Ethiopian airliner down in Africa

[bill fly]

I’d like to get some of the macho types on here into the sim and throw a low level all Hell let loose scenario at them.
No green table, QRH open under the reading light, cigar lit and plenty of confidence - Just noise, conflicting indications, unfamiliar flight behaviour, shakers and elevator load, while the ground whizzes by.
That kind of situation requires lots of pre-knowledge, analysis and cool assessment, while you ride in a confusing mad cockpit. Even better lots of practice.
Concentrates the mind or defeats the mind.

[BALEWA]

So, basically, with all said and done here and all the revelations coming out lately from Boeing, NTSB and the FAA the Lionair and ET guys just didn't have a chance.

What a Shame, it had to all come out like this, like if all this was not discussed and debated after the Lionair October crash.

THE MAX IS SAFE...…Thats what they all said.

I wonder how many of us would have made it out better if put in the exact same situation or scenario as both crashes.

Sad….

[safetypee]

Originally Posted by GlobalNav

And oversight is not as easy as it looks on paper. It gets reduced from technical examination to paper audits, turns engineers into clerks, and insulates the “overseers” from the technical details. Battles rage over the items to be retained by the FAA and can be beaten down by FAA management that is more sensitive to “customer” complaints.

Global Nav, I agree.
However these actives should not remove the need for the regulator to have sufficient understanding of the system to judge normal and non-normal operations, and then compare with crew standards and training.
Beware the assumptions in that.

Unfortunately many systems are now so complex and intertwined, only the manufacturer has the ability to understand the larger picture. Aspects of complex accident investigations may be delegated to the manufacturer, but at least their findings have to be submitted to the investigative group for peer review.

In part, this problem should be manageable with partnership, trust, and mutual understanding of design and certification processes, including safety culture. Perhaps the other overseas authorities should play a greater part in the oversight and review processes.
What happens when these aspect fail; who investigates these features?

[dufc]

Boeing statement just issued :

A Message from Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg

To airlines, passengers and the aviation community:

We know lives depend on the work we do, and our teams embrace that responsibility with a deep sense of commitment every day. Our purpose at Boeing is to bring family, friends and loved ones together with our commercial airplanes—safely. The tragic losses of Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 and Lion Air Flight 610 affect us all, uniting people and nations in shared grief for all those in mourning. Our hearts are heavy, and we continue to extend our deepest sympathies to the loved ones of the passengers and crew on board.

Safety is at the core of who we are at Boeing, and ensuring safe and reliable travel on our airplanes is an enduring value and our absolute commitment to everyone. This overarching focus on safety spans and binds together our entire global aerospace industry and communities. We're united with our airline customers, international regulators and government authorities in our efforts to support the most recent investigation, understand the facts of what happened and help prevent future tragedies. Based on facts from the Lion Air Flight 610 accident and emerging data as it becomes available from the Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 accident, we're taking actions to fully ensure the safety of the 737 MAX. We also understand and regret the challenges for our customers and the flying public caused by the fleet's grounding.

Work is progressing thoroughly and rapidly to learn more about the Ethiopian Airlines accident and understand the information from the airplane's cockpit voice and flight data recorders. Our team is on-site with investigators to support the investigation and provide technical expertise. The Ethiopia Accident Investigation Bureau will determine when and how it's appropriate to release additional details.

Boeing has been in the business of aviation safety for more than 100 years, and we'll continue providing the best products, training and support to our global airline customers and pilots. This is an ongoing and relentless commitment to make safe airplanes even safer. Soon we'll release a software update and related pilot training for the 737 MAX that will address concerns discovered in the aftermath of the Lion Air Flight 610 accident. We've been working in full cooperation with the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration, the Department of Transportation and the National Transportation Safety Board on all issues relating to both the Lion Air and the Ethiopian Airlines accidents since the Lion Air accident occurred in October last year.

Our entire team is devoted to the quality and safety of the aircraft we design, produce and support. I've dedicated my entire career to Boeing, working shoulder to shoulder with our amazing people and customers for more than three decades, and I personally share their deep sense of commitment. Recently, I spent time with our team members at our 737 production facility in Renton, Wash., and once again saw firsthand the pride our people feel in their work and the pain we're all experiencing in light of these tragedies. The importance of our work demands the utmost integrity and excellence—that's what I see in our team, and we'll never rest in pursuit of it.

Our mission is to connect people and nations, protect freedom, explore our world and the vastness of space, and inspire the next generation of aerospace dreamers and doers—and we'll fulfill that mission only by upholding and living our values. That's what safety means to us. Together, we'll keep working to earn and keep the trust people have placed in Boeing.

