UPS cargo crash near Birmingham AL
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Hey A Squared,
Agree, night and day very different kettles of fish. And the extract you quoted, you'll notice, was hedged with regard to the UPS accident because there's a lot of other possibilities for root causes (although if they knew the AD and the RWY and couldn't see the PAPI or lost it for a bit, one wonders why they were pushing on).
To all those that keep quoting the low speed for the Asiana SFO accident: those guys were thundering down from quite a ways out, were way too high from about 8.5NM to go, and from my calcs based on the FltAware data required >4deg to land from 5NM (presuming that this is way above their approved limits for final!), and from about 3.3NM to run they descended at approx 9.5%/5.4deg angle and ridiculous RoD until they saw a green light or two at ~ 1.3NM/500ft.
It was only after that that their speed and altitude plunged. They were incredibly luck to make it to land and not do a Lion Air (DPS).
Essentially it was a grossly unstable approach from about 10NM out. If they looked at the picture out of the window and decided it didn't look right they had lots of guide altitudes from say other approach charts (eg, GPS APCH) and memory (eg, x000ft over the bridge was normal, etc).
And of course, as per the manufacturer's FCTM (and I'd guess their SOPs), they really should have gone around somewhere between 1000ft and 500ft.
(Afterthought: if they'd taken action sooner (requires someone monitoring dist/alt), and done some of the steep descent earlier, they might have been back on/near (abv) PAPI GS at/before 3-5NM out and would have saved everybody a lot of trouble and two people their lives.)
Apologies for digression, but glad to get that rant off my chest
Agree, night and day very different kettles of fish. And the extract you quoted, you'll notice, was hedged with regard to the UPS accident because there's a lot of other possibilities for root causes (although if they knew the AD and the RWY and couldn't see the PAPI or lost it for a bit, one wonders why they were pushing on).
To all those that keep quoting the low speed for the Asiana SFO accident: those guys were thundering down from quite a ways out, were way too high from about 8.5NM to go, and from my calcs based on the FltAware data required >4deg to land from 5NM (presuming that this is way above their approved limits for final!), and from about 3.3NM to run they descended at approx 9.5%/5.4deg angle and ridiculous RoD until they saw a green light or two at ~ 1.3NM/500ft.
It was only after that that their speed and altitude plunged. They were incredibly luck to make it to land and not do a Lion Air (DPS).
Essentially it was a grossly unstable approach from about 10NM out. If they looked at the picture out of the window and decided it didn't look right they had lots of guide altitudes from say other approach charts (eg, GPS APCH) and memory (eg, x000ft over the bridge was normal, etc).
And of course, as per the manufacturer's FCTM (and I'd guess their SOPs), they really should have gone around somewhere between 1000ft and 500ft.
(Afterthought: if they'd taken action sooner (requires someone monitoring dist/alt), and done some of the steep descent earlier, they might have been back on/near (abv) PAPI GS at/before 3-5NM out and would have saved everybody a lot of trouble and two people their lives.)
Apologies for digression, but glad to get that rant off my chest
Last edited by roulette; 6th Sep 2013 at 08:38. Reason: editorial
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Originally Posted by roulette
...and from about 3.3NM to run they descended at approx 9.5%/5.4deg angle and ridiculous RoD until they saw a green light or two at ~ 1.3NM/500ft.
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flare:
What I read is that the A/T were engaged, but in FLCH, which meant they simply remained at idle. Incompatible modes.
disagree...you may have read that the autothrottles were armed but not engaged...speed would not have been maintained unless the biological pilots had acted
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Most of my career I just flew the airplane like a pilot and didn't care much if anything engaged or not. If it did fine but if it didn't I wouldn't blame the systems, I would blame me. Yes, sim checks you have to do the cat lll approaches but in real life you seldom or in my case never did. We never should rely on anything to work as advertised because sometimes they don't.
All approaches are quite simple to fly. Never get low unless you are visual with the runway and can procede accordingly. So many accidents and near accidents like SFO are done by pilots that can't fly without their automation. Sometimes automation fails. We need real pilots back in the cockpit like we did in the past.
