So, the best brains in the RAF have poured over the Board's findings, but have been unable to recommend any more fire protection on Nimrod, any additional protection in the wings, or dual wall protection to AAR pipework.
Mightycrewseven worries about the wording in Q12 out of 15 well worked through questions from a worried local MP who is trying to do his best for his costituents. Crewseven, I wouldn't waste your concern about this ridiculous mistake, for starters the core of the question concerned the OSD of R1 of 2025, but more importantly, the very clever response by MoD lawyers of offering to further inquiries should mean that none of those questions get answered for a very long time. Sir Glenn Torpy will be well into his retirement by then. Still, galling to think that those lawyers are paid for out of the public purse.
Where does all this leave the MRA4 program?
Well, unsurprisingly the mantra of 'We cannot accept any further delays to MRA4 in service date' has continued, so don't expect any of the protection not provided on MR2 to be fitted to its replacement.
Of course, life in the wider aviation community continues apace Just yesterday, a call has been made for cargo bay fire protection US NTSB calls for cargo aircraft fire suppression systems,
John Croft, Washington DC (05Dec07, 13:33 GMT, )
"US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) officials today called for all Part 121 carriers to install fire suppression systems on cargo aircraft to contain onboard fires in the cargo hold.
The outcome follows the NTSB’s investigation of a post-flight fire that destroyed a UPS Douglas DC-8 cargo aircraft at the Philadelphia International airport on 7 February 2006.
Investigators were not been able to determine the cause of the fire, other than to say it most likely started in one of three suspected cargo containers.
Contributing to the aircraft hull loss, said the Board, were inadequate certification test requirements for smoke and fire detection systems and the lack of an on-board fire suppression system.
Along with the call to install the suppression systems, the Board issued the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) six additional recommendations, including a request for “clear guidance” to operators of airports, large passenger and cargo aircraft and fractional services as to how flight crew or first responders should respond to evidence of a fire when no onboard alerts are available.
According to the NTSB, the UPS pilots had the choice of four checklists for troubleshooting a smell the first officer described as “like burning wood” when the aircraft was descending through 9,375m (31,000ft) on the approach to the Philadelphia.
“None covered what the crew was seeing,” says an investigator, adding that one of the checklists they completed brought more air into the cargo hold to fuel the fire.
The aircraft’s smoke alarms ultimately sounded at 1,088m (3,600ft) and smoke entered the cockpit just as the aircraft touched down. The crew evacuated the aircraft with no injuries. "