Dennis Muilenburg
Chairman, President and CEO
The Boeing Company

[LDRA]

Originally Posted by Ian W

The reliable indication is that it is always nose down trim and unless you do something about it and the AoA is still indicating a close to stall value it will wind in another nose down trim. Unsurprisingly, this will require more back stick pressure, If you trim against it then after 5 seconds it will wind in more nose down trim. If your 'driver assist' in your smart car was repeatedly trying to pull you out of your lane - how many times would it take before you switched it off? IF nose down trim repeatedly runs making the control column force difficult to handle and you also know that this is a fault that can happen in the MAX and has caused fatal crashes, would you
(a). Say it's not runaway trim as that is running continuously to the maximum position so I'll just carry on pulling harder, or,
(b) Say the trim is repeatedly doing something I think is dangerous I will set the Stab Trim cut out switches to Off as was said in that AD ..

Wouldn't you also always get nose down trim from STS if you are decelerating?

It doesn't even need to be actually decelerating, just need air speed indication system to indicate deceleration, as STS trim command is primarily scheduled off air speed

[formulaben]

Originally Posted by bsieker

To reiterate: frequent automatic trim is normal on a 737 (STS, Mach Trim, ...), and is in no way comparable to a lane assist function going haywire. You comparison would be more appropriate if we were talking about the autopilot initiating a turn when none was called for.

Bernd

OK, I'll bite. What do you do when the aircraft rolls (e.g. initiates a turn) when none was called for? And what about a yaw? And what about a pitch? What would any sensible airman do?

[BluSdUp]

Gums
Salute
I would like to address this short reply to You as it appear that You can grasp details, principals and the greater Picture.

It looks to me that the Max is certified under false pretenses , or self certified as FAA has let Boeing do most of it in house!!
The Max is unstable and not airworthy with out the MCAS!
I doubt the MCAS is fit for purpose, as I have always said the 737-800 even , has a dangerous pitch coupling.

I predict that in the not so distant future the Max will kill again if only a software fix is provided,this time due to a full stall, spin as the MCAS is inadequate.
I could be wrong, but 10 000hrs 738 plus 2000hrs sim tells me this bird is one step to fare and the Max is clearly two steps past stable and safe.
Simple as that!
Regards
Cpt B
PS
Do not take my word for it.
MOT in Canada is going to look into the FAA certification they excepted AND are doing their own certification on any fix.
Aircanada has grounded all the Maxes to 1 July
Lets hope its this July not 2020
DS

[bsieker]

Originally Posted by formulaben

OK, I'll bite. What do you do when the aircraft rolls (e.g. initiates a turn) when none was called for? And what about a yaw? And what about a pitch? What would any sensible airman do?

You got it the wrong way round. This wasn't a challenge. It was to point out that the problem of erroneous MCAS activation is not as easily identified as, say, lane-assist failing or the autopilot initiating a wrong turn.

So pilots identifying a rogue autopilot or lane-assist has nothing to do with being able to identify rogue MCAS, especially in a noisy and high-workload environment.

Moreover, you cannot assume that "any sensible airman" (if you can even define that) would do what you, in the comfort of your armchair and having perfect hindsight, have deduced was the most appropriate action, simply by our privileged knowledge of the actual outcome.


Bernd

[PEI_3721]

Ian W, # 2076, patplan # 2071,
Take care when attempting to compare failure reports with supposed accident scenarios; local investigation or narratives might not have the same level of expertise or understanding.
Furthermore, it would be unwise to make direct comparison with recent accidents, because without knowledge of the source of failure (where did the erroneous AoA originate), everything else is assumption.

My reading of the other events cannot identify any connection with AoA or any other parameter associated with MACS.

[flyingchanges]

So, hypothetically, if an intermittent short were to develop in a yoke mounted electric trim switch, and it would run nose down for a few seconds, stop run nose down again, stop. How many times would it need to do this before you called it a runaway? Or would you watch it do it again and again? Hey, look it's doing it again, too bad we don't have a checklist that would deal with this unwanted stab trim motion.

[Chesty Morgan]

Dunno about you but MY runaway stabiliser checklist says, and I quote, "Uncommanded stabilizer trim movement occurs continuously".

​​​​​​Yes, since Lion Air, we know carrying out this checklist would have solved the problem .

[WillFlyForCheese]

Apparent test flight now . . .

https://flightaware.com/live/flight/BOE302

[gums]

Salute!

