Nimrod Information
Join Date: Nov 2005
Location: Norfolk England
Posts: 247
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Airworthiness and Risk
First Tucumseh - thanks very much for your further excellent examples of how and why what MOD always claims is a robust system lets the guys in the front line down far too often - as you say the human element which should be the "glue" that makes sure all the links come and work together has been too often the weakest link for many years past, and worse far too many people at the top of the food chain are only too happy to listen to what they perceive to be the good news, for example on coping with budget cuts, without questioning what lies beneath the surface or worse not understanding the implications even when they are explained to them.
Covec - yours is an interesting question, and Tuc may also wish to answer as he is more up to date than me on MOD procedures. However, as far as I am aware although each project should have an up to date risk register (including the MRA4 for example) during the D&M phase this does not translate into a specific in-service risk register - rather flying risks will end up as performance limitations or procedures - engineering risks may well end up as additional inspections, lower component lives etc etc. In other words those areas where you might have a "performance" risk left from the devopment programme should end up somewhere in the paperwork and be clearly visible. As an example if some of the analyses I mentioned for the IFR installation had been carried out (as you will realise I doubt if they were for the MRA2 installation or are being for the MRA4) show a clear risk then in theory you must do something about it unless you can show that the odds of it happening are so low as to be acceptable (and I do not know the current numbers for the clearance of military aircraft). Thus you may change procedures to reduce or eliminate exposure to the risk - you could increase the frequency of inspections to ensure the situation is not deteriorating or, best of all (but most expensive) you could modify the problem out.
Obviously for any in-service aircraft it is the task of the engineering officers and supervisors to make their own assessment of day to day risks eg when offering an aircraft to the aircrew with a deferred defect or flight limitation, and, of course the final link is the captain not just with regard to the acceptance of the safety issues, but also for suitablity for the task. Often there will be formal help eg with published limits for cracks etc and a minimum equipment list and you could, I sppose, regard these as a type of Risk Register. I have always assumed that supervisors on the flying side make similar assessments -but again without any formal "risk register" for operational factors other than the RTS and a knowledge of the capabilities/training of their crews.
I would assume that there will be formal IFR trials for the MRA4 if only for the different aerodynamic configuration, but whether this will make a proper assessment of the installation itself I would not know - it is one of my questions.
JB
Covec - yours is an interesting question, and Tuc may also wish to answer as he is more up to date than me on MOD procedures. However, as far as I am aware although each project should have an up to date risk register (including the MRA4 for example) during the D&M phase this does not translate into a specific in-service risk register - rather flying risks will end up as performance limitations or procedures - engineering risks may well end up as additional inspections, lower component lives etc etc. In other words those areas where you might have a "performance" risk left from the devopment programme should end up somewhere in the paperwork and be clearly visible. As an example if some of the analyses I mentioned for the IFR installation had been carried out (as you will realise I doubt if they were for the MRA2 installation or are being for the MRA4) show a clear risk then in theory you must do something about it unless you can show that the odds of it happening are so low as to be acceptable (and I do not know the current numbers for the clearance of military aircraft). Thus you may change procedures to reduce or eliminate exposure to the risk - you could increase the frequency of inspections to ensure the situation is not deteriorating or, best of all (but most expensive) you could modify the problem out.
Obviously for any in-service aircraft it is the task of the engineering officers and supervisors to make their own assessment of day to day risks eg when offering an aircraft to the aircrew with a deferred defect or flight limitation, and, of course the final link is the captain not just with regard to the acceptance of the safety issues, but also for suitablity for the task. Often there will be formal help eg with published limits for cracks etc and a minimum equipment list and you could, I sppose, regard these as a type of Risk Register. I have always assumed that supervisors on the flying side make similar assessments -but again without any formal "risk register" for operational factors other than the RTS and a knowledge of the capabilities/training of their crews.
I would assume that there will be formal IFR trials for the MRA4 if only for the different aerodynamic configuration, but whether this will make a proper assessment of the installation itself I would not know - it is one of my questions.
JB
John, whilst your questions wondering what analyses have been done on MR2/4 etc. are of relevant and of interest, in one of your earlier posts you appeared to have already made up your mind.....
....other posts have already suggested that the ad-hoc falklands fit was extensively re-engineered (including, I think it would be fair to assume, appropriate failure mode analysis) many years ago. Hence I fear your assumptions that this is the cause are probably flawed - like me you just don't have the facts to make such assertions.
This speculation is dangerous and furthermore you & others are quoting standards and in doing so are superficially appearing knowledgeable on these matters (which maybe true), but as you admit you don't know the details on Nimrod then your speculation is just that - speculation without detailed facts on this particular subject.
