UPS cargo crash near Birmingham AL
Join Date: Mar 2008
Location: Western USA
Posts: 555
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Willow Run 6-3:
Questions: does NTSB have some review process by which it goes to (for example) ALPA with the results of its investigation, before preparing its report, and ask whether such a representative of pilots would add any other data or tests? Does NTSB vet an outline of its proposed analytic framework for identifying probable cause? Does it circulate a draft report to anyone outside the agency for comment before making and declaring it final?
Questions: does NTSB have some review process by which it goes to (for example) ALPA with the results of its investigation, before preparing its report, and ask whether such a representative of pilots would add any other data or tests? Does NTSB vet an outline of its proposed analytic framework for identifying probable cause? Does it circulate a draft report to anyone outside the agency for comment before making and declaring it final?
Join Date: Jun 2011
Location: france
Posts: 760
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Edit : Approach charts with missing FAF F-GGED BEA report!
Originally Posted by roulishollandais
Since they built continuous descent approaches they suppressed both the notion of the limits and the table, and sometimes worth: the FAF ! (LFST VOR-DME 05, AIR INTER 20. JAN 1990). But sold aircrafts with such commercial lies.
Edit :
DELETE that quotation :
Surprise : Today these two charts have been removed from the official BEA Report on the BEA site !!!
Limiting the responsability of the airlines who keep the income of money when selling tickets, and insurance paying alone and not very much (10,000$/Asiana's victims in SFO!) does no more help Air Safety. Crashes get an interesting industry.
Machinbird was right to near-suffocate at the price of the book, really undecent.
Airlines and their Leasing Associates in dirty money, must pay the true price of the crashes. So long it will not be the case, airlines will not do what it is needed to do not let the same wrong method leading to the next and next and next crashes.
Last edited by Jetdriver; 25th Aug 2013 at 20:15.
Join Date: Jul 2013
Location: Within AM radio broadcast range of downtown Chicago
Age: 71
Posts: 846
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Investigation, cont'd
@Desert185
I get that the union has its own investigatory team and that their effort is part of or co-ordinated with NTSB. And also that NTSB in general is very thorough. And while I truly appreciate the comtent of your post, yours did not answer a key part of my inquiries. Please allow me to clarify: I'm starting from a premise about the Quality, writ large, of the cumulative posts here. The content in-thread has: (1) depth (in the sense of sharp focus on detail and thoroughness so as to be comprehensive on any given substantive point);
(2) scope (in the sense of including all (or substantially all) the subject matters that make up the factual picture of this crash, and all the analytic or operational matters as well);
(3) veteran aviator perspective earned through vast accumulations of flight and PIC hours; and
(4) a robust give-and-take which demands participants to think before they post but then also -and this is key - continue thinking as the thread is spun.
If it is valid to say the Quality - again, writ large - of this thread would earn it placement at, say, the Ph.D. level at some hypothetical Naval War College program on administration of a CAA/safety regulation of civil aeronautics, then how would the NTSB investigation-in-fact compare? Is it "Ph.D." Quality? Perhaps even better? Or still slogging it out for a Master's?
I have my own opinion, and since it is an unqualified one, I'm refraining from expressing it expressly, though its veil is rather thin.
I get that the union has its own investigatory team and that their effort is part of or co-ordinated with NTSB. And also that NTSB in general is very thorough. And while I truly appreciate the comtent of your post, yours did not answer a key part of my inquiries. Please allow me to clarify: I'm starting from a premise about the Quality, writ large, of the cumulative posts here. The content in-thread has: (1) depth (in the sense of sharp focus on detail and thoroughness so as to be comprehensive on any given substantive point);
(2) scope (in the sense of including all (or substantially all) the subject matters that make up the factual picture of this crash, and all the analytic or operational matters as well);
(3) veteran aviator perspective earned through vast accumulations of flight and PIC hours; and
(4) a robust give-and-take which demands participants to think before they post but then also -and this is key - continue thinking as the thread is spun.
If it is valid to say the Quality - again, writ large - of this thread would earn it placement at, say, the Ph.D. level at some hypothetical Naval War College program on administration of a CAA/safety regulation of civil aeronautics, then how would the NTSB investigation-in-fact compare? Is it "Ph.D." Quality? Perhaps even better? Or still slogging it out for a Master's?
I have my own opinion, and since it is an unqualified one, I'm refraining from expressing it expressly, though its veil is rather thin.
