Looks like pilot error!
Google translation of "Le Figaro" leak:
The night of 31 May to 1 June 2009, the captain left the cockpit to 2:01 to go to rest and is replaced by a co-pilot takes his place on the left. When the Pitot probes frosting and the autopilot disconnects 2:10, the configuration of the crew is as follows. The captain is out of the cockpit, what is allowed during a flight "enhanced" (with three drivers). The less experienced co-pilot, who sits on the right is "driver based": it gets the control of the aircraft. The second co-pilot (Pilot Officer reinforcement) seated on the left is "driver not on" his mission is to manage failures and to provide information to his colleague.
Just after the autopilot disconnect, the pilot on the right gives a first-rate nose-which raises the unit up to 37,500 feet. At this altitude, the risk of dropping out, that is to say the loss of lift of the aircraft and so his fall is very important. The pilot should never have to mount the unit at that altitude. It seems that at this moment, "the event Pitot" is completed. The device found consistent speeds and just then the pilot to manually maintain the trajectory and the altitude of the aircraft to avoid the accident that follows. The loss of information anemometer was only temporary.
"My colleague had to panic"
The co-pilot seated on the left loses precious seconds to call the captain who is out of position. It activates an alarm located on top of his head and loses sight of the display failure. He does not see his colleague maintains an order to pitch, that is to say, continues to pull the handle, the opposite of what to do. This action is out of the plane's flight envelope: it picks up and drops into the ocean.
"This maneuver is totally incomprehensible, said an Air France pilot. My colleague had to panic. "During the fall of the device, the first officer maintains his order to pitch despite a few trials in the other direction, exacerbating the situation and prevent the aircraft to find the lift. The procedure in force at that time at Air France said to the throttle and reduce the incidence, that is to say, to push the handle. The co-pilot put the throttle but runs the opposite of what to do with the handle despite the impact of an alarm "Stall" stall for almost a minute.
When the captain entered the cockpit, neither pilot talks stall him. They tell him about technical problems and tell him they do not understand. The captain is unable to analyze the situation and help his two colleagues. Seconds before impact, the pilot takes the controls on the left. But it's too late, he can not do anything.
"This scenario raises the question of the level of the crew, says one expert. Either it was a bad crew and we need to understand how this could be possible for Air France, its level was compared to other standard crew of the company and so is the training and recruitment that will be questioned . 'In the pilot, we are reminded that certain formations, especially the control in icing conditions at high altitudes, came after the 447 despite twelve reported incidents of Pitot probes in-house.