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Ethiopian airliner down in Africa

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Ethiopian airliner down in Africa

Old 19th Apr 2019, 18:48
  #4141 (permalink)  
 
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The information states that MCAS trims nose down 2.5 degrees in 10 seconds. Is this all or nothing?

Is there an indication at what AoA the bump in lift occurs?
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Old 19th Apr 2019, 19:01
  #4142 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Smythe View Post
The information states that MCAS trims nose down 2.5 degrees in 10 seconds. Is this all or nothing?
Yep. It's going to be changed.

Is there an indication at what AoA the bump in lift occurs?
Depends on many other factors. (All I know is what I read here.)
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Old 19th Apr 2019, 19:25
  #4143 (permalink)  
 
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Quote: Is there an indication at what AoA the bump in lift occurs?
Depends on many other factors. (All I know is what I read here.)
Thanks, I understand this, but if one follows the scenario that the 738 and the 737-8 are so similar that a powerpoint is all that is required, then considering all of the factors being the same or similar, when does the 737-8 pitch up vs the 738?
I am trying to word this correctly...
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Old 19th Apr 2019, 19:43
  #4144 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Smythe View Post
The information states that MCAS trims nose down 2.5 degrees in 10 seconds. Is this all or nothing?

Is there an indication at what AoA the bump in lift occurs?
Many pages back, in another thread LEOCh posted a schematic chart showing a nasty inflection between 10 and 15 degrees AOA, which is when MCAS kicks in. Once AOA is below 10 degrees, MCAS unwinds the nose-down trim (unless the pilots intervene with electrical trim inputs).

for want of more accurate values, the nacelle lift region stretches from AoA 8' to 14' (where the wing stalls)
See: https://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/618252-boeing-737-max-software-fixes-due-lion-air-crash-delayed-post10423226.html



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Old 19th Apr 2019, 20:12
  #4145 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by MurphyWasRight View Post
It is a shame that the Mentour Pilot video has been disabled, I managed to watch it and it showed what happens when the IAS disagree and runaway trim checklist are followed in the (presumed) ET MCAS case. Overall fairly similar to your scenario.

The pilots in the sim calmly and methodically followed the checklists in what I would call a demonstrating or teaching mode, certainly not stressed or surprised. Don't believer they even had a stick shaker going.

Even so they ended up in a state where manual trim inputs were physically close to impossible after electrical trim cutout due to the air speed.
My takeaway was that unless the pilot trimmed close to neutral before electrical tim cutout there was no way to manually trim.
Note that this should be possible (as shown in both lion air flights) since pilot trim cancels (for 5 seconds) MCAS trim actions.

One other observation from the video is that from the jumpseat camera point of view the trim wheel action is very obvious. I suspect it might be much less so for stressed pilots trying to make sense of the situation. This may be why the jumpseat pilot was able to save the penultimate Lion air flight.
Originally Posted by positiverate20 View Post
Mentour pilot's video was fantastic, it was uploaded prior to the publication of the preliminary report, it's a shame he has removed it.
Mentour pilot has uploaded a completely new video about B737 trim issues. It covers a lot of familiar territory, but does include some of the relevant footage from the (deleted) video that was referred to in the Leeham News article:

Edit: Skip forward to 10 mins to see the actual footage.

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Old 19th Apr 2019, 21:34
  #4146 (permalink)  
 
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OK, first: I'm not a pilot, I'm a functional safety engineer, mostly working for automotive.
Second: I read this thread from the beginning and learned a lot, thanks!

But I think I can explain one tendency which went up:
Pilots blame the pilots, engineers blame the Boeing engineers.

From my point of view, the reason in both cases is the same:
Pilots know the processes and trained procedures for pilots and learned, that the crews didn't follow them completely and textbook-like but rather improvised. But they do not know the engineering process regarding safety-critical systems/hardware/software.
With the engineers it is exactly otherwise. They see a crew overwhelmed by alarms, shakers and informations caused by an engineering error. For them (sorry) the pilot is the last line of defense in case they did not do their job of everything goes wrong (multiple point fault).

Pilots follow procedures which e.g. minimize the risk to take off with a wrong configuration, They double-check and check again and have proven-in-use procedures which make sure that such things happen less than one in a million flights.
Engineers know proven-in-use processes which make sure that something like the current MCAS system effectively never happens.
Still it happened.

Boeing knows why they put all focus on how great they fix MCAS because if someone asks the right question, they are in much deeper trouble like, for example Volkswagen:
The big punishment for them was not fixing the cars but they had to implement a process that makes sure that this never happens again.

