Future Carrier (Including Costs)

[WE Branch Fanatic]

Originally Posted by Gordon Brown

What is the point of these floating cocktail parties? Do you think LM would let us trade the Daves in for A-models?

MARITIME OPERATING CONCEPT - THE MARITIME FORCE CONTRIBUTION TO THE INTEGRATED OPERATING CONCEPT

Under section 5 - Force Level Outputs - page 50

The Maritime Force will be organised around four Force Level Outputs: Homeland and Operational Advantage in the North Atlantic; Persistent Engagement; Carrier Strike; Littoral Strike

Homeland and Operational Advantage in the North Atlantic - page 52

An integrated Maritime Force, with NATO at its heart, protecting our homeland and our allies. Homeland Defence/Warfighting. Includes the attribution of CASD, Carrier Strike, and Littoral Strike capabilities (LRG(N)) to NATO as a pillar of Defence and Deterrence in the Euro Atlantic; seeks a more assertive posture which regains operational advantage.

Key outcomes:

• Protection of strategic interests and CNI, including Maritime Counter Terrorism and Maritime Security in the UK’s TTW and EEZ.
• Ensure freedom of manoeuvre in the North Atlantic.
• Maintain CASD for UK and NATO.
• Lead nation in NATO MARCOM.

Carrier Strike - page 54

The heart of the Maritime Force’s – and NATO’s – warfighting capability Built around the Queen Elizabeth Class Aircraft Carriers. Carrier Strike: Homeland Defence/Contingency/ Warfighting. Contribute to OANA. Through deployments to strategic locations across the globe, promote UK interests, deter adversaries and prevent conflict.

• Project decisive air power from a protected maritime task group, including gaining and retaining the necessary degree of sea control to ensure Freedom of Manoeuvre.
• Demonstrate Global Britain, with regular deployments openly demonstrating British will to engage and resolve to act.
• Contribute to UK/NATO warfighting capability, as a more lethal and more integrated Maritime Force.
• Enable and execute Special Operations.

The Sea Control role(s) of the carrier is discussed at length in various places, such as this thread from elsewhere:

1977 US Congress Report: The US Sea Control Mission (carriers needed in the Atlantic for Air Defence and ASW - due to Maths/Physics/Geography)

Two major conclusions can be reached:

A. Sea Control (ASW, air defence/AAW, and anti surface warfare) is a major mission for the carrier and the carrier group. It was during the Second World War and the Cold War, and it is again now in a renewed era of peer adversaries and contested seas.

B. Sea Control is difficult to achieve without carrier aviation. Geography, Mathematics, and Physics show that attacking aircraft are best dealt with using fighters to kill the archers, not the arrows, and that the best chance of stopping anti ship missiles is to engage the launch platform. Similarly constant helicopter ASW operations are best supported by a big deck with multiple helicopters, and Physics shows that modern long range sonars need to work in conjunction with dipping sonar to achieve their potential - and vice versa.

This 1976 film from the IWM Collections is also very interesting: THE ROYAL NAVY AND THE SOVIET THREAT

This was made for the consumption of the British public, although sadly it appears just a few years defence later was being run by politicians who seem to have missed it. It covers the dependence of the UK and Europe on seaborne commerce, and the growing threat posed by the Soviet Navy and the Soviet Naval Air Force.

At approximately 11.00 the coverage of RN (and RM and RAF) capabilities starts. At 14.00 HMS Ark Royal (IV) gets a mention as making an important contribution to NATO - something forgotten about during the carrier related discussions in the early 1960s. At 15.00 her embarked squadron of ASW Sea Kings is mentioned in terms of providing an essential element in the anti submarine warfare defence of the force. None of this nonsense about (just) defending the carrier.

At 22.35 we get told about 'the most important surface ship of the future' - the 'anti submarine cruiser'. The point is made that a carrier provides easily the most cost effective means of deploying large anti submarine helicopters to sea in worthwhile numbers as well as command facilities for a task group. From 24.15 the presenter mentions that these ships will carry the Sea Harrier to supplement land based air cover for the fleet outside the range of shore bases and mentions dealing with shadowing aircraft used by the Soviets for targeting long range missiles.

