Future Carrier (Including Costs)
A letter writer in today's Times is calling for a third carrier so we always have one available
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/babc...s-small-as-50/
Babcock plans next-gen frigates with crews as small as 50
Babcock has announced its plans for the Type 32 frigates, which could see the vessels operated with crews as small as 50 sailors.
In a detailed discussion with The Telegraph, John Howie, Babcock’s Chief of Corporate Affairs, shed light on the potential that recent technological advancements hold for reducing the necessary crew size on naval ships.
“People talk about a Type 32 frigate – we like to refer to it as Type 31 batch two. We’re doing a crew of about 105 on Type 31, so realistically we should be aiming to half that number for batch two,” Howie explained….
By significantly reducing the crew size from the current requirement of approximately 105 sailors on the Type 31 frigates, Babcock seems to be recognising that the Royal Navy can no longer jam ships full of people and that recruitment is an issue.
Howie also noted the possibility of further reducing the crew numbers below 50, although he acknowledged the importance of maintaining safety and operational integrity.
Babcock plans next-gen frigates with crews as small as 50
Babcock has announced its plans for the Type 32 frigates, which could see the vessels operated with crews as small as 50 sailors.
In a detailed discussion with The Telegraph, John Howie, Babcock’s Chief of Corporate Affairs, shed light on the potential that recent technological advancements hold for reducing the necessary crew size on naval ships.
“People talk about a Type 32 frigate – we like to refer to it as Type 31 batch two. We’re doing a crew of about 105 on Type 31, so realistically we should be aiming to half that number for batch two,” Howie explained….
By significantly reducing the crew size from the current requirement of approximately 105 sailors on the Type 31 frigates, Babcock seems to be recognising that the Royal Navy can no longer jam ships full of people and that recruitment is an issue.
Howie also noted the possibility of further reducing the crew numbers below 50, although he acknowledged the importance of maintaining safety and operational integrity.
According to Wiki, the '97 Defence Review - which was the initial driver for procurement concluded:-
""the emphasis is now on increased offensive airpower, and an ability to operate the largest possible range of aircraft in the widest possible range of roles. When the current carrier force reaches the end of its planned life, we plan to replace it with two larger vessels. Work will now begin to refine our requirements but present thinking suggests that they might be of the order of 30,000–40,000 tonnes and capable of deploying up to 50 aircraft, including helicopters"
I have a very vague recollection that two was partly driven by the issues the French were clearly about to have with the Charles de Gaulle - which was laid down in '89 - which was planned to have a 12-15 month refueling/refit every 6-7 years. Not only did you lose the carrier capability for a long time you also lost time in working up the crew again after the refit.
1)Asturias, that'll be the same review that suggested 32 Escorts, 10 SSNs and 22 MCMVs? Oh, and the carriers were to be supplemented by an LPH (the former HMS Ocean) and 2 LPDs. I suspect two not three was driven by (possibly the expectation of) what the bean counters in the House of Darkness would agree to. They were also expected to be 30-40,000 tonnes and have a complement of 50 aircraft. I would have thought in their heart of hearts their then Lordships would have liked to see if not a return to the planned four carrier navy of which CVA01 and her sisters were to form part then three as a minimum. The review foresaw the possibility of simultaneous and prolonged operations - it didn't answer how these could be supported for a sustained period with only two carriers if they were required to support both.
If only subsequent reviews had been as (mostly) sensible and comprehensive. It's worth re-reading some of it.
2) A crew of 50 (presumably 'core crew' i.e. supplemented by specialists for the 'autonomous systems' or a crewed aerial vehicle) is all fine and dandy but when spread across Cruising or Defence watchbills how will it be sustained? There is research that suggests a three watch system is the most sustainable for crew effectiveness and, physical and mental health.
If only subsequent reviews had been as (mostly) sensible and comprehensive. It's worth re-reading some of it.
6. In the post Cold War world, we must be prepared to go to the crisis, rather than have the crisis come to us. So we plan to buy two new larger aircraft carriers to project power more
flexibly around the world. New transport aircraft and ships will move our people and equipment rapidly to troublespots.
