UPS cargo crash near Birmingham AL

[PEI_3721]

‘…why one of the pilots could be visual with the runway but fail to see…’
This is similar to the Zurich 29 CFIT accident many years ago. Here it was impossible to see the runway with the charted minimum visibility, but the crew could have seen the local village/road.
As shown in previous diagrams and incident links, the 18 approach is one of those situations where the sight of the runway can be interrupted if the approved approach path is not followed. It might even be possible to see the far end of the runway lights but not the PAPI; e.g. San Diego.

‘It did not leave them at the MDA on the 2 whites and 2 reds of the PAPI.’
This one of the key issues; as with most accidents the precursors and initial conditions have as much or more influence as might the final moments.

‘EGPWS Sink Rate’, this is not necessarily the aircraft vertical speed, but the terrain rate of closure (Rad Alt); thus an alert could originate from rapidly rising ground with the aircraft at constant vertical speed.

Re ASRS; excellent. The crew / operator asked ‘should we be doing this’? The crew/operator disseminated their safety concerns and took action on a safety report, Factual, Actual, Critical, Potential; … if only other operators / airports / regulators could take similar action.