So far nobody asked Boeing how something so obvious and big could slip thru their safety process including document reviews, walk-thru, inspections, accessments and linked documents on several layers of detail. And, in addition, how this would not be found in all the classic safety/quality analysis methods (FMEDA, FMEA, FTA, DFA...).
Safety is not based on the genius of the one great programmer who is also a pilot and simulates every thin in his head (but makes a mistake after having too much pizza) but rather a strict process including a lot of people and a lot of documentation and testing.

Within this thread, pilots question the training and qualification of mainly all pilots regarding critical situations. But they are the last line of defense.
Following the same logic, one could question the qualification, independence and culture of Boeing safety engineers.
And yes, that would lead to the question if there are other functions like MCAS still hidden...

Maybe the pilots may have been able to safe a few lives, but the biggest mistakes happened years before driven by
-> Strange laws (Grandfather rights)
-> Commercial interest (no training)
-> inconsistent requirements / documentation (0,6 within risk analysis and 2.5 within SW)
-> Maybe bad safety culture if this was done on purpose and not by mistake
-> Mistakes within the impact analysis of a wrong MCAS activation

If I would be a member of the FAA or similar organization, I would not focus on MCAS and the bugfix, I would simply aks: What went wrong within the engineering process and how can you prove that no other hazards excaped thru the exact same hole in your process.
The deviation from established engineering rocesses I assume here in my opinion far exceeds the deviation between the trim runaway procedure and what actually happened.

But as mentioned: I'm not a pilot.
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Old 19th Apr 2019, 21:36
  #4147 (permalink)  
 
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There was a time when pilots talked about the laws of aerodynamics in a language that was clear, concise and understood by the aviation community. Now the language has changed, it is full of computer terminology. Yet despite all that talk about all sorts of wizardry with computers, the laws of aerodynamics remain unchanged. It is those that have resulted in a ten meter crater in this instance, it is that very combat between this new phenomenon and the basics of aerodynamics that we seem to put our faith and trust . I ask this question, Is the whole scenario really that much different to the VW emissions scandal.
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Old 19th Apr 2019, 22:37
  #4148 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by MurphyWasRight View Post
Not exactly the same signs as stab trim runaway which would be trained/expected to be continuous whereas MCAS (unpatched) worked in up to 10 second bursts then stops until the next pilot trim input.

A MCAS checklist could stress both the need for and safety of -fully- trimming before using the cutout switches to avoid possibility of manual trim not working due to aero loads.

Had this been included in the AD in response to Lion Air it may have helped.

In roughly the time it takes to read this post MCAS provided 2 nose down inputs to ET.
The Runaway Stabilizer checklist states "Condition: Uncommanded stabilizer trim movement occurs continuously". I think we can agree that an MCAS event is "uncommanded".
What does continuous mean? 5 seconds, 10 seconds, 1 minute, one hour? And let's say that the uncommanded stabilizer trim movement is caused by an intermittent short circuit somewhere (trim switch, wiring harness, etc) that produces a 5 second, 10 second, 1 minute uncommanded stabilizer trim movement? How can you tell the difference? Do you really care what the source is? Does the source affect the outcome? Do you really think that someone flying along, fat, dumb and happy and suddenly has the nose pitch down will have the presence of mind to count how long the trim is moving? I would suggest the shock value would preclude that.

As well, one does not want to get into the game of diagnosing the source of the failure (MCAS or otherwise) while the control of the aircraft is at stake. One checklist to cover all scenarios is more than adequate. Secure the malfunction, fly the airplane and land asap and save the diagnosis and troubleshooting once you're back on terra firma.
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Old 19th Apr 2019, 23:00
  #4149 (permalink)  
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We keep going back to the limited electrical trimming applied by the captain. Or should it be electrical trimming achieved?

I'm really puzzled by the fuzzy inputs - just about on the centre vertical of the graph. More like noise than a specific thumb input, or even a few inputs.


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Old 19th Apr 2019, 23:25
  #4150 (permalink)  
 
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Hi all

just read an interesting news story about all cirrus vision jets being grounded due to faulty aoa information forcing the nose down in some instances

https://www.flyingmag.com/faa-ground...us-vision-jets
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Old 20th Apr 2019, 02:34
  #4151 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by L39 Guy View Post
The Runaway Stabilizer checklist states "Condition: Uncommanded stabilizer trim movement occurs continuously". I think we can agree that an MCAS event is "uncommanded".
What does continuous mean? 5 seconds, 10 seconds, 1 minute, one hour? And let's say that the uncommanded stabilizer trim movement is caused by an intermittent short circuit somewhere (trim switch, wiring harness, etc) that produces a 5 second, 10 second, 1 minute uncommanded stabilizer trim movement? How can you tell the difference? Do you really care what the source is? Does the source affect the outcome? Do you really think that someone flying along, fat, dumb and happy and suddenly has the nose pitch down will have the presence of mind to count how long the trim is moving? I would suggest the shock value would preclude that.

