Nimrod Information
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Nige,
Sorry for the delay, it has just taken me an hour to find the reference again:
BoI Para 43 (page 2-39)
Vage,
I share your views. I was concerned before the report was published, but now I am very worried about flying in the aircraft.
Sorry for the delay, it has just taken me an hour to find the reference again:
BoI Para 43 (page 2-39)
Moreover, the expert also states that neither explosive suppressive foam nor nitrogen inerting would have prevented the fire developing, or the boiling of fuel in the No 7 tank, or the subsequent explosion.
I share your views. I was concerned before the report was published, but now I am very worried about flying in the aircraft.
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Captain F, I am left scratching my head. Whilst I welcome the unprecedented grovelling apologies on offer from military "leaders" and politicians, I feel the BoI has singularly failed to explain why the RAF was so hopelessly incompetent in the run up to this crash. And has failed to explain the complacency of a smug MoD in batting away warnings my 7 year old daughter could have worked out. Sir Glenn Torpy presides over an organisation whose military airworthiness is not fit for purpose and cannot hide behind loss of resource for throwing the lives of 14 brave men away.
So why does he not accept responsibility and resign?
Surely, the setting up of one possibly two inquiries will simply kick these immensely important questions into the long grass and at the same time remove the requirement for anyone to immediately resign?
I further doubt if Labour will still be in Govt by the time a Public Inquiry has been held.
Furthermore the offer of compensation might just prevent a damaging court case where the charge of gross negligence/corporate manslaughter can be heard?
Meanwhile, the additional time delays mean that crews will continue to be sent up there without fuel tank protection should another fuel leak reach a different source of ignition.
This is damage limitation, nothing more.
So why does he not accept responsibility and resign?
Surely, the setting up of one possibly two inquiries will simply kick these immensely important questions into the long grass and at the same time remove the requirement for anyone to immediately resign?
I further doubt if Labour will still be in Govt by the time a Public Inquiry has been held.
Furthermore the offer of compensation might just prevent a damaging court case where the charge of gross negligence/corporate manslaughter can be heard?
Meanwhile, the additional time delays mean that crews will continue to be sent up there without fuel tank protection should another fuel leak reach a different source of ignition.
This is damage limitation, nothing more.
Last edited by nigegilb; 5th Dec 2007 at 14:12.
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Shoddy Maintenance
Direct quote from THETIMES page 9 dated today (Dec 5)
Quote 'Mr Knight, 55, from Bridgewater in Somerset said, 'I am stunned by the report. This proves there was a catalogue of failures from shoddy maintenance to the use of air-to-air refuelling' Unquote
Oh really?
And after all the 'dont be so sensitive no-one is blaming the ground crew'.
Quote 'Mr Knight, 55, from Bridgewater in Somerset said, 'I am stunned by the report. This proves there was a catalogue of failures from shoddy maintenance to the use of air-to-air refuelling' Unquote
Oh really?
And after all the 'dont be so sensitive no-one is blaming the ground crew'.
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I have now read the majority of the BOI Report. It paints a picture of an organisation in disarray. I have said in several posts before on various threads that the MoD's management and assurance of safety and airworthiness is in a shambles. The Report confirms this. It also confirms that there have been several indicators which gave forewarning of this type of accident on this aircraft.
The MoD, the IPTs and the RAF are all culpable in this. There are individuals within the IPTs and the Support Groups who are culpable, they should know who they are, but actually many of them are/were not competent to hold their positions. Look at the leadership and the expertise within what was ADRP. It is simply not competent. Look at the DASC, and its Aviation Safety Review Team. The resources they had meant that each aircraft would be reviewed every 10 to 15 years. If they hadn't disbanded the team of course.
The situation is not restricted to the Nimrod IPT. The majority of the in-service aircraft IPTs had Safety Cases that would not pass scrutiny. In fact there is no formal system for scrutinising the Safety Cases of current aircraft, it is done an ad hoc basis. I know, I have read many of those Safety Cases, they were in many cases not worth the paper they were printed on. Look at the Harrier IPT, they had no Safety Case at all for quite some time. Ask a previous Harrier IPT Leader about his attitude to the Safety Case.
It is now time to seriously ask the question as to whether the MoD is fit to self regulate ? It is time to ask ourselves the unthinkable, are MoD aircraft fit (demonstrably safe and airworthy) to fly in non-segregated airspace. Have a look at the Secretary of State's policy statement on safety, look at the definition of airworthiness. The answer I would give, is that in this current state, and until proven otherwise - No !
