Go Back  PPRuNe Forums > Flight Deck Forums > Tech Log
Reload this Page >

AF447 wreckage found

Tech Log The very best in practical technical discussion on the web

AF447 wreckage found

Old 29th Jul 2011, 10:40
  #2221 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Nov 2010
Location: FR
Posts: 478
The BEA just published a "Synthesis note" and "Safety recommendations":
FR : Vol AF 447
EN : FLIGHT AF 447
AlphaZuluRomeo is offline  
Old 29th Jul 2011, 10:49
  #2222 (permalink)  
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
 
Join Date: Mar 2000
Location: UK
Posts: 18,583
Oh dear.
BOAC is offline  
Old 29th Jul 2011, 10:57
  #2223 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Mar 2001
Location: us
Posts: 694
Is there more to be released later today?

The synthesis note is 4 pages in both French and English, and the set of recommendations is one page.
SaturnV is offline  
Old 29th Jul 2011, 11:02
  #2224 (permalink)  
RWA
 
Join Date: Sep 2007
Location: Melbourne
Posts: 180
Quoting ChrisN:-
RWA’s translation included: "Fragmented elements and gearboxes," says the BEA
Blame google mate - the only translation I'll take responsibility for is the title of the article!

Avionista, as far as I know the BEA didn't say which pilot was sitting in which seat. I've been assuming that the normal setup - senior F/O in his accustomed (righthand) seat - applied, and further that the junior one was in the lefthand one, and also the PF. That's supported by the captain's words on leaving the flightdeck ("He's taking my place.") The point coulde be important since I understand that the standby instruments on an A330 are in a 'left of centre' position on the A330 panel - so if the main instruments were misbehaving it would have been difficult for the more senior F/O to take over, he'd have had to lean way over to his left.

Typical of the BEA on this occasion, though - they didn't provide even the simplest and least controversial information (like which pilot was flying the aeroplane) in their report.

Quoting Avionista quoting Le Figaro:-

Just after the autopilot disconnect, the pilot on the right gives a first-rate nose-which raises the unit up to 37,500 feet.
In fairness to the PF (whichever one it was) I have to remind everyone that the only 'nose-up input' he applied at the onset of the accident was immediately after the sign-off. The BEA states that the 'zoom climb' started at least 11 seconds after that - and there is no mention of the PF moving the stick either way until he applies 'nose-down' to (successfully) counteract the climb.

That strongly implies that the PF did not cause the climb - unless the A330 takes 11 seconds-plus to respond to control movements?

In any case, flying manually, on instruments, in rough weather, one would expect that there'd have been literally dozens of control movements over the period of the whole event. But the BEA chooses to mention only three or four of them?

I only hope (without much hope) that this third 'interim report' gives us a lot more 'hard information.' For a start, the BEA must already know everything that the CVR and the FDR recorded? Be interesting to see how much more they decide to tell us? Maybe 'third time lucky'.........?

PS, thanks - SaturnV must admit that I rather expected as much (or, rather, 'as little').

One immediate contradiction 'jumps out' at you:-


At 2 h 13 min 32, the PF said "we’re going to arrive at level one hundred". About fifteen seconds later, simultaneous inputs by both pilots on the sidesticks were recorded and the PF said "go ahead you have the controls". The angle of attack, when it was valid, always remained above 35 degrees.


"• Throughout the flight, the movements of the elevator and the THS were consistent with the pilot’s inputs.




If we are encouraged to believe that the THS reacted to 'noseup inputs' by pitching up, why did it not in turn respond to 'nosedown inputs' by pitching down?

Last edited by RWA; 29th Jul 2011 at 11:17.
RWA is offline  
Old 29th Jul 2011, 11:22
  #2225 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Mar 2001
Location: us
Posts: 694
RWA, there may be more later. There is a press conference at 14:30.
SaturnV is offline  
Old 29th Jul 2011, 12:04
  #2226 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jan 2008
Location: CYUL
Posts: 852
Oh dear x 2.

I do not fly or know how the systems work on the Airbus aircrafts.

I do not know if we have all the details yet.

I do not know if there is a cover up here (for those who may believe in that theory).

In any case if the information given so far is correct it is hard to believe a competent crew with experience on type would allow this aircraft to go from FL350 to FL380, stall the aircraft and never recover because they did not understand what was happening.