Previous rant continued:

At least one of the Chuck Yeager wannabes here pointed out lack of previous flight writeups that likely had MCAS activation prior to the 610 crash. WRONG!!! We went thru the acatual writeups and maintenance actions right here on pPrune.
- IAS disagree - alt disagree - feel difference
The FDR traces clearly showed the same things that 610 experienced at the onset, as well as the "corrective action". It showed what they did. You know, the Luke Skywalker/Yeager procedure -turn off stuff and go "manual". It worked, but they forgot to writeup the constant stick shaker. Hmmmmmmmmmm. Would that have helped the 610 crew?
The traces show that crew had instant shaker, likely GPWS warning when they did their dive just as flaps retracted, and so forth - exactly what the 610 crew experienced.

The FAA Airworthiness Directive mentioned all of the above possible indications plus stick shaker indicating that something was awry, and recommended the "runaway trim" procedure ( basically, "O.K. R2, let's go manual!")

The recognition of inadvertant AoA-related MCAS activation upon takeoff must be pre-thought and actions rehearsed, as many things are happening. WoW and shaker starts. Flaps up and nose goes down, maybe get GPWS alert, several caution indicator lights come on and trim goes nose down again a few seconds after trimming up. and so forth. To make things worse, 610 crew put flaps down and the MCAS behaved itself. uh huh. Step 2 or 3 or "x" in the stick shaker/stall warning proedure, right? Flaps back up and MCAS starts again. Are you confused now?
So I cut the 610 crew some slack, especially since the intermittent trim was not what one would expect from the tradional runawy trim emergency.

Dunno why 302 crew didn't recognize the problem, but it may have been caused by something else and may be yet another undocumented "feature" of the MAX.

Gums sends...

[Ian W]

Originally Posted by PEI_3721

Ian W, # 2076, patplan # 2071,
Take care when attempting to compare failure reports with supposed accident scenarios; local investigation or narratives might not have the same level of expertise or understanding.
Furthermore, it would be unwise to make direct comparison with recent accidents, because without knowledge of the source of failure (where did the erroneous AoA originate), everything else is assumption.

My reading of the other events cannot identify any connection with AoA or any other parameter associated with MACS.

That is just the point.
I would have expected a large number of 737 pilots to start quoting what happened when they get an AoA mismatch and unreliable airspeed. There is no large number - despite everyone piling on (with some justification) that reliance on a single AoA was not good engineering. It would appear that AoA subsystem failures in the earlier variants of the 737 are rare enough to be considered highly improbable and that would be added to the 'in any case a repeatedly running MCAS can be handled as with any other trim runaway'.
So the question remains what is different about the Max AOA subsystem that makes it less reliable that the earlier 737s?

[groundbum]

if Norwegian have a lot of grounded MAX8s, and are already short of cash, is this extended grounding their death knell? I doubt Boeing are paying any compensation on a day by day basis, it could be years after a lot of litigation which is not much use for cashflow...

G

[Zeffy]

DOT memo

It's official -- DOT will audit FAA certification of 737Max.

[Livesinafield]

It's an error they type is grounded... that kind of thing doesn't "slip through"

[runner1021]

The thing I'm having a hard time understanding is why the MCAS finally wins. Did the pilots simply give up? If you feel the aircraft becoming nose heavy, what do you do? You apply counteracting nose up trim. MCAS trims the nose down, and you, in turn, trim nose up. Over and over and over. It should be a draw. (Of course this doesn't take into account the myriad of conflicting and confusing warnings that you are also trying to deal with). It would appear that the issue that eventually lead to both crew's demise was excessive airspeed. Although airspeed is life, in these instances it may have been just the opposite. The higher the airspeed, the more authority the stabilizer has over the elevator until you reach the point where control is impossible. But, if you continue to trim, shouldn't you be able to maintain some semblance of controlled flight? However, when you add in extremely high airspeed, pitch sensitivity becomes a huge issue.

[Longtimer]

CNBC

Transportation Department seeks audit of FAA’s certification of Boeing 737 Max 8

Published 2 hours ago | Updated Moments Ago

Leslie Josephs@lesliejosephs

Christine Wang@christiiineeee

Key Points

• Transportation Secretary Elaine Chao has asked for a formal audit of the FAA’s approval of Boeing 737 Max 8 planes.
• Two of the planes have been involved in fatal crashes in less than five months.
• Chao asked the agency’s inspector general to audit the FAA’s process.

https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/19/transportation-secretary-asks-departments-inspector-general-to-audit-faas-certification-of-boeing-737-max.html

memorandum-secretary-audit-certification-boeing-737-max8-2012-2017.pdf

[acad_l]

But did they notice that there is a new (and decent) nominee as head of the FAA?