S_H
The MoD, the IPTs and the RAF are all culpable in this. There are individuals within the IPTs and the Support Groups who are culpable, they should know who they are, but actually many of them are/were not competent to hold their positions. Look at the leadership and the expertise within what was ADRP. It is simply not competent. Look at the DASC, and its Aviation Safety Review Team. The resources they had meant that each aircraft would be reviewed every 10 to 15 years. If they hadn't disbanded the team of course.
The situation is not restricted to the Nimrod IPT. The majority of the in-service aircraft IPTs had Safety Cases that would not pass scrutiny. In fact there is no formal system for scrutinising the Safety Cases of current aircraft, it is done an ad hoc basis. I know, I have read many of those Safety Cases, they were in many cases not worth the paper they were printed on. Look at the Harrier IPT, they had no Safety Case at all for quite some time. Ask a previous Harrier IPT Leader about his attitude to the Safety Case.
It is now time to seriously ask the question as to whether the MoD is fit to self regulate ? It is time to ask ourselves the unthinkable, are MoD aircraft fit (demonstrably safe and airworthy) to fly in non-segregated airspace. Have a look at the Secretary of State's policy statement on safety, look at the definition of airworthiness. The answer I would give, is that in this current state, and until proven otherwise - No !
S_H
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Also a verbal quote may not be phrased in as an exact way as a written statement.
Words such as 'policy', 'documentation', 'funding', 'resourcing' and so on might have been omitted.
Nige, it was kind of you not to mention that it was I who told you that there were no recommendations about fuel tank protection! It is, in fact, true that there were no recommendations, because, as Mr P's quote says, the Board's unnamed expert asserted that protection would not have prevented the explosion of tank 7. Also, that meant that, as far as I know, the subject was not mentioned at the brief - and questions afterwards were severely time-limited.
Without having expert knowledge of the dynamics of fuel explosions, I could see why the 'expert' might have said that - since this was not a case where the explosion resulted from something started within the tank, but as a result of gross overheating from outside the tank.
It was clever of Mr P to find the reference - there are 156 pages of the report, not all of them very easy reading! But should you want to check it out yourself
http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/Ab...odMr2Xv230.htm
Finally, just to complete Mr P's quote, it comes in a paragraph titled
and the sentence after Mr P's quote (the final sentence of the para) reads
airsound
Without having expert knowledge of the dynamics of fuel explosions, I could see why the 'expert' might have said that - since this was not a case where the explosion resulted from something started within the tank, but as a result of gross overheating from outside the tank.
It was clever of Mr P to find the reference - there are 156 pages of the report, not all of them very easy reading! But should you want to check it out yourself
http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/Ab...odMr2Xv230.htm
Finally, just to complete Mr P's quote, it comes in a paragraph titled
Lack of Fire Detection in No 7 Tank Dry Bay
The Board believes that the lack of a fire detection and suppression system within the N0 7 tank dry bay was a Contributory Factor in the loss of XV230.
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RAF_Techie101,
I know that the bomb bay firewire runs through the No 7 tank dry bay but this is not dedicated fire warning for the dry bay itself. A bomb bay fire warning, by definition, indicates a bomb bay fire. Had the crew member on the periscope not seen fire, and with no other indications, the crew would have believed the warning to be spurious (albeit unusual).
A dedicated dry bay smoke detection system would give a quicker warning to the crew, buying precious seconds. The potential down side is that, unlike the underfloor bays, the area could not be viewed for confirmation.
I know that the bomb bay firewire runs through the No 7 tank dry bay but this is not dedicated fire warning for the dry bay itself. A bomb bay fire warning, by definition, indicates a bomb bay fire. Had the crew member on the periscope not seen fire, and with no other indications, the crew would have believed the warning to be spurious (albeit unusual).
A dedicated dry bay smoke detection system would give a quicker warning to the crew, buying precious seconds. The potential down side is that, unlike the underfloor bays, the area could not be viewed for confirmation.
Gainesy,
It it simply not practical to jump out of a Nimrod with a parachute, I was speaking to a current Nimrod pilot today about this subject, he stated, correctly imho, that if you did jump from a Nimrod, you would be in severe danger of getting ingested by the engines or striking the tail plane.
I must say though, there is plenty of space to store them onboard.
