Mid-Air Collision over Southern Germany (merged)
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frequency changes
all this puts new meaning into those often mistakes in frequency changes that have happened to me so many times and i hear happen to others as well.
just a few seconds trying to talk to ATC on a wrong frequency suddenly has more meaning to me now.
at times the wrong frequency is given, often the freq is mis-heard, sometimes mis-dailed, or the radio not switched over to new frequency.
let's all be more careful out there.
it could have happened to anyone.
just a few seconds trying to talk to ATC on a wrong frequency suddenly has more meaning to me now.
at times the wrong frequency is given, often the freq is mis-heard, sometimes mis-dailed, or the radio not switched over to new frequency.
let's all be more careful out there.
it could have happened to anyone.
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What's this hangup with offset routings Wiley. Who follows the routes anyway? As in the States direct routings are becoming the norm, the 'traditional' airways system's days are doubtless numbered. In any case how many Russian and other third world outfits have sat nav. Ever been on the flight deck of a 154? Out of the dark ages.
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Volare and Standard-departure
Good posts, if the SOPs are based on the bean counters considerations and ignore the basic safety considerations then it is the bean counters and those responsible for the co-ordination SOPs that put the controllers in an impossible situation, and it is these people rather than the controllers who should face the music.
I make no comment about the absence of one of the controllers and the extent to which this added to the problem as I dont know the facts. To me this was an accident waiting to happen and unless the co-ordination procedures are urgently reassessd there will be more accidents in the future.
Good posts, if the SOPs are based on the bean counters considerations and ignore the basic safety considerations then it is the bean counters and those responsible for the co-ordination SOPs that put the controllers in an impossible situation, and it is these people rather than the controllers who should face the music.
I make no comment about the absence of one of the controllers and the extent to which this added to the problem as I dont know the facts. To me this was an accident waiting to happen and unless the co-ordination procedures are urgently reassessd there will be more accidents in the future.
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As mentioned earlier and perhaps most pertinent here is the number of frequency changes required to transit this area of Europe. 50 seconds is nothing copmpare to the delays and 'blank spots' inherent in these procedures, I guess though that any attempt to streamline the system will meet with industrial action as we have recenrly seen.
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My Multiple response...
To Devils Advocate: Hear Hear !!
To Seriph: The reference to Off-set routings refers not to taking a traingular route to a destination, but rather to a 1/2 nautical mile left or right offset to an established airway or even direct routing between two positions.
The reason for this is (and I have first-hand jump seat experience) that navigational systems are now so accurate, that two aircraft routing in opposite directions between the same two positions actually (often) cross EXACTLY (as in wingtips virtually aligned) over and under each other. BY off-setting from the direct track or airway by 1/2 a nautical mile, both left or both right, there will be a natural 1 nautical mile separation between aircraft on opposite direction routings. This would provide a lateral (horizonatal) safety if the vertical seperation were compromised. (This would not have helped in the swiss incident however)
To Seriph: (again) The beancounters may not write the SOP's, but their decisions regarding the procurement of equipment (safety and otherwise), (dis)approving operational requests for additional staff, etc.. can often (and do often) limit the options available to operational managements scope when it comes to making SOP's.
Beancounters often go for financially viable options, operators making the same call would go for the operationally safer options.
To Seriph: The reference to Off-set routings refers not to taking a traingular route to a destination, but rather to a 1/2 nautical mile left or right offset to an established airway or even direct routing between two positions.
The reason for this is (and I have first-hand jump seat experience) that navigational systems are now so accurate, that two aircraft routing in opposite directions between the same two positions actually (often) cross EXACTLY (as in wingtips virtually aligned) over and under each other. BY off-setting from the direct track or airway by 1/2 a nautical mile, both left or both right, there will be a natural 1 nautical mile separation between aircraft on opposite direction routings. This would provide a lateral (horizonatal) safety if the vertical seperation were compromised. (This would not have helped in the swiss incident however)
To Seriph: (again) The beancounters may not write the SOP's, but their decisions regarding the procurement of equipment (safety and otherwise), (dis)approving operational requests for additional staff, etc.. can often (and do often) limit the options available to operational managements scope when it comes to making SOP's.
Beancounters often go for financially viable options, operators making the same call would go for the operationally safer options.
Last edited by Standard_Departure; 5th Jul 2002 at 07:46.
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Gotta say that I've never felt too confident about the 'handovers' from Padua(?) into Swiss controlled airspace and vice-versa ( e.g. when operating in / out of Milan ) it just seems that sometimes, even if only for a short minute ( usually whilst trying to get a word in edgeways ! ) you're kind of 'on your own', i.e seemingly not talking to anybody and / or not under positive control by ATC - it 's probably just a (wrong) perception but it might sometimes seem that the coordination between the Italian and Swiss ATC units is not quite as slick as one might hope for - and it's busy bit of airspace too.