What even happened to flying the attitude and using power when all other things fail?

Someone with Airbus experience tell me this...

They still had 3 ADIs or artificial horizons available to them, no?

They still had full control over the inputs to the flight controls and engines, no?

The left PFD lost the airspeed for 29 seconds, the ISIS for 54 seconds so what about the right hand PFD airspeed indicator?
Does the #2 PFD airspeed source come from the same source as the ISIS?

Anyhow even if all 3 airspeeds were out for a limited amount of time how does that figure into not being able to remain at FL350 and not zoom climb at a very high rate (7000/min) to FL380?

If all fails with the airspeed (and TAS) you could always back yourself up with ground speed for a rough estimate. If an aircraft wants to climb when it is supposed to be level at a certain altitude, counter act the climb by nose down input. In most aircrafts when you disconnect the AP, one usually finds it is not "properly trimmed" and manual inputs are required. Is this not the case in the Airbus?

Maybe I'm missing something here because this happened in an Airbus but it is hard to believe that some frozen pitot tubes which were the originating factor in this tragedy confused the pilots to the point of no recovery.

From my point of view it sure seems like the crew messed it up and allowed an aircraft to stall at high altitude and never recovered it.
Jet Jockey A4 is offline  
Old 29th Jul 2011, 12:29
  #2227 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jul 2002
Location: UK
Posts: 3,182
Originally Posted by RWA View Post
Well, I guess this is all the extra information we are going to get. 'The aeroplane behaved perfectly, the pilots just stuffed up (now including the captain)........' etc. etc.
I don't know how a request for addition of an AoA indicator, as well as numerous additions to flight recorder parameters indicates that the BEA considered the aircraft "perfect".

Hopefully the interim report proper will be published after today's press conference, but it looks to me like what the BEA are saying is that while it appears that the crash was in part caused by a mishandling of the aircraft in the wake of a UAS incident, exacerbated by night IMC and unsettled weather, it also suggests that the pilots did not receive proper training in either manual aircraft handling at high speed and high level flight, CRM training in how to operate and communicate on the flight deck when the captain is on his rest period, and that the aircraft itself presents information that could be perceived as confusing when outside of its flight envelope. In short, there's room for improvement at both AF and Airbus (and I suspect the industry in general).

[EDIT : Note that my info comes from the "Synthesis" and Recommendations published this morning, which may not have been available when you posted. If anything I think that highlights the importance of taking any press-filtered information with the requisite shovelful of salt.]
DozyWannabe is offline  
Old 29th Jul 2011, 12:33
  #2228 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Apr 2010
Location: Poland
Age: 45
Posts: 15
RWA
If we are encouraged to believe that the THS reacted to 'noseup inputs' by pitching up, why did it not in turn respond to 'nosedown inputs' by pitching down?
It was explained to you already, yet you choose to ignore that and champion your pet theory of "cover up".
sebaska is offline  
Old 29th Jul 2011, 14:13
  #2229 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Aug 2009
Location: Germany
Age: 63
Posts: 1,809
Cool

Hi,

In any case if the information given so far is correct it is hard to believe a competent crew with experience on type would allow this aircraft to go from FL350 to FL380, stall the aircraft and never recover because they did not understand what was happening.
If you read the synthesis .. it show that the pilots were incompetents (no training for the AF447 case despite multiple same events in the past)
And also cause no recommendations in the past by the BEA about those events and no a sensed word by DGAC about same events
AF - DGAC - BEA are to put in the same bag and Airbus is not better (they always stated before 2010 that stall training was not needed)

Hopefully the interim report proper will be published after today's press conference,
Maybe you are dreaming ?
jcjeant is offline  
Old 29th Jul 2011, 14:21
  #2230 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: May 2000
Location: Phuket
Posts: 297
PILOT ERROR: Air France Jet Plunged Into Ocean Because Pilots Screwed Up

I just found this today. I have no idea if it will help or not.

I think you guys can brain storm all you want over the fine points why the computer and or indications did what they did. However the bottom line is either the pilots had mucked up data for whatever reasons and for that reason could not fly the aircraft out of the situation or the freaking system would not let fly the profile what was needed to escape the bad situation.