All approaches are quite simple to fly. Never get low unless you are visual with the runway and can procede accordingly. So many accidents and near accidents like SFO are done by pilots that can't fly without their automation. Sometimes automation fails. We need real pilots back in the cockpit like we did in the past.
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How many greens?!
C'mon guys/gals, you know perfectly well when you see greens off the PAPIs?
It's where the light is shining through the grass and is the next colour transition after 4 reds!!!!
Refer to David Gunsons hilarious CD "What Goes Up Might Come Down".
Magic comedy no matter how often heard, though somewhat dated and definitely NOT politically correct!
It's where the light is shining through the grass and is the next colour transition after 4 reds!!!!
Refer to David Gunsons hilarious CD "What Goes Up Might Come Down".
Magic comedy no matter how often heard, though somewhat dated and definitely NOT politically correct!
Originally Posted by Bubbers
We need real pilots back in the cockpit like we did in the past.
) so it's not a sudden decline in our capabilities. Human beings are not being trained like they used to be. That's what created real pilots from standard human beings.
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Real pilots? You mean ones with situational awareness?
In my engine performance studies, I had an instructor who became upset with folks who did "PLUG AND CHUG" with a computer model of an engine, putting in numbers and not questioning the output. He taught us, instead, to make a back-of-the-envelope prediction of the results - not terribly accurate, but good enough for a sanity check on the computer. Very useful!
BTW, many of us can still wield a K&E slipstick with deadly accuracy (four significant digits!). The real skill comes in placing the decimal point correctly.
In my engine performance studies, I had an instructor who became upset with folks who did "PLUG AND CHUG" with a computer model of an engine, putting in numbers and not questioning the output. He taught us, instead, to make a back-of-the-envelope prediction of the results - not terribly accurate, but good enough for a sanity check on the computer. Very useful!
BTW, many of us can still wield a K&E slipstick with deadly accuracy (four significant digits!). The real skill comes in placing the decimal point correctly.
OK645;
I'm beginning to appreciate that statement more and more as I encounter, (but don't fly) odd FMS arrangements and their (highly, in my opinion) non-intuitive operation. With others, I'm having a separate discussion on the relative safety of such post-production installations, particularly as it concerns those new to transport operations - another thread.
I retired in late 2007 off the A330/A340 just when RNAV approaches were being introduced (Canada) so I never flew them though I have done numerous NDB/VOR LOC(BC) approaches in both managed and selected (using TRK/FPA) modes on all three Airbii types with very satisfactory performance, easily monitored/managed with solid SA from the PFD/ND/MCDU displays .
I thought they were as close to "precision" as one could get without traditional external electronic guidance. But one always had to give the airplane/autoflight time to do its job so a late intercept more than a few hundred feet above the calculated path wouldn't work and one had to resort to either capturing from above, (using IDLE-OPEN DESCENT, V/S or FPA, (protected with the Alt-Select)), or hand-fly it. In this, the traditional ILS was a but more robust so one could abuse the approach handling a bit more and the airplane, like any airplane, would still do it. I expect the same non-precision "room" for the airplane to do it's work would be necessary on an RNAV approach.
I completely agree with the thread's comments on raw data. It was (and remains, IIRC) a mandatory SOP to have raw data up somewhere if there Nav Accuracy was "LOW". Otherwise it was a matter of airmanship, and with the equipment provided, why not have it up anyway, all the time?
Like most technical tasks which require a set series of steps tailored to particular requirements, I suspect every one of us has our "rabbit trails", - our favourite ways of accomplishing oft-used, familiar tasks to do the non-precision descent, etc., etc.; - which means when something new arises, I again suspect that very few of us are not 'slightly' challenged, which is a good thing, but which also becomes a human factor when/if other circumstances, such as those which I believe arose in the BHM approach, arise.
