Bingo
Thank you. I accept what you say, in part. I was going to say I didn’t claim this example happened on Nimrod (clearly I was referring to Hercules) but then I remembered the equipment was common across a number of types and, yes, it was fitted to MR1. That is, a Nimrod (or Andover, VC10, Dominie or Jetstream at the time) could have had the same problem. It just so happens Lyneham workshops spotted the problem first.
My point, and Chug makes the same one very well, is that if you ask a given IPT “How many problems have you had on such and such”, they may answer “one” and the MoD immediately says “isolated case”. But if you ask the question (mandated for 760s) “What about affected aircraft, equipment or contractors” the answer may be more than one. That is, not isolated, but a potentially critical trend. Stovepiped IPTs, and the demise of centralised support for maintaining the build standard of equipment (coupled with no money to do it anyway) conveniently hide these trends and make the MoD’s argument seem plausible to those who do not understand the “system”. And such a system means each IPT must contribute financially to the solution, and invariably don’t have the funding.
No, I may not know a lot about the Nimrod airframe but please don’t use that as a reason for dismissing what I say. Here’s another example, which I’ve mentioned before, but nobody likes discussing. Aircraft type A is fitted with a system which the equipment project office has (knowingly, and with 2* support) failed to integrate properly, rendering it unfit for purpose (unsafe). Given this project office is responsible for all such equipment, fitted to the vast majority of aircraft, the “affected aircraft, equipment and contractors” question is asked (by Aircraft A IPT, which is a failure of process and duty of care, as the equipment office shouldn’t need to be told). Specifically, two 2*s are separately advised to order all such systems checked for proper integration and safe function. They ignore this. As does 4*. Some time later Aircraft type B is shot down (2 dead) and the BOI recommends said system “should be integrated”, as if they’ve just worked it out.
To get to the truth you must ask the right question. There is no point asking about Aircraft A. The IPT will say “Isolated case, it was fixed”. Clearly, the BOI for Aircraft B did not dig deeper, as their recommendation only applied to that type. Again, this is a process failure; either the BOI should have looked wider and deeper, or if that wasn’t in their remit they should have recommended such action to the appropriate authority (who’d already refused). They didn’t. Notably, the BOI must have been complicit in burying the fact that this was not an isolated failure of process, but a clear trend which had been identified years previously. And I haven’t mentioned the Coroner’s role. Based on the verdict, he clearly didn’t know the truth.
The point I’m making is that if you study supposedly isolated cases on, say, Chinook, Tornado, Hercules, Nimrod etc you will find trends. (It doesn’t have to apply to all cases, just two or more). I do understand that, quite naturally, people have their own agendas on these aircraft. My advice is, if you find an area of concern, do not jump in and ask a singular question of MoD; rather, seek advice from those looking at the other cases to see if there is commonality. That is, ask the affected aircraft, equipment or contractors question. This restricts the MoD’s room for manoeuvre.