Mid-Air Collision over Southern Germany (merged)
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Hey Lum....
What?
It may be one single control center. Even one single control sector suite. One sector it most certainly is not! The Brussels sectors at Maastricht, as Garp said, are all relatively small by necessity because of the complexity and sheer volume of traffic.
If you can think of a solution in this area, please notify Eurocontrol immediately. You'll be an instant star.
airspace over Belgium is controlled by Maastricht, 1 single control
It may be one single control center. Even one single control sector suite. One sector it most certainly is not! The Brussels sectors at Maastricht, as Garp said, are all relatively small by necessity because of the complexity and sheer volume of traffic.
If you can think of a solution in this area, please notify Eurocontrol immediately. You'll be an instant star.
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Ferris,
I am afraid that you don't (should not) have a choice, once an aircraft declares that it is following a TCAS RA, it is advised that you DO NOT give any contra instructions.
I suggest (as you said) that you give Essential Traffic Information (but) to the other (conflicting) aircraft.
An important thing to remember, is that as ATC's, we get a reduced re-fresh rate (sweep update) on the SSR, that is to say relative to the aircraft equipment, and it may well transpire that what you and I see on the Mode C readout is out of date by 5 seconds, and could imply that aircraft have already crossed levels and cleared each other.
Zagreb is a classic example of 2 aircraft that had actually cleared each other, but due to the ATC instruction, the climbing aircraft actually descended back into the collision path - A tragedy that you and I would rather avoid I am sure.
As difficult as it may sound, if the situation has reached the point that aircraft are saying "GFA231 IS TCAS DECENT !!" The best we can do is close our eyes and say a silent prayer.
Cya
I am afraid that you don't (should not) have a choice, once an aircraft declares that it is following a TCAS RA, it is advised that you DO NOT give any contra instructions.
I suggest (as you said) that you give Essential Traffic Information (but) to the other (conflicting) aircraft.
An important thing to remember, is that as ATC's, we get a reduced re-fresh rate (sweep update) on the SSR, that is to say relative to the aircraft equipment, and it may well transpire that what you and I see on the Mode C readout is out of date by 5 seconds, and could imply that aircraft have already crossed levels and cleared each other.
Zagreb is a classic example of 2 aircraft that had actually cleared each other, but due to the ATC instruction, the climbing aircraft actually descended back into the collision path - A tragedy that you and I would rather avoid I am sure.
As difficult as it may sound, if the situation has reached the point that aircraft are saying "GFA231 IS TCAS DECENT !!" The best we can do is close our eyes and say a silent prayer.
Cya
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Skyguide phone system was down as well as conflict warning system
From AP today at 13:32 CET:
Not only was maintenance work being carried out on the software of the Skyguide radar systems at Zurich ACC, but also on their telephone system. This latest insight comes from the German BFU (Air Accident Investigation Bureau).
The duty controller was thus working two radar screens and two radio frequencies on the night of the mid-air collision. On one frequency, he was handling an ILS approach to Friedrichshafen airport, on the other he was coordinating the two doomed aircraft.
Between 23.25.43 and 23.33.11 the duty controller tried in vain to contact Friedrichshafen airport by phone. Immediately after this (at 23.34.49, and 44 seconds before the mid-air collision) he radioed his first set of instructions to the TU-154 crew to descend.
Not only was maintenance work being carried out on the software of the Skyguide radar systems at Zurich ACC, but also on their telephone system. This latest insight comes from the German BFU (Air Accident Investigation Bureau).
The duty controller was thus working two radar screens and two radio frequencies on the night of the mid-air collision. On one frequency, he was handling an ILS approach to Friedrichshafen airport, on the other he was coordinating the two doomed aircraft.
Between 23.25.43 and 23.33.11 the duty controller tried in vain to contact Friedrichshafen airport by phone. Immediately after this (at 23.34.49, and 44 seconds before the mid-air collision) he radioed his first set of instructions to the TU-154 crew to descend.
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Ruslan
I think you will find that if the Russian TCAS was not working the 757 would STILL get a TCAS RA provided the transponder was OK on both a/c, what would NOT happen is the aircraft co-ordinating with each others TCAS so that they did not BOTH call a descent, but as I said, at the momment we only know that there was ONE (757?) TCAS warning, ANYTHING else is pure conjecture (don't mind the what ifs, but some people have been STATING, if they had done this they would not have collided, far to definate a statement at this stage).