Two declassified training films are also interesting:

MATCH ATTACK - 1976

Navy Instructional film on the role of the Medium-range Anti-submarine Torpedo Carrying Helicopter (MATCH) in co-ordinated anti-submarine warfare (ASW) operations. The film uses stock footage of German U-boat attacks on allied convoys during the Battle of the Atlantic, and various shots of Soviet submarines, to emphasise the importance of ASW. A Royal Navy Wasp helicopter, launched from the Leander Class frigate HMS Achilles (F.12) then carries out an attack on a submarine using air-dropped torpedoes, with direction from the parent ship's operations room, including computer plotting. The Wasp is then re-armed and scrambled to make another attack. The roles of the RAF's Nimrod long-range maritime patrol aircraft and the dipping-sonar equipped Sea King helicopter* are also described.

*At 14.02 and 14.50.

PRINCIPLES OF ANTI-AIR WARFARE - 1977

Navy Instructional film giving an overview of the threat to NATO warships from Soviet missiles and aircraft, with reference to the situation in the North Sea and Atlantic Ocean. The film briefly covers electronic warfare, countermeasures, the use of radar pickets and reconnaissance. Numerous photos and film of NATO and Soviet ships and aircraft are shown, including F4 Phantoms launching missiles and taking off from the Audacious Class aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal (R.09), shots of F14 and Harrier jets, various shots of missiles on the launcher and in flight, Tupolev-95 'Bear' reconnaissance aircraft and Tupolev-16 'Badger' bombers.

I have to wonder why the staff officers who did the staff work to justify new carriers in the early 1960s managed to ignore the experience of the Second World War and the Royal Navy's NATO roles - which included using carriers to fend off the Russian aircraft and submarines. Why not ignore the main effort - what could go wrong?

At 06.40 in the film mention is made of Airborne Early Warning, including the US Navy's E-2 Hawkeye. It would take the loss of HMS Sheffield on 4 May 1982 to get the politicians to agree to fund our own AEW Sea King. There is a 1970s film made by what was then Grumman Aerospace Corporation about the Hawkeye and the fairly senior USN Officers describe in terms of dealing with the challenge at sea.

At 09.15 fighters aircraft get a mention - the last RN Phantoms, the Sea Harrier (did any exist in 1977?) and the USN F-14 Tomcat. They, so the narrator states, can intercept reconnaissance aircraft, can splash missile carrying aircraft. and can engage missiles. Obviously not with the Sidewinder - what that the reason they thought the Sea Harrier needed Sparrow?

It seems that we have to learn the same lessons again and again. Why? The same Mathematics, Physics, and Geography that was relevant to ASW and AAW in 1974 and 1977 is still relevant now.

[Not_a_boffin]

Once again. FFS.

[Gordon Brown]

Originally Posted by WE Branch Fanatic

MARITIME OPERATING CONCEPT - THE MARITIME FORCE CONTRIBUTION TO THE INTEGRATED OPERATING CONCEPT

Under section 5 - Force Level Outputs - page 50

The Maritime Force will be organised around four Force Level Outputs: Homeland and Operational Advantage in the North Atlantic; Persistent Engagement; Carrier Strike; Littoral Strike

Homeland and Operational Advantage in the North Atlantic - page 52

An integrated Maritime Force, with NATO at its heart, protecting our homeland and our allies. Homeland Defence/Warfighting. Includes the attribution of CASD, Carrier Strike, and Littoral Strike capabilities (LRG(N)) to NATO as a pillar of Defence and Deterrence in the Euro Atlantic; seeks a more assertive posture which regains operational advantage.

Key outcomes:

• Protection of strategic interests and CNI, including Maritime Counter Terrorism and Maritime Security in the UK’s TTW and EEZ.
• Ensure freedom of manoeuvre in the North Atlantic.
• Maintain CASD for UK and NATO.
• Lead nation in NATO MARCOM.

Carrier Strike - page 54

The heart of the Maritime Force’s – and NATO’s – warfighting capability Built around the Queen Elizabeth Class Aircraft Carriers. Carrier Strike: Homeland Defence/Contingency/ Warfighting. Contribute to OANA. Through deployments to strategic locations across the globe, promote UK interests, deter adversaries and prevent conflict.

• Project decisive air power from a protected maritime task group, including gaining and retaining the necessary degree of sea control to ensure Freedom of Manoeuvre.
• Demonstrate Global Britain, with regular deployments openly demonstrating British will to engage and resolve to act.
• Contribute to UK/NATO warfighting capability, as a more lethal and more integrated Maritime Force.
• Enable and execute Special Operations.