Join Date: Dec 2006
Location: Florida and wherever my laptop is
Posts: 1,350
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Coagie/Capn Bloggs
"the basic fact is they were lower than published minimums."
The crew were visual with the runway (report on the CVR). What are the 'published minimums' once visual with the runway?
As the crew were visual it is a problem of visual approaches to 18 that should be addressed, not how to fly the NPA. The NPA had 'done its job' and the crew were now runway in sight landing visually. Something, in that visual approach led them to drop significantly below the visual glide path shown by the PAPIs/Approach lights/runway lights. Should the range/altitude checks of the NPA be continued despite being visual and inside/below MDA?
Was it in response to the 'sink rate' or a range/altitude check that the reassurance was given of 'runway in sight'? If so then that is an indication of some sort of visual illusion or an unforgivingly small vertical margin for visual approaches.
Quote:
We can discuss mirages, refractions, tree heights, runway in sight call outs, etc., etc., but the basic fact is they were lower than published minimums.
I'm with you. They were way too low. I was just trying to figure out why, it seems, they were oblivious to being a couple hundred feet low.
We can discuss mirages, refractions, tree heights, runway in sight call outs, etc., etc., but the basic fact is they were lower than published minimums.
I'm with you. They were way too low. I was just trying to figure out why, it seems, they were oblivious to being a couple hundred feet low.
The crew were visual with the runway (report on the CVR). What are the 'published minimums' once visual with the runway?
As the crew were visual it is a problem of visual approaches to 18 that should be addressed, not how to fly the NPA. The NPA had 'done its job' and the crew were now runway in sight landing visually. Something, in that visual approach led them to drop significantly below the visual glide path shown by the PAPIs/Approach lights/runway lights. Should the range/altitude checks of the NPA be continued despite being visual and inside/below MDA?
Was it in response to the 'sink rate' or a range/altitude check that the reassurance was given of 'runway in sight'? If so then that is an indication of some sort of visual illusion or an unforgivingly small vertical margin for visual approaches.
Last edited by Ian W; 22nd Aug 2013 at 08:45.
Ian,
Those quotes were not mine, but to take up a couple of your points:
I'm not so sure. I don't understand why one of the pilots could be visual with the runway but fail to see the 4 reds of the PAPI, which should then illicit a startled response along the lines of "@#$% we're low!". A possibility is as mentioned previously that the caller called a road or other lights, not the runway.
There are none. It's a Visual Approach from the point you get Visual. A distance/altitude scale would be of limited value at that point because eyes would be outside, on the PAPI.
Pure conjecture, but I don't think it did. It did not leave them at the MDA on the 2 whites and 2 reds of the PAPI. If one gets Visual beforehand eg off a Dive and Drive, you'll see 4 reds; I would then hold the altitude and fly into the PAPI 2W/2R and recommence descent.
Another concern is the "Sink Rate" call. The autopilot was still engaged; if in Vertical Speed set by the PF (I'm not familiar with Airbus), that would be a rate of descent of at least 1000ft/min (the warning in my aeroplane goes off at around 1700ft/min at 500ft AGL). The terrain was undulating, which can trick the system, but nevertheless the rate of descent would seem to be on the high side to me.
The excellent (unverified) profile diagram of MM43's shows that to be the case, in my opinion. By day, you'd see the ground close-by and subconsciously not go low. By night, it'd be invisible (apart from a red light mentioned earlier?) and if the crew got low for whatever reason they would have few visual cues about how dire the situation was.
Those quotes were not mine, but to take up a couple of your points:
The crew were visual with the runway (report on the CVR).
What are the 'published minimums' once visual with the runway?
The NPA had 'done its job' and the crew were now runway in sight landing visually.
Another concern is the "Sink Rate" call. The autopilot was still engaged; if in Vertical Speed set by the PF (I'm not familiar with Airbus), that would be a rate of descent of at least 1000ft/min (the warning in my aeroplane goes off at around 1700ft/min at 500ft AGL). The terrain was undulating, which can trick the system, but nevertheless the rate of descent would seem to be on the high side to me.
unforgivingly small vertical margin for visual approaches.
Visual
Your comment appears correct regarding minimums when on a visual approach.
But, were they visually proceeding at the point of the runway in sight call?
At this time, there does not appear to be a confirmation by the PF that the runway was in sight, or that he was going to continue "on the gauges".
I'll have to re-read the time line about the call out and when things started turning bad.
