Ethiopian airliner down in Africa
Joined: May 2016
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From: Sunshine Coast
One of the many serious post-flight delinquencies by the previous flight's Captain was his failure to properly document the problems encountered on his flight together with a full account of the remedial actions taken. There was no mention of the stick-shaker activation, there was no mention of having to run the Runway Stabilizer NNC and no mention of having to set the STAB TRIM switches to CUTOUT. The Captain limited his AFML write-up of defects to 'IAS and ALT Disagree shown after take off' and 'feel diff press light illuminate'. That was it!
His write up in the company's A-SHOR electronic reporting system was simply,
Airspeed unreliable and ALT disagree shown after takeoff, STS also running to the wrong direction, suspected because of speed difference, identified that CAPT instrument was unreliable and handover control to FO. Continue NNC of Airspeed Unreliable and ALT disagree. Decide to continue flying to CGK at FL280, landed safely runway 25L.
It appears that they did what you would have expected them to do. There's circumstantial evidence that the accident flight crew briefed for the possibility of encountering Airspeed Unreliable and ALT DISAGREE problems again, reviewed the Flight With Unreliable Airspeed tables and prepared a plan for dealing with the problems if they encountered them.
So maybe time to get off the accident crews' backs, huh?
Joined: Dec 2014
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From: Schiphol
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/ca...aga-2019-03-19
Captain Sullenberger
Captain Sullenberger
Joined: Jan 2008
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From: uk
That is an interesting point.
If the leaked log from the pre-crash LionAir flight is accurate, the captain noted "STS running reverse". It was a prosaic description, appearing to lack the detail and urgency that one would associate with a catastrophic nosedive only arrested due to the fortuitous circumstance of an off-duty 737 pilot sitting in the jump seat knowing the correct procedure.
If the leaked log from the pre-crash LionAir flight is accurate, the captain noted "STS running reverse". It was a prosaic description, appearing to lack the detail and urgency that one would associate with a catastrophic nosedive only arrested due to the fortuitous circumstance of an off-duty 737 pilot sitting in the jump seat knowing the correct procedure.
Prelim report says that an entry was made on an electronic reporting system, including: "Airspeed unreliable and ALT disagree shown after takeoff, STS also running to the wrong direction, suspected because of speed difference". This is different to the maint log report, which didn't mention STS at all - it's clear they didn't think STS was the real problem, merely another symptom of what they reported in the log.
STS also trims intermittently, is stopped by pilot trimming, and if speeds are unreliable it's probably very reasonable to assume that STS is affected if the a/c is trimming itself weirdly. Particularly in the absence of any knowledge of MCAS and with no AOA disagree displayed.
Joined: May 2002
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From: Downeast
You only need know that you are getting uncommanded trim that is effecting controllability of the aircraft.
Is that the case in the aircraft in question here?
Or are there several ways of dealing with various possible causes of the un-wanted trimming?
Gender Faculty Specialist
Joined: Mar 2002
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From: In your head.
Joined: Mar 2008
Posts: 307
Likes: 1
From: England
Lot of discussion on MCAS and associated issues, I'm not condoning Boeing's apparent quick fix but airlines and consumers have a degree of involvement too.
737 is by today's standards an old design, the NG was a comprehensive update but its still based on a 60's design.
If you look at the 757 which most of us thought would take over from the 737 it takes a greater payload further, higher and faster for a comparable or better fuel burn; Not seen much outside the States now but still heavily used by some major players for N. American routes.
Why choose an older design over newer, more efficient types? Conservatism and customer familiarity/confidence are my first thoughts, leading us to this moment.
737 is by today's standards an old design, the NG was a comprehensive update but its still based on a 60's design.
If you look at the 757 which most of us thought would take over from the 737 it takes a greater payload further, higher and faster for a comparable or better fuel burn; Not seen much outside the States now but still heavily used by some major players for N. American routes.
Why choose an older design over newer, more efficient types? Conservatism and customer familiarity/confidence are my first thoughts, leading us to this moment.
Joined: Jul 2007
Posts: 556
Likes: 1
From: Germany
I think it is a mistake to say that the tendency to pitch up with added thrust due to nacelle created lift is "inherently unstable." In hindsight, Boeing and its customers would have been better served by skipping MCAS, requiring some training in the pitch up tendency even if, God forbid, the flight characteristics required a new type rating. And it probably would not have actually required a new type rating anyway!
Obviously, these kinds of assistive devices require a proper hazard assessment to be performed, including adequate assumptions about human behaviour, especially in a high-workload environment, which is exactly where this system is most likely to be active, and an analysis of worst-case consequences of single failures. Arguably that could have been done better in the case of MCAS.
On the whole, I'm sure you will find that fly-by-wire airliners generally have a far better safety record than conventionally controlled ones. That is not to say that it is only due to the computer-controlled flight controls, but also because FBW types are newer and incorporate other advances in safe design and systems reliability. But it is also clear that computer-assisted flight controls do not generally make flying less safe, QF72 notwithstanding. Case in point: The A320neo has had no accidents and perhaps one incident (tailstrike), despite being on the market somewhat longer and having almost twice as many airframes in service as the 737MAX.