It it simply not practical to jump out of a Nimrod with a parachute, I was speaking to a current Nimrod pilot today about this subject, he stated, correctly imho, that if you did jump from a Nimrod, you would be in severe danger of getting ingested by the engines or striking the tail plane.
I must say though, there is plenty of space to store them onboard.
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Not directly related to this incident, but certainly pertinent to the theme………why do UK Mil aircraft not have to have the same number of fire extinguishant bottles as the aircraft has engines?
I believe civilian regs require one per engine, but that’s certainly not the case with the Hercules, at just 2. Furthermore, when the C-130J was procured, why was the opportunity not taken to fit another 2 in the stbd side? Why would you NOT want more protection, in the case of the C-130, a relatively cheap and simple mod I would suggest.
Not sure how this equates to the Nimrod, but I fail to understand the apparent disparity between civil and military requirements.
Regards,
Kokpit.
I believe civilian regs require one per engine, but that’s certainly not the case with the Hercules, at just 2. Furthermore, when the C-130J was procured, why was the opportunity not taken to fit another 2 in the stbd side? Why would you NOT want more protection, in the case of the C-130, a relatively cheap and simple mod I would suggest.
Not sure how this equates to the Nimrod, but I fail to understand the apparent disparity between civil and military requirements.
Regards,
Kokpit.
I fail to understand the apparent disparity between civil and military requirements.
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Kokpit,
I believe you are refering to engine fire extinguishers. The Nimrod does indeed have adequate extinguishers for the number of engines. The extinguishers being refered to regarding the bomb bay, is the large CO2 bottle carried on board which can be manually routed to either the elevator, aileron or bomb bays in an emergency.
Ping
I believe you are refering to engine fire extinguishers. The Nimrod does indeed have adequate extinguishers for the number of engines. The extinguishers being refered to regarding the bomb bay, is the large CO2 bottle carried on board which can be manually routed to either the elevator, aileron or bomb bays in an emergency.
Ping
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so-called "Shoddy Maintenance" - Apology please?
TD
Is there any chance of a public apology to NLS over your "Shoddy Maintenance" quote?
I know it has upset the Nimrod groundcrew greatly, since :
a. It simply is not true, and
b. Was not in any way a quote from the BOI report, which I have read in full on Tuesday.
If you were misquoted by The Times, I will redirect this request to them.
CS
Is there any chance of a public apology to NLS over your "Shoddy Maintenance" quote?
I know it has upset the Nimrod groundcrew greatly, since :
a. It simply is not true, and
b. Was not in any way a quote from the BOI report, which I have read in full on Tuesday.
If you were misquoted by The Times, I will redirect this request to them.
CS
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Mr Point
2 "points" for you:
1. Regardless of what the periscope might have revealed, the crew would still have done the drill, which includes switching off the air passing through that hot pipe. However, as the BOI report has stated, the fire became self-propagating very quickly, so the drill would not have achieved anything, except to possibly indicate a hopeless situation.
2. A smoke detector, as part of a fire protection system, would not have been fitted in the 7 Tank dry bay. Leaking Avtur would be the identified hazard, so a flame detector or firewire would be the mitigating control. Anyway, whatever would have been fitted, the crew would do the drill and operate the extinguishant, in all circumstances. A viewer would not be needed for confirmation before operating the extinguishant.
Regards
Ed Set
I know that the bomb bay firewire runs through the No 7 tank dry bay but this is not dedicated fire warning for the dry bay itself. A bomb bay fire warning, by definition, indicates a bomb bay fire. Had the crew member on the periscope not seen fire, and with no other indications, the crew would have believed the warning to be spurious (albeit unusual).
A dedicated dry bay smoke detection system would give a quicker warning to the crew, buying precious seconds. The potential down side is that, unlike the underfloor bays, the area could not be viewed for confirmation.
A dedicated dry bay smoke detection system would give a quicker warning to the crew, buying precious seconds. The potential down side is that, unlike the underfloor bays, the area could not be viewed for confirmation.
1. Regardless of what the periscope might have revealed, the crew would still have done the drill, which includes switching off the air passing through that hot pipe. However, as the BOI report has stated, the fire became self-propagating very quickly, so the drill would not have achieved anything, except to possibly indicate a hopeless situation.
2. A smoke detector, as part of a fire protection system, would not have been fitted in the 7 Tank dry bay. Leaking Avtur would be the identified hazard, so a flame detector or firewire would be the mitigating control. Anyway, whatever would have been fitted, the crew would do the drill and operate the extinguishant, in all circumstances. A viewer would not be needed for confirmation before operating the extinguishant.