The Sea Control role(s) of the carrier is discussed at length in various places, such as this thread from elsewhere:

1977 US Congress Report: The US Sea Control Mission (carriers needed in the Atlantic for Air Defence and ASW - due to Maths/Physics/Geography)

Two major conclusions can be reached:

A. Sea Control (ASW, air defence/AAW, and anti surface warfare) is a major mission for the carrier and the carrier group. It was during the Second World War and the Cold War, and it is again now in a renewed era of peer adversaries and contested seas.

B. Sea Control is difficult to achieve without carrier aviation. Geography, Mathematics, and Physics show that attacking aircraft are best dealt with using fighters to kill the archers, not the arrows, and that the best chance of stopping anti ship missiles is to engage the launch platform. Similarly constant helicopter ASW operations are best supported by a big deck with multiple helicopters, and Physics shows that modern long range sonars need to work in conjunction with dipping sonar to achieve their potential - and vice versa.

This 1976 film from the IWM Collections is also very interesting: THE ROYAL NAVY AND THE SOVIET THREAT

This was made for the consumption of the British public, although sadly it appears just a few years defence later was being run by politicians who seem to have missed it. It covers the dependence of the UK and Europe on seaborne commerce, and the growing threat posed by the Soviet Navy and the Soviet Naval Air Force.

At approximately 11.00 the coverage of RN (and RM and RAF) capabilities starts. At 14.00 HMS Ark Royal (IV) gets a mention as making an important contribution to NATO - something forgotten about during the carrier related discussions in the early 1960s. At 15.00 her embarked squadron of ASW Sea Kings is mentioned in terms of providing an essential element in the anti submarine warfare defence of the force. None of this nonsense about (just) defending the carrier.

At 22.35 we get told about 'the most important surface ship of the future' - the 'anti submarine cruiser'. The point is made that a carrier provides easily the most cost effective means of deploying large anti submarine helicopters to sea in worthwhile numbers as well as command facilities for a task group. From 24.15 the presenter mentions that these ships will carry the Sea Harrier to supplement land based air cover for the fleet outside the range of shore bases and mentions dealing with shadowing aircraft used by the Soviets for targeting long range missiles.

Two declassified training films are also interesting:

MATCH ATTACK - 1976

Navy Instructional film on the role of the Medium-range Anti-submarine Torpedo Carrying Helicopter (MATCH) in co-ordinated anti-submarine warfare (ASW) operations. The film uses stock footage of German U-boat attacks on allied convoys during the Battle of the Atlantic, and various shots of Soviet submarines, to emphasise the importance of ASW. A Royal Navy Wasp helicopter, launched from the Leander Class frigate HMS Achilles (F.12) then carries out an attack on a submarine using air-dropped torpedoes, with direction from the parent ship's operations room, including computer plotting. The Wasp is then re-armed and scrambled to make another attack. The roles of the RAF's Nimrod long-range maritime patrol aircraft and the dipping-sonar equipped Sea King helicopter* are also described.

*At 14.02 and 14.50.

PRINCIPLES OF ANTI-AIR WARFARE - 1977

Navy Instructional film giving an overview of the threat to NATO warships from Soviet missiles and aircraft, with reference to the situation in the North Sea and Atlantic Ocean. The film briefly covers electronic warfare, countermeasures, the use of radar pickets and reconnaissance. Numerous photos and film of NATO and Soviet ships and aircraft are shown, including F4 Phantoms launching missiles and taking off from the Audacious Class aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal (R.09), shots of F14 and Harrier jets, various shots of missiles on the launcher and in flight, Tupolev-95 'Bear' reconnaissance aircraft and Tupolev-16 'Badger' bombers.

I have to wonder why the staff officers who did the staff work to justify new carriers in the early 1960s managed to ignore the experience of the Second World War and the Royal Navy's NATO roles - which included using carriers to fend off the Russian aircraft and submarines. Why not ignore the main effort - what could go wrong?

