AF447 wreckage found
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Again and again all fingers are pointing to the lack of training of the pilots and some errors made in the event.
Wait and see ....
Wait and see ....
For me the big question is why they chose the general nose up stick input with aparently PFD showing pitch already at +16 deg and a/s below Vs. Was the final hole to line up in the swiss cheese the stall alarm inhibited at <60kts?
Last edited by xcitation; 29th Jul 2011 at 00:22.
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Well, I guess this is all the extra information we are going to get. 'The aeroplane behaved perfectly, the pilots just stuffed up (now including the captain)........' etc. etc.
My French is well over fifty years old, like the rest of me, so I had to depend on 'Google-translate' for the main text. But I'll offer a personal translation for the title - colloquially speaking, "AF 447 : les pilotes en ligne de mire" probably translates best as "AF447 : the pilots to cop the s**t."
AF 447 : les pilotes en ligne de mire - Europe1.fr - France
My French is well over fifty years old, like the rest of me, so I had to depend on 'Google-translate' for the main text. But I'll offer a personal translation for the title - colloquially speaking, "AF 447 : les pilotes en ligne de mire" probably translates best as "AF447 : the pilots to cop the s**t."
"The BEA will present a new report Friday. The crew would be called into question, according to Le Figaro.
The third report by the BEA on the exact circumstances of the accident flight Rio-Paris is expected and feared. The aim is to shed light on the main stages of the disaster that led the Flight 447 to disappear on 1 June 2009 with 228 people on board. Even before its publication on Friday at 14h, the pilots' unions are on the frontlines to expose their responsibilities would be allocated by the Office of inquiry and analysis.
The crew never realized that the aircraft had stalled
According to The Figaro.fr, the report released Friday is mainly because the crew. The BEA will provide Friday on "new facts derived from the exploitation of data from flight recorders." And, according to Le Figaro, "the crew never realized that the aircraft had stalled and has never applied the appropriate maneuvers." "When the captain, who had gone to rest, came back in the cockpit, his two colleagues told him about technical problems but have never talked about dropping out, provides a framework for Air France on a daily basis. Commander edge has never been able to save the situation. "
"Fragmented elements and gearboxes," says the BEA
Even before the report, the BEA has responded, saying "these elements were fragmented and gear." "It's certainly not accusing the crew as it made it mean that we have the chain of causes and Friday, the BEA will say," we understood everything we needed to that the accident does not happen again, "said a spokesman for the BEA, the investigating technique.
The BEA had presented the film in late May of last moments of flight with an initial analysis of black boxes rescued. This first study had pointed to the failure of the Pitot probes, depriving the pilots of the velocity measurements of the device. But investigators have always felt that this could not explain alone the accident.
The union Alter advance another hypothesis about the causes of the accident: a failure of the flight computers manufactured by Airbus. "One wonders, after analysis, if not the flight computers that brought the plane to stall," said William Pollard."
The third report by the BEA on the exact circumstances of the accident flight Rio-Paris is expected and feared. The aim is to shed light on the main stages of the disaster that led the Flight 447 to disappear on 1 June 2009 with 228 people on board. Even before its publication on Friday at 14h, the pilots' unions are on the frontlines to expose their responsibilities would be allocated by the Office of inquiry and analysis.
The crew never realized that the aircraft had stalled
According to The Figaro.fr, the report released Friday is mainly because the crew. The BEA will provide Friday on "new facts derived from the exploitation of data from flight recorders." And, according to Le Figaro, "the crew never realized that the aircraft had stalled and has never applied the appropriate maneuvers." "When the captain, who had gone to rest, came back in the cockpit, his two colleagues told him about technical problems but have never talked about dropping out, provides a framework for Air France on a daily basis. Commander edge has never been able to save the situation. "
"Fragmented elements and gearboxes," says the BEA
Even before the report, the BEA has responded, saying "these elements were fragmented and gear." "It's certainly not accusing the crew as it made it mean that we have the chain of causes and Friday, the BEA will say," we understood everything we needed to that the accident does not happen again, "said a spokesman for the BEA, the investigating technique.
The BEA had presented the film in late May of last moments of flight with an initial analysis of black boxes rescued. This first study had pointed to the failure of the Pitot probes, depriving the pilots of the velocity measurements of the device. But investigators have always felt that this could not explain alone the accident.
The union Alter advance another hypothesis about the causes of the accident: a failure of the flight computers manufactured by Airbus. "One wonders, after analysis, if not the flight computers that brought the plane to stall," said William Pollard."