If we are encouraged to believe that the THS reacted to 'noseup inputs' by pitching up, why did it not in turn respond to 'nosedown inputs' by pitching down?
This is not a problem for non FBW aircraft. I say again we are so far ahead of the game we have lapped ourselves and are now behind again.

I will give the pilots the benefit of the doubt on their flying (not managing) skills. I have to ask again, do you want to be able to fly an aircraft or do you want to fly a system? Please do not give me a lame excuse about how fine the system is, just answer the question.

Last edited by before landing check list; 29th Jul 2011 at 14:35.
before landing check list is offline  
Old 29th Jul 2011, 14:24
  #2231 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jul 2002
Location: UK
Posts: 3,182
Originally Posted by jcjeant View Post
Airbus is not better (they always stated before 2010 that stall training was not needed)
I think that was a misconception widely held by the industry as a whole, and not specific to Airbus in particular. It certainly looks like AF are going to have to pull their socks up though...

[EDIT : @before landing checl list - I think that's a terribly poorly-summarised article which doesn't even bother to translate what's being said into layman's terms - the whole thing has been reduced to an inaccurate soundbite. ]

Last edited by DozyWannabe; 29th Jul 2011 at 14:51.
DozyWannabe is offline  
Old 29th Jul 2011, 14:28
  #2232 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Aug 2009
Location: Germany
Age: 63
Posts: 1,809
Cool

Hi,

Found on a french site .. the synthesis of the press meeting (in french)

15h04: «Il est nécessaire d'examiner la façon dont est organisée la sécurité des vols chez Air France» affirme le directeur du BEA.
Nouvelle critique sur la coordination dans cette compagnie aérienne.

15h02: L'enquête continue, déclare Jean-Paul Troadec, directeur du BEA. La difficulté réside dans l'analyse du comportement des pilotes, d'où la création d'un «groupe facteur humain».

15h01: Recommandation analogue sur la balise de détresse, qui est un instrument pas très fiable et qui se détruit facilement, dit le directeur du BEA.

15h00: Le directeur du BEA Troadec évoque la difficulté à localiser les épaves d'avion, et émet l'idée de multiplier les données sur les localisations des avions. «il faut réduire au maximum la difficulté de localisation».

14h59: Recommandation sur l'imposition d'enregistrement de nouvelles données

14h58: Recommandation sur les utilisations plus strictes des données des enregistrements de vols.

14h57: Il y a un besoin d'enregistrement des images de la planche de bord, dont le radar, affirme le directeur du BEA.

14h56: Il y a besoin de réaliser une étude sur la présence d'une évaluation d'incidence accessible

14h55: Recommandation sur la suppléance du commandant de bord

14h54: Les recommandations sur l'exploitation, dont le renforcement la compétence des pilotes en pilotage manuel en haute altitude.

14h53: Les recommandations concernent l'exploitation, la certification, les enregistreurs de vols, la transmission des données de vol.

14h52: Il parle de précédentes recommandations, dont les sondes Pitot.

14h50: Le directeur du BEA, Jean-Paul Troadec reprend la parole et ennonce des recommandations de sécurités.

14h50: «Pour essayer de comprendre les actions du pilote; un groupe facteur humain va être créé» dit Alain Bouillard

14h48: Alain Bouillard, du BEA dit que l'équipage et sa formation est conforme (la formation a depuis été modifiée). Il n'y a pas eu de répartition claire des tâches des pilotes. Il pointe les défaillances des pilotes.

14h47: Aucun message de détresse n'a été émis par l'équipage, dit Alain Bouillard du BEA.

14h45: Les pilotes affirment ne plus avoir d'indications valides. Une action à piquer est alors réalisée. L'avion est à 4.000 mètres à 240km/h; L'incidence est toujours à 15°

14h44: Incidence passe à 40°. La chute est 11.000 pieds minute. Les moteurs sont en pleine poussée.

14h43: L'assiette et l'incidence sont à 16°. Les alarmes s'éteignent car les données sont considérées comme invalides.

14h41: Maintien de l'ordre à cabrer du pilote. Les pilotes ne voient pas la situation de décrochage.

14h40: L'assiette progresse au-dessus de 10° et l'avion prend une trajectoire ascendante. L'avion monte, avant de descendre brutalement.

14h38: L'agent commence à détailler les problèmes survenus, dont le givrage des sondes pitot , les alarmes de décrochage qui résonnent, les ordres à cabrer du pilote.

