Mid-Air Collision over Southern Germany (merged)

[ferris]

VANMAN,
You have missed my point.

And in the case where the aircraft ignored the RA, it was FULLY UNDER CONTROL. Both had traffic, the descender was stopping above the climber, which was stopping at the level below. Both understood the plan. Their TCAS' wanted them to cross levels by steepening the dive/increasing the climb. How can that be safer?

Surely jumping in at the TA stage, having your situational awareness on the job, and controlling the situation is better than blindly following an unexpected RA? Not always possible, granted, but preferable. What I was getting at is the UNCONTROLLED way in which you opt out of the ATC system at present. I haven't put a lot of thought into the solution- maybe a button like the ident which you could hit at the same time as reacting to the RA which would announce to all, ATC and the other aircraft involved, that you were RAing?

[ferris]

Incapacity

And reference incapacity; controllers will tell you you must always have a replacement in the building. Managers (beancounters) answer is that you call someone in if that eventuality arises. They may even have a plan for the 'service outage'. It just depends who is the industrially stronger

[hkgmjq]

it's a shame my first post is written in disgust.

I've been reading and learning from pprune forums for several years now, and not being in the industry have been content to observe and keep my mouth shut.

But tonight I feel obliged to send in this link as yet another example of the appalling journalism that tends to swarm around such terrible accidents as these.

news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/from_our_own_correspondent/newsid_2099000/2099421.stm

if that doesn't work, the article is currently on the bbc news homepage under the 'grief amid the wreckage' title.

Sure, there's eight million tons of crap written about aviation every day, but to have such gutless, provocative and cheap garbage come from the bbc is a new low, at least for me.

It needs to be seen to be believed.

[Standard_Departure]

Ferris,

I feel compelled to say that I think you have big balls to persuade one aircraft to "ignore" an RA.

I cannot even begin to describe the ability it must have taken to get TWO aircraft to "ignore" their RA's.

There I was, thinking that if the pilot's did not respond to RA's within 5 -10 seconds, they would be .... history.

Personally, if I had allowed 2 aircraft to get close enough so that they had both got RA's, I'd let them follow their TCAS's and be happy to hear a "Clear of Conflict" report from either.

Sorry man, we just DO NOT have that power.

[Ghostflyer]

Ferris,

Vanman's point is key. You said 'it was FULLY UNDER CONTROL' sadly most ATC errors occur whilst the the aircraft is fully under radar control. I am not slagging purely, stating my opinion that we all screw up; even ATC guys. Most of the time though it is the pilots misunderstanding the controllers. We are fortunate in that we have 2 guys around to try to make certain that we trap the errors.

Anyone can point fingers and use Harry Hindsight to solve a problem that has already happened. (C'mon Seriph) I watch TCAS on a day to day basis as you watch the radar and the update rate is significantly higher on TCAS than on any search radar that I have seen in sweep mode. Short of getting a radar that has single target priority track on all the aircraft within its sweep; there will be a delay. (Bring on phased arrays!) We all look at a historic picture, the key is to recognise the picture offering the highest probability of reality.

All parties will react to the information that they consider the highest priority and that provides the latest information. For pilots that goes: Mk1 eyeball, other pilots Mk 1 eyeball, TCAS, ATC, PPRUNE.

For ATC mates (Have to admit my best mate is an ATCer, utoh) it will probably be secondary radar followed by primary coz the altitude recognition is better on secondary.

The info priority is moot, the bottom line is that ATC guys have the big picture and should see the disaster coming together earlier and that is their best time to intervene. The pilots see it all happen later and they will have less faith in the guys with the big picture as impact approaches. You are a very brave man if you think you really can solve the problem during the gravy strokes.

It is easy to start attributing blame but the chain was unbroken by all parties and the ATC mate, given good info from his sensors, had the longest time to solve the problem, followed by the pilots as the collision approached.

Ferris, you are absolutely right, mitigating the situation at or before the TA stage is preferable. Preferably at about 50 miles.
If ATC try to intervene at the TCAS RA stage they have either missed the opportunity to intervene earlier or have not had the chance. In most cases at this late stage they will only end up confusing the situation. (Ask any military Fighter Controller that has gone from a standard search radar to the ACMI, a GPS based real time information system.)