Bernd
Joined: Nov 2007
Posts: 2
Likes: 0
From: dublin
It would certainly be a positive thing if any of the previous Lion Air flight crew/
supernumary crew could post impressions from that flight.
After lots of criticism on his site they are probably highly unmotivated to do that
and I don't blame them
but horse's mouth stuff is better than a lot of guess work
supernumary crew could post impressions from that flight.
After lots of criticism on his site they are probably highly unmotivated to do that
and I don't blame them
but horse's mouth stuff is better than a lot of guess work
Joined: Nov 2015
Posts: 5
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From: NYC
This WSJ Article out today but I can't post the link yet, perhaps someone else can.
Inside U.S. Airlines' Decisions to Keep Flying the 737 MAX
Interesting quote from the article:No problems had shown up, says Neil Raaz, American’s director of flight safety. “We just didn’t see the indications that told us our airplanes were unsafe, and frankly, we still haven’t,” says Mr. Raaz, who is also a Boeing 737 captain and has U.S. Navy and National Transportation Safety Board training in accident investigations.
Joined: Nov 2007
Posts: 2
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From: dublin
No, you cannot simply waive certification requirements on stability by saying you will provide some more training. And how have you arrived at the conclusion that training would do a better job than a small system that provides the required control forces at high angles of attack? This is a system that helps return the aircraft to its normal flight envelope when it already is at a high angle of attack. Typically this is a situation where something else has already gone wrong, and that almost always implies a high workload, where it is vastly preferable to have the airplane return to fully controlled flight by itself rather than relying on a task-saturated pilot to remember some bit of training highly specific to this type of aircraft.
Obviously, these kinds of assistive devices require a proper hazard assessment to be performed, including adequate assumptions about human behaviour, especially in a high-workload environment, which is exactly where this system is most likely to be active, and an analysis of worst-case consequences of single failures. Arguably that could have been done better in the case of MCAS.
On the whole, I'm sure you will find that fly-by-wire airliners generally have a far better safety record than conventionally controlled ones. That is not to say that it is only due to the computer-controlled flight controls, but also because FBW types are newer and incorporate other advances in safe design and systems reliability. But it is also clear that computer-assisted flight controls do not generally make flying less safe, QF72 notwithstanding. Case in point: The A320neo has had no accidents and perhaps one incident (tailstrike), despite being on the market somewhat longer and having almost twice as many airframes in service as the 737MAX.
Bernd
Obviously, these kinds of assistive devices require a proper hazard assessment to be performed, including adequate assumptions about human behaviour, especially in a high-workload environment, which is exactly where this system is most likely to be active, and an analysis of worst-case consequences of single failures. Arguably that could have been done better in the case of MCAS.
On the whole, I'm sure you will find that fly-by-wire airliners generally have a far better safety record than conventionally controlled ones. That is not to say that it is only due to the computer-controlled flight controls, but also because FBW types are newer and incorporate other advances in safe design and systems reliability. But it is also clear that computer-assisted flight controls do not generally make flying less safe, QF72 notwithstanding. Case in point: The A320neo has had no accidents and perhaps one incident (tailstrike), despite being on the market somewhat longer and having almost twice as many airframes in service as the 737MAX.
Bernd
this is a whole new arena- FBW versus conventional. In fact the argument is only kept alive by the 737 which is the only large jet NOT FBW. The argument is more Boeing v Airbus where newer Boeings look conventional = control yoke and throttles that actually move- ie “ it does what it says on the tin” versus joy sticks which don’t move together and static thrust levers.
Airbus and Boeing both similar in incident rates over last few years. I’m also sure this has been covered at length in previous prunes.
I like the Boeing way - you can see what the other pilot is trying to do. And what the automatics are doing since the controls follow through on commands. There will be armies of pro Airbus guys who will disagree.
Joined: Jul 2002
Posts: 65
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From: Europe
Suppose MCAS becomes unavailable during flight e.g. due to Stab trim deactivation. The MAX’s flight characteristics in approach to stall scenarios proved not certifiable without MCAS as a fix. I’d like to ask the ones in the know (FcEng and others) how critical the loss of MCAS in flight would be in real life. For example, encountering a flight upset with approach to stall, how easily can this be recovered without MCAS? How was the risk of such an event assessed? Was it demonstrated in test flights? Why was it determined there would be no need to train flight crews on the simulator for the changed handling outside the certification parameters?
In a previous post I assumed such a scenario to be critcal, but perhaps it isn’t? Thanking you in advance for shedding light on this issue.
In a previous post I assumed such a scenario to be critcal, but perhaps it isn’t? Thanking you in advance for shedding light on this issue.
Joined: Nov 2007
Posts: 2
Likes: 0
From: dublin
Lot of discussion on MCAS and associated issues, I'm not condoning Boeing's apparent quick fix but airlines and consumers have a degree of involvement too.
737 is by today's standards an old design, the NG was a comprehensive update but its still based on a 60's design.