At 06.40 in the film mention is made of Airborne Early Warning, including the US Navy's E-2 Hawkeye. It would take the loss of HMS Sheffield on 4 May 1982 to get the politicians to agree to fund our own AEW Sea King. There is a 1970s film made by what was then Grumman Aerospace Corporation about the Hawkeye and the fairly senior USN Officers describe in terms of dealing with the challenge at sea.

At 09.15 fighters aircraft get a mention - the last RN Phantoms, the Sea Harrier (did any exist in 1977?) and the USN F-14 Tomcat. They, so the narrator states, can intercept reconnaissance aircraft, can splash missile carrying aircraft. and can engage missiles. Obviously not with the Sidewinder - what that the reason they thought the Sea Harrier needed Sparrow?

It seems that we have to learn the same lessons again and again. Why? The same Mathematics, Physics, and Geography that was relevant to ASW and AAW in 1974 and 1977 is still relevant now.

You haven't answered the question.

What is the point of a 65000 ton behemoth that carries a few 'invisible' jumping beans whose only surface attack capability comprises a couple of 500lb precision guided bombs (assuming there is no noticeable jamming environment) with an FT of about 5nm?

[Biggus]

A great location to hold a cocktail party?

[langleybaston]

Seemingly defending the Indefensible takes a lot of words.

[SLXOwft]

At the risk of prolixity I will throw in another few penn'orth on why the UK carriers are IMO a good thing and why more money needs to be spend on equipping them with the range of tools they need. I accept there are some who will never be convinced it's money well spent.

Among other things having aircraft carriers enables the UK to:

1. Project hard power globally especially in areas where permission to use land bases isn't forthcoming or is conditional. This applies both to airpower and the delivery of land forces .
2. There are strong arguments that in the current geopolitical climate WEBF's Sea Control mission is as important today as it was 50 years ago and not just in the North Atlantic.
3. An independent carrier force provides influence with US politicians as it shows that at least one European country is prepared to put money in forces that can be effective outside the continent.
4. Project soft power
5. Leverage the development of UCAVs, USuVs, and UUVs to use them effectively away from fixed bases.

It is perhaps instructive that the most visible demonstration of China's strategy since the beginning of the Century has been a concentration on Sea Control as it pushes to displace its neighbours from their legitimate interests in the South China Sea and beyond. It is only by the US, UK and others demonstrating their own Sea Control abilities that it can be opposed peacefully.

A few illustrative quotes.

For the British governments that decided to build the new carriers, the first straw in the wind was probably the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operation against Serbia in the late 1990s. NATO had a massive land-based air force operating from nearby bases in Italy. Yet the two small Invincible-class carriers HMS Invincible and HMS Ark Royal regularly generated more sorties—and had more impact—than all the land-based aircraft.

(...)

What the carriers and amphibious ships mean for the United Kingdom is that it can—when needed—operate independently. British national interests may demand that independence. Britain’s view of what matters abroad at times will differ from that of its allies. The ability to operate independently may generate desired support from other countries, including the United States. Without it, Britain’s pursuit of national interests overseas is limited and will depend on the permission and assistance of others.

Most of the world’s population lives and works not far from the ocean, on which most global commerce moves. The U.S. Navy’s post-Cold War littoral strategy was based on those facts and is still valid today. Great Britain let its navy—especially its power projection capability—atrophy after the Cold War. The addition of the Queen Elizabeth and Prince of Wales—armed with F-35B fighters—marks an important milestone in the return of the Royal Navy and its ability to project British national resolve.

from British Aircraft Carriers Return - Norman Friedman USNI Proceeedings Vol. 143/8/1,374 August 2017

The oceans are the “high ground of the global system,” and the ability to control them confers unparalleled advantage. Command of the sea allows a nation’s ships, goods, commerce, and military forces to move around the globe at will. Without the ability to fight for sea control, nations are relegated to “a passive role” and become “consumers” of the global order rather than drivers of it.

(...)

It is clear sea control and command of the sea remain decisively important. They should become the foundation of a new, comprehensive naval strategy articulating how the nation and its allies will secure freedom of navigation, further the nation’s strategic goals, and aid the spread of liberal democratic ideas. They have served this purpose before. They should do so again.

from Sea Control and Command of the Sea Remain Essential - Trent Hone USNI Proceedings Vol. 147/11/1,425 November 2021

[Asturias56]

Those are valid points - and , in a perfect world, or with a Government that led rather than followed public opinion, carriers are a useful option. However given the resources available, and likely to be available, they're an expensive distraction.