7. If we ask our forces to fight, we must be sure they will win. That means we must correct the deep-seated problems we inherited from the previous government, most obviously in the medical and logistics areas, to ensure that our forces are properly supported. Past cuts in support have been presented as "trimming the tail without blunting the teeth". The reality is that logistic support is the life-blood of the forces, and we must ensure that our forces get the back up they need.
8. At the same time we must focus our effort on the capabilities we need to be successful today. That will mean reductions in some areas which were needed primarily to meet Cold War threats. So we will place somewhat less emphasis on open ocean anti-submarine warfare and have fewer tanks and fast jets in the front line
(...)
11. It would be as wrong to take military success for granted in this new environment as it would have been during the Cold War. We have therefore taken a hard look at the capabilities of today's Armed Forces. The so-called 'peace dividend' from the ending of the Cold War has already been taken. Since 1990, defence expenditure has fallen by some 23% in real terms and our forces have been cut by nearly a third. Yet over this period we have faced a series of new and largely unexpected operational challenges. Our Armed Forces have responded outstandingly but they face serious problems that carry increasing risks in relation to the changed pattern of operations. There are personnel shortages in important areas, which with the high level of operational commitments are creating excessive and unsustainable pressures on many of our people. Other areas of weakness include the extent of our rapid deploymentcapabilities and our ability to sustain and support overseas operations, including medical support.
(...)
58. Apart from scale, however, the new international environment is in many ways more demanding. Undertaking smaller but frequent, often simultaneous and sometimes prolonged operations can be more difficult than preparing for a single worst-case conflict. During the 1990s, we have deployed or been prepared to deploy forces on a wide range of operations at various levels, in addition to maintaining our day-to-day responsibilities. Against the security priorities described earlier we can expect this trend to continue. There is a new emphasis on defence diplomacy and on the use of armed forces to support diplomacy in efforts to deter or manage crises, from humanitarian missions to UN embargoes and peacekeeping. Crises often occur with little warning and we need to be able to respond rapidly. In order to deter, and where deterrence fails, we must maintain forces which can be successful in conventional warfighting. Indeed most of the military capabilities required are equally valuable in support of the wider range of tasks we now face. All this places a premium on the flexibility and usability of the Armed Forces in the modern world.
59. We could of course, as a country, choose to take a narrow view of our role and responsibilities which did not require a significant military capability. This would mean that we would not wish and would not be able to contribute effectively to resolving crises such as Bosnia, Kosovo, or the invasion of Kuwait. This is indeed a real choice, but not one the Government could recommend for Britain.
flexibly around the world. New transport aircraft and ships will move our people and equipment rapidly to troublespots.
7. If we ask our forces to fight, we must be sure they will win. That means we must correct the deep-seated problems we inherited from the previous government, most obviously in the medical and logistics areas, to ensure that our forces are properly supported. Past cuts in support have been presented as "trimming the tail without blunting the teeth". The reality is that logistic support is the life-blood of the forces, and we must ensure that our forces get the back up they need.
8. At the same time we must focus our effort on the capabilities we need to be successful today. That will mean reductions in some areas which were needed primarily to meet Cold War threats. So we will place somewhat less emphasis on open ocean anti-submarine warfare and have fewer tanks and fast jets in the front line
(...)
11. It would be as wrong to take military success for granted in this new environment as it would have been during the Cold War. We have therefore taken a hard look at the capabilities of today's Armed Forces. The so-called 'peace dividend' from the ending of the Cold War has already been taken. Since 1990, defence expenditure has fallen by some 23% in real terms and our forces have been cut by nearly a third. Yet over this period we have faced a series of new and largely unexpected operational challenges. Our Armed Forces have responded outstandingly but they face serious problems that carry increasing risks in relation to the changed pattern of operations. There are personnel shortages in important areas, which with the high level of operational commitments are creating excessive and unsustainable pressures on many of our people. Other areas of weakness include the extent of our rapid deploymentcapabilities and our ability to sustain and support overseas operations, including medical support.
(...)