However, there have been times when I have received a runway in sight call and my response was, "continuing on the approach", as I new that visual cues for that approach could be misleading. The approach to the west at San Diego comes to mind.
Just my opinion, but I don't think they slipped 200+ feet low because of that call out, or being on a visual approach at that moment.
Regards.
But, were they visually proceeding at the point of the runway in sight call?
At this time, there does not appear to be a confirmation by the PF that the runway was in sight, or that he was going to continue "on the gauges".
I'll have to re-read the time line about the call out and when things started turning bad.
However, there have been times when I have received a runway in sight call and my response was, "continuing on the approach", as I new that visual cues for that approach could be misleading. The approach to the west at San Diego comes to mind.
Just my opinion, but I don't think they slipped 200+ feet low because of that call out, or being on a visual approach at that moment.
Regards.
Join Date: Feb 2009
Location: DE
Posts: 5
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
A Squared: sorry, I may have missed it if mentioned earlier, but if the Jepp Plate is in fact in error, how would one know? Was it in the NOTAMs? Sorry, I must have missed it.
(Again, I don't seem to have an option to 'quote' any replies)
(Again, I don't seem to have an option to 'quote' any replies)
Join Date: Jul 2002
Location: Ireland
Posts: 596
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
He also stated that he did not see the rotating beacon on the hill approximately 1 mi from the runway.
The only two hills approximately a mile from the runway would be the the hill where the trees were hit and the hill where they impacted the ground.
In an attempt to ascertain the height of the trees and power poles, I used Google street view in conjunction with a photograph of the tree damage and another of an engineer fixing the power lines. At no time did I see either a rotating beacon or somewhere where a rotating beacon could be fixed above the height of the tallest pines.
Likewise there are many many photos of the hill of the crash site and again, no sight of a beacon, rotating or otherwise.
The report was from 1999. Is it possible that there was a beacon there at one time which has now been removed?
Join Date: Feb 2013
Location: N. California
Posts: 11
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Link to NASA report
Originally Posted by roulishollandais
It is clear today that our Accident Boards are no more free to publish something whose publishing would increase Air Safety, if private or public actors , Airlines, Private "work" or "think"teams or aviation industry, regulatorrs,etc. don't like it : I just wanted to show you the Air Fance/Atlas approach chart without "FAF", given to the pilots by Air Inter the day of the Mont Sainte Odile's crash .That chart was in the original BEA report aswell as the official (and very different) approach chart with wrong altitude of level lines.
Surprise : Today these two charts have been removed from the official BEA Report on the BEA site !!! Danger is considered coming from pointing the sources of the crash and their drama and not from life and aircraft destruction.
Surprise : Today these two charts have been removed from the official BEA Report on the BEA site !!! Danger is considered coming from pointing the sources of the crash and their drama and not from life and aircraft destruction.
http://www.bea.aero/docspa/1992/f-ed...es/annexe6.pdf
(The pdf has multiple pages)
You can find a link to the file in paragraph 111.43 - Volets de procédure:
F-GGED
where the absence of the FAF label is also mentioned.
The fact that you don't find something somewhere does not necessarily imply that it is not there.
‘…why one of the pilots could be visual with the runway but fail to see…’
This is similar to the Zurich 29 CFIT accident many years ago. Here it was impossible to see the runway with the charted minimum visibility, but the crew could have seen the local village/road.
As shown in previous diagrams and incident links, the 18 approach is one of those situations where the sight of the runway can be interrupted if the approved approach path is not followed. It might even be possible to see the far end of the runway lights but not the PAPI; e.g. San Diego.
‘It did not leave them at the MDA on the 2 whites and 2 reds of the PAPI.’
This one of the key issues; as with most accidents the precursors and initial conditions have as much or more influence as might the final moments.
‘EGPWS Sink Rate’, this is not necessarily the aircraft vertical speed, but the terrain rate of closure (Rad Alt); thus an alert could originate from rapidly rising ground with the aircraft at constant vertical speed.
Re ASRS; excellent. The crew / operator asked ‘should we be doing this’? The crew/operator disseminated their safety concerns and took action on a safety report, Factual, Actual, Critical, Potential; … if only other operators / airports / regulators could take similar action.
This is similar to the Zurich 29 CFIT accident many years ago. Here it was impossible to see the runway with the charted minimum visibility, but the crew could have seen the local village/road.