My original notion behind raising 'the old ways' was a nagging sense that the cadet schools teach rote stuff and don't, nay can't, provide "opportunities" to scare oneself after just about killing oneself and everyone else on board. I don't advocate "arranging" such affairs but aviation is inherently dangerous (as the words under the photo of the airplane in the tree go), and somehow that sense has been subsumed within the relative comfort of cockpits and brilliant auto-systems, displays and all those things that have been designed and intended to reduce/deflect "human factors" risks . . . .
I am a great believer in no cotton-batting around what the airplane is always trying to do to one and I am afraid that increasingly-"pampered" (the term is not intended as derisive but merely as a recognition of the nature of the structure and priorities of such an 'aviation education'), cadets work as one cannot teach "adrenaline". There is a real possibility of "graduating" without comprehension of the nastier bits and, of greater concern, with an inappropriate measure and impresssion of self-satisfaction that the job is getting done, and well. Data programs, statitistics, papers and robust SMS programs can only accomplish so much and are of no use whatsoever when one is "it" and comes close to or meets aviation's prime reality.
Nothing has materially changed in the principles of flight and risk, or in these airplanes that one can't master with native initiative, talent and ability so I believe this state of affairs is at the seat of the newly-coined notion of "startle effect".
An uninformed, school-encouraged self-confidence is vastly different than an abiding respect informed both by 'experience' (as in a healthy fear in the form described above) and knowledge derived from hard work and constant professional learning. I think it is appropriate that an "airman" possesses both overriding qualities. A major, large transport operation is no place to be gaining the former.
I miss it, but I don't miss the business...
the newer Airbii have a more consistent and intuitive series of actions required to set up, for example, a LOC only approach with a VNAV-style APP DES vertical mode....more intuitive than the comparable series of actions required in, for example, the 73NG.
I retired in late 2007 off the A330/A340 just when RNAV approaches were being introduced (Canada) so I never flew them though I have done numerous NDB/VOR LOC(BC) approaches in both managed and selected (using TRK/FPA) modes on all three Airbii types with very satisfactory performance, easily monitored/managed with solid SA from the PFD/ND/MCDU displays .
I thought they were as close to "precision" as one could get without traditional external electronic guidance. But one always had to give the airplane/autoflight time to do its job so a late intercept more than a few hundred feet above the calculated path wouldn't work and one had to resort to either capturing from above, (using IDLE-OPEN DESCENT, V/S or FPA, (protected with the Alt-Select)), or hand-fly it. In this, the traditional ILS was a but more robust so one could abuse the approach handling a bit more and the airplane, like any airplane, would still do it. I expect the same non-precision "room" for the airplane to do it's work would be necessary on an RNAV approach.
I completely agree with the thread's comments on raw data. It was (and remains, IIRC) a mandatory SOP to have raw data up somewhere if there Nav Accuracy was "LOW". Otherwise it was a matter of airmanship, and with the equipment provided, why not have it up anyway, all the time?
Like most technical tasks which require a set series of steps tailored to particular requirements, I suspect every one of us has our "rabbit trails", - our favourite ways of accomplishing oft-used, familiar tasks to do the non-precision descent, etc., etc.; - which means when something new arises, I again suspect that very few of us are not 'slightly' challenged, which is a good thing, but which also becomes a human factor when/if other circumstances, such as those which I believe arose in the BHM approach, arise.
My original notion behind raising 'the old ways' was a nagging sense that the cadet schools teach rote stuff and don't, nay can't, provide "opportunities" to scare oneself after just about killing oneself and everyone else on board. I don't advocate "arranging" such affairs but aviation is inherently dangerous (as the words under the photo of the airplane in the tree go), and somehow that sense has been subsumed within the relative comfort of cockpits and brilliant auto-systems, displays and all those things that have been designed and intended to reduce/deflect "human factors" risks . . . .
I am a great believer in no cotton-batting around what the airplane is always trying to do to one and I am afraid that increasingly-"pampered" (the term is not intended as derisive but merely as a recognition of the nature of the structure and priorities of such an 'aviation education'), cadets work as one cannot teach "adrenaline". There is a real possibility of "graduating" without comprehension of the nastier bits and, of greater concern, with an inappropriate measure and impresssion of self-satisfaction that the job is getting done, and well. Data programs, statitistics, papers and robust SMS programs can only accomplish so much and are of no use whatsoever when one is "it" and comes close to or meets aviation's prime reality.