In the end game, the pilots are probably so cluedo and shocked, that the chances of you getting the message across in the last 20 secs are not high; therefore they will follow the most compelling (and most accurate) info be it visual or TCAS.

Getting my sanctimonious head on if everyone had done ther job perfectly, this accident would probably not have happened. Sadly, it was a clear day in 1923 when I last flew a perfect flight, a hop in the Sopwith Camel. More likely I just didn't spot the mistakes.

The best thing to come from this, from my point of view, is that I have been forced to re-assess my way of working. Hopefully, I will incorporate some of the good ideas into my working routine that other mates (pilots and ATC) have presented.

Ghost

[vanman]

Control Handover

See what you meam HKGMJQ - and raises the ugly prospect ... was a third aircraft taken down by the fallout...

The tail of the plane had sheered off from the main body of the aircraft and the jagged piece was lying beside part of one of the propellers.

...just a thought

Ferris - I have to say I'm with STD_DEP on this. Whilst it does initially sound strange for TCAS to have the aircraft cross each others level, without much more info it's impossible to speculate. If crossing each others level would have kept them apart in 4 dimensions then, whilst it's not how you might have handled it, it will do it's job. Your job finished (rather unsuccessfully in this instance) a few seconds ago when the RAs were announced.

Either TCAS is to be be used or it isn't. Either it works and we put our trust in it, or it doesn't and we don't. Clearly 'the powers that be' believe TCAS to enhance safety or we wouldn't have it.

What this accident seems to have highlighted is that once the situation has deteriorated to an extent where an RA has proved necessary, then further controller input is counterproductive and dangerous.

It would seem though that a better system for making the ATCO aware of the moment when the TCAS has overridden his control must be found if he/she is to confidently keep quiet at the necessary time. We all know that there are times when one has to wait 30secs or more to transmit on frequency especially in busy airspace where an RA might be more likely. There will be many RAs where the first the controller knows of it is when it has already occurred, given the current vaguery of the notification process. In such circumstances he/she may offer conflicting instructions in all innocence that the RA is occuring.

Who has control?

[arcniz]

hkgmjq You're putting us on, right?

The BBC story you reference is very emotional and dramatic, but that is not so inappropriate, given the circumstances. One feels that the author is trying to convey an immediate and personal sense of the scene as she witnessed it. Journalists are expected to do that.

She remains relatively faithful to the facts, as they are understood at present. An exception to this is the reference to 'propeller' - probably referring incorrectly to a piece of a tubine. The article does somewhat implicate Swiss ATC, but what it reports is consistent with information from various authorities that is now generally known.

On balance, I think it is sensitive and well written for the audience to whom they cater.


The really deplorable qualities of bad journalism that specifically ARE NOT manifest in the BBC story include:

a) fabrication of facts

b) false and misleading attribution of statements

c) wildly inappropriate what-if scenarios

d) baseless accusations regarding cause or responsibility

e) deliberately misleading or confusing information

f) using a tragic circumstance as an opportunity to grind on about some marginally related agenda or concept.

g) exaggeration and hyperbole of a nature that create a clearly false impression of the actual events

h) incorporating unnecessarily precise physical detail and gore to the extent that they may cause profound revulsion and fear among the general public

[Seriph]

Going round in circles aren't you boys, and extremely voluble ones from some. Basically obey ATC and if the TCASD goes of obey it! And of course keep your eyes skinned, very likely for hours on end. Lets give it a rest, we are way beyond the pale.

[GaryRay]

To All:
Here is latest news from Moscow ( not BBC story!):