58. Apart from scale, however, the new international environment is in many ways more demanding. Undertaking smaller but frequent, often simultaneous and sometimes prolonged operations can be more difficult than preparing for a single worst-case conflict. During the 1990s, we have deployed or been prepared to deploy forces on a wide range of operations at various levels, in addition to maintaining our day-to-day responsibilities. Against the security priorities described earlier we can expect this trend to continue. There is a new emphasis on defence diplomacy and on the use of armed forces to support diplomacy in efforts to deter or manage crises, from humanitarian missions to UN embargoes and peacekeeping. Crises often occur with little warning and we need to be able to respond rapidly. In order to deter, and where deterrence fails, we must maintain forces which can be successful in conventional warfighting. Indeed most of the military capabilities required are equally valuable in support of the wider range of tasks we now face. All this places a premium on the flexibility and usability of the Armed Forces in the modern world.
59. We could of course, as a country, choose to take a narrow view of our role and responsibilities which did not require a significant military capability. This would mean that we would not wish and would not be able to contribute effectively to resolving crises such as Bosnia, Kosovo, or the invasion of Kuwait. This is indeed a real choice, but not one the Government could recommend for Britain.
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I have a very vague recollection that two was partly driven by the issues the French were clearly about to have with the Charles de Gaulle - which was laid down in '89 - which was planned to have a 12-15 month refueling/refit every 6-7 years. Not only did you lose the carrier capability for a long time you also lost time in working up the crew again after the refit.
"then Lordships would have liked to see if not a return to the planned four carrier navy of which CVA01 and her sisters were to form part "
That died in 1963 when they announced they were building only one (which they didn't) - and that is 60 years ago
60 years before that we were planning the "Dreadnought"
That died in 1963 when they announced they were building only one (which they didn't) - and that is 60 years ago
60 years before that we were planning the "Dreadnought"
True but Thorneycroft announced CVA-01 would be part of a three carrier navy. Jock Slater was Lt J C K Slater RN in 1963, Michael Boyce started at BRNC in 1961 so was a Mid/Actg Sub Lt., they at least were serving officers when the decision was taken.
In the same debate the ex-beachmaster said
It may have been have been 60 years ago but history has a habit of repeating itself, giving the opportunity for better decisions to be taken. The replacements for Hermes and Victorious Eagle were clearly to have been 'when circumstances allow'.
This was all predicated on a P1154 based supersonic V/STOL aircraft being available - taken 60 years to fill a similar requirement.
The life of H.M.S. "Eagle" and H.M.S. "Hermes" can with refits be extended until about 1980. H.M.S. "Victorious" and H.M.S. "Ark Royal" will come to the end of their useful lives in the early 1970s. A decision has, therefore, been taken to build one carrier replacement. This ship will be of around 50,000 tons and will give us, with H.M.S. "Eagle" and "Hermes", a force of three carriers. This decision will ensure that the Fleet Air Arm can maintain its rôle at least until 1980.
(...)
The all-up cost of the aircraft carrier is about £60 million, which will be spent over eight to ten years. The hon. Member asked about other aircraft carriers. The conclusion which we have reached is that we should go for an aircraft carrier fleet of three carriers, which will be composed, at least until 1980—when the "Ark Royal" and the "Victorious" go out—of the "Hermes" and the "Eagle". Whether a replacement of the "Eagle" and the "Hermes" will be made during the 1970s is a matter which will fall to be considered at that date.
(...)
The all-up cost of the aircraft carrier is about £60 million, which will be spent over eight to ten years. The hon. Member asked about other aircraft carriers. The conclusion which we have reached is that we should go for an aircraft carrier fleet of three carriers, which will be composed, at least until 1980—when the "Ark Royal" and the "Victorious" go out—of the "Hermes" and the "Eagle". Whether a replacement of the "Eagle" and the "Hermes" will be made during the 1970s is a matter which will fall to be considered at that date.
On the question of the new aircraft, we are delighted that, for the first time almost in post-war history, the R.A.F. and the Royal Navy have been able to agree on the characteristics of an aircraft. Would he give some idea of the number of aircraft of this type which he proposes to order and what the total cost is likely to be?
This was all predicated on a P1154 based supersonic V/STOL aircraft being available - taken 60 years to fill a similar requirement.