Uhm, like I say, I'm not sure if the above's true, but it's just a feeling I sometimes get about it - anybody else know what I mean ?
Uhm, like I say, I'm not sure if the above's true, but it's just a feeling I sometimes get about it - anybody else know what I mean ?
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At the end of the day Switzerland is probably too small to justify having its own ATC service, especially smack in the middle of the European core area.
They're already having to cobble together a civil/military mix 'n' match system because the Air Force and airlines are having trouble sharing out the sky between them.
Isn't it about time the airspace was carved up between the surrounding nations? Sorry, Switzerland, no offence.
They're already having to cobble together a civil/military mix 'n' match system because the Air Force and airlines are having trouble sharing out the sky between them.
Isn't it about time the airspace was carved up between the surrounding nations? Sorry, Switzerland, no offence.
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3fourty and someone else made points about the Russian not following TCAS, my understanding is we don't yet know if his TCAS operated, so how can we say that if they had both followed TCAS the accident would not have happened? When the tapes are sorted we will hopefully THEN be able to comment on this, at the momment there are just too many possibles:- both TCAS's went off correctly but the Russian followed ATC, the 757s called wrong, the Russian's did not work, the 757 called down then reversed/did not reverse/called for increased descent etc. etc.
Another point has been made about frequency changes, since the extra digit was added this has certainly got worse, maybe if we dropped the 1 off the front it would mean less to retain in your head while reading it back so better retention, ALL vhf frequencies start with 1 so it is not really needed - ie 132.475 becomes 32.475 etc.
Another point has been made about frequency changes, since the extra digit was added this has certainly got worse, maybe if we dropped the 1 off the front it would mean less to retain in your head while reading it back so better retention, ALL vhf frequencies start with 1 so it is not really needed - ie 132.475 becomes 32.475 etc.
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Hi Foxmoth,
I appreciate and respect the TCAS debate.
The way I see it, when the sequence of events reached the point that TCAS reactions were required, the system had already failed. Reacting to RA's is tant-amount (?) to clutching at straws.
I appreciate and respect the TCAS debate.
The way I see it, when the sequence of events reached the point that TCAS reactions were required, the system had already failed. Reacting to RA's is tant-amount (?) to clutching at straws.
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Just a quickie, Real issue is the the interaction of ATC instructions and TCAS, time is so tight when the TCAS goes off, there is no time for debate about which you do and if the decison is the wrong one !!! TCAS is not infallible, close calls induced by TCAS limitations, mode C encoding have happened before. As with all automated systems with only limited logic and no reasoning, most times it does a good job, but once in a while you discover the weak points.As to ATC, the debate over Swiss size is irrelevant, the average ATc sector size is not constrained by ploitical or geographical boundaries, merely workload considerations,which will of course be determined by goegraphical aspects, e.g LGW LHR interaction. No amount of open skies will change that.
As to offsets, as has been said, with direct routes, offset where ? As to the Russian aircraft's reaction, , we can only wait and see. We all know that a lot of what is speculated is just that. Probably the best thing we can do as a group is keep reporting what happens to us, TCAS RAs etc so as to get a handle on what really happens. Without hard evidence of problems in any area, we will get nothing done no matter how much we write here, so if you have issues, MOR, company reports, BALPA or whoever your union or professional association is.
A sad event which like others before it will cause some to say"ther but for the grace of God go I" or similar words
Regards
MArtin A
As to offsets, as has been said, with direct routes, offset where ? As to the Russian aircraft's reaction, , we can only wait and see. We all know that a lot of what is speculated is just that. Probably the best thing we can do as a group is keep reporting what happens to us, TCAS RAs etc so as to get a handle on what really happens. Without hard evidence of problems in any area, we will get nothing done no matter how much we write here, so if you have issues, MOR, company reports, BALPA or whoever your union or professional association is.
A sad event which like others before it will cause some to say"ther but for the grace of God go I" or similar words
Regards
MArtin A
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Martin A,
1) If Swiss size is irrelevant then why does the Skyguide web site state the opposite? (Pls see my previous post on this thread)
2) I agree about conflicting instructions when normal seperation has broken down. If controllers limited there input to lateral avoidance advice, allowing TCAS to control the vertical, then no conflicting instructions would be received in either aircraft (also mentioned in previous post). Maybe some ATCO will tell me the down side of this - but as yet I can't see the problem.