MOSCOW, JULY 6, RIA NOVOSTI -The Swiss air traffic controller made gross errors while controlling the Boeing -757 and the TU-154 airplanes. On Saturday, head of the Russian State Civil Aviation Service and first deputy transport minister Aleksander Neradko reported to journalists details of the aircraft accident which happened in the skies over Germany. According to him, available results of the investigation show that the air traffic controller of the Zurich airport allowed the Boeing-757, flying at the level of 260 to climb to level 360 (10,970 meters) without paying attention to the TU-154 aircraft which entered the Zurich responsibility area at the level similar to the Boeing's and was flying the crossing route. Neradko said that "to all appearances, the controller did not notice that, probably being distracted by something else." According to him, 4 airplanes were controlled by him at the Zurich airport and he was operating two display monitors.
The first control message to the crew of the TU-154 aircraft arrived 44 seconds prior to the collision. The message contained the instruction to descend to level 350 and 6 seconds later the controller repeated his command. At the same time, flight recorders on board the TU-154 aircraft confirm that 10 seconds after the receipt of first message the crew reported that it started descending. After that the controller again repeated his instruction "but mixed up the side from which the Boeing was approaching: he stated that it was the right side though in reality it was the left one." The air traffic controller's dictaphone registered the Boeing's voice message that the aircraft was descending according to instructions of the airborne collision avoidance system. At that moment, the Boeing descended by 200 meters and turned out to be at the altitude which the Russian aircraft was already flying.
Neradko also reported that the collision avoidance system at the Zurich airport "was withdrawn from the program". He stated that "if it worked, it would have warned the controller of the danger earlier." In his turn, Sergei Frank, Russia's transport minister, told journalists that the tragic situation in the air was evident 5 minutes before the collision. According to Neradko, the investigating commission, which involves specialists from Russia, the US, Bahrein and Switzerland, is analysing the recordings of the voice and flight recorders.

[ferris]

St. Departure- I am sorry that you don't understand how TCAS works. There is an excellent thread on the ATC forum by Capt Pit Bull which goes into some depth. As for never getting them close enough... well, you are just ignorant.
In the circumstances where the RAs were ignored; a 737 after a test flight was cleared to F160, vs a Dash8 climbing to F150. The 737 had been 'manouvering vigorously', and was in a high rate of descent. The 737 reported the TA as the two approached, was given the traffic, then the DH8 was given traffic and the plan. They both levelled off at their cleared levels, after acknowleging they would. The DH8 then said "Oh, and for information, we had an RA". I asked the 737, and he said" Yes, we did too", but was obviously not saying anything earlier in order to avoid confusion and the paperwork. I chased up the reorts later- thats when I discovered the RAs had wanted them to cross levels- and learned that it will do whatever it thinks will provide the biggest sep.

Vanman, I am merely trying to get ATC into the TCAS loop. The thought that I might interfere and CAUSE an accident really frightens me. The radio isn't the best way, surely (and as has been demonstrated), maybe incorporated in CPDLC, ot the ident button idea. Automatically would be best. I don't know......

[mole]

I have read this thread throughout and learned a lot. I had not intended contributing until I read the above. I have to say this post makes me wonder if some people do actually know what they are doing. Ferris points two aircraft at each other when one is climbing and the other, I quote "The 737 had been 'manouvering vigorously', and was in a high rate of descent"

Of course the respective TCAS got worried and started shouting, what would you expect in these circumstances? Ferris please tell us why you allowed these two aircraft to point at each other especially when one was still apparently involved in a test profile. Incidentally I would imagine the RA to which you refer must have been of a very short duration and ceased before either aircraft had time to manoeuvre. Nothing at all to do with the "plan" just the fact that the aircraft did level off at their assigned levels.

[fiftyfour]

BBC lunchtime news says Swiss ATC has reduced movement limits by 20% until further notice.

[ferris]

Mole- you claim to be a pilot?
Who said I "pointed the aircraft at each other"? One was joining the STAR, the other was going to destination after departure. Aircraft "point at each other all the time", you clown. That's why there are controllers. One standard we use is called 'vertical'. That means when you cross you will be vertically seperated. The rate you approach that level is up to you. Imagine this "Easy captain, I think you are descending too fast...." bwahahaha.
The test had finished, but I guess the crew were taking advantage of no pax.
Think about what you post. I am trying to think of how not to be put in a position of contradicting RAs. Or it will happen again.

[Hold at Saffa]

Swiss Control Human Factors

By their own chronology of events, Skyguide reports that both aircraft were on the same Swiss Control frequency for between five and six minutes prior to impact. A mid air collision in European controlled airspace has occurred, the first since Zagreb, with disastrous consequences.

Having visited the Zürich AACC (Area and Approach control centre) several things strike me as incongruous within their rather surprisingly rapid efforts to deflect blame upon dead aircrew.