Nothing has materially changed in the principles of flight and risk, or in these airplanes that one can't master with native initiative, talent and ability so I believe this state of affairs is at the seat of the newly-coined notion of "startle effect".
An uninformed, school-encouraged self-confidence is vastly different than an abiding respect informed both by 'experience' (as in a healthy fear in the form described above) and knowledge derived from hard work and constant professional learning. I think it is appropriate that an "airman" possesses both overriding qualities. A major, large transport operation is no place to be gaining the former.
I miss it, but I don't miss the business...
Last edited by PJ2; 6th Sep 2013 at 19:21.
I would be interested to see the statistics of how many non- precision approaches UPS fly using the Profile mode. As a Vnav mode to be used from Top of descent it is rubbish and Lufthansa when they flew the A306 didn't use it. Most of my colleagues have given up on it as well as a descent tool. The UPS fms is a slighly later iteration of the A306 fms but it is still a long way from the capability seen in fmgc of early A320s. To my mind this approach was flown using Vertical Speed as a descent mode hence the continuous descent from the approach platform height into the terrain.
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Green, White, Red
Oops 
, meant (quick flash of white before) a bunch of red lights. 
I was talking to someone else about another matter at the time of writing, and didn't see the word substitution (from discussion) ... until re-reading post following flyboyike's post. Multitasking, my bad!
, meant (quick flash of white before) a bunch of red lights. I was talking to someone else about another matter at the time of writing, and didn't see the word substitution (from discussion) ... until re-reading post following flyboyike's post. Multitasking, my bad!
OAK465 - I agree, lots of excellent capability....and in fact IMO the newer Airbii have a more consistent and intuitive series of actions required to set up, for example, a LOC only approach with a VNAV-style APP DES vertical mode....more intuitive than the comparable series of actions required in, for example, the 73NG.
If the LOC 18 were flown in an NG with IAN (Intergrated Approach Navigation), the setup for the approach would be identical to an ILS. Including the one button push required to arm the approach mode. The aircraft would then descend on a stable, accurate FMS generated glide path to a DA. Either using a single channel autopilot, or hand flown using the same symbology as an ILS.
The above capability strikes me as simpler, and more importantly a lower threat procedure. Flown with more accuracy (.3 RNP or .1 RNP). I wonder if these two pilots would still be alive today if they'd been provided a similar simple, consistent and accurate capability ? Especially at night, when possibly fatigued.
An attempt to illustrate some of the other options for non precision approach navigation. For those that are interested. If not, please excuse the post.
INTEGRATED APPROACH NAVIGATION
Integrated Approach Navigation (IAN) is an approach option designed for airlines that want to use ILS-like pilot procedures, display features, and autopilot control laws for nonprecision (Category I) approaches. This option does not require additional ground facility support.
The FMC transmits IAN deviations to the autopilot and display system. The pilot procedures for IAN are derived from current ILS pilot procedures and are consistent for all approach types: Select the approach on the FMC control display unit, tune the appropriate station, and arm the autopilot approach mode. The IAN function supports the ILS for glideslope inoperative, localizer only, and backcourse approach types.
The IAN function will alert the crew to approach selection or tuning inconsistencies. For example, if an ILS station is tuned and an area navigation (RNAV) approach also is selected on the FMC, the flight crew will be alerted and the ILS approach mode will take precedence automatically, with the appropriate display format.
While the IAN display (fig. 3) is similar to an ILS display, there are sufficient visual differences to ensure that the crew does not confuse a nonprecision IAN approach for a precision ILS or GLS approach (fig. 4). As on all nonprecision approaches, the altimeter is the primary method of ensuring that altitude constraints are honored.
Retrofit of this option involves software updates for the FMC, CDS, flight control computer, and digital flight data acquisition unit (DFDAU) and hardware and software updates for the EGPWS.