1) If Swiss size is irrelevant then why does the Skyguide web site state the opposite? (Pls see my previous post on this thread)
2) I agree about conflicting instructions when normal seperation has broken down. If controllers limited there input to lateral avoidance advice, allowing TCAS to control the vertical, then no conflicting instructions would be received in either aircraft (also mentioned in previous post). Maybe some ATCO will tell me the down side of this - but as yet I can't see the problem.
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Check the facts
Here some facts from the BFU, you can also check http://www.bfu-web.de/aktuinfo-e28.htm
2002-07-05 11:00 MESZ
08:00 UTC
Findings of the Air Traffic Service Group for investigation of the accident on July 01st. 2002 with the aircraft Boeing 757 and Tupolev 154
As of: July 04th, 2002 at 14:00 LT
In the accident night, from 23:00 L the configuration of the radar data processing of Skyguide was modified. Thus the system was operating in FALLBACK modus. This requires among other facts, that radar separation values were increased from 5 NM to 7 NM.
The STCA (short term conflict alert) was not available at that time. In other words, the warning system, that indicates dangerous approaches of two aircrafts in same altitudes optically and acoustically to the air traffic controller, was not available.
At the time of the accident only one controller was responsible for the entire traffic in the Zurich airspace. He was monitoring two frequencies and two radar scopes. On one frequency (119,925 MHz) he was guiding one traffic for an approach into FDH and on the other frequency (128,050 MHz) he had to control both accident aircrafts.
A second controller was outside of the control room taking a rest.
During the work on the radar system there was also some working on the telephone net of Skyguide. Therefore the main telephone line war switched off. For the radar controllers work a backup (bypass) line was available. When trying to establish contact for coordination with FDH technical problems occurred. Between 23:25:43 and 23:33:11 LT the controller tried serveral times to establish contact with FDH. He was not successful.
At 23:34:49, 44sec prior collision, the radar controller issued the first descent clearance to BTC2937 to FL350. As the crew did not react to this clearance he repeated the clearance 14sec later. Now the crew of the TU-154 confirmed the clearance and initiated the descent.
At about the same time the crew of flight DHX611 started a descent as well. This happened without instruction from the radar controller. At the same time there was a statement on the radio that a TCAS descent was initiated. This transmission most probably came from DHX611.
From 23:30:11 until the collision at 23:35:33 the controller was responsible for 4 aircrafts on 128,050 MHz and 1 aircraft on 119.925 MHz. At 23:35:31, 2sec prior impact, another aircraft checked in.
2002-07-05 11:00 MESZ
08:00 UTC
Findings of the Air Traffic Service Group for investigation of the accident on July 01st. 2002 with the aircraft Boeing 757 and Tupolev 154
As of: July 04th, 2002 at 14:00 LT
In the accident night, from 23:00 L the configuration of the radar data processing of Skyguide was modified. Thus the system was operating in FALLBACK modus. This requires among other facts, that radar separation values were increased from 5 NM to 7 NM.
The STCA (short term conflict alert) was not available at that time. In other words, the warning system, that indicates dangerous approaches of two aircrafts in same altitudes optically and acoustically to the air traffic controller, was not available.
At the time of the accident only one controller was responsible for the entire traffic in the Zurich airspace. He was monitoring two frequencies and two radar scopes. On one frequency (119,925 MHz) he was guiding one traffic for an approach into FDH and on the other frequency (128,050 MHz) he had to control both accident aircrafts.
A second controller was outside of the control room taking a rest.
During the work on the radar system there was also some working on the telephone net of Skyguide. Therefore the main telephone line war switched off. For the radar controllers work a backup (bypass) line was available. When trying to establish contact for coordination with FDH technical problems occurred. Between 23:25:43 and 23:33:11 LT the controller tried serveral times to establish contact with FDH. He was not successful.
At 23:34:49, 44sec prior collision, the radar controller issued the first descent clearance to BTC2937 to FL350. As the crew did not react to this clearance he repeated the clearance 14sec later. Now the crew of the TU-154 confirmed the clearance and initiated the descent.
At about the same time the crew of flight DHX611 started a descent as well. This happened without instruction from the radar controller. At the same time there was a statement on the radio that a TCAS descent was initiated. This transmission most probably came from DHX611.
From 23:30:11 until the collision at 23:35:33 the controller was responsible for 4 aircrafts on 128,050 MHz and 1 aircraft on 119.925 MHz. At 23:35:31, 2sec prior impact, another aircraft checked in.
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SKYGUIDE WILL FRY FOR THIS !!!
The system has failed the controller, the airlines and the flying pax.
