to accept that, when the original board and the initial reviewing officers found no negligence under the test to be applied, the air marshals could simply reverse that conclusion—with integrity, I accept, and on their honest review of the evidence, but not having heard any of it and unable, presumably because of the weight of their duties, to give it the same degree of attention as had the board itself.
I am reminded that many military men need conclusions—they look for them—but I remind them of Thomas Huxley's version of scientific rigour. He said:
"My business is to teach my aspirations to confirm themselves to fact, not to try and make facts harmonize with my aspirations".
That is a good lesson.
I turn to the role of the Ministry of Defence. Perhaps it was inevitable, as I fear may have been the case, that after eight years, with Minister after Minister and batteries of civil servants being sucked into the debate, some of them lost objectivity. They became so embroiled in the matter and its political ramifications that a mind set and fixed views may well have set in. Surely, if we are discussing military justice, the Ministry of Defence must deal with matters strictly at arms' length.
Why are all those considerations so important? Because our services depend on the morale of our serving men and on their sense of justice in the military arm of their services. On page 38 of the committee's evidence, soldier A, who is a senior officer, states:
"Those who have read the aircraft accident summary I would consider to feel a sense of injustice and those who have read the full Board of Inquiry most definitely a sense of outrage, and that is the feeling, as far as my perception goes, of the grass-roots level".
We Peers and generals are not today debating a technical matter; we are debating matters that affect the morale of our serving men.
Lastly, I turn to the use of a committee of this kind. I voted against it, but when I was asked to serve on it, I agreed. I voted against it for three reasons. First, I found it difficult to envisage a role for a committee of this House investigating a specific factual problem. I wondered whether that was within our compass and whether we were properly equipped to do that. Secondly, it struck me—this remains so—that it was a semi-judicial exercise. Therefore, thirdly, I was concerned that when we reported, our conclusions should not become the subject of political debate of a level that did not reflect the gravity of the matter. I fear that we may have achieved that result.
It remains my considered view that, should the House consider such a committee to be appropriate in future, it should be in only the most exceptional circumstances, in the most clearly prescribed way and on the basis that the House will treat the conclusions of that committee with the greatest respect, if it has done its work properly.
Twenty-nine people died. Every reasonable person thinks to himself that there must be an explanation—either people were negligent or there was aircraft failure or a mixture of the two. We search for a conclusion. However, to the inquiring, objective mind, a doubting investigation and a willingness to indulge in scrutiny ensures a fair result. Such an approach may mean that, because of the state of the facts, we simply cannot say what happened. We cannot find the pilots negligent; we cannot condemn the equipment. I regard that not as a failure of the inquiring mind but as a compliment to its integrity, if the evidence is inadequate to reach a conclusion that meets the test: absolutely no doubt whatsoever.
JB
Last edited by John Blakeley; 30th Aug 2006 at 19:30.