At the risk of prolixity I will throw in another few penn'orth on why the UK carriers are IMO a good thing and why more money needs to be spend on equipping them with the range of tools they need. I accept there are some who will never be convinced it's money well spent.
Among other things having aircraft carriers enables the UK to:
- Project hard power globally especially in areas where permission to use land bases isn't forthcoming or is conditional. This applies both to airpower and the delivery of land forces .
- There are strong arguments that in the current geopolitical climate WEBF's Sea Control mission is as important today as it was 50 years ago and not just in the North Atlantic.
- An independent carrier force provides influence with US politicians as it shows that at least one European country is prepared to put money in forces that can be effective outside the continent.
- Project soft power
- Leverage the development of UCAVs, USuVs, and UUVs to use them effectively away from fixed bases.
It is perhaps instructive that the most visible demonstration of China's strategy since the beginning of the Century has been a concentration on Sea Control as it pushes to displace its neighbours from their legitimate interests in the South China Sea and beyond. It is only by the US, UK and others demonstrating their own Sea Control abilities that it can be opposed peacefully.
A few illustrative quotes.
For the British governments that decided to build the new carriers, the first straw in the wind was probably the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operation against Serbia in the late 1990s. NATO had a massive land-based air force operating from nearby bases in Italy. Yet the two small Invincible-class carriers HMS Invincible and HMS Ark Royal regularly generated more sorties—and had more impact—than all the land-based aircraft.
(...)
What the carriers and amphibious ships mean for the United Kingdom is that it can—when needed—operate independently. British national interests may demand that independence. Britain’s view of what matters abroad at times will differ from that of its allies. The ability to operate independently may generate desired support from other countries, including the United States. Without it, Britain’s pursuit of national interests overseas is limited and will depend on the permission and assistance of others.
Most of the world’s population lives and works not far from the ocean, on which most global commerce moves. The U.S. Navy’s post-Cold War littoral strategy was based on those facts and is still valid today. Great Britain let its navy—especially its power projection capability—atrophy after the Cold War. The addition of the Queen Elizabeth and Prince of Wales—armed with F-35B fighters—marks an important milestone in the return of the Royal Navy and its ability to project British national resolve.
from British Aircraft Carriers Return - Norman Friedman USNI Proceeedings Vol. 143/8/1,374 August 2017
The oceans are the “high ground of the global system,” and the ability to control them confers unparalleled advantage. Command of the sea allows a nation’s ships, goods, commerce, and military forces to move around the globe at will. Without the ability to fight for sea control, nations are relegated to “a passive role” and become “consumers” of the global order rather than drivers of it.
(...)
It is clear sea control and command of the sea remain decisively important. They should become the foundation of a new, comprehensive naval strategy articulating how the nation and its allies will secure freedom of navigation, further the nation’s strategic goals, and aid the spread of liberal democratic ideas. They have served this purpose before. They should do so again.
from Sea Control and Command of the Sea Remain Essential - Trent Hone USNI Proceedings Vol. 147/11/1,425 November 2021