How can they possibly be allowed to manage an ATC system if they are so blatently negligent.
To the ATC(s) involved: Keep the faith man !!
The system has failed the controller, the airlines and the flying pax.
How can they possibly be allowed to manage an ATC system if they are so blatently negligent.
To the ATC(s) involved: Keep the faith man !!
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Fully agree with Martin. Talking heads on TV and radio are complaining about the amount of frequency changes due to the many different control centres where this is completely irrelevant. Sectors are sometimes so small because the traffic just wouldn't permit to make them bigger or do they expect that having one large sector with 80 a/c on the frequency will make things safer??? Take the example of the belgian airspace which can be compared to the swiss airspace both in size and complexity. Almost 2.000 flights a day (above FL245) with 6 sectors (again only above FL245) with delegated areas well into the french and german airspace and military areas all over the place. Let's put all of that on one frequency. Blaming the different computersystems operated by the different ATC units is also ridiculous. They're different but the transmission of flightdata hasn't been a problem since many years.
I am behind the radar since the mid-eighties but now is the first time that I'm thinking about my job when I'm at home. The idea that something like this could have happened to me or any other colleague is devastating. I really hope that all of the guys who were on duty at Zurich will get proper psychological help.
I am behind the radar since the mid-eighties but now is the first time that I'm thinking about my job when I'm at home. The idea that something like this could have happened to me or any other colleague is devastating. I really hope that all of the guys who were on duty at Zurich will get proper psychological help.
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Garp, are you really an ATC controller?
The upper airspace over Belgium is controlled by Maastricht, 1 single control extending well beyond the belgian borders.
The lower airspace is controlled by Belgocontrol and is devided in several sectors.
The upper airspace over Belgium is controlled by Maastricht, 1 single control extending well beyond the belgian borders.
The lower airspace is controlled by Belgocontrol and is devided in several sectors.
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Foxmoth,
If TCAS was not working or properly functioning on RA65816, then I believe no RA conclusion on board of 757 occurred considering the way TCAS II works. It could only receive traffic warning in that case, in other hands considering you’re listening comm. frequency you won’t be dive beeing aware there is another instructed for immediate descend. We should wait for tapes, fully agree here, but it really looks like Russian pilot has failed to follow RA command and commenced ATC instruction.
If TCAS was not working or properly functioning on RA65816, then I believe no RA conclusion on board of 757 occurred considering the way TCAS II works. It could only receive traffic warning in that case, in other hands considering you’re listening comm. frequency you won’t be dive beeing aware there is another instructed for immediate descend. We should wait for tapes, fully agree here, but it really looks like Russian pilot has failed to follow RA command and commenced ATC instruction.
Keeping Danny in Sandwiches
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What this accident is showing is that they are very rarely caused by a single fact but rather than a number of factors coming together.
As a pilot I am horrified that a controller is working two different types of airspace, overflights and approaches into FDH at the same time. When Conflict Alert was turned off it is nonsense to suggest that increased separation is the answer. The answer must surely be an extra pair of eyes and brains.
With regard to late ATC calls to take avoiding action it must surely be better either to say nothing and allow TCAS to work or restrict instructions to heading changes.
As a pilot I am horrified that a controller is working two different types of airspace, overflights and approaches into FDH at the same time. When Conflict Alert was turned off it is nonsense to suggest that increased separation is the answer. The answer must surely be an extra pair of eyes and brains.
With regard to late ATC calls to take avoiding action it must surely be better either to say nothing and allow TCAS to work or restrict instructions to heading changes.
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No, turning aircraft wouldn't suffice.
I'm sorry, I couldn't sit there and pray that TCAS was doing it's thing. As I have previously stated, experience has led me to have no faith whatsoever in TCAS. I would be talking a hundred to the dozen giving traffic, avoidance instructions which would include both level changes and turns, and standing on my head if I thought it would help. The fastest way to avoid a conflict is with a level change. At those altitudes, turns are fairly slow.
In most cases, I would hope that level change instructions had been issued before an RA occurs (as was the case here).
Also, importantly, I don't know you have an RA unless you tell me.
I'm sorry, I couldn't sit there and pray that TCAS was doing it's thing. As I have previously stated, experience has led me to have no faith whatsoever in TCAS. I would be talking a hundred to the dozen giving traffic, avoidance instructions which would include both level changes and turns, and standing on my head if I thought it would help. The fastest way to avoid a conflict is with a level change. At those altitudes, turns are fairly slow.
In most cases, I would hope that level change instructions had been issued before an RA occurs (as was the case here).
Also, importantly, I don't know you have an RA unless you tell me.