I think you will find that if the Russian TCAS was not working the 757 would STILL get a TCAS RA provided the transponder was OK on both a/c, what would NOT happen is the aircraft co-ordinating with each others TCAS so that they did not BOTH call a descent, but as I said, at the momment we only know that there was ONE (757?) TCAS warning, ANYTHING else is pure conjecture (don't mind the what ifs, but some people have been STATING, if they had done this they would not have collided, far to definate a statement at this stage).
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Target on TCAS screen
When responding to a TCAS Resolution Advisory such as "descend, crossing traffic..." it is well to do not only to descend, but also to initiate an immediate steep turn away from the target highlighted on the TCAS screen. It's the last chance of stay'n alive.
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Foxmoth,
I'm not sure you did get it right, if the one didn't receive step-confirmation from other (e.g not working TCAS at all) no RA provided, TA only mode available (any TCAS guru around, correct me if I wrong). And my last note remains: you should LISTEN other traffic commands too.
TCAS2000 Brochure (PDF)
but not in full details, sorry
(please don't take it as advertising)
I'm not sure you did get it right, if the one didn't receive step-confirmation from other (e.g not working TCAS at all) no RA provided, TA only mode available (any TCAS guru around, correct me if I wrong). And my last note remains: you should LISTEN other traffic commands too.
TCAS2000 Brochure (PDF)
but not in full details, sorry
(please don't take it as advertising)
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Criminal investigation underway in Switzerland
The district attorney in Bülach (whose territory includes Zurich Airport) has opened an investigation into Skyguide. Charges are involuntary manslaughter and negligent interference with public transport.
As the mid-air crash physically occurred in Germany, Skyguide is the only Swiss target for any criminal investigation.
In addition, one of the serious deficiencies outlined in the recently published report by BFU, the Swiss Air Accident Investigation Bureau, is coming back to haunt Skyguide in the context of Monday’s mid-air collision, an issue confirmed by Jean Overney, the bureau’s top manager.
The report, released on 26 June 2002, had – among other points – highlighted shortcomings in Skyguide's time stamping and legal recording of events. The report says that “our investigations have revealed that the recording of flight paths by the legal recording system and their representation on controllers’ screens can differ”.
Investigations carried out by the Swiss Air Accident Investigation Bureau following Monday’s mid-air collision have confirmed that the available legal recordings do not “in every aspect” concur with the situation as described by the duty controller.
As the mid-air crash physically occurred in Germany, Skyguide is the only Swiss target for any criminal investigation.
In addition, one of the serious deficiencies outlined in the recently published report by BFU, the Swiss Air Accident Investigation Bureau, is coming back to haunt Skyguide in the context of Monday’s mid-air collision, an issue confirmed by Jean Overney, the bureau’s top manager.
The report, released on 26 June 2002, had – among other points – highlighted shortcomings in Skyguide's time stamping and legal recording of events. The report says that “our investigations have revealed that the recording of flight paths by the legal recording system and their representation on controllers’ screens can differ”.
Investigations carried out by the Swiss Air Accident Investigation Bureau following Monday’s mid-air collision have confirmed that the available legal recordings do not “in every aspect” concur with the situation as described by the duty controller.
Last edited by Alpha Leader; 5th Jul 2002 at 14:17.
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So, it now looks like the controller was very busy. Does anyone know the manning at Zurich centre on a night shift ? Were they working all the Zurich sectors 'band-boxed' or were there other sectors open ?
If the 'standby' controller had come back and plugged-in would there have been any other cover available ?
At the London Terminal CC, the availability of staff has a definite influence on whether I ask for a sector to be split. I know it shouldn't, but with present levels of staffing there is little option.
Standard Departure,
You seem very quick to critise our Swiss colleague by jumping to conclussions. Your description of someone hopping from chair to chair, making R/T calls without waiting for a readback would be laughable if the circumstances were not so tragic.
Have you never worked with two radar sreens side by side, frequencies Cross-coupled ? One screen set to long range, the other short range. All transmissions (A/C or ATC) are broadcast on BOTH frequencies and no, you don't even have to get out of your chair.
Speculation is healthy, it makes us think what we might do in a similar situation but please don't be so quick to condem someone who must be suffering terribly without at least THINKING of ALL the likely scenarios
If the 'standby' controller had come back and plugged-in would there have been any other cover available ?
At the London Terminal CC, the availability of staff has a definite influence on whether I ask for a sector to be split. I know it shouldn't, but with present levels of staffing there is little option.