As well, one does not want to get into the game of diagnosing the source of the failure (MCAS or otherwise) while the control of the aircraft is at stake. One checklist to cover all scenarios is more than adequate. Secure the malfunction, fly the airplane and land asap and save the diagnosis and troubleshooting once you're back on terra firma.
Totally agree that no one is going to time the length of the runaway, at least I would hope not - act as soon as it is seen.

My point was more about the nature of the emergency AD that could have been much clearer about uncommanded trim that stops with any pilot trim then restarts about 5 seconds later.
In that case stress importance of first fully trimming then hitting cutout.
This is hinted at in a note at the end of the procedure, I say it should have been highlighted.

Unlike 'stuck switch" uncommanded trim the MCAS case does allow for pilot electrical trim first then followed by cutout, a quick blip of the switch is all that would be needed to test if this was possible. That could be a step in the runaway trim procedure, I agree do not need a seperate MCAS checklist if that was included.

As I said before I am sure Boeing pilots/engineer could come up with a clear procedure if given the mandate to do so.
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Old 20th Apr 2019, 04:01
  #4152 (permalink)  
 
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So far nobody asked Boeing how something so obvious and big could slip thru their safety process including document reviews, walk-thru, inspections, accessments and linked documents on several layers of detail.
Boeing must have known something was up if the computer modelling showed that MCAS needed to provide 0.6 degrees correction, and in flight testing, 2.5 degrees was required. That is a big disconnect between design assumptions and actual.

What went wrong within the engineering process and how can you prove that no other hazards excaped thru the exact same hole in your process.
There are 4 interfaces for the Horizontal Stabilizer portion of the Flight Control System (FCS), which link the autopilot trim, electric trim, manual trim, and MCAS trim to the stabilizer trim system.

EDIT: Just read this...
Boeing is currently examining whether or not the current MCAS interface between the MCAS computers and the horizontal stabilizer trim motors and Horizontal Stabilizer Jackscrew is compatible with the MCAS software updates.

As MCAS was an option for other 737 variants, (as well as other Boeing aircraft) it would be interesting to see what those systems provided as a correction. (perhaps to the 738?)

On a historical note, it appears that MCAS has been considered for most Boeing aircraft, but that the vortex tabs solved the problem....now we know why they are still on all of the wings.

Last edited by Smythe; 20th Apr 2019 at 04:30.
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Old 20th Apr 2019, 04:57
  #4153 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by MurphyWasRight View Post
My point was more about the nature of the emergency AD that could have been much clearer about uncommanded trim that stops with any pilot trim then restarts about 5 seconds later.
In that case stress importance of first fully trimming then hitting cutout.
This is hinted at in a note at the end of the procedure, I say it should have been highlighted.

Unlike 'stuck switch" uncommanded trim the MCAS case does allow for pilot electrical trim first then followed by cutout, a quick blip of the switch is all that would be needed to test if this was possible. That could be a step in the runaway trim procedure, I agree do not need a seperate MCAS checklist if that was included.
I think that’s a good observation. Sorry for misinterpreting your original intent.
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Old 20th Apr 2019, 05:44
  #4154 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by L39 Guy View Post
The Runaway Stabilizer checklist states "Condition: Uncommanded stabilizer trim movement occurs continuously". I think we can agree that an MCAS event is "uncommanded".
What does continuous mean? 5 seconds, 10 seconds, 1 minute, one hour? And let's say that the uncommanded stabilizer trim movement is caused by an intermittent short circuit somewhere (trim switch, wiring harness, etc) that produces a 5 second, 10 second, 1 minute uncommanded stabilizer trim movement? How can you tell the difference? Do you really care what the source is? Doesa) the source affect the outcome? Do you really think that someone flying along, fat, dumb and happy and suddenly has the nose pitch down will have the presence of mind to count how long the trim is moving? I would suggest the shock value would preclude that.

