UPS cargo crash near Birmingham AL
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I could list dozens of other examples, but the point seems self-evident. Recording inside the cockpit (showing the flight crew) understandably is very controversial. But would it make sense (and is it technically feasible) to record outward, and capture that data on future data recorders?
http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/4...mandatory.html
Like so many of these safety reporting and recording innovations (CVR, QAR, ASAP), we'll be assured initially that the information can never be used for discipline, is totally anonymous and is only harvested to promote safety. However, over time things will somehow change...
I looked again at the notams and changed the data source to FAA and the equipment is listed out of service until further notice.. I did wonder if this is for testing. Will the NTSB fly an A300 down the approach or will they do it in a simulator?
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I looked again at the notams and changed the data source to FAA and the equipment is listed out of service until further notice.. I did wonder if this is for testing. Will the NTSB fly an A300 down the approach or will they do it in a simulator?
High sink rate?
The late EQPWS alerts might seem consistent with a higher than normal sink rate. What might account for a high sink rate in the visual segment?
For those who picked a anomaly with my recent posts and quotes, here is what I posted (it had been deleted by the mods):
This came from one of the links PEI_3721 posted.
To Olasek and Coagie, I ask you this. Given that you both believe that blaming the institution is easier than the individual by letting the pilots off the hook, what then is your solution to the accidents where apparently incompetent pilots crash perfectly serviceable aircraft (or ones that have temporarily U/S ASIs) into the ground? Are you happy that they have been removed from the gene pool and won't do it again? How many others are there out there that do not deliberately violate SOPs but are still going to have a accident and what are you going to do to find them and stop them having that accident?
The only thing we do differently is to set it on the MDA (catchbasket). We don't use it down the approach.
Not quite: the aircraft is positively controlled down that profile. I think the whole concept of starting at the FAF and simply flying a constant rate of descent or FPA and hoping you won't clip steps or get to the MDA prior to the MAPt is fundamentally flawed.
That is precisely why having and using a detailed distance/altitude scale is superior; profile errors are picked up immediately they manifest themselves instead of waiting until a "not below" step comes up on the chart. A couple of those "TAWS Saves" involved crews that did not use the distance/altitude profile, even though it was published on their charts.
Blaming individuals is emotionally more satisfying than targeting institutions.
To Olasek and Coagie, I ask you this. Given that you both believe that blaming the institution is easier than the individual by letting the pilots off the hook, what then is your solution to the accidents where apparently incompetent pilots crash perfectly serviceable aircraft (or ones that have temporarily U/S ASIs) into the ground? Are you happy that they have been removed from the gene pool and won't do it again? How many others are there out there that do not deliberately violate SOPs but are still going to have a accident and what are you going to do to find them and stop them having that accident?
Originally Posted by PEI_3721
I prefer not to overuse ALT SEL; it has great safety value in setting up an approach procedure and after a missed approach.
Perhaps your technique is more focused on conducting the (NP) approach – ‘how go’s it’, correct for accuracy; whereas my view is more of a gross safety check, which in some circumstances (see previous link) requires an immediate climb to a safe alt / profile.
If in this accident the procedure was commenced at an incorrect range, which resulted in being consistently low (assuming a constant approach), the error might have been detected by an intermediate check of altitude and range. This method has some consistency with crew activity at MDA where altitude must dominate.
When and where the error could be detected depends on the choice and number of alt/range entries, which in this case was 2, BASKN or IMTOY, where the latter might have been too late.
When and where the error could be detected depends on the choice and number of alt/range entries, which in this case was 2, BASKN or IMTOY, where the latter might have been too late.
Last edited by Capn Bloggs; 22nd Aug 2013 at 00:26. Reason: grammar
Below the Glidepath - not correcting
Old Boeing Driver,
A worthy first post after all that lurking. We have come full circle with airplane accidents. Right from the dreadful toll of accidents in the early days that were almost always blamed on "pilot error" to today's accident situation where, to misquote somebody else, whenever we hear hoof beats we think Zebras and not Horses.
A worthy first post after all that lurking. We have come full circle with airplane accidents. Right from the dreadful toll of accidents in the early days that were almost always blamed on "pilot error" to today's accident situation where, to misquote somebody else, whenever we hear hoof beats we think Zebras and not Horses.
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OLD BOEING DRIVER said that NA on the approach plate doesn't matter. I disagree. Like most of this thread where the discussion talks about the confusing plate, it definitely matters. Errors, inconsistencies, NOTAMs, whatever. I keep looking at the plate and I can easily see how there could very well be some confusion. Not saying they had confusion, but possibly. It certainly could have been at least partly causal. Time will tell.
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To Olasek and Coagie, I ask you this. Given that you both believe that blaming the institution is easier than the individual by letting the pilots off the hook, what then is your solution to the accidents where apparently incompetent pilots crash perfectly serviceable aircraft (or ones that temporarily U/S ASIs) into the ground? Are you happy that they have been removed from the gene pool and won't do it again? How many others are there out there that do not deliberately violate SOPs but are still going to have a accident and what are you going to do to find them and stop them having that accident?
We can discuss mirages, refractions, tree heights, runway in sight call outs, etc., etc., but the basic fact is they were lower than published minimums.
I meant people, in general, find it easier to blame a big, soulless entity, than blame an individual, for fear it would hurt that individual's or his/her associates' or family's feelings.
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OLD BOEING DRIVER said that NA on the approach plate doesn't matter. I disagree.
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A SQuared: you just said it yourself: "THe notation on the Jepp chart was in error"....(sorry, I have no option to quote posts for some reason). If the chart was in error, how could one not consider that partly causal? What minimums if at night it was NA anyway? Note 2 on top adds to the confusion.
NA on the Plate
I meant from the point that it is simply a restriction on paper.