14h35: Récit du début du vol par Alain Bouillard, du BEA. Deux pilotes en cabine. Vitesse normale de croisière. L'agent du BEA retrace les éléments déjà connus du vol d'Air France.

14h33: La conférence de presse du BEA a commencé au Bourget. Le directeur prend la parole, regrettant le traitement médiatique fait sur la catastrophe
jcjeant is offline  
Old 29th Jul 2011, 14:30
  #2233 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jan 2011
Location: London, UK
Posts: 143
"Sebaska wrote at #2233 (I don't have the quote facility for some reason)

RWA

Quote: If we are encouraged to believe that the THS reacted to 'noseup inputs' by pitching up, why did it not in turn respond to 'nosedown inputs' by pitching down?

It was explained to you already, yet you choose to ignore that and champion your pet theory of "cover up".

"

Where was this explained already, Sebaska? I have looked and I can't see any answer to RWA's point. I think it's a valid one.
ilesmark is offline  
Old 29th Jul 2011, 14:33
  #2234 (permalink)  
bearfoil
Guest
 
Posts: n/a
Without any new evidence, the crash becomes more an exercise in politics, and authority.

Perhaps the bottom line is how much authority (control of evidence) should any entity possess which has a commercial interest in the outcome of their investigation?

DOZY: As a sw boffin, do you expect much of what is needed for an understanding has a particular timeframe?

I think the window around a/p loss, since this is the point at which the vulnerability was highest? If the PILOTS are as described, what is the point in a retrospect of STALL?

How did this START?
 
Old 29th Jul 2011, 14:34
  #2235 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Aug 2009
Location: Germany
Age: 63
Posts: 1,809
Cool

Hi,

I think that was a misconception widely held by the industry as a whole, and not specific to Airbus in particular. It certainly looks like AF are going to have to pull their socks up though...
Well ... the aircraft involved in the crash is an Airbus property of AF and piloted by AF pilots so far I know
jcjeant is offline  
Old 29th Jul 2011, 14:54
  #2236 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Aug 2009
Location: Germany
Age: 63
Posts: 1,809
Cool

Hi,

Some comments about extracts of the press meeting:

14h56: Il y a besoin de réaliser une étude sur la présence d'une évaluation d'incidence accessible

2:56 p.m.: There is a need to conduct a study on the presence of an indication of attitude
Those type of instruments are already available ... but were not installed on the AF447

15h02: L'enquête continue, déclare Jean-Paul Troadec, directeur du BEA. La difficulté réside dans l'analyse du comportement des pilotes, d'où la création d'un «groupe facteur humain».

3:02 p.m.: The investigation continues, said Jean-Paul Troadec, director of BEA. The difficulty in analyzing the behavior of pilots, hence the creation of a "group human factor".
The analyse of the pilot behaviour is not so difficult .. when you know that the BEA itself show in his synthesis the "lack of proper training" of the AF447 pilots


14h33: La conférence de presse du BEA a commencé au Bourget. Le directeur prend la parole, regrettant le traitement médiatique fait sur la catastrophe

2:33 p.m.: The press conference began in the BEA Bourget. The director speaks, regretting that the media coverage of the disaster
First at all ... in France the press is free and secondly .. the press articles were based on leaks from the BEA
Before take care of the press .. it's better for BEA to give a look at their personnel !
jcjeant is offline  
Old 29th Jul 2011, 15:05
  #2237 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Aug 2009
Location: Germany
Age: 63
Posts: 1,809
Cool

Hi,

Full report available: (so far in french only)
http://media.webcastor.fr/web/bea/f-cp090601e3.pdf
jcjeant is offline  
Old 29th Jul 2011, 15:09
  #2238 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Nov 2010
Location: FR
Posts: 478
jcjeant, take care when translating:

14h56: Il y a besoin de réaliser une étude sur la présence d'une évaluation d'incidence accessible

2:56 p.m.: There is a need to conduct a study on the presence of an indication of angle of attack (not attitude)



About the group: question is why the stall alarm was ignored, IMO.