As well, one does not want to get into the game of diagnosing the source of the failure (MCAS or otherwise) while the control of the aircraft is at stake. One checklist to cover all scenarios is more than adequate. Secure the malfunction, fly the airplane and land asap and save the diagnosis and troubleshooting once you're back on terra firma.
other than MCAS can be stopped by a simple use of the thumb switch on the yoke, MCAS will not be keep going runaway, will just pause for 5 seconds and than restart.
MCAS has also a much different logic, including new cutoff logic than previous versions, a runaway trim can be in both directions, while MCAS is only in nose down, and can be stopped without cutout...to me as non pilot does not look like a memory item
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Old 20th Apr 2019, 06:22
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TryingtoLearn #4154 rightly asks “What went wrong within the engineering process and how can you prove that no other hazards excaped thru the exact same hole in your process.”
787 was first aircraft certificated (partly) under new ''Organisation Designation Authorisation'' (ODA) arrangements, specifically intended to reduce FAA involvement. NTSB Report 2014/AIR1401 tells us what went wrong and how hazardous batteries slipped thru.
“Boeing’s electrical power system safety assessment did not consider the most severe effects of a cell internal short circuit and include requirements to mitigate related risks, and the review of the assessment by Boeing authorized representatives and Federal Aviation Administration certification engineers did not reveal this deficiency"
.”
Boeing failed to incorporate design requirements in the 787 main and auxiliary power unit battery specification control drawing to mitigate the most severe effects of a cell internal short circuit, and the Federal Aviation Administration failed to uncover this design vulnerability as part of its review and approval of Boeing’s electrical power system certification plan and proposed methods of compliance".
"
Unclear traceability among the individual special conditions, safety assessment assumptions and rationale, requirements, and proposed methods of compliance for the 787 main and auxiliary power unit battery likely contributed to the Federal Aviation Administration’s failure to identify the need for a thermal runaway certification test.”
787 battery fires could easily have cost two planes and all on board. Boeing/FAA Corp. failed to learn. 737 Max is second Boeing certificated under ODA.

Last edited by ozaub; 20th Apr 2019 at 06:28. Reason: formatting went awry
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Old 20th Apr 2019, 06:33
  #4156 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Smythe View Post
As MCAS was an option for other 737 variants
Can you expand on that? Have any (non-Max) 737 operators opted for MCAS on their aircraft? Why would they need it?

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Old 20th Apr 2019, 11:21
  #4157 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by TryingToLearn View Post
OK, first: I'm not a pilot, I'm a functional safety engineer, mostly working for automotive.
Second: I read this thread from the beginning and learned a lot, thanks!

But I think I can explain one tendency which went up:
Pilots blame the pilots, engineers blame the Boeing engineers.

From my point of view, the reason in both cases is the same:
Pilots know the processes and trained procedures for pilots and learned, that the crews didn't follow them completely and textbook-like but rather improvised. But they do not know the engineering process regarding safety-critical systems/hardware/software.
With the engineers it is exactly otherwise. They see a crew overwhelmed by alarms, shakers and informations caused by an engineering error. For them (sorry) the pilot is the last line of defense in case they did not do their job of everything goes wrong (multiple point fault).

Pilots follow procedures which e.g. minimize the risk to take off with a wrong configuration, They double-check and check again and have proven-in-use procedures which make sure that such things happen less than one in a million flights.
Engineers know proven-in-use processes which make sure that something like the current MCAS system effectively never happens.
Still it happened.

Boeing knows why they put all focus on how great they fix MCAS because if someone asks the right question, they are in much deeper trouble like, for example Volkswagen:
The big punishment for them was not fixing the cars but they had to implement a process that makes sure that this never happens again.

So far nobody asked Boeing how something so obvious and big could slip thru their safety process including document reviews, walk-thru, inspections, accessments and linked documents on several layers of detail. And, in addition, how this would not be found in all the classic safety/quality analysis methods (FMEDA, FMEA, FTA, DFA...).
Safety is not based on the genius of the one great programmer who is also a pilot and simulates every thin in his head (but makes a mistake after having too much pizza) but rather a strict process including a lot of people and a lot of documentation and testing.

Within this thread, pilots question the training and qualification of mainly all pilots regarding critical situations. But they are the last line of defense.
Following the same logic, one could question the qualification, independence and culture of Boeing safety engineers.
And yes, that would lead to the question if there are other functions like MCAS still hidden...

Maybe the pilots may have been able to safe a few lives, but the biggest mistakes happened years before driven by
-> Strange laws (Grandfather rights)
-> Commercial interest (no training)
-> inconsistent requirements / documentation (0,6 within risk analysis and 2.5 within SW)
-> Maybe bad safety culture if this was done on purpose and not by mistake
-> Mistakes within the impact analysis of a wrong MCAS activation

If I would be a member of the FAA or similar organization, I would not focus on MCAS and the bugfix, I would simply aks: What went wrong within the engineering process and how can you prove that no other hazards excaped thru the exact same hole in your process.
The deviation from established engineering rocesses I assume here in my opinion far exceeds the deviation between the trim runaway procedure and what actually happened.