You all know that adherance to standards in itself is no guarantee of safety either so implying otherwise is also misleading out of context. Whilst you know this, it seems clear to me that this could be taken out of context by those who perhaps do not understand the detail of what this means from an engineering perspective (i.e. journolists and others following this thread with interest).
- it crashed, if all the leaked reports are to be believed, because it was not an airworthy aircraft, and it would appear that not only was the accident predictable but it was predicted, and the rest of the Nimrod fleet may be in the same state. Why is this – because it appears that what should have been a temporary installation to meet the urgent operational needs of the Falklands War has become a permanent fit,
This speculation is dangerous and furthermore you & others are quoting standards and in doing so are superficially appearing knowledgeable on these matters (which maybe true), but as you admit you don't know the details on Nimrod then your speculation is just that - speculation without detailed facts on this particular subject.
You all know that adherance to standards in itself is no guarantee of safety either so implying otherwise is also misleading out of context. Whilst you know this, it seems clear to me that this could be taken out of context by those who perhaps do not understand the detail of what this means from an engineering perspective (i.e. journolists and others following this thread with interest).
The Risk Assessment by a line captain, over and above the criteria mentioned by JB, and published as a Minimum Equipment List etc for his aircraft type, can be broadly characterized as a "feeling in his/her water". In other words experience, especially if one has been scared f***less with a similar condition previously. Hence my dramatised example for AC. He criticised it as a poor example as manufacturers guidance would assure me to the contrary. That is the difference between old pilots and engineers. He believes them, I don't (necessarily). But all this is by the way, because the basic truth here is not a tension between pilots and engineers, but between the front line and the rear echelons in the MOD. The former are at war, and their fate may be determined in the most arbitrary way. The latter, with honourable exceptions, Tuc, are sitting fat dumb and happy having supplied the former with non-airworthy aircraft. That is a bloody disgrace!
Last edited by Chugalug2; 8th Jul 2007 at 18:41.
covec
I could reply at length, but here's the official answer. (Search for Risk). It uses the phrase "the IPT SHOULD" a lot. That is, none of what it says is actually mandated. Also, the first entry refers to the IPT having a risk register. Nowhere does it mention that it is DEC who should initiate the Register. Having got this basic principle wrong, I'd take the rest with a pinch of salt.
http://www.ams.mod.uk/
JFZ90
"You all know that adherance to standards in itself is no guarantee of safety either so implying otherwise is also misleading out of context".
No-one is suggesting adherence to standards guarantees safety, but I think aircrew reading this would prefer me to invoke said standards rather than treating them as an optional nuisance. I sincerely hope you are never placed in the position of being instructed to ignore these standards.
I could reply at length, but here's the official answer. (Search for Risk). It uses the phrase "the IPT SHOULD" a lot. That is, none of what it says is actually mandated. Also, the first entry refers to the IPT having a risk register. Nowhere does it mention that it is DEC who should initiate the Register. Having got this basic principle wrong, I'd take the rest with a pinch of salt.
http://www.ams.mod.uk/
JFZ90
"You all know that adherance to standards in itself is no guarantee of safety either so implying otherwise is also misleading out of context".
No-one is suggesting adherence to standards guarantees safety, but I think aircrew reading this would prefer me to invoke said standards rather than treating them as an optional nuisance. I sincerely hope you are never placed in the position of being instructed to ignore these standards.
Join Date: Mar 2006
Location: wilts
Posts: 1,667
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
My own engineering contacts want the MRA4 to have a double skinned IFR system as well as fuel tank protection. Bomb bay fire protection is also possible. The RAF does not want the program to move right and does not have any money.
John Bakeley
Re Post 824....
"I would assume that there will be formal IFR trials for the MRA4 if only for the different aerodynamic configuration, but whether this will make a proper assessment of the installation itself I would not know - it is one of my questions......."
What 'different aerodynamic configuration'?
The installation is ""retained"" for god sakes..... Same as MR2.
Jeeeez...Us
"I would assume that there will be formal IFR trials for the MRA4 if only for the different aerodynamic configuration, but whether this will make a proper assessment of the installation itself I would not know - it is one of my questions......."
What 'different aerodynamic configuration'?
The installation is ""retained"" for god sakes..... Same as MR2.
