Originally Posted by
Gordon Brown
What is the point of these floating cocktail parties? Do you think LM would let us trade the Daves in for A-models?
MARITIME OPERATING CONCEPT - THE MARITIME FORCE CONTRIBUTION TO THE INTEGRATED OPERATING CONCEPT
Under section 5 - Force Level Outputs - page 50
The Maritime Force will be organised around four Force Level Outputs: Homeland and Operational Advantage in the North Atlantic; Persistent Engagement; Carrier Strike; Littoral Strike
Homeland and Operational Advantage in the North Atlantic - page 52
An integrated Maritime Force, with NATO at its heart, protecting our homeland and our allies. Homeland Defence/Warfighting. Includes the attribution of CASD, Carrier Strike, and Littoral Strike capabilities (LRG(N)) to NATO as a pillar of Defence and Deterrence in the Euro Atlantic; seeks a more assertive posture which regains operational advantage.
Key outcomes:
• Protection of strategic interests and CNI, including Maritime Counter Terrorism and Maritime Security in the UK’s TTW and EEZ.
• Ensure freedom of manoeuvre in the North Atlantic.
• Maintain CASD for UK and NATO.
• Lead nation in NATO MARCOM.
Carrier Strike - page 54
The heart of the Maritime Force’s – and NATO’s – warfighting capability Built around the Queen Elizabeth Class Aircraft Carriers. Carrier Strike: Homeland Defence/Contingency/ Warfighting. Contribute to OANA. Through deployments to strategic locations across the globe, promote UK interests, deter adversaries and prevent conflict.
• Project decisive air power from a protected maritime task group, including gaining and retaining the necessary degree of sea control to ensure Freedom of Manoeuvre.
• Demonstrate Global Britain, with regular deployments openly demonstrating British will to engage and resolve to act.
• Contribute to UK/NATO warfighting capability, as a more lethal and more integrated Maritime Force.
• Enable and execute Special Operations.
The Sea Control role(s) of the carrier is discussed at length in various places, such as this thread from elsewhere:
1977 US Congress Report: The US Sea Control Mission (carriers needed in the Atlantic for Air Defence and ASW - due to Maths/Physics/Geography)
Two major conclusions can be reached:
A. Sea Control (ASW, air defence/AAW, and anti surface warfare) is a major mission for the carrier and the carrier group. It was during the Second World War and the Cold War, and it is again now in a renewed era of peer adversaries and contested seas.
B. Sea Control is difficult to achieve without carrier aviation. Geography, Mathematics, and Physics show that attacking aircraft are best dealt with using fighters to kill the archers, not the arrows, and that the best chance of stopping anti ship missiles is to engage the launch platform. Similarly constant helicopter ASW operations are best supported by a big deck with multiple helicopters, and Physics shows that modern long range sonars need to work in conjunction with dipping sonar to achieve their potential - and vice versa.
This 1976 film from the IWM Collections is also very interesting: THE ROYAL NAVY AND THE SOVIET THREAT
This was made for the consumption of the British public, although sadly it appears just a few years defence later was being run by politicians who seem to have missed it. It covers the dependence of the UK and Europe on seaborne commerce, and the growing threat posed by the Soviet Navy and the Soviet Naval Air Force.
At approximately 11.00 the coverage of RN (and RM and RAF) capabilities starts. At 14.00 HMS Ark Royal (IV) gets a mention as making an important contribution to NATO - something forgotten about during the carrier related discussions in the early 1960s. At 15.00 her embarked squadron of ASW Sea Kings is mentioned in terms of providing an essential element in the anti submarine warfare defence of the force. None of this nonsense about (just) defending the carrier.
At 22.35 we get told about 'the most important surface ship of the future' - the 'anti submarine cruiser'. The point is made that a carrier provides easily the most cost effective means of deploying large anti submarine helicopters to sea in worthwhile numbers as well as command facilities for a task group. From 24.15 the presenter mentions that these ships will carry the Sea Harrier to supplement land based air cover for the fleet outside the range of shore bases and mentions dealing with shadowing aircraft used by the Soviets for targeting long range missiles.
Two declassified training films are also interesting:
MATCH ATTACK - 1976
Navy Instructional film on the role of the Medium-range Anti-submarine Torpedo Carrying Helicopter (MATCH) in co-ordinated anti-submarine warfare (ASW) operations. The film uses stock footage of German U-boat attacks on allied convoys during the Battle of the Atlantic, and various shots of Soviet submarines, to emphasise the importance of ASW. A Royal Navy Wasp helicopter, launched from the Leander Class frigate HMS Achilles (F.12) then carries out an attack on a submarine using air-dropped torpedoes, with direction from the parent ship's operations room, including computer plotting. The Wasp is then re-armed and scrambled to make another attack. The roles of the RAF's Nimrod long-range maritime patrol aircraft and the dipping-sonar equipped Sea King helicopter* are also described.
*At 14.02 and 14.50.
PRINCIPLES OF ANTI-AIR WARFARE - 1977
Navy Instructional film giving an overview of the threat to NATO warships from Soviet missiles and aircraft, with reference to the situation in the North Sea and Atlantic Ocean. The film briefly covers electronic warfare, countermeasures, the use of radar pickets and reconnaissance. Numerous photos and film of NATO and Soviet ships and aircraft are shown, including F4 Phantoms launching missiles and taking off from the Audacious Class aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal (R.09), shots of F14 and Harrier jets, various shots of missiles on the launcher and in flight, Tupolev-95 'Bear' reconnaissance aircraft and Tupolev-16 'Badger' bombers.
I have to wonder why the staff officers who did the staff work to justify new carriers in the early 1960s managed to ignore the experience of the Second World War and the Royal Navy's NATO roles - which included using carriers to fend off the Russian aircraft and submarines. Why not ignore the main effort - what could go wrong?
At 06.40 in the film mention is made of Airborne Early Warning, including the US Navy's E-2 Hawkeye. It would take the loss of HMS Sheffield on 4 May 1982 to get the politicians to agree to fund our own AEW Sea King. There is a 1970s film made by what was then Grumman Aerospace Corporation about the Hawkeye and the fairly senior USN Officers describe in terms of dealing with the challenge at sea.
At 09.15 fighters aircraft get a mention - the last RN Phantoms, the Sea Harrier (did any exist in 1977?) and the USN F-14 Tomcat. They, so the narrator states, can intercept reconnaissance aircraft, can splash missile carrying aircraft. and can engage missiles. Obviously not with the Sidewinder - what that the reason they thought the Sea Harrier needed Sparrow?
It seems that we have to learn the same lessons again and again. Why? The same Mathematics, Physics, and Geography that was relevant to ASW and AAW in 1974 and 1977 is still relevant now.