If you look at the 757 which most of us thought would take over from the 737 it takes a greater payload further, higher and faster for a comparable or better fuel burn; Not seen much outside the States now but still heavily used by some major players for N. American routes.
Why choose an older design over newer, more efficient types? Conservatism and customer familiarity/confidence are my first thoughts, leading us to this moment.
737 is by today's standards an old design, the NG was a comprehensive update but its still based on a 60's design.
If you look at the 757 which most of us thought would take over from the 737 it takes a greater payload further, higher and faster for a comparable or better fuel burn; Not seen much outside the States now but still heavily used by some major players for N. American routes.
Why choose an older design over newer, more efficient types? Conservatism and customer familiarity/confidence are my first thoughts, leading us to this moment.
Y
Joined: May 2002
Aviation Qualifications: ATP+Mil
Posts: 18,633
Likes: 1,072
From: Downeast
Nomad,
In a companion thread here there is discussion about having to rely upon the same faulty sensors even in "Manual" reversion and comments that one might actually be in "pseudo-manual mode" as a result.
I think back to the long discussion about AF 447 crash and the circumstances surrounding that tragedy.
How does a crew really get back to an old fashioned "Hands On" configuration of controls, instruments, and sensors (where all of the automation and fancy gadgets are completely isolated from involvement) these days?
In a companion thread here there is discussion about having to rely upon the same faulty sensors even in "Manual" reversion and comments that one might actually be in "pseudo-manual mode" as a result.
I think back to the long discussion about AF 447 crash and the circumstances surrounding that tragedy.
How does a crew really get back to an old fashioned "Hands On" configuration of controls, instruments, and sensors (where all of the automation and fancy gadgets are completely isolated from involvement) these days?
Joined: Mar 2007
Posts: 257
Likes: 2
From: Europe
Why so? What was driving the cost? The fuselage cross section was the same as 707, 727 and 737. Wings were better, and the undercarriage was high enough to support support high bypass turbofans without workarounds. The 757-200 was originally intended as a replacement for the 727-200 and is only 2 ft. longer, even if it seats more due to more efficient use of cabin space. It is hard to see why a shrink of the 757 would not have been a competent replacement for the 737 - 700 to 900 and a serious competitor for the A32x-Neo.
Joined: Apr 2015
Aviation Qualifications: Spotter
Posts: 1,130
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From: Under the radar, over the rainbow
Reuters report on CVR
Unless I've missed it, this Reuters story hasn't been addressed here.
Exclusive: Lion Air pilots scoured handbook in minutes before crash
. . . Big Snip . . .
“They didn’t seem to know the trim was moving down,” the third source said. “They thought only about airspeed and altitude. That was the only thing they talked about.”
. . . Big Snip . . .
“They didn’t seem to know the trim was moving down,” the third source said. “They thought only about airspeed and altitude. That was the only thing they talked about.”
Joined: Sep 2018
Posts: 199
Likes: 41
From: Laredo, TX
No, you cannot simply waive certification requirements on stability by saying you will provide some more training. And how have you arrived at the conclusion that training would do a better job than a small system that provides the required control forces at high angles of attack? This is a system that helps return the aircraft to its normal flight envelope when it already is at a high angle of attack. Typically this is a situation where something else has already gone wrong, and that almost always implies a high workload, where it is vastly preferable to have the airplane return to fully controlled flight by itself rather than relying on a task-saturated pilot to remember some bit of training highly specific to this type of aircraft.
Obviously, these kinds of assistive devices require a proper hazard assessment to be performed, including adequate assumptions about human behaviour, especially in a high-workload environment, which is exactly where this system is most likely to be active, and an analysis of worst-case consequences of single failures. Arguably that could have been done better in the case of MCAS.
On the whole, I'm sure you will find that fly-by-wire airliners generally have a far better safety record than conventionally controlled ones. That is not to say that it is only due to the computer-controlled flight controls, but also because FBW types are newer and incorporate other advances in safe design and systems reliability. But it is also clear that computer-assisted flight controls do not generally make flying less safe, QF72 notwithstanding. Case in point: The A320neo has had no accidents and perhaps one incident (tailstrike), despite being on the market somewhat longer and having almost twice as many airframes in service as the 737MAX.
Bernd
Obviously, these kinds of assistive devices require a proper hazard assessment to be performed, including adequate assumptions about human behaviour, especially in a high-workload environment, which is exactly where this system is most likely to be active, and an analysis of worst-case consequences of single failures. Arguably that could have been done better in the case of MCAS.
On the whole, I'm sure you will find that fly-by-wire airliners generally have a far better safety record than conventionally controlled ones. That is not to say that it is only due to the computer-controlled flight controls, but also because FBW types are newer and incorporate other advances in safe design and systems reliability. But it is also clear that computer-assisted flight controls do not generally make flying less safe, QF72 notwithstanding. Case in point: The A320neo has had no accidents and perhaps one incident (tailstrike), despite being on the market somewhat longer and having almost twice as many airframes in service as the 737MAX.
Bernd