Jeeeez...Us
The MR4 is aerodynamically obviously a bit different from the MR2 with all its changes & bulges hence its possible AAR trials will be conducted to ensure the MR4 changes have not introduced any untoward handling/behaviour when refueling. I assume this is what John was referring to.
tuc
I know you know that, but someone reading your post above re the sea king may get the impression that it would have solved the problem. In fact, as I'm sure you'd agreed, the anti col beacon issue is actually quite complicated. I am however rather surprised that the issue was not flagged as not it-for-purpose in any case - I'd argue you shouldn't need a DEF STD to highlight this issue as being rather important during design, let alone trials & acceptance.
tuc
No-one is suggesting adherence to standards guarantees safety, but I think aircrew reading this would prefer me to invoke said standards rather than treating them as an optional nuisance. I sincerely hope you are never placed in the position of being instructed to ignore these standards.
As a new Mk is being introduced, a new Aircraft Safety Case is required; as it would be even if the role of the aircraft changed. (And, from the various posts here, that does seem to have changed in recent years for the Mk2, so I assume its Safety Case is wholly up to date).
It may be retained, and may carry the caveat "it was built to standards of the day", but that does not infer automatic read-across. Under the circumstances I think I'd be ensuring it was brought up to latest standards. Perhaps that is what has caused the 7 year, and counting, delay?
It may be retained, and may carry the caveat "it was built to standards of the day", but that does not infer automatic read-across. Under the circumstances I think I'd be ensuring it was brought up to latest standards. Perhaps that is what has caused the 7 year, and counting, delay?
The differences twixt MR2 & MRA4 fwd of the IFR probe, that would affect IFR, are... NIL.
If you read his post in this context it does make sense.
JFZ90
Apologies... & to JB.
Quite right....
T'would appear that I had a bit of a knee-jerk thing going on there (post the barbie & all...). Perhaps a bit too defensive of MRA4 just now...
Quite right....
T'would appear that I had a bit of a knee-jerk thing going on there (post the barbie & all...). Perhaps a bit too defensive of MRA4 just now...
Join Date: Nov 2006
Location: N Scotland
Posts: 85
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Its rumoured (here, I think) that the AAR system on the MRA4 will not be released into service. I further understand that the decision was made before the crash. ie it was/is about money at the time.
Join Date: Apr 2002
Location: ecosse
Posts: 714
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
It seems everyone is going into the manuals and wer'e losing sight of the origins of this thread
This was a unique, catastrophic and tragic accident that happened to an aircraft that was properly prepared, declared and accepted as serviceable for that sortie - as was XV239, XV256, XV257, XV666, the Chinook, the Hercules, the Comets, Yoke Peter, Yoke Uncle, Yoke Yoke - and all the Lightnings, Chipmunks, JP's, Hunters, Canberras, Harriers, Hastings, Tornados, and all other ac that suffered loss of systems or were exposed to unforseen risk when airborne
So, as Captain, I stand up at briefing and say
"Ok crew, today wer'e doing a 6 hr Ops/Ct which involves a 30min AAR slot for the pilots, but there is a big risk of a fire in the Bomb Bay after refuel, and we might not get back, so I am not taking this ac and cancelling the sortie"
History will agree with me - "You brief for the best and you plan for the worst"
You cannot prepare for an emergency in a moment - your reactions to an emergency are a result of procedures which you have practised over a period of time - that is why we have IA's supported by check lists and the efforts of the crew!
TD
I have flown many AAR sorties, some not planned - SAR - where my only concern was to establish contact with the tanker when a long way from home
I never had any worries other than to get more gas and I have trusted the plumbing system, pre-and post Falklands fit, and I am here to prove it
This still does not answer the questions - so I suggest we all wait for the BOI report
This was a unique, catastrophic and tragic accident that happened to an aircraft that was properly prepared, declared and accepted as serviceable for that sortie - as was XV239, XV256, XV257, XV666, the Chinook, the Hercules, the Comets, Yoke Peter, Yoke Uncle, Yoke Yoke - and all the Lightnings, Chipmunks, JP's, Hunters, Canberras, Harriers, Hastings, Tornados, and all other ac that suffered loss of systems or were exposed to unforseen risk when airborne
So, as Captain, I stand up at briefing and say
"Ok crew, today wer'e doing a 6 hr Ops/Ct which involves a 30min AAR slot for the pilots, but there is a big risk of a fire in the Bomb Bay after refuel, and we might not get back, so I am not taking this ac and cancelling the sortie"
History will agree with me - "You brief for the best and you plan for the worst"
You cannot prepare for an emergency in a moment - your reactions to an emergency are a result of procedures which you have practised over a period of time - that is why we have IA's supported by check lists and the efforts of the crew!