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One point of confusion in the cockpit can be attributed to the fact that the stall warning ceases to warn below 60 kts. There is evidence that the pilot at the controls at one point pushed the stick forward to lower the nose, and when the plane accelerated to over 60 kts, the stall warning started up again.
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I'd have thought that there are at least two occasions, bearfoil - both IAS:-
1. the initial upset at the top of the 'zoom climb' - warning sounds, pilot applies TO/GA power, warning stops.
2. The attempted recovery (to quote the BEA 'note'):-
"At 2 h 12 min 02, the PF said "I don’t have any more indications", and the PNF said "we have no valid indications". At that moment, the thrust levers were in the IDLE detent and the engines’ N1’s were at 55%. Around fifteen seconds later, the PF made pitch-down inputs. In the following moments, the angle of attack decreased, the speeds became valid again and the stall warning sounded again."
For all we know, that led the pilot(s) to try the TO/GA thing all over again?
In that connection, just noticed something else; the next entry in the 'note' is timed one minute and thirty seconds LATER than the one I just quoted - but the BEA tells us nothing at all about what happened during that period:-
1. the initial upset at the top of the 'zoom climb' - warning sounds, pilot applies TO/GA power, warning stops.
2. The attempted recovery (to quote the BEA 'note'):-
"At 2 h 12 min 02, the PF said "I don’t have any more indications", and the PNF said "we have no valid indications". At that moment, the thrust levers were in the IDLE detent and the engines’ N1’s were at 55%. Around fifteen seconds later, the PF made pitch-down inputs. In the following moments, the angle of attack decreased, the speeds became valid again and the stall warning sounded again."
For all we know, that led the pilot(s) to try the TO/GA thing all over again?
In that connection, just noticed something else; the next entry in the 'note' is timed one minute and thirty seconds LATER than the one I just quoted - but the BEA tells us nothing at all about what happened during that period:-
"At 2 h 13 min 32, the PF said "we’re going to arrive at level one hundred"."
Leading to the conclusion that the attempted recovery was made MUCH higher than I, at any rate, have been thinking up to now?
As a minimum, let's hope that the BEA publishes a full CVR transcript,'fills all the gaps' in the narrative, and above all explains not only why the THS went to 'full up' in the first place; but also why, more important, it stayed at full up even though the pilot had begun making nosedown inputs.
If they don't, IMO it'll be clear evidence that a cover-up on the grand scale is in progress.
Last edited by RWA; 29th Jul 2011 at 04:13.
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Airbus chief pilot critical of AF crew
This has not yet hit the English speaking media. From Die Welt: Airbus chief pilot Ferando Alonso (sic) critizises the AF crew for not applying proper procedure by inducing a climb twice as steep as indicated and failing to react to the stall warning for 50 seconds.
German speakers:
Air-France-Absturz: Crew von Todesflug AF 447 missachtete Flugregeln - Nachrichten Panorama - Weltgeschehen - WELT ONLINE
German speakers:
Air-France-Absturz: Crew von Todesflug AF 447 missachtete Flugregeln - Nachrichten Panorama - Weltgeschehen - WELT ONLINE
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Looks like pilot error!
Google translation of "Le Figaro" leak:
Google translation of "Le Figaro" leak:
The night of 31 May to 1 June 2009, the captain left the cockpit to 2:01 to go to rest and is replaced by a co-pilot takes his place on the left. When the Pitot probes frosting and the autopilot disconnects 2:10, the configuration of the crew is as follows. The captain is out of the cockpit, what is allowed during a flight "enhanced" (with three drivers). The less experienced co-pilot, who sits on the right is "driver based": it gets the control of the aircraft. The second co-pilot (Pilot Officer reinforcement) seated on the left is "driver not on" his mission is to manage failures and to provide information to his colleague.
Just after the autopilot disconnect, the pilot on the right gives a first-rate nose-which raises the unit up to 37,500 feet. At this altitude, the risk of dropping out, that is to say the loss of lift of the aircraft and so his fall is very important. The pilot should never have to mount the unit at that altitude. It seems that at this moment, "the event Pitot" is completed. The device found consistent speeds and just then the pilot to manually maintain the trajectory and the altitude of the aircraft to avoid the accident that follows. The loss of information anemometer was only temporary.
"My colleague had to panic"
The co-pilot seated on the left loses precious seconds to call the captain who is out of position. It activates an alarm located on top of his head and loses sight of the display failure. He does not see his colleague maintains an order to pitch, that is to say, continues to pull the handle, the opposite of what to do. This action is out of the plane's flight envelope: it picks up and drops into the ocean.