As shown in previous diagrams and incident links, the 18 approach is one of those situations where the sight of the runway can be interrupted if the approved approach path is not followed. It might even be possible to see the far end of the runway lights but not the PAPI; e.g. San Diego.
‘It did not leave them at the MDA on the 2 whites and 2 reds of the PAPI.’
This one of the key issues; as with most accidents the precursors and initial conditions have as much or more influence as might the final moments.
‘EGPWS Sink Rate’, this is not necessarily the aircraft vertical speed, but the terrain rate of closure (Rad Alt); thus an alert could originate from rapidly rising ground with the aircraft at constant vertical speed.
Re ASRS; excellent. The crew / operator asked ‘should we be doing this’? The crew/operator disseminated their safety concerns and took action on a safety report, Factual, Actual, Critical, Potential; … if only other operators / airports / regulators could take similar action.
Join Date: Jul 2002
Location: Ireland
Posts: 596
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
749CONNIE
Thanks for that.
Re-reading it, there could be another way to see it.
The context is of the pilot who reported the approach claiming he 'did not see the rotating beacon on the hill'.
He may have been responding to someone who told him there was supposed to be a rotating beacon on the hill rather than saying there was a beacon but didn't see it on the night in question.
Re-reading it, there could be another way to see it.
The context is of the pilot who reported the approach claiming he 'did not see the rotating beacon on the hill'.
He may have been responding to someone who told him there was supposed to be a rotating beacon on the hill rather than saying there was a beacon but didn't see it on the night in question.
Join Date: Feb 2013
Location: N. California
Posts: 11
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Departure off 36 vs approach to 18
Off another forum. Interesting process of TERPS criteria.
http://www.airlinepilotforums.com/safety/76529-ups...
IAP/PAPI vs TROUBLE T
DISCLAIMER: I haven’t seen this analysis depicted elsewhere to date, so here I go…Without (a) speculating into any details of the fatal incident which occurred at KBHM last week or (b) referring to any proprietary publications, practices, or property of any non-tax-funded entity, I would like to expand on my understanding of a significant issue. This interpretation comes from quite a few years of instruction (given and received) in military and civilian multi-engine aircraft operations and instrument flying. You may think this issue directly relates to the recent KBHM incident, but I am expanding on it independent of that. I am trying to document my understandings with hopes that others can correct any errors and/or help better explain how these issues may impact flying safe. Finally, please keep in mind that I am a pilot and not a TERPS certified engineer, but I think we all should hear from one.
SUMARY
Obstacle information for the area north of BHM RW18 over-laid with visual AND instrument approach path information do NOT depict safe vertical clearance of obstacles. Comparing actual vs. published approach path settings (on PAPIs for example) does nothing for ensuring that the resulting path will adequately guide a pilot clear of obstacles – that is merely an accuracy check against a book. There appears to be an error with FAA provided information given to pilots and that information needs to be changed OR obstacles/terrain need to be lowered OR approach paths, visual AND instrument, need to be altered to allow for safe vertical clearance of obstacles.
EXPANDED INFO
Source documents: Current FAA/NACO IAP for LOC 18 and ODP for KBHM; USAF flying regulations (real exciting – and available online)
1. In order to determine obstacle information for landing on RW 18, one can look at climb restrictions and data for departing RW 36. This is a somewhat counterintuitive idea that stems from the fact that if an airfield doesn’t have a published approach procedure, USAF pilots can’t depart it under IFR…it’s either TERPS validated both in and out of the field or it hasn’t been TERPS at all, and if it’s the former, all obstacle data should be accurate. Also, this is NOT a standard practice NOR procedure as it is assumed approach procedures and airfield approach lights are in place to safely avoid all obstacles in applicable flight path; it is a semi-advanced Instrument Instructor technique to examine fields surrounded by terrain to, if for nothing else, validate which direction from the airport has the most/least restrictive path in and out.
2. The required climb gradient of 420’/nm to 1000M can be used to determine the Obstacle Clearance Surface (OCS). The OCS line connects a starting point over the end of the runway with the peak of the most controlling obstacle or terrain through the altitude limit indicated.
2a. The OCS line must be assumed to start at ‘screen height’ or distance above the end of the runway of 35’ because the airfield analysis/approach procedures are developed by the FAA for military and civilian use (airports used only for specific branches of the military do not use a screen height, which provides more of a margin of safety for clearing obstacles).
2b. 48’/nm must be subtracted (it is the standard buffer used in published climb gradients per source document).