But as mentioned: I'm not a pilot.
Normailisation of Deviance.

It happens an increment at a time.
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Old 20th Apr 2019, 12:01
  #4158 (permalink)  
 
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"Maybe the pilots may have been able to safe a few lives, but the biggest mistakes happened years before driven by
-> Strange laws (Grandfather rights) "

Within the machine industry there is no 'Grandfather rights', not in the European Machinery Directive, and US NFPA
https://www.robotics.org/content-det...ontent_id/6622
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Old 20th Apr 2019, 12:40
  #4159 (permalink)  
 
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Been following most of this thread with interest since it stared, but appologise if this has already been posted. I can't post the URL as I haven't posted 10 times , but its a page from Spectrum.ieee org by a software developer and pilot, and looks at the 737 Max disaster from a software developers point of view.


This bit in particular sums it all up for me, whereby the author compares the installation of fitting an Autopilot to his Cessna 172 and the certification of MCAS on the Max 8

"As you can see, the similarities between my US $20,000 autopilot and the multimillion-dollar autopilot in every 737 are direct, tangible, and relevant. What, then, are the differences?
For starters, the installation of my autopilot required paperwork in the form of a “Supplemental Type Certificate,” or STC. It means that the autopilot manufacturer and the FAA both agreed that my 1979 Cessna 172 with its (Garmin) autopilot was so significantly different from what the airplane was when it rolled off the assembly line that it was no longer the same Cessna 172. It was a different aircraft altogether.
In addition to now carrying a new (supplemental) aircraft-type certificate (and certification), my 172 required a very large amount of new paperwork to be carried in the plane, in the form of revisions and addenda to the aircraft operating manual. As you can guess, most of those addenda revolved around the autopilot system.
Of particular note in that documentation, which must be studied and understood by anyone who flies the plane, are various explanations of the autopilot system, including its command of the trim control system and its envelope protections.
There are instructions on how to detect when the system malfunctions and how to disable the system, immediately. Disabling the system means pulling the autopilot circuit breaker; instructions on how to do that are strewn throughout the documentation, repeatedly. Every pilot who flies my plane becomes intimately aware that it is not the same as any other 172.

This is a big difference between what pilots who want to fly my plane are told and what pilots stepping into a 737 Max are (or were) told.

Another difference is between the autopilots in my system and that in the 737 Max. All of the CAN bus–interconnected components constantly do the kind of instrument cross-check that human pilots do and that, apparently, the MCAS system in the 737 Max does not. For example, the autopilot itself has a self-contained attitude platform that checks the attitude information coming from the G5 flight computers. If there is a disagreement, the system simply goes off-line and alerts the pilot that she is now flying manually. It doesn’t point the airplane’s nose at the ground, thinking it’s about to stall.

Perhaps the biggest difference is in the amount of physical force it takes for the pilot to override the computers in the two planes. In my 172, there are still cables linking the controls to the flying surfaces. The computer has to press on the same things that I have to press on—and its strength is nowhere near as great as mine. So even if, say, the computer thought that my plane was about to stall when it wasn’t, I can easily overcome the computer.

In my Cessna, humans still win a battle of the wills every time. That used to be a design philosophy of every Boeing aircraft, as well, and one they used against their archrival Airbus, which had a different philosophy. But it seems that with the 737 Max, Boeing has changed philosophies about human/machine interaction as quietly as they’ve changed their aircraft operating manuals."
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Old 20th Apr 2019, 14:07
  #4160 (permalink)  
 
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Quote: As MCAS was an option for other 737 variants
Can you expand on that? Have any (non-Max) 737 operators opted for MCAS on their aircraft? Why would they need it?
In reading through the volumes of data, on AoA...I did read where it was either offered or going to be offered on the entire 737 line. I dont know if and when it was offered. The issue of the vortex tabs was included in this explanation. It may be when they were trying to get rid of the tail tabs, but unclear when it stated vortex tabs, which ones they were talking about.
Perhaps they were just going to offer MCAS for stall protection, I dont know. Now that the internet is inundated with information on this, it will have to dig to find this.

MCAS is standard on the 767 tanker, but is different..this seems to be a much better system , 2 sensors, and disco on pilot input.
The KC-46 uses a similar system because the weight and balance of the tanker shifts as it redistributes and offloads fuel. The KC-46 has a two-sensor MCAS system, which “compares the two readings,” the Air Force said.
Moreover, while the MAX 8 MCAS will reset and come back on automatically, the KC-46’s system is “disengaged if the pilot makes a stick input,” according to the Air Force. “The KC-46 has protections that ensure pilot manual inputs have override priority.”
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