It's even worse when they don't work but that seems a characteristic of a lot of Britain these days

[WE Branch Fanatic]

Originally Posted by Gordon Brown

You haven't answered the question.

What is the point of a 65000 ton behemoth that carries a few 'invisible' jumping beans whose only surface attack capability comprises a couple of 500lb precision guided bombs (assuming there is no noticeable jamming environment) with an FT of about 5nm?

I am sure you are aware that the F-35B Lightning Force build up is rather slow, but the plan is to put two squadrons aboard the carrier - both 617Sqn and 809NAS are pencilled in for CSG25 as far as I know, plus a full load of Merlins. As you are are also no doubt aware the jets have roles other than surface attack - such as air defence, and they have intercepted Russian jets in the Mediterranean and more recently in the Norwegian Sea, and in recent weeks American carrierborne Hornets have splashed both suicide UAVs and anti ship missiles.

Some of the weapons due for integration have an anti surface unit role, and some (particularly American writers) point out that since the enemy warship is most likely missile armed, the carrier's aircraft should concentrate on killing the missile at range and let surface warships deal with the enemy vessel - the missiles will be more numerous than the ships they are fired from. Additionally long range missiles frequently depend on airborne platforms for targeting - which can be engaged if a force has its own fighters.

The carrier also has an anti submarine warfare role with multiple ASW helicopters. This has been a major carrier role in the Royal Navy since 1960 and experience has shown the value of basing a squadron of them aboard the same ship - coordination, communications, maintenance, and logistic support. For Steadfast Defender 24, no less than seven ASW Merlins were/are to be embarked (as well as Crowsnest fitted cabs and some Jungly Wildcats).

Originally Posted by langleybaston

Seemingly defending the Indefensible takes a lot of words.

• Project decisive air power from a protected maritime task group, including gaining and retaining the necessary degree of sea control to ensure Freedom of Manoeuvre.

Seems understandable enough to me!

Our geographical location, dependency on seaborne commerce, and role in NATO (and other alliances) make the carrier of particular value to the UK. World trade relies on the free movement of merchant ships, NATO relies on transatlantic reinforcement and maritime transport within the European theatre, seaborne logistics have been critical for moving forces and equipment for dealing with crises elsewhere, and we wish to retain the ability to put forces ashore at a time and place of our choosing. I have previously answered a similar question from you by saying that the carriers are for the related missions of Sea Control and Power Projection - and some consider moving forces by sea or amphibious operations as power projection.

Sea Control (sometimes used as short hand for ASW, air defence, and so on - in other words fighting the war at sea) can be defined as acquiring and securing the privilege to use the maritime space in the period as expected. Threats exist on the surface, underwater, and in the air. In some places you would have to consider land based missiles.

Surface threats: The carrier can launch aircraft to detect hostile vessels and engage them (when suitably armed) at long range. Modern air to air missiles also provide the capability to shoot down missiles that enemy vessels have fired, reducing the danger of shipborne missiles systems being overwhelmed by numbers. Remember, nobody has yet managed to solve the problem of reloading vertically launched missiles as sea.

Air threats: The carrier can launch aircraft that can detect hostile aircraft far beyond the radar horizon of any surface warship, defeat low fliers attempting to hide behind the horizon, visually identify aircraft, and engage them before they get close enough to friendly vessels to fire a salvo of anti ship missiles. They can also splash missiles once launched, reducing the danger of ship based defences being overwhelmed by numbers. The carrier can carry fighters close to forces or shipping being protected and provide a 24/7 CAP or more, regardless of the distance from friendly air bases. You can demonstrate mathematically that you can achieve the same level of defence with a significantly smaller number of fighters based aboard a carrier 100nm away from the CAP station than you would with jets based 200nm or 300nm away.

Submarine threats: The carrier provides the means to deploy a number of ASW helicopters that are collocated for ease of coordination, logistics, and maintenance, and of course a larger deck provides the ability to launch and recover aircraft in worse weather than smaller ships. Some submarines carry anti ship missiles - these can be engaged with modern AAMs and the targeting platforms for long range ones can be engaged.

Land based threats: Again missiles can be detected and engaged, as proven recently by the Americans in the Red Sea, and potentially launch sites can be attacked.