Standard Departure,
You seem very quick to critise our Swiss colleague by jumping to conclussions. Your description of someone hopping from chair to chair, making R/T calls without waiting for a readback would be laughable if the circumstances were not so tragic.
Have you never worked with two radar sreens side by side, frequencies Cross-coupled ? One screen set to long range, the other short range. All transmissions (A/C or ATC) are broadcast on BOTH frequencies and no, you don't even have to get out of your chair.
Speculation is healthy, it makes us think what we might do in a similar situation but please don't be so quick to condem someone who must be suffering terribly without at least THINKING of ALL the likely scenarios
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Vertigo, if you took the time to read my posting properly, you would find that the focus of my critisism is directed at the ATC system, in this case skyguide;
I am familiar with cross-coupling (of frequencies), also with long and short range screens in close proximity, but what seems to point away from this though, is the fact that the T154 was on frequency and in conflict with the DHL for 4 minutes before a decent instruction was given, what other reason could there be for the delay if all the functions were within arm's reach? I cannot be convinced that any ATC would consider vectoring an a/c to an ILS as a priority over an iminent mid-air.
Where were the coordination telephones for Friedrichshafen? at his own sector, or at another sector? (I am talking about the stand-by phones)
Ref: Click here for the reference
Vertigo, I truly have sympathy for the ATC, I believe that even with the limited information available, it is clear that, the SYSTEM failed, not the ATC. All that remains to be seen is to what extent.
And Skyguide, please don't tell me that this is also within your tolerance limits or acceptable standard operating procedures !!!!!
the bulk of the damage was done when they removed TWO vital safety nets, #1 the other controller & #2, the conflict detection equipment.
Where were the coordination telephones for Friedrichshafen? at his own sector, or at another sector? (I am talking about the stand-by phones)
During the work on the radar system there was also some working on the telephone net of Skyguide. Therefore the main telephone line war switched off. For the radar controllers work a backup (bypass) line was available. When trying to establish contact for coordination with FDH technical problems occurred. Between 23:25:43 and 23:33:11 LT the controller tried serveral times to establish contact with FDH. He was not successful
Vertigo, I truly have sympathy for the ATC, I believe that even with the limited information available, it is clear that, the SYSTEM failed, not the ATC. All that remains to be seen is to what extent.
Last edited by Standard_Departure; 5th Jul 2002 at 14:58.
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Sorry to intrude as I'm not in any way connected with your noble trade, but it so happens I have a few acqaintances in Ufa, Bashkiria, so I guess I have a right for a question or two.
1. Concerning the BFU report. My English is not so good as, say, Ruslan's, so I never realized that "immediately" means 90 sec. I can stroll 100m in 90 sec, let alone a plane. I mean the time between the last call to FDH and the first call to Tupolev.
2. As I see, there was a small but measurable time between the "TCAS descent" from DHL and actual collision. Was it possible to prevent the collision in this time or Russian pilots only are forbidden 14sec delay?
Thank you for answers in advance and please be certain I've read all the twenty-four pages of this thread (meaning some extra questions will certainly arise if people here allow).
1. Concerning the BFU report. My English is not so good as, say, Ruslan's, so I never realized that "immediately" means 90 sec. I can stroll 100m in 90 sec, let alone a plane. I mean the time between the last call to FDH and the first call to Tupolev.
2. As I see, there was a small but measurable time between the "TCAS descent" from DHL and actual collision. Was it possible to prevent the collision in this time or Russian pilots only are forbidden 14sec delay?
Thank you for answers in advance and please be certain I've read all the twenty-four pages of this thread (meaning some extra questions will certainly arise if people here allow).
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Thought I wpould take a look back at this later. Glad I did. Normal USSr transponder does not show on TCAS (many hours on LHR to NRT confirms this!) ANY mode A transponder shows on TCAS. If mode C available, then TA and RA available to a TCAS equiped aircraft. If target has TCAS, thne co-ordinated manoeuvres are possible Hence all that TA only when you go engine out, it lets you look at TCAS targets, but the TCAS equiped other aircraft now knows that you will not manoeuvre, i.e you are in a sort of listen only mode.
as to the ATC, the bandboxing has gone on for years, the increase in separation due to equipment limitations has also gone on for years and is quite normal and acceptable. What happened is what always seems to happen in the middle of the night. Only two blips on the tube and you just know they are going to meet, usually witha few thousand or so between them, but it really isa case of S**s law applying whe you least expect it. As to not noticing what was happening, possibly so, but bear in mind that with a near head on cross, 5 minutes before the crosss, the aircraft would have been about 80nm miles apart. Even at 1 minute it was around 15 or 16 miles, not overly generous, but not a hit. From the little I saw, they were on near head on crossing tracks, so with very little difference in timing, they could have passed harmlessly 7nm apart. That would have been hard to tell at 80nm, but probably a bit more certain at say 20 to 30. From my own experience (a long time ago !) one would try not to climb or descend cruising aircraft at altitude, mainly because the option of climb may not be available. If you could keep everyone in level flight it would seem to be a better service.