Regards
Ed Set
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Ping,
Sorry if I didn't make myself clear, I was indeed talking about engine fire suppresion systems, and fully appreciated that this didn't apply to the Nimrod incident.
I just wondered if it was a pertinent example of how the MoD might view safety (with respect to the C-130 at least) as opposed to how a civil operator / regulator might have done.
Sorry if I didn't make myself clear, I was indeed talking about engine fire suppresion systems, and fully appreciated that this didn't apply to the Nimrod incident.
I just wondered if it was a pertinent example of how the MoD might view safety (with respect to the C-130 at least) as opposed to how a civil operator / regulator might have done.
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[QUOTE I was speaking to a current Nimrod pilot today about this subject, he stated, correctly imho, that if you did jump from a Nimrod, you would be in severe danger of getting ingested by the engines or striking the tail plane.[/QUOTE]
I'd accept a 'sever danger' in preference to riding a wingless aircraft from X thousand feet. It would be very difficult in many situations, no doubt about that, to complete a safe escape - but it's not as if you have a more pressing item to sort out at the time, is it?
Back in the late 70's/(very) early 80's I seem to recall being told that there'd been some handling problems on the soon to arrive MR2. The little winglet doodads on the tail were, I think, the answer to that issue - at the time the infamous 'somebody' told me that the trials crew had been provided with parachutes while that got sorted out....dunno if there's any truth to that, quite possibly just a silly story at the time.
Ultimately what is the cost of it? If the difficulties of escape mean that a single person survives and the other dozen don't, isn't that still worth doing?
Personally I think it's simply discounted by most people because for the greatest part of the aircraft's history it flew far out to sea - survival without the aircraft dinghies at 56N 20W means there's little point surviving the parachute jump.... we simply got used to figuring there's no point having a chute. (Especially in winter, and flying at MOA).
I'd accept a 'sever danger' in preference to riding a wingless aircraft from X thousand feet. It would be very difficult in many situations, no doubt about that, to complete a safe escape - but it's not as if you have a more pressing item to sort out at the time, is it?
Back in the late 70's/(very) early 80's I seem to recall being told that there'd been some handling problems on the soon to arrive MR2. The little winglet doodads on the tail were, I think, the answer to that issue - at the time the infamous 'somebody' told me that the trials crew had been provided with parachutes while that got sorted out....dunno if there's any truth to that, quite possibly just a silly story at the time.
Ultimately what is the cost of it? If the difficulties of escape mean that a single person survives and the other dozen don't, isn't that still worth doing?
Personally I think it's simply discounted by most people because for the greatest part of the aircraft's history it flew far out to sea - survival without the aircraft dinghies at 56N 20W means there's little point surviving the parachute jump.... we simply got used to figuring there's no point having a chute. (Especially in winter, and flying at MOA).
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Chugalug and Kokpit,
My guess is that it gives the military the freedom to react to military needs. Op Corporate is a classic case of needs must regarding the AAR mod to a number of aircraft types. Right now, military jets are getting modified to deal with military need. We don't have the resources, mostly time (not money) to install safety systems.
However, once the dust has settled or when operating in a civilian environment, a more regulatory framework has to be imposed, which brings me to my reply to Chug about "nothing to do with me". I never said that the MOD/RAF are blameless. BAe are also in the queue to see the QC. Chug, you missed the point (because you were not at a briefing today): 3 separate agencies signed up to the NSC, including a purely independent civilian company. So, even with an MAA overseeing military safety, people make mistakes, regardless of the name above their door.
Regards
Ed Set
I fail to understand the apparent disparity between civil and military requirements
However, once the dust has settled or when operating in a civilian environment, a more regulatory framework has to be imposed, which brings me to my reply to Chug about "nothing to do with me". I never said that the MOD/RAF are blameless. BAe are also in the queue to see the QC. Chug, you missed the point (because you were not at a briefing today): 3 separate agencies signed up to the NSC, including a purely independent civilian company. So, even with an MAA overseeing military safety, people make mistakes, regardless of the name above their door.
Regards
Ed Set
Davejb
Back in the early 00's I can confirm that the trials crew are provided with parachutes for high risk flights (where there may be some handling problems on the soon to arrive MRA4). The little winglet doodads on the tail are, & I know, a wee bit bigger than on the MR2. So says an infamous 'somebody'. Not just a silly story at the time.