Power Projection includes the use (or threatened use) of airpower against targets ashore - again Little's Theorem applies and there is value is launching from near the target in terms of things like sortie rate, and of course there is the political issue of not relying on a host nation and relying on them agreeing to use their bases and airspace. Power Projection also covers things such amphibious capabilities - which demand a large degree of Sea Control, and some writers consider moving military equipment by sea to count as power projection. This is why the term Carrier Enabled Power Projection is used, and presumably why Not_a_boffin keeps waving a collection of birch sticks at me. He has pointed out that the defence of a task group (or forces ashore) was part of the CVF requirement.

Originally Posted by SLXOwft

At the risk of prolixity I will throw in another few penn'orth on why the UK carriers are IMO a good thing and why more money needs to be spend on equipping them with the range of tools they need. I accept there are some who will never be convinced its money well spent.

Among other things having aircraft carriers enables the UK to:

1. Project hard power globally especially in areas where permission to use land bases isn't forthcoming or is conditional. This applies both to airpower and the delivery of land forces .
2. There are strong arguments that in the current geopolitical climate WEBF's Sea Control mission is as important today as it was 50 years ago and not just in the North Atlantic.
3. An independent carrier force provides influence with US politicians as it shows that at least one European country is prepared to put money in forces that can be effective outside the continent.
4. Project soft power
5. Leverage the development of UCAVs, USuVs, and UUVs to use them effectively away from fixed bases.

It is perhaps instructive that the most visible demonstration of China's strategy since the beginning of the Century has been a concentration on Sea Control as it pushes to displace its neighbours from their legitimate interests in the South China Sea and beyond. It is only by the US, UK and others demonstrating their own Sea Control abilities that it can be opposed peacefully.

Sea Control and Power Projection are related and often conflated. However, if an adversary is able to deny you use of the sea, you will not be projecting power in any way, shape, or form. With the re-emergence of conventional state versus competition and conflict, the seas and the airspace above them are once again contested. For example, the level of Russian submarine activity in the Atlantic is high and for the last few years NATO has considered the Atlantic to be contested.

Originally Posted by Asturias56

Those are valid points - and , in a perfect world, or with a Government that led rather than followed public opinion, carriers are a useful option. However given the resources available, and likely to be available, they're an expensive distraction.

Why do you think NATO considers the carrier to be of extreme importance and aside from Britain, France, Italy, and Spain all have a carrier capability? Could it be that the carrier is particularly suited to the geography of the Euro-Atlantic? For example, how else would you intercept a potentially hostile aircraft at a range of several hundred miles AND carry enough ASW helicopters for constant ASW operations?

[Asturias56]

"Why do you think NATO considers the carrier to be of extreme importance and aside from Britain, France, Italy, and Spain all have a carrier capability?"

Possibly because the Americans provide all of it for free? The UK has 2 small unreliable carriers that have a handful of jets (and a promise of two squadrons in 18-24 months - wow!), The French have single carrier, The Italians and the Spanish have a glorified, aging helicopter carrier each - the Spanish vessel is no longer listed as an Aircraft Carrier but as an assault ship. The rest of NATO doesn't bother

All together they have less , a lot less, capability of a single US carrier

[Not_a_boffin]

Originally Posted by Asturias56

"Why do you think NATO considers the carrier to be of extreme importance and aside from Britain, France, Italy, and Spain all have a carrier capability?"

Possibly because the Americans provide all of it for free?

By that logic, NATO doesn't need to provide anything.......

[Asturias56]

Well the Poles and the Germans provide the battlefield after all

[pr00ne]

Originally Posted by Asturias56

"Why do you think NATO considers the carrier to be of extreme importance and aside from Britain, France, Italy, and Spain all have a carrier capability?"

Possibly because the Americans provide all of it for free? The UK has 2 small unreliable carriers that have a handful of jets (and a promise of two squadrons in 18-24 months - wow!), The French have single carrier, The Italians and the Spanish have a glorified, aging helicopter carrier each - the Spanish vessel is no longer listed as an Aircraft Carrier but as an assault ship. The rest of NATO doesn't bother

All together they have less , a lot less, capability of a single US carrier

Small? SMALL?? At over 65,000 tons and the largest vessels ever to enter RN service you have a very strange idea of size…

[Asturias56]

I was thinking of the number of aircraft they operate compared to a proper carrier -

[Not_a_boffin]

Originally Posted by Asturias56

I was thinking of the number of aircraft they operate compared to a proper carrier -

Once the F35 force has built up - and no I won't defend the speed of that - then there will be enough for what they're supposed to do. One of the reasons they are the size they are is that smaller ones and penny packets of aircraft don't pass the capability test.