This has indications of a combination of technical and human factors which will not be half as easy to solve as we may think.
As to TCAS manoeuvres, they are only vertical, bearing accuracy is low (+/- 5 degrees), but with refresh rates better than ATC radar. All to be done in vertical no GPWS pull ups, as you normally only need about 3 to 400 ft change of relative flight path. Turns not always a good idea. A 747-400 tried this at near maximum altitude, lost a couple of thousand ft in in over enthusiatic attempt and did not help anyones adrenalin level ! With the bearing inaccuracy, you could actually turn into the traffic. Possibly OK if you also keep the VSI where it should be whilst doing it, i.e. follow TCAS basic but add lateral. As someone said though, lateral is hard to achieve in a short time with risk of control problems at near max altitude, vertical much better.
Moral, stick to TCAS manoeuvres as they are published now. Maybe they will change maybe not.
As to what was happeing in the control room, maybe someone familiar with the set up in ZRH can speak, but with all respect to my fellow pilots, unless you have been there (working or with a lot of familiarity of an ATC unit) it is difficult to comment in specific terms as to what and how things should be done in a particular unit at a particular time. What was happening as described earlier seems quite reasonablt to me, no different than ony other unit operating at those kind of traffic levels.
Regards
MArtin A
as to the ATC, the bandboxing has gone on for years, the increase in separation due to equipment limitations has also gone on for years and is quite normal and acceptable. What happened is what always seems to happen in the middle of the night. Only two blips on the tube and you just know they are going to meet, usually witha few thousand or so between them, but it really isa case of S**s law applying whe you least expect it. As to not noticing what was happening, possibly so, but bear in mind that with a near head on cross, 5 minutes before the crosss, the aircraft would have been about 80nm miles apart. Even at 1 minute it was around 15 or 16 miles, not overly generous, but not a hit. From the little I saw, they were on near head on crossing tracks, so with very little difference in timing, they could have passed harmlessly 7nm apart. That would have been hard to tell at 80nm, but probably a bit more certain at say 20 to 30. From my own experience (a long time ago !) one would try not to climb or descend cruising aircraft at altitude, mainly because the option of climb may not be available. If you could keep everyone in level flight it would seem to be a better service.
This has indications of a combination of technical and human factors which will not be half as easy to solve as we may think.
As to TCAS manoeuvres, they are only vertical, bearing accuracy is low (+/- 5 degrees), but with refresh rates better than ATC radar. All to be done in vertical no GPWS pull ups, as you normally only need about 3 to 400 ft change of relative flight path. Turns not always a good idea. A 747-400 tried this at near maximum altitude, lost a couple of thousand ft in in over enthusiatic attempt and did not help anyones adrenalin level ! With the bearing inaccuracy, you could actually turn into the traffic. Possibly OK if you also keep the VSI where it should be whilst doing it, i.e. follow TCAS basic but add lateral. As someone said though, lateral is hard to achieve in a short time with risk of control problems at near max altitude, vertical much better.
Moral, stick to TCAS manoeuvres as they are published now. Maybe they will change maybe not.
As to what was happeing in the control room, maybe someone familiar with the set up in ZRH can speak, but with all respect to my fellow pilots, unless you have been there (working or with a lot of familiarity of an ATC unit) it is difficult to comment in specific terms as to what and how things should be done in a particular unit at a particular time. What was happening as described earlier seems quite reasonablt to me, no different than ony other unit operating at those kind of traffic levels.
Regards
MArtin A
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Martin,
Good posting, very considerate too.
There are some (many) things that remain un-asked and/or un-answered. As an egsample;
Assuming that the aircraft collided at an intersection of two airways, that intersection probably has a name or a fix associatedwith it. Were there any estimates passed for that position, and if so, how far apart were the estimates?