Controllers routinely occupy their sectors whilst maintaining a 'speaker watch'. No headsets are used, and local distractions are therefore amplified. Was the controller actually at his/her seated sector position from 2325-2336, or merely there long enough to answer the initial contact calls of first DHL at 2325 and then the Tu154 at 2330?

Why weren't either aircraft assigned a separation vector at any time from 2325, why was it left so late to descend the Tupolev? That it was left so late in attempting to separate aircraft at the same level, that a delayed response from the Tupolev is even as issue, is an indictment of the Sector Controller responsible.

I regularly operate in Swiss controlled airspace, to and from Zürich Airport, and within Zürich's area of responsibility, and find their usual standard of controlling to be among the finest in Europe. However, as seems likely from the chronology of this disaster, lack of attention by the Zürich controller was, at the very least, the triggering causal factor of this accident. Personally, rather than reduce ZRH AACC capacity by 20% as has been the Skyguide response, I for one would like to see compulsory headsets insisted upon for all European Air Traffic Controllers.

It is perilously easy to become distracted by local conversations (how many European pilots haven’t heard other conversations/laughter taking place in the background of ATC comms?) during even optimum periods of stress. The potential for disaster is, in my opinion, orders of magnitude greater late at night with vastly reduced alertness levels.

If the ongoing investigation does reveal, as I strongly suspect it will, lack of ATC attention from 2325 until impact at 2336, I find the haste in deflecting blame onto the TU154 crew, and failing to accept full responsibility, to be an appalling reflection on the management of Skyguide (Swiss Control).

We need to learn from this. Ducking lawsuits and seeking a redirection of responsibility is no way to further flight safety.

[BEagle]

An article in today's Sunday Times gives an interesting and detailed account of what appears to have happened.

But only the formal report will be conclusive.

(Edited because I didn't realise that it was not permitted to link to newspaper reports in this way - my apologies.)

[Standard_Departure]

Ferris,

I apologise, I misunderstood what you said, I thought that you were implying that they had both reported RA's and then you sorted it out from there .......

HOWEVER:

Your attitude about TCAS is dissapointing. By your own admission, they would have missed had you left them to their own actions (RA induced).

To treat TCAS as though it were a U$ 9.99 piece of equipment that was a waste of time and effort anyway, is not fair to the Aviation society.

The purpose of TCAS, is ultimately to save lives, and therefore it has (in concept) an obvious value to you and I.

The implication that ATC's should disregard any actions by RA, and try and work it out ourselves, may lead younger and less experienced ATC's to think that they might be able to do the same. You are obviously an ATC with lot's of experience, and I am sure there are younger ATC's that look to you as an egsample.

I don't think that we should willy-nilly write TCAS off, but rather try and understand it better, and, where we can, give positive input and value.

If I offended you previously, that was not my intention.

[millhampost]

BEagle
Times on line is not available to computers outside UK -
I've just been asked to pay GBP39.99 to see the article you quote.
If it is indeed interesting and detailed perhaps you would reproduce it in full.
Regards.

[BEagle]

My apologies for trying to post a link to the ST. I knew that quoting from the paper by 'cut and paste' wasn't permitted, I didn't realise that direct links were not allowed.

Apologies again.

Incidentally, the article implies that the Swiss ATCO was struggling with a failed telephone system to a German airport at the same time as the conflict alert system was down all on his own. When he turned his attention to the impending collision, he had difficulty in contacting the Tu-154.

I wonder whether the Tu-154's first reply co-incided with the ATCO's second call ('blocked') and hence the third call was the one which the Tu-154's commander heard?

The CVR/FDR transcripts will probably clarify this possibility.

[ferris]

I am not trying to imply that TCAS is no good. Just trying to work out how it could be better. It's only getting busier and busier out there.
Sadly, TCAS did not prevent the recent midair.
TCAS' success is predicated on immediate action. I would hate to think I had muddied the waters in such an event. Lets face it, if those aircraft didn't have TCAS, they would have missed. Conversely, if the controller had said nothing, they would have missed. There must be a solution.

[PaperTiger]

Did anyone else pick up that reference in the Russian release about DHX611 being in a climb from FL260 to 360 at the time ?
Was news to me although I may have missed it before. Or did the Russians just invent it, like the phantom 5-minutes earlier call from the 154 ?