2c. The resulting 372’/nm forms the OCS line (high school math on 372’/6076’ derives a 3.5 deg angle…steeper than the 3.28 deg angle of the Precision Approach Path Indicator AND the 3.28 deg angle of the PAPI lights AND the path expected to be displayed on aircraft vertical navigation or profile indication systems.
3. PAPI lights alone are supposed to provide obstacle clearance within 3.5nm of the landing runway and a TERPS’ed approach procedure should do the same from the point one is established on the procedure until you get to minimums at take over visual navigation to the runway (in this case aided only by the aforementioned PAPIs). The instrument approach procedure should comply with Required Obstacle Clearance standards (starting at 250’ clearance above obstacles and tapering down to a lower but safe amount of clearance as the aircraft nears the runway). Given the data derived below using basic trigonometry, I don’t see how the FAA provided data can be construed as the most safe or compliant.
[IMG][/IMG]
CONCLUSION: According to my calculations, there appears to be an error with FAA provided information given to pilots and that information needs to be changed OR obstacles/terrain need to be lowered OR approach paths, visual and instrument, need to be altered (increased descent angle and or higher runway crossing height) to allow for safe vertical clearance of obstacles. If my calculations are off, I think they are close enough to validate imposing restrictions on the use of ANY vertical path guidance for transport category aircraft to RW 18 in anything but day/VMC conditions.
NOTE: Several years back, I nearly put two student pilots to sleep with the concept outlined in step 1 above during pre-flight. We/I didn’t work through the data crunching and plotting process, but needless to say their eyes were opened when I took them into KBHM to get a close-up view of the terrain to the north. It was day/vmc in the overhead/closed traffic pattern, but we all learned why KBHM was highlighted (with the likes of Eagle County and Jackson Hole) in the USAF instrument flying regulations. I wish I had crunched these numbers and challenged someone up the flagpole…
http://www.airlinepilotforums.com/safety/76529-ups...
IAP/PAPI vs TROUBLE T
DISCLAIMER: I haven’t seen this analysis depicted elsewhere to date, so here I go…Without (a) speculating into any details of the fatal incident which occurred at KBHM last week or (b) referring to any proprietary publications, practices, or property of any non-tax-funded entity, I would like to expand on my understanding of a significant issue. This interpretation comes from quite a few years of instruction (given and received) in military and civilian multi-engine aircraft operations and instrument flying. You may think this issue directly relates to the recent KBHM incident, but I am expanding on it independent of that. I am trying to document my understandings with hopes that others can correct any errors and/or help better explain how these issues may impact flying safe. Finally, please keep in mind that I am a pilot and not a TERPS certified engineer, but I think we all should hear from one.
SUMARY
Obstacle information for the area north of BHM RW18 over-laid with visual AND instrument approach path information do NOT depict safe vertical clearance of obstacles. Comparing actual vs. published approach path settings (on PAPIs for example) does nothing for ensuring that the resulting path will adequately guide a pilot clear of obstacles – that is merely an accuracy check against a book. There appears to be an error with FAA provided information given to pilots and that information needs to be changed OR obstacles/terrain need to be lowered OR approach paths, visual AND instrument, need to be altered to allow for safe vertical clearance of obstacles.
EXPANDED INFO
Source documents: Current FAA/NACO IAP for LOC 18 and ODP for KBHM; USAF flying regulations (real exciting – and available online)
1. In order to determine obstacle information for landing on RW 18, one can look at climb restrictions and data for departing RW 36. This is a somewhat counterintuitive idea that stems from the fact that if an airfield doesn’t have a published approach procedure, USAF pilots can’t depart it under IFR…it’s either TERPS validated both in and out of the field or it hasn’t been TERPS at all, and if it’s the former, all obstacle data should be accurate. Also, this is NOT a standard practice NOR procedure as it is assumed approach procedures and airfield approach lights are in place to safely avoid all obstacles in applicable flight path; it is a semi-advanced Instrument Instructor technique to examine fields surrounded by terrain to, if for nothing else, validate which direction from the airport has the most/least restrictive path in and out.
2. The required climb gradient of 420’/nm to 1000M can be used to determine the Obstacle Clearance Surface (OCS). The OCS line connects a starting point over the end of the runway with the peak of the most controlling obstacle or terrain through the altitude limit indicated.