INTEGRATED APPROACH NAVIGATION
Integrated Approach Navigation (IAN) is an approach option designed for airlines that want to use ILS-like pilot procedures, display features, and autopilot control laws for nonprecision (Category I) approaches. This option does not require additional ground facility support.
The FMC transmits IAN deviations to the autopilot and display system. The pilot procedures for IAN are derived from current ILS pilot procedures and are consistent for all approach types: Select the approach on the FMC control display unit, tune the appropriate station, and arm the autopilot approach mode. The IAN function supports the ILS for glideslope inoperative, localizer only, and backcourse approach types.
The IAN function will alert the crew to approach selection or tuning inconsistencies. For example, if an ILS station is tuned and an area navigation (RNAV) approach also is selected on the FMC, the flight crew will be alerted and the ILS approach mode will take precedence automatically, with the appropriate display format.
While the IAN display (fig. 3) is similar to an ILS display, there are sufficient visual differences to ensure that the crew does not confuse a nonprecision IAN approach for a precision ILS or GLS approach (fig. 4). As on all nonprecision approaches, the altimeter is the primary method of ensuring that altitude constraints are honored.
Retrofit of this option involves software updates for the FMC, CDS, flight control computer, and digital flight data acquisition unit (DFDAU) and hardware and software updates for the EGPWS.
Max landing weight is 140000kg, but I am guessing that they were probably around 135000kg if they were flying Vref +5kt. At these weights they appear to have exceeded the runway weight bearing capability but there may have been an exemption whilst the main runway was being dug up.
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There are not many LOC BC approaches left in the US, but here is one of them.
http://155.178.201.160/d-tpp/1309/00430LDBC29R.PDF
I got this on a diversion from Nogales and was confused until I realized there was no reverse sensing on my HSI. I hadn't flown a BC in about 25 years :-). There are none in the northeast US where I do most of my flying.
http://155.178.201.160/d-tpp/1309/00430LDBC29R.PDF
I got this on a diversion from Nogales and was confused until I realized there was no reverse sensing on my HSI. I hadn't flown a BC in about 25 years :-). There are none in the northeast US where I do most of my flying.
Last edited by acroguy; 8th Sep 2013 at 00:03.
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Quote:
Originally Posted by Bubbers
We need real pilots back in the cockpit like we did in the past.
Maybe the selection process for pilots is markedly different from days of yore.
When the Navy was attempting to teach me how to fly the 'Navy' way, there was a lot of natural selection going on. We used to kill off ~1 person per week in the training command alone. (The training command published its own weekly safety blurb so it was not hard to keep track.)
Modern pilots seem to be selected more by financial means than any other. Perhaps additional screening is needed. Something along the lines of this:
Assessing People for Risk Taking Behaviour Be sure to look at the paragraph entitled "Assessed Atributes".
Maybe we do not have to kill off those that are unsuited after all. Just point them in another direction.
Originally Posted by Bubbers
We need real pilots back in the cockpit like we did in the past.
Originally Posted by Capn Bloggs
Agree! Why don't we have them? I don't believe that human beings have become markedly dumber in the last few years (perhaps too much computering/i-ing has addled our brains? ) so it's not a sudden decline in our capabilities. Human beings are not being trained like they used to be. That's what created real pilots from standard human beings.
) so it's not a sudden decline in our capabilities. Human beings are not being trained like they used to be. That's what created real pilots from standard human beings.When the Navy was attempting to teach me how to fly the 'Navy' way, there was a lot of natural selection going on. We used to kill off ~1 person per week in the training command alone. (The training command published its own weekly safety blurb so it was not hard to keep track.
)Modern pilots seem to be selected more by financial means than any other. Perhaps additional screening is needed. Something along the lines of this:
Assessing People for Risk Taking Behaviour Be sure to look at the paragraph entitled "Assessed Atributes".
Maybe we do not have to kill off those that are unsuited after all. Just point them in another direction.
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acroguy:
Front course inbound in the OBS?
I got this on a diversion from Nogales and was confused until I realized there was no reverse sensing on my HSI. I hadn't flown a BC in about 25 years :-). There are none in the northeast US where I do most of my flying.