Last edited by SLXOwft; 16th Feb 2024 at 13:10. Reason: correction from V to E
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" but history has a habit of repeating itself,"
I'm afraid the bit of history which is repeating is the chronic lack of cash for defence
Looking back it's hard to see a decision on UK military matters that wasn't mainly budget driven after 1952
I'm afraid the bit of history which is repeating is the chronic lack of cash for defence
Looking back it's hard to see a decision on UK military matters that wasn't mainly budget driven after 1952
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It was always a trade off between defined military need and Treasury. Some very clever and devoted Defence staff just about won enough, but by Christmas 1914 the army was in a desperate manpower state.
For ever ............
"but by Christmas 1914 the army was in a desperate manpower state."
Yup -my grandfather rejoined the Coldstream's at the age of 33 ( that's about equivalent to 50 today) in Aug '14 - he'd done over 10 years full time back in the 1900's so was fully trained etc etc . On the 29th Oct 1/Coldstream's had been reduced to the Quartermaster (a Lieutenant) and 80 OR at Ypres. He was in the first set of reinforcements - circa 116 men and 2 officers - on the 31st. They lost 50% of the men 2 days later in a German attack. He lasted a month before being wounded - went back, gassed in 1915 and saw most of the war out in a training battalion.
Yup -my grandfather rejoined the Coldstream's at the age of 33 ( that's about equivalent to 50 today) in Aug '14 - he'd done over 10 years full time back in the 1900's so was fully trained etc etc . On the 29th Oct 1/Coldstream's had been reduced to the Quartermaster (a Lieutenant) and 80 OR at Ypres. He was in the first set of reinforcements - circa 116 men and 2 officers - on the 31st. They lost 50% of the men 2 days later in a German attack. He lasted a month before being wounded - went back, gassed in 1915 and saw most of the war out in a training battalion.
"but by Christmas 1914 the army was in a desperate manpower state."
Yup -my grandfather rejoined the Coldstream's at the age of 33 ( that's about equivalent to 50 today) in Aug '14 - he'd done over 10 years full time back in the 1900's so was fully trained etc etc . On the 29th Oct 1/Coldstream's had been reduced to the Quartermaster (a Lieutenant) and 80 OR at Ypres. He was in the first set of reinforcements - circa 116 men and 2 officers - on the 31st. They lost 50% of the men 2 days later in a German attack. He lasted a month before being wounded - went back, gassed in 1915 and saw most of the war out in a training battalion.
Yup -my grandfather rejoined the Coldstream's at the age of 33 ( that's about equivalent to 50 today) in Aug '14 - he'd done over 10 years full time back in the 1900's so was fully trained etc etc . On the 29th Oct 1/Coldstream's had been reduced to the Quartermaster (a Lieutenant) and 80 OR at Ypres. He was in the first set of reinforcements - circa 116 men and 2 officers - on the 31st. They lost 50% of the men 2 days later in a German attack. He lasted a month before being wounded - went back, gassed in 1915 and saw most of the war out in a training battalion.
Deployed on a forward slope, what would Wellington have said. Had the government not disbanded his Peninsular Army (as an 1814 peace dividend) he would have adopted an agressive strategy in 1815. Not the defensive campaign culminating in Waterloo with an.army consisting of large numbers of raw recruits and troops returing from the War of 1812 many of whom were probably originally intended for demobing. His low country allies suffered heavy casualties from artillery deploying on a forward slope not the reverse slope he intended them to.
Back to the 21st century.
Italian carrier Giuseppe Garibaldi tied up on the Victoria Jetty vacated by POW on the 15th; followed by the through deck LPD San Giorgio on the 16th, which is now berthed against North West Wall, presumably both participants in the Maritime Command Livex or another element on Steadfast Defender 2024. (For those wishing overt aviation content there is currently an EH-101 on GG's deck.)
Back to the 21st century.
Italian carrier Giuseppe Garibaldi tied up on the Victoria Jetty vacated by POW on the 15th; followed by the through deck LPD San Giorgio on the 16th, which is now berthed against North West Wall, presumably both participants in the Maritime Command Livex or another element on Steadfast Defender 2024. (For those wishing overt aviation content there is currently an EH-101 on GG's deck.)
At the risk of 'incoming' does the success of Ukraine's drones against Russian ships not render these large assets as hostages to fortune ? Especially if we cannot support them with the requisite number of 'bodyguards' .