"This maneuver is totally incomprehensible, said an Air France pilot. My colleague had to panic. "During the fall of the device, the first officer maintains his order to pitch despite a few trials in the other direction, exacerbating the situation and prevent the aircraft to find the lift. The procedure in force at that time at Air France said to the throttle and reduce the incidence, that is to say, to push the handle. The co-pilot put the throttle but runs the opposite of what to do with the handle despite the impact of an alarm "Stall" stall for almost a minute.
When the captain entered the cockpit, neither pilot talks stall him. They tell him about technical problems and tell him they do not understand. The captain is unable to analyze the situation and help his two colleagues. Seconds before impact, the pilot takes the controls on the left. But it's too late, he can not do anything.
"This scenario raises the question of the level of the crew, says one expert. Either it was a bad crew and we need to understand how this could be possible for Air France, its level was compared to other standard crew of the company and so is the training and recruitment that will be questioned . 'In the pilot, we are reminded that certain formations, especially the control in icing conditions at high altitudes, came after the 447 despite twelve reported incidents of Pitot probes in-house.
Just after the autopilot disconnect, the pilot on the right gives a first-rate nose-which raises the unit up to 37,500 feet. At this altitude, the risk of dropping out, that is to say the loss of lift of the aircraft and so his fall is very important. The pilot should never have to mount the unit at that altitude. It seems that at this moment, "the event Pitot" is completed. The device found consistent speeds and just then the pilot to manually maintain the trajectory and the altitude of the aircraft to avoid the accident that follows. The loss of information anemometer was only temporary.
"My colleague had to panic"
The co-pilot seated on the left loses precious seconds to call the captain who is out of position. It activates an alarm located on top of his head and loses sight of the display failure. He does not see his colleague maintains an order to pitch, that is to say, continues to pull the handle, the opposite of what to do. This action is out of the plane's flight envelope: it picks up and drops into the ocean.
"This maneuver is totally incomprehensible, said an Air France pilot. My colleague had to panic. "During the fall of the device, the first officer maintains his order to pitch despite a few trials in the other direction, exacerbating the situation and prevent the aircraft to find the lift. The procedure in force at that time at Air France said to the throttle and reduce the incidence, that is to say, to push the handle. The co-pilot put the throttle but runs the opposite of what to do with the handle despite the impact of an alarm "Stall" stall for almost a minute.
When the captain entered the cockpit, neither pilot talks stall him. They tell him about technical problems and tell him they do not understand. The captain is unable to analyze the situation and help his two colleagues. Seconds before impact, the pilot takes the controls on the left. But it's too late, he can not do anything.
"This scenario raises the question of the level of the crew, says one expert. Either it was a bad crew and we need to understand how this could be possible for Air France, its level was compared to other standard crew of the company and so is the training and recruitment that will be questioned . 'In the pilot, we are reminded that certain formations, especially the control in icing conditions at high altitudes, came after the 447 despite twelve reported incidents of Pitot probes in-house.
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RWA’s translation included: "Fragmented elements and gearboxes," says the BEA
Could this be a mistranslation which should be “transmission”? I don’t see how “gearbox” makes sense in this context.
“Transmission” is used in engineering for gearboxes etc., but the word is also used in some contexts for human/human communication.
"Fragmented elements and communications" would make more sense to me.
Could this be a mistranslation which should be “transmission”? I don’t see how “gearbox” makes sense in this context.
“Transmission” is used in engineering for gearboxes etc., but the word is also used in some contexts for human/human communication.
"Fragmented elements and communications" would make more sense to me.
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Yes, it is a mistranslation.
No, it shouldn't be "transmission".
"réducteur" is the word. Translated as a noun (gearbox) by Google, it's in fact an adjective (in this case), meaning the leaks reduce the amount of sense the BEA put on the accident.
I'm not confident enough on my english skills, but perhaps 'reductive' or 'reductionist view' should do?
The BEA is saying it's too simple (and unrepresentative) to (just) say "pilot error, and that's all folks" (which is ~ what the mass media are doing, they don't want a complex answer, it has to be the plane's fault, or the crew's fault, but keep it simple for underbrains, please).
No, it shouldn't be "transmission".
"réducteur" is the word. Translated as a noun (gearbox) by Google, it's in fact an adjective (in this case), meaning the leaks reduce the amount of sense the BEA put on the accident.
I'm not confident enough on my english skills, but perhaps 'reductive' or 'reductionist view' should do?
The BEA is saying it's too simple (and unrepresentative) to (just) say "pilot error, and that's all folks" (which is ~ what the mass media are doing, they don't want a complex answer, it has to be the plane's fault, or the crew's fault, but keep it simple for underbrains, please).