2a. The OCS line must be assumed to start at ‘screen height’ or distance above the end of the runway of 35’ because the airfield analysis/approach procedures are developed by the FAA for military and civilian use (airports used only for specific branches of the military do not use a screen height, which provides more of a margin of safety for clearing obstacles).
2b. 48’/nm must be subtracted (it is the standard buffer used in published climb gradients per source document).
2c. The resulting 372’/nm forms the OCS line (high school math on 372’/6076’ derives a 3.5 deg angle…steeper than the 3.28 deg angle of the Precision Approach Path Indicator AND the 3.28 deg angle of the PAPI lights AND the path expected to be displayed on aircraft vertical navigation or profile indication systems.
3. PAPI lights alone are supposed to provide obstacle clearance within 3.5nm of the landing runway and a TERPS’ed approach procedure should do the same from the point one is established on the procedure until you get to minimums at take over visual navigation to the runway (in this case aided only by the aforementioned PAPIs). The instrument approach procedure should comply with Required Obstacle Clearance standards (starting at 250’ clearance above obstacles and tapering down to a lower but safe amount of clearance as the aircraft nears the runway). Given the data derived below using basic trigonometry, I don’t see how the FAA provided data can be construed as the most safe or compliant.
[IMG][/IMG]
CONCLUSION: According to my calculations, there appears to be an error with FAA provided information given to pilots and that information needs to be changed OR obstacles/terrain need to be lowered OR approach paths, visual and instrument, need to be altered (increased descent angle and or higher runway crossing height) to allow for safe vertical clearance of obstacles. If my calculations are off, I think they are close enough to validate imposing restrictions on the use of ANY vertical path guidance for transport category aircraft to RW 18 in anything but day/VMC conditions.
NOTE: Several years back, I nearly put two student pilots to sleep with the concept outlined in step 1 above during pre-flight. We/I didn’t work through the data crunching and plotting process, but needless to say their eyes were opened when I took them into KBHM to get a close-up view of the terrain to the north. It was day/vmc in the overhead/closed traffic pattern, but we all learned why KBHM was highlighted (with the likes of Eagle County and Jackson Hole) in the USAF instrument flying regulations. I wish I had crunched these numbers and challenged someone up the flagpole…
Last edited by 749CONNIE; 22nd Aug 2013 at 14:16.
The perfect and A squared:
Indeed, A, had they followed the NA on the Jepps they'd not have shot the LOC approach. The error in question seems to have no impact on this accident. Being lower than mins at a given distance did ... so I'd say Old Boeing Driver has a valid point.
Reaching back to Somewherefaraway and his post, his point was that the approach in question is not kosher to shoot at night per a UPS SOP or rule. I'll take that at face value, and ask myself: what approach were these gents flying?
Indeed, A, had they followed the NA on the Jepps they'd not have shot the LOC approach. The error in question seems to have no impact on this accident. Being lower than mins at a given distance did ... so I'd say Old Boeing Driver has a valid point.
Reaching back to Somewherefaraway and his post, his point was that the approach in question is not kosher to shoot at night per a UPS SOP or rule. I'll take that at face value, and ask myself: what approach were these gents flying?
Last edited by Lonewolf_50; 22nd Aug 2013 at 14:08.
Join Date: Mar 2013
Location: huntsvegas
Posts: 41
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Beacon on a hill
Can it be seen in this photo?
http://avherald.com/img/ups_a306_n15...m_130814_2.jpg
http://avherald.com/img/ups_a306_n15...m_130814_2.jpg
Join Date: Apr 2009
Location: Oakland, CA
Age: 72
Posts: 427
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
May I suggest that if you do not have a solution you quit jumping on here and berating Asians, the French and other pilots who are "obviously incompetent" saying "they learnt that in flight school".
Last edited by olasek; 22nd Aug 2013 at 14:47.
Join Date: Jul 2002
Location: Ireland
Posts: 596
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Can it be seen in this photo?
http://avherald.com/img/ups_a306_n15...m_130814_2.jpg
http://avherald.com/img/ups_a306_n15...m_130814_2.jpg
The only fixed lights I could find on that hill are three of those susended traffic lights that are so popular in the US.
Join Date: Aug 2008
Location: U.S.A.
Posts: 15
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Pure conjecture, but I don't think it did. It did not leave them at the MDA on the 2 whites and 2 reds of the PAPI.
I wish the NTSB wouldn't say the sink rate call was an EGPWS callout vs a GPWS callout because of the predictive vs reactive nature of those systems. That difference could end up being a big clue in what happened that morning.