About the leaks: from the BEA ? Sure of that ? Of from interested parties (company, manufacturer, government...) who had access before the general public ?
Do you search for facts, reality, answers ?
AlphaZuluRomeo is offline  
Old 29th Jul 2011, 15:24
  #2239 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jun 2009
Location: California
Age: 50
Posts: 203
Synthesis Note

Nothing new. A "qui" typo on the english version that should have been caught by the proof readers, a bit sloppy from an organization that is detail focussed, surely a simple spell check would catch it?

Safety Recommendations

Some odd grammer but readable. All looks good addressing the areas of serious concern that we have read in the forum threads. To that extent it is all consistent.
However it still does answer why the pilot inputs of generally nose up which appear to contradict the PFD. Why input stick back when pitch +16 and below Vs with TOGA thrust and N1 near 100%. Perhaps we will never know as we can't see exactly what the flight instruments showed. This appears to be addressed in the remarkable suggestion in the safety recommendations. Is this formally recommending cameras on the flight deck?
Images recorders

One recommends that the regulatory authorities require that aircraft undertaking public transport flights
with passengers be equipped with an image recorder that makes it possible to observe the whole of the
instrument panel. Another recommends defining strict rules relating to the use of such recordings.


Flight parameter recordings

There are two recommendations on recording additional parameters.

Last edited by xcitation; 29th Jul 2011 at 16:51.
xcitation is offline  
Old 29th Jul 2011, 15:31
  #2240 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jul 2002
Location: UK
Posts: 3,182
Originally Posted by bearfoil View Post
DOZY: As a sw boffin, do you expect much of what is needed for an understanding has a particular timeframe?
Well, from a software perspective, what you'd need to do is load up a test rig made up of the exact hardware installed on that aircraft with the exact software installed (down to point releases), apply the DFDR data to that test rig's inputs to see what the software and hardware does - then repeat this test anything up to hundreds or thousands of times to see if any anomalies appear. I suspect this would not be a small or inexpensive undertaking, but it would be do-able.

How did this START?
It's looking very much like an inappropriate response to the situation as it developed, starting with the nose-up inputs shortly after FMS disconnect, then progressing through selection of TOGA and the later aggressive and maintained nose-up inputs all the way down, and it wouldn't be the first time it has happened (as I've always said, I think this was another Birgenair-type situation).

Way back when I started commenting on these threads earlier in the year I said that unreliable instrument readings in the wee hours at night, in IMC with unsettled weather hundreds of miles from land was a nightmare situation for any pilot to confront, and that any findings of mishandling on the part of the pilots *must* take this factor into account, and this is why I got very agitated when people said that by saying software failure was unlikely to be a cause I was blaming the pilots.

Lack of training appears to be a significant issue here, along with poor CRM practice when it comes to rest periods. It would appear that the ITCZ is a known problem area when it comes to aviation, and many pilots on the thread have expressed the opinion that they would not have left the two F/Os in charge until safely out the other side.

Colganair 3407 was the wake up call that the airline industry had bred complacency in two distinct areas, one of which was the effect of fatigue and the other was poor recognition of stall conditions and application of the correct response to those conditions - but that investigation was still ongoing when AF447 crashed and the final NTSB report not released until February 2010, 8 months after AF447.

In short I think AF447 was a "perfect storm" of the problems within aviation. Birgenair and Aeroperu had shown what could happen if the pitot-static system was compromised, but both of those incidents happened in the climb phase. Not much thought was given to what would happen if something similar happened at cruise altitude, with the attendant limits on possible escape procedures. Airlines had been training pilots to respond to approach to stall and the warnings generated without getting into what would happen if you were to actually stall, how to recognise it and - crucially - how to get out of it, because it requires going against the human instinct to cram on power and pull up when the correct response is actually to get the nose down and hold it there until the speed comes back and the wings are flying again. AF also deserve to come in for criticism for failing to expedite the replacement of pitot tubes which were known to have problems.

@jcjeant - if you're honestly suggesting that airlines were training their Airbus pilots on approach to stall only and the rest of their crews were getting full stall recognition and escape training, I think you need to get some perspective.
DozyWannabe is offline  

Thread Tools
Search this Thread

Contact Us - Archive - Advertising - Cookie Policy - Privacy Statement - Terms of Service - Do Not Sell My Personal Information

Copyright © 2018 MH Sub I, LLC dba Internet Brands. All rights reserved. Use of this site indicates your consent to the Terms of Use.