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Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
RAF Chinook delivers engineers and support staff of 617 Squadron to @HMSPWLS in preparation for receiving F-35 Jets.
https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/babc...s-small-as-50/
Babcock plans next-gen frigates with crews as small as 50
Babcock has announced its plans for the Type 32 frigates, which could see the vessels operated with crews as small as 50 sailors.
In a detailed discussion with The Telegraph, John Howie, Babcock’s Chief of Corporate Affairs, shed light on the potential that recent technological advancements hold for reducing the necessary crew size on naval ships.
“People talk about a Type 32 frigate – we like to refer to it as Type 31 batch two. We’re doing a crew of about 105 on Type 31, so realistically we should be aiming to half that number for batch two,” Howie explained….
By significantly reducing the crew size from the current requirement of approximately 105 sailors on the Type 31 frigates, Babcock seems to be recognising that the Royal Navy can no longer jam ships full of people and that recruitment is an issue.
Howie also noted the possibility of further reducing the crew numbers below 50, although he acknowledged the importance of maintaining safety and operational integrity.
Babcock plans next-gen frigates with crews as small as 50
Babcock has announced its plans for the Type 32 frigates, which could see the vessels operated with crews as small as 50 sailors.
In a detailed discussion with The Telegraph, John Howie, Babcock’s Chief of Corporate Affairs, shed light on the potential that recent technological advancements hold for reducing the necessary crew size on naval ships.
“People talk about a Type 32 frigate – we like to refer to it as Type 31 batch two. We’re doing a crew of about 105 on Type 31, so realistically we should be aiming to half that number for batch two,” Howie explained….
By significantly reducing the crew size from the current requirement of approximately 105 sailors on the Type 31 frigates, Babcock seems to be recognising that the Royal Navy can no longer jam ships full of people and that recruitment is an issue.
Howie also noted the possibility of further reducing the crew numbers below 50, although he acknowledged the importance of maintaining safety and operational integrity.
Autonomous systems are great, but cannot completely replace people.
Re the Chinook - a quick off-thread question: what are the requirements for lashing a heli on-deck prior to offloading pax?
I ask because - after the farce where an inexperienced-on-type Sqn Ldr tried lifting the back end of Invincible when he 'forgot' to do the after-landing checks prior to waving in the lashing party (AFCS - 'OFF') - we would have a non-stop badgering from FLYCO on every arrival about checks. I understand their point, as it was only the quick thinking of the No.1 crewman that saved at least one life. As for the now-potentially-damaged Chinook: where would you choose to divert if you were 12nm or so away from West Freugh? That's right - a farmer's field in N Ireland... couldn't make it up.
I ask because - after the farce where an inexperienced-on-type Sqn Ldr tried lifting the back end of Invincible when he 'forgot' to do the after-landing checks prior to waving in the lashing party (AFCS - 'OFF') - we would have a non-stop badgering from FLYCO on every arrival about checks. I understand their point, as it was only the quick thinking of the No.1 crewman that saved at least one life. As for the now-potentially-damaged Chinook: where would you choose to divert if you were 12nm or so away from West Freugh? That's right - a farmer's field in N Ireland... couldn't make it up.
It wont work, LCS tried it permanent crew of 40 plus up to 30 mission specialists if required, Turned out it wont work so they went to crew of 70, that number 70-100 is the lower level for these sized ships which practicalities will prevent going below
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Not only are there fishead watchkeeping ( OOD and PWO ) considerations to add to the DC and cleaning task there is also a service wide need to have enough sea-going billets to produce both Senior Rates and mid-seniority officers. Where will MEO, WEO and their Chief Tiffs come from if there are no sea billets for A M/W EO (D M/W EO idc)?
With 50 ish bodies, and allowing for some dayworkers, you have about 14 or 15 watchkeepers, of all trades, in a 3 watch system and 20 ish if the ship is in permanent Defence Watches.
Babcock are dreaming.
N
With 50 ish bodies, and allowing for some dayworkers, you have about 14 or 15 watchkeepers, of all trades, in a 3 watch system and 20 ish if the ship is in permanent Defence Watches.
Babcock are dreaming.
N
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