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The BEA just published a "Synthesis note" and "Safety recommendations":
FR : Vol AF 447
EN : FLIGHT AF 447
FR : Vol AF 447
EN : FLIGHT AF 447
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Quoting ChrisN:-
Blame google mate - the only translation I'll take responsibility for is the title of the article! 
Avionista, as far as I know the BEA didn't say which pilot was sitting in which seat. I've been assuming that the normal setup - senior F/O in his accustomed (righthand) seat - applied, and further that the junior one was in the lefthand one, and also the PF. That's supported by the captain's words on leaving the flightdeck ("He's taking my place.") The point coulde be important since I understand that the standby instruments on an A330 are in a 'left of centre' position on the A330 panel - so if the main instruments were misbehaving it would have been difficult for the more senior F/O to take over, he'd have had to lean way over to his left.
Typical of the BEA on this occasion, though - they didn't provide even the simplest and least controversial information (like which pilot was flying the aeroplane) in their report.
Quoting Avionista quoting Le Figaro:-
In fairness to the PF (whichever one it was) I have to remind everyone that the only 'nose-up input' he applied at the onset of the accident was immediately after the sign-off. The BEA states that the 'zoom climb' started at least 11 seconds after that - and there is no mention of the PF moving the stick either way until he applies 'nose-down' to (successfully) counteract the climb.
That strongly implies that the PF did not cause the climb - unless the A330 takes 11 seconds-plus to respond to control movements?
In any case, flying manually, on instruments, in rough weather, one would expect that there'd have been literally dozens of control movements over the period of the whole event. But the BEA chooses to mention only three or four of them?
I only hope (without much hope) that this third 'interim report' gives us a lot more 'hard information.' For a start, the BEA must already know everything that the CVR and the FDR recorded? Be interesting to see how much more they decide to tell us? Maybe 'third time lucky'.........?
PS, thanks - SaturnV must admit that I rather expected as much (or, rather, 'as little').
One immediate contradiction 'jumps out' at you:-
RWA’s translation included: "Fragmented elements and gearboxes," says the BEA
Avionista, as far as I know the BEA didn't say which pilot was sitting in which seat. I've been assuming that the normal setup - senior F/O in his accustomed (righthand) seat - applied, and further that the junior one was in the lefthand one, and also the PF. That's supported by the captain's words on leaving the flightdeck ("He's taking my place.") The point coulde be important since I understand that the standby instruments on an A330 are in a 'left of centre' position on the A330 panel - so if the main instruments were misbehaving it would have been difficult for the more senior F/O to take over, he'd have had to lean way over to his left.
Typical of the BEA on this occasion, though - they didn't provide even the simplest and least controversial information (like which pilot was flying the aeroplane) in their report.
Quoting Avionista quoting Le Figaro:-
Just after the autopilot disconnect, the pilot on the right gives a first-rate nose-which raises the unit up to 37,500 feet.
That strongly implies that the PF did not cause the climb - unless the A330 takes 11 seconds-plus to respond to control movements?
In any case, flying manually, on instruments, in rough weather, one would expect that there'd have been literally dozens of control movements over the period of the whole event. But the BEA chooses to mention only three or four of them?
I only hope (without much hope) that this third 'interim report' gives us a lot more 'hard information.' For a start, the BEA must already know everything that the CVR and the FDR recorded? Be interesting to see how much more they decide to tell us? Maybe 'third time lucky'.........?
PS, thanks - SaturnV must admit that I rather expected as much (or, rather, 'as little').
One immediate contradiction 'jumps out' at you:-
At 2 h 13 min 32, the PF said "we’re going to arrive at level one hundred". About fifteen seconds later, simultaneous inputs by both pilots on the sidesticks were recorded and the PF said "go ahead you have the controls". The angle of attack, when it was valid, always remained above 35 degrees.
"• Throughout the flight, the movements of the elevator and the THS were consistent with the pilot’s inputs.
If we are encouraged to believe that the THS reacted to 'noseup inputs' by pitching up, why did it not in turn respond to 'nosedown inputs' by pitching down?
Last edited by RWA; 29th Jul 2011 at 11:17.
Oh dear x 2. 
I do not fly or know how the systems work on the Airbus aircrafts.
I do not know if we have all the details yet.
I do not know if there is a cover up here (for those who may believe in that theory).
In any case if the information given so far is correct it is hard to believe a competent crew with experience on type would allow this aircraft to go from FL350 to FL380, stall the aircraft and never recover because they did not understand what was happening.