Was the ATC on duty starting a night shift, or ending an afternoon shift? How many continuous hours had he been on duty? In fact, how are the shifts arranged at Zurich ACC?
Statements made to the press seem to imply that these 2 ATC's were the only guys on duty at the Entire Zurich ACC, and one of them was on a break. Is this accurate? The entire Zurich ACC, ONE CONTROLLER ??
If there are any Zurich ATC's out there, could you (without incriminating yourselves) fill in any of these type of "Procedural" details.
Cya
Good posting, very considerate too.
There are some (many) things that remain un-asked and/or un-answered. As an egsample;
Assuming that the aircraft collided at an intersection of two airways, that intersection probably has a name or a fix associatedwith it. Were there any estimates passed for that position, and if so, how far apart were the estimates?
Was the ATC on duty starting a night shift, or ending an afternoon shift? How many continuous hours had he been on duty? In fact, how are the shifts arranged at Zurich ACC?
Statements made to the press seem to imply that these 2 ATC's were the only guys on duty at the Entire Zurich ACC, and one of them was on a break. Is this accurate? The entire Zurich ACC, ONE CONTROLLER ??
If there are any Zurich ATC's out there, could you (without incriminating yourselves) fill in any of these type of "Procedural" details.
Cya
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Ferris,
Of course as a Controller you want to do something however I suspect that one of the Accident Report findings will be that having allowed the aircraft to get too close the controller would have been better to have done nothing. The DHL 611had already left its cruise altitude and was descending. If the BTC 2937 had done nothing (or followed TCAS) there would have been a very close Near Miss however there should not have been an accident.
In the past there was a theory that mid-air collisions during the cruise normally involved the same type of aircraft because of the instrument error in the altimeters was the same. I suspect that one of the side effects of RVSM is less instrument error, more accurate altimeters and more aircraft at exactly the same level.; the same way that more accurate lateral navigation has reduced the scatter of aircraft down airways.
Standard_Departure.
Estimates have not generally been given in Europe of some years. "Radar Contact" is normally the answer to the initial call.
Of course as a Controller you want to do something however I suspect that one of the Accident Report findings will be that having allowed the aircraft to get too close the controller would have been better to have done nothing. The DHL 611had already left its cruise altitude and was descending. If the BTC 2937 had done nothing (or followed TCAS) there would have been a very close Near Miss however there should not have been an accident.
In the past there was a theory that mid-air collisions during the cruise normally involved the same type of aircraft because of the instrument error in the altimeters was the same. I suspect that one of the side effects of RVSM is less instrument error, more accurate altimeters and more aircraft at exactly the same level.; the same way that more accurate lateral navigation has reduced the scatter of aircraft down airways.
Standard_Departure.
Estimates have not generally been given in Europe of some years. "Radar Contact" is normally the answer to the initial call.
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Enemy 12 o'clock high
I've said it before, but how many more innocent children are going to die before someone gets rid of this World War 2 CB radio ATC nonsense that is so completely,..... completely,...... completely ridiculous???
TCAS is just a pathetic attempt to scratch at the edge of a simple fact. - WE ARE IN THE DIGITAL AGE
We all know it would take about 10 mins to specify what a computer controlled digital system would be like, and any IT supplier could deliver the thing by next year. Don't talk to me about Swanick - that was like someone trying to design an electric razor that looked like a human being with arms etc to manipulate a cut-throat. I couldn't do it so I'm not surpised they didn't manage to either. Note I'm not saying you have to do away with pilots, but perlease there is absolutely no point in a person trying to work out airliner ballistics in real time and then try to relay that at human speech speed/error rate across a crackly voice channel.
All we get is pilot studies, pilot studies and pilot studies.
And dead bodies...
TCAS is just a pathetic attempt to scratch at the edge of a simple fact. - WE ARE IN THE DIGITAL AGE
We all know it would take about 10 mins to specify what a computer controlled digital system would be like, and any IT supplier could deliver the thing by next year. Don't talk to me about Swanick - that was like someone trying to design an electric razor that looked like a human being with arms etc to manipulate a cut-throat. I couldn't do it so I'm not surpised they didn't manage to either. Note I'm not saying you have to do away with pilots, but perlease there is absolutely no point in a person trying to work out airliner ballistics in real time and then try to relay that at human speech speed/error rate across a crackly voice channel.
All we get is pilot studies, pilot studies and pilot studies.
And dead bodies...
If there is only one controller in the room, what is the contingency if that controller is in some way incapacitated? Surely this cannot be normal practice?