Just because it said NA, if they had been at the MDA until PAPI and REIL's were completely visual, there would have possibly have been a different outcome.
Granted, that if they saw that restriction and diverted due to the other runwat being closed, there probably would also have been a different ending.
There should be some good data soon.
Just because it said NA, if they had been at the MDA until PAPI and REIL's were completely visual, there would have possibly have been a different outcome.
Granted, that if they saw that restriction and diverted due to the other runwat being closed, there probably would also have been a different ending.
There should be some good data soon.
Capn Bloggs, you missed my point. I'll try again. I meant people, in general, find it easier to blame a big, soulless entity, than blame an individual, for fear it would hurt that individual's or his/her associates' or family's feelings. I never said it I thought it was the right way of thinking. It can cause changes, that don't need to be made, to be made. I pointed out, that if the error is on the pilot, then corrective action on that pilot should take place, however, if the error is systemic, in other words, if the pilot's error is encouraged by the system, be it in training, operations, accounting, or elsewhere, then corrective action should be taken on the system. If a good system is changed, because of one pilot's non-systemic error, because people are too afraid of hurt feelings, it may no longer be a good system (the law of unintended consequences).
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Originally Posted by THEPRFCT10
A SQuared: you just said it yourself: "THe notation on the Jepp chart was in error".
I'll try again. The approach is authorized at Night.
The Note on the Jepp Chart saying there are no authorized minimums at night is in error. There was previous discussion on this matter earlier in this thread.
According to the chart published by the FAA, the procedure *is* authorized at night (provided the PAPI is operating)
So my question to you is *if* the procedure *is* authorized at night (which is is) what causal factor does an erroneous note on a chart have that says it is not authorized?
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what then is your solution to the accidents where apparently incompetent pilots crash perfectly serviceable aircraft
What is a solution for a perfectly competent driver who one day decides to run a red light or overtake another car on a windy mountain road with not enough room to spare?
I suggest you read some accident reports from GA when many of them state 'lost control for unknown reason' or 'decided to descend below MDA in poor weather', etc, etc. What institution can be blamed since no airline is involved??? FAA for not flunking a pilot in his verly early career?. How can you predict that a pilot who keeps passing all known competency checks will do something irrational or will be guilty of major abrogation of his duties in say 8333 hr of his career??
I don't have a solution but certainly consider it a gross naïveté to think you can subject pilots to more training or 'better' training and somehow avoid those accidents unless you can unambiguously enumerate deficienices in their training (like in the caseof the Polish Tupolev pilots that crashed their presidential Tu-154).
Last edited by olasek; 22nd Aug 2013 at 04:31.
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Pause
Lord Wingspan almighty, maker of all Lift, what a thread! I give thanks for it. May it be some comfort to those who grieve for 1354's fliers that herein, on this thread, many fine, wise knowledgeable and dedicated Professional aviators are busy positing and counter-posting and vetting and sorting out whatever fact or conjecture might be relevant. Think of the crashing sound of The Doors song, Waiting for the Sun. Waiting (for an NTSB probe followed by analysis followed by report-writing followed by report approval and sometime in the somewhat foreseeable future: issuance) is not what we choose to do
Questions: does NTSB have some review process by which it goes to (for example) ALPA with the results of its investigation, before preparing its report, and ask whether such a representative of pilots would add any other data or tests? Does NTSB vet an outline of its proposed analytic framework for identifying probable cause? Does it circulate a draft report to anyone outside the agency for comment before making and declaring it final?
I don't trust bureaucracy. I trust leadership. I am just not convinced, at this time, that the leadership on causal analysis being publicly developed in very quick order on this thread, is something which both FAA and NTSB are prepared to integrate into their far more 'analog' worlds. This accident should send up a red flag that something was deeply flawed somewhere. And even if that supposition on my part turns out to have been alarmist or merely incorrect, the challenges posed by the Triple 7 CFIT in Dirty Harry Town are much greater, aren't they, because they reach into ICAO realms.
Yes, I am advocating a kind of mobilization, a kind of increased operational tempo, a surge (not a bad word), to get to the root cause. My engineering education, limited and informal though it may be, did strike Truth at least in this: The Careful Enough Statement of the Problem Implies the Solution.
Questions: does NTSB have some review process by which it goes to (for example) ALPA with the results of its investigation, before preparing its report, and ask whether such a representative of pilots would add any other data or tests? Does NTSB vet an outline of its proposed analytic framework for identifying probable cause? Does it circulate a draft report to anyone outside the agency for comment before making and declaring it final?
I don't trust bureaucracy. I trust leadership. I am just not convinced, at this time, that the leadership on causal analysis being publicly developed in very quick order on this thread, is something which both FAA and NTSB are prepared to integrate into their far more 'analog' worlds. This accident should send up a red flag that something was deeply flawed somewhere. And even if that supposition on my part turns out to have been alarmist or merely incorrect, the challenges posed by the Triple 7 CFIT in Dirty Harry Town are much greater, aren't they, because they reach into ICAO realms.
Yes, I am advocating a kind of mobilization, a kind of increased operational tempo, a surge (not a bad word), to get to the root cause. My engineering education, limited and informal though it may be, did strike Truth at least in this: The Careful Enough Statement of the Problem Implies the Solution.
Originally Posted by Olasek
I suggest you read some accident reports from GA when many of them state 'lost control for unknown reason' or 'decided to descend below MDA in poor weather', etc, etc.
But we're talking major commercial operations here, where the passengers reasonably expect that the pilots will cope, and that pilots will not do something silly, or if they do, then defences in the system will catch them.
May I suggest that if you do not have a solution you quit jumping on here and berating Asians, the French and other pilots who are "obviously incompetent" saying "they learnt that in flight school".