It's also worth noting that were one to do a comparison of manpower needed per sortie generated (and indeed equate that to cost), then QEC would be significantly more efficient than a CVN.....

[Biggus]

The UK F-35 fleet is triple, or even quadruple hatted, in terms of meeting UK defence missions in time of war.

So, even if we do get the full 138 order, which I personally very much doubt, I don't think we will often see a sizable chunk of the UK fleet on board a carrier, apart from major exercises planned several years in advance.

[Asturias56]

Originally Posted by Biggus

The UK F-35 fleet is triple, or even quadruple hatted, in terms of meeting UK defence missions in time of war.

So, even if we do get the full 138 order, which I personally very much doubt, I don't think we will often see a sizable chunk of the UK fleet on board a carrier, apart from major exercises planned several years in advance.

from
:-HoC Defence Committe Report. First Report - Ready for War? - 4th Feb 2024

59. Professor Justin Bronk also raised the issue of F-35 fleet size, describing the F-35 force as “triple or quadruple-hatted in terms of how many parts of UK defence are counting on it for how many mission outputs in the case of a war [and] … there are not very many of them.

[ORAC]

Well at least we don’t have squadrons earmarked to chop to SACLANT any more….

[ORAC]

https://www.navylookout.com/rapid-re...-short-notice/

Rapid response – HMS Prince of Wales sails to replace her sister ship at short notice

Just a week after HMS Queen Elizabeth was withdrawn from exercise Steadfast Defender due to a defect, HMS Prince of Wales will sail on 10th February as her replacement (subject to the usual caveats about weather conditions).

This represents a staggering effort by the ship’s company and the support team in Portsmouth. PWLS was at 30 days’ notice to sail but has been prepared to sail in 7 days. Last weekend PWLS was just beginning a planned maintenance period and among other projects, her flight deck was covered in tents and scaffolding in preparation for work to start on reapplying CAMREX (non-skid paint) and heat-resistant coatings (TMS – Thermal Metallic Spray) to the flight deck.….

Until now PWLS has only embarked two F-35 jets and although many rotary wing types have also been handled onboard, these were mostly for flying trials evolutions. She has never before hosted an air group and the full complement of COMUKCSG battle staff.

Embarking the air group involves taking on another 5-600 people in addition to the core ship’s company, all of which have to be safely delivered to the ship, integrated into life on board and produce effective operational outputs.

A major logistic effort is required to store ship with assorted equipment to support the air group as well as the additional food and other items transferred from QNLZ to PWLS….

As the high readiness carrier, QNLZ had an almost full load of air weapons, although this was due to be further enhanced by her 4th visit to the Northern Ammunition Jetty at Glen Mallan for another on-load before STDE24. Instead, PWLS is expected to visit Glen Mallan soon for the first time to fill her largely empty magazines while QNLZ follows later to conduct an off-load prior to docking in Rosyth.

The Phalanx Close-In Weapons Systems (CIWS) were removed from PWLS while she was being repaired in Rosyth but were not replaced as she was heading to the Eastern Seaboard of the US where there is no perceived air threat.

While it may make sense for a navy short of sailors to save the need for a few weapon maintainers, this kind of practice perhaps demonstrates a peacetime mentality where the focus is the next deployment in the programme rather than a mindset that is prepared for the unexpected.

Unsurprisingly there has not been time in the last week to re-embark the 3 Phalanx mounts, set to work, certify and test them…..

[Asturias56]

so they have to go to Scotland every time the plans change? This is madness - tho it probably sounds great to the Treasury

I despair - I'm not a carrier fan but if we're going to have them surely we can afford a few more CIWS? The carriers cost billions

[GeeRam]

I was more astonished to see that POW was needing to have the decks re-done so soon after barely operating any F-35's let alone ever a full air-wing......!
How long would the deck last if she ever had to operate a full air-wing (if we ever have enough jets to do so) for an extended tour...or a combat tour?