Sounds wied, at best
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A number of comments here from people who perhaps would do better to read the posts of those who actually know what they’re talking about. I’m referring in particularly to those who’ve suggested lateral manoeuvring in response to a TCAS resolution alert. (A seriously not good idea.) As for the person who suggested a 60 degree turn… I can only surmise he has never been on a flight deck of a passenger jet above 20,000’ – or sincerely hope he hasn’t.
From the number of ‘hits’ I see this thread has had, I’m guessing that a lot of people outside the industry are visiting this site hoping to learn what went wrong. To them, may I say please don’t take everything you read here as ‘Gospel’.
No single mistake ever causes an accident like this to occur, but a series of small errors, (many of which would be insignificant in isolation). People die when all those insignificant errors form an unbroken chain, the so-called ‘error chain’. That’s what happened on this occasion. Let’s hope the investigation concentrates on breaking any future error chain rather that playing the blame game – and breaking it far earlier than 90 seconds before a cataclysm.
From the number of ‘hits’ I see this thread has had, I’m guessing that a lot of people outside the industry are visiting this site hoping to learn what went wrong. To them, may I say please don’t take everything you read here as ‘Gospel’.
No single mistake ever causes an accident like this to occur, but a series of small errors, (many of which would be insignificant in isolation). People die when all those insignificant errors form an unbroken chain, the so-called ‘error chain’. That’s what happened on this occasion. Let’s hope the investigation concentrates on breaking any future error chain rather that playing the blame game – and breaking it far earlier than 90 seconds before a cataclysm.
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We are getting quite tied up with timings in this thread.
Already it's been shown that SwissGuide's system has some inaccuracies and I've seen this within our own system ; where RT times are not the same as the Radar Recordings.
Because of the critical nature of these events , I trust that Swiss timings will be co related to timings of the German and French Radar recordings.
Already it's been shown that SwissGuide's system has some inaccuracies and I've seen this within our own system ; where RT times are not the same as the Radar Recordings.
Because of the critical nature of these events , I trust that Swiss timings will be co related to timings of the German and French Radar recordings.
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I've always viewed TCAS as another tool, much the same as Wx Radar. Equipment knowledge, interpretation and situational awareness by the operator is required with Wx Radar, it is then up to the operator to maneuver the A/C to avoid the "lumpy stuff".
Experiencing an RA in real life or in the sim while IMC, leaves you charging after a computer generated solution (escape maneuver) without visual / oral confirmation of some sort, and is disconcerting to say the least. Upon receiving a TA/RA, my first reactions are; check my altitude, eyeballs outside - then lights on, day, night, VMC or IMC. The gee whiz marvels of today’s technology are tools that still need old fashioned airmanship for backup.
Missing radio calls is nothing new, we've all done it, as our undivided attention is not always placed on that com box (aviate, navigate, communicate). A disturbing trend that I have noticed amongst aircrew is both pilots switching to I/C to communicate with the cabin, or both monitoring the ATIS while simultaneously monitoring ATC - seems simple enough - but maintain the S.O.P.
My above comments are in no way meant to speculate on the cause of this particular accident, only to bring forth some basic fundamentals that we should all look at as means of additional preventive measures as we continue to fly safely.
Experiencing an RA in real life or in the sim while IMC, leaves you charging after a computer generated solution (escape maneuver) without visual / oral confirmation of some sort, and is disconcerting to say the least. Upon receiving a TA/RA, my first reactions are; check my altitude, eyeballs outside - then lights on, day, night, VMC or IMC. The gee whiz marvels of today’s technology are tools that still need old fashioned airmanship for backup.
Missing radio calls is nothing new, we've all done it, as our undivided attention is not always placed on that com box (aviate, navigate, communicate). A disturbing trend that I have noticed amongst aircrew is both pilots switching to I/C to communicate with the cabin, or both monitoring the ATIS while simultaneously monitoring ATC - seems simple enough - but maintain the S.O.P.
My above comments are in no way meant to speculate on the cause of this particular accident, only to bring forth some basic fundamentals that we should all look at as means of additional preventive measures as we continue to fly safely.
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4 years ago I spent a wonderful few days with my old man out in Bahrain when he was one of the Skippers on the DHL 757.My thoughts are with the families and all the staff of such a friendly and professional base. I know that my father who recently passed away would have been devasted at such an unnecessary loss.
S.Lewis.
S.Lewis.