TD
I have flown many AAR sorties, some not planned - SAR - where my only concern was to establish contact with the tanker when a long way from home
I never had any worries other than to get more gas and I have trusted the plumbing system, pre-and post Falklands fit, and I am here to prove it
This still does not answer the questions - so I suggest we all wait for the BOI report
Join Date: Nov 2005
Location: Norfolk England
Posts: 247
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Specuation
JFC90
You are, of course, quite right, and I obviously did not make it clear enough that my comments were based on "leaked" and hence inevitably speculative, reports that MOD has done little to counter, including the ST article on remarks by the Stn Cdr Kinloss. Yours is the first time that I have seen a comment that the FI installation was extensively re-engineered - not that this would necessarily meet all of the relevant standards, and carrying out a safety analysis is little use if its results were not to be implemented - were they?
All of this aside having seen how the Chinook BOI was "manipulated" (which I will happily justify in a PM if you wish) I am, like everyone else, very suspicious of the reasons for the continuing delays!
JB
You are, of course, quite right, and I obviously did not make it clear enough that my comments were based on "leaked" and hence inevitably speculative, reports that MOD has done little to counter, including the ST article on remarks by the Stn Cdr Kinloss. Yours is the first time that I have seen a comment that the FI installation was extensively re-engineered - not that this would necessarily meet all of the relevant standards, and carrying out a safety analysis is little use if its results were not to be implemented - were they?
All of this aside having seen how the Chinook BOI was "manipulated" (which I will happily justify in a PM if you wish) I am, like everyone else, very suspicious of the reasons for the continuing delays!
JB
Registered User **
Join Date: Mar 2005
Location: Cambridge
Posts: 556
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
This was a unique, catastrophic and tragic accident .................................exposed to unforseen risk when airborne
You (mis)quote the loss of XW666, I suggest you get hold of the accident report, and read carefully the reason why it was lost. Yes there was a fuel tank fire, yes there was a short circuit in the engine loom, but look at why the starter motor failed, read the report and see that similar failures had happened at least twice previously. A modification programme had been introduced, but, some 10 to 15 years later, XW666 flew with a pre-modification starter motor. If XW666 had not been on a post major air test, if it had happened with a full crew in a less fortuitous location and if the crew had not displayed such skill and judgement we would probably be discussing a tragedy.
When carrying out the safety analysis, the engineer is not allowed to factor in providence (luck) as some on here, and it seems some who are exposed to the greatest risk, would have us do.
Safety_Helmut
Join Date: Sep 2006
Location: Bridgwater Somerset
Posts: 459
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
buoy15
As you have said you are a Nimrod captain (I hope I have that right), If one of your aircrew or one of their family members asked you, whats the chances of surviving a Bomb bay fire due to a fuel leak.
Knowing what happened to XV257 when the fire extinguisher had no effect and that XV230 exploded.
What would your answer be?
I have asked a Snr Officer what he would say and was not surprised by his answer.
And perhaps you could tell me what is the procedure that you practise now for a Bomb Bay fire.
As you have said you are a Nimrod captain (I hope I have that right), If one of your aircrew or one of their family members asked you, whats the chances of surviving a Bomb bay fire due to a fuel leak.
Knowing what happened to XV257 when the fire extinguisher had no effect and that XV230 exploded.
What would your answer be?
I have asked a Snr Officer what he would say and was not surprised by his answer.
And perhaps you could tell me what is the procedure that you practise now for a Bomb Bay fire.
Join Date: Mar 2006
Location: wilts
Posts: 1,667
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I am not surprised by the comments of B15, there is no consensus at Kinloss about where to go from here. There is no-one in seniority pushing for fuel tank protection. Energies are being used on coping with the day to day. Attitude to risk varies from person to person.
As an indicator though, take a look at how many people have quit.
This BoI needs to be published ASAP. The lack of info to the families is wrong. No reason given for reconvening. The only thing I can glean is that the boffins keep changing their minds.
As an indicator though, take a look at how many people have quit.
This BoI needs to be published ASAP. The lack of info to the families is wrong. No reason given for reconvening. The only thing I can glean is that the boffins keep changing their minds.
The only thing I can glean is that the boffins keep changing their minds
a. Find a viable & suitable answer that avoids the bean counters having to spend money.
b. Find a viable & suitable answer that does not embarrass the people at the top who have done nothing to sort out this and other problems, that they are fully aware of.
c. Find a suitable answer to avoid litigation against the MOD for failure in 'Duty of Care' which does seem to be lacking in this and other aircraft types.
d. Delay findings untill the MR2 out of service date deadline for making modifications, that was mentioned in an earlier thread, has passed.
e. Or hopefully that this time the actual truth, as best as can be with the evidence, will be delivered and something done about it to avoid another accident.