What even happened to flying the attitude and using power when all other things fail?
Someone with Airbus experience tell me this...
They still had 3 ADIs or artificial horizons available to them, no?
They still had full control over the inputs to the flight controls and engines, no?
The left PFD lost the airspeed for 29 seconds, the ISIS for 54 seconds so what about the right hand PFD airspeed indicator?
Does the #2 PFD airspeed source come from the same source as the ISIS?
Anyhow even if all 3 airspeeds were out for a limited amount of time how does that figure into not being able to remain at FL350 and not zoom climb at a very high rate (7000/min) to FL380?
If all fails with the airspeed (and TAS) you could always back yourself up with ground speed for a rough estimate. If an aircraft wants to climb when it is supposed to be level at a certain altitude, counter act the climb by nose down input. In most aircrafts when you disconnect the AP, one usually finds it is not "properly trimmed" and manual inputs are required. Is this not the case in the Airbus?
Maybe I'm missing something here because this happened in an Airbus but it is hard to believe that some frozen pitot tubes which were the originating factor in this tragedy confused the pilots to the point of no recovery.
From my point of view it sure seems like the crew messed it up and allowed an aircraft to stall at high altitude and never recovered it.
I do not fly or know how the systems work on the Airbus aircrafts.
I do not know if we have all the details yet.
I do not know if there is a cover up here (for those who may believe in that theory).
In any case if the information given so far is correct it is hard to believe a competent crew with experience on type would allow this aircraft to go from FL350 to FL380, stall the aircraft and never recover because they did not understand what was happening.
What even happened to flying the attitude and using power when all other things fail?
Someone with Airbus experience tell me this...
They still had 3 ADIs or artificial horizons available to them, no?
They still had full control over the inputs to the flight controls and engines, no?
The left PFD lost the airspeed for 29 seconds, the ISIS for 54 seconds so what about the right hand PFD airspeed indicator?
Does the #2 PFD airspeed source come from the same source as the ISIS?
Anyhow even if all 3 airspeeds were out for a limited amount of time how does that figure into not being able to remain at FL350 and not zoom climb at a very high rate (7000/min) to FL380?
If all fails with the airspeed (and TAS) you could always back yourself up with ground speed for a rough estimate. If an aircraft wants to climb when it is supposed to be level at a certain altitude, counter act the climb by nose down input. In most aircrafts when you disconnect the AP, one usually finds it is not "properly trimmed" and manual inputs are required. Is this not the case in the Airbus?
Maybe I'm missing something here because this happened in an Airbus but it is hard to believe that some frozen pitot tubes which were the originating factor in this tragedy confused the pilots to the point of no recovery.
From my point of view it sure seems like the crew messed it up and allowed an aircraft to stall at high altitude and never recovered it.
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Hopefully the interim report proper will be published after today's press conference, but it looks to me like what the BEA are saying is that while it appears that the crash was in part caused by a mishandling of the aircraft in the wake of a UAS incident, exacerbated by night IMC and unsettled weather, it also suggests that the pilots did not receive proper training in either manual aircraft handling at high speed and high level flight, CRM training in how to operate and communicate on the flight deck when the captain is on his rest period, and that the aircraft itself presents information that could be perceived as confusing when outside of its flight envelope. In short, there's room for improvement at both AF and Airbus (and I suspect the industry in general).
[EDIT : Note that my info comes from the "Synthesis" and Recommendations published this morning, which may not have been available when you posted. If anything I think that highlights the importance of taking any press-filtered information with the requisite shovelful of salt.]
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RWA
It was explained to you already, yet you choose to ignore that and champion your pet theory of "cover up". 
If we are encouraged to believe that the THS reacted to 'noseup inputs' by pitching up, why did it not in turn respond to 'nosedown inputs' by pitching down?
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Hi,
If you read the synthesis .. it show that the pilots were incompetents (no training for the AF447 case despite multiple same events in the past)
And also cause no recommendations in the past by the BEA about those events and no a sensed word by DGAC about same events
AF - DGAC - BEA are to put in the same bag and Airbus is not better (they always stated before 2010 that stall training was not needed)
Maybe you are dreaming ?
In any case if the information given so far is correct it is hard to believe a competent crew with experience on type would allow this aircraft to go from FL350 to FL380, stall the aircraft and never recover because they did not understand what was happening.
And also cause no recommendations in the past by the BEA about those events and no a sensed word by DGAC about same events
AF - DGAC - BEA are to put in the same bag and Airbus is not better (they always stated before 2010 that stall training was not needed)
Hopefully the interim report proper will be published after today's press conference,
