Mid-Air Collision over Southern Germany (merged)

[Seriph]

Yes Vertigo I worry about Standard Departure as well. His ideas about lateral spacing from 'first hand jump seat experience' are bizare. Some of us are up there 900+ hrs a year and might know what we are talking about. Standard airways routings are frequently discarded, I've crossed the whole of Europe on a single direct many times.

[FL600]

The controller made a mistake like we all did at one point or another, whether it was forgetting an aircraft requesting a pushback or a late vector to final...This time Tcas was involved in a way it was never designed to be. Scary and so so sad. My understanding is that Skyguide is standing by the controller as to prevent a 72nd victim of this tragedy.

Yes one man operation in zurich ACC at night is normal staffing.

Many would love to manipulate this event for political gains and some might succeed. For me this is and will remain a tragedy that hits very close to home. It has been a difficult week.

[GearUp CheerUp]

The coverage in the newspapers of this accident have plumbed the depths of cheap sensationalism.

I was reading the Daily Express a couple of days ago where some **** had written an article in which he/she made the point that RVSM was putting everyones lives at risk by cramming traffic closer together in search of extra capacity / profit at the expense of safety.

Correct me if I'm wrong but in the days before RVSM altimeters were good enough for 1000' separation up to 29 000 feet and above that the separation had to be 2000'. RVSM approval is only granted to operators who can demonstrate that their equipment can give the same accuracy above 29 as at lower levels.

I wouldn't insult my backside by using this sort of 'newspaper' (I use the term generally) as wiping material.

[St_Paul_Island]

Regarding radio frequencies in Europe, I have often wondered about the logic of having to memorise 6 digits. As I recall, short term memory is only good for 5 (?) or so items, so one has forgotten the first few digits by the time the last ones arrive in the queue. At least that is the way it works for me and my grey cells.

Why didn't they change the last 2 digits into a letter code? A (alpha) could be 00, etc. This would provide 26 "spaces" within each 100, more than enough for now and also any future frequency splits.

Easier to say and remember "123.4romeo" than "123.456".

Of course all the boxes would have to change yet again. I'm foolish to think that anything would change based upon an anonymous posting, but I wonder why it wasn't thought of before.

[411A]

Seriph raises a very valid point IMHO....keeping to standard routings costs a little more time and fuel, but should be much easier for ATC to plan for conflicting traffic.

[Standard_Departure]

Seriph (with 900 + hours per year!)

Yes Vertigo I worry about Standard Departure as well. His ideas about lateral spacing from 'first hand jump seat experience' are bizare. Some of us are up there 900+ hrs a year and might know what we are talking about. Standard airways routings are frequently discarded, I've crossed the whole of Europe on a single direct many times.- (Seriph)

If you read the following two quotes from within these pages, you will notice NOTHING bizare about my experience.

There are still thousands of aircraft flying airways at any given time of the day all around the world.

The referal to offset routings applies to direct tracks and airways alike.

What exactly was bizare about my statement? (specifially please)

What's this hangup with offset routings Wiley. Who follows the routes anyway? As in the States direct routings are becoming the norm, the 'traditional' airways system's days are doubtless numbered. In any case how many Russian and other third world outfits have sat nav. Ever been on the flight deck of a 154? Out of the dark ages.- (Seriph)

The reason for this is (and I have first-hand jump seat experience) that navigational systems are now so accurate, that two aircraft routing in opposite directions between the same two positions actually (often) cross EXACTLY (as in wingtips virtually aligned) over and under each other. BY off-setting from the direct track or airway by 1/2 a nautical mile, both left or both right, there will be a natural 1 nautical mile separation between aircraft on opposite direction routings. This would provide a lateral (horizonatal) safety if the vertical seperation were compromised. (This would not have helped in the swiss incident however) - (Standard Departure)

....... or are you just looking for a fight ?

['%MAC']

St. Paul Isla,
5 is at the low end, a safe assumption. The research, (Weiner?) substantiates it as 7 ± 2. Way back before my time this was how the telephone network in the States was set up, for example Belleview 458. I think they found it really didn’t make much of a difference. If you give the numbers in packets of 2 they seem to be remembered better, so for your example: onetwo (pause) threefour (pause) fivesix. There is loads of research on this, probably too much to make any rational or timely decision.

[Seriph]

No Std Dep, I'm not looking for a fight just amused at your first hand experience from sitting on a jump seat. I can think of very few bits of airspace where everyone goes in the same direction, just look at an airways map of the eastern USA or Switzerland / Germany. At any time we can track TCAS returns going in all directions. It has been proposed some time back in the States that the conventioinal airways system be scrapped. Also you assume that all aircraft are capable of an accurate offset, not yet.

[Alpha Leader]

van man:

In one of your recent posts you mentioned Skyguide's own website and its statement of relevance.

Despite being nominally a private company, Skyguide is 99% owned by the Swiss government. Its board is made up of a curious mixture of people, such as Franz Kellerhals (Chairman) and Anton Menth (New President of the Swiss postal service) - both better known for having just recently brought down Tornos (a machinery manufacturer). Others are Christophe Keckeis (Second CIC of the Swiss Air Force), Josef Felder (Zurich Airport), Pierre Moreillon (Aerosuisse, a lobby group), Philippe Simon (Representing the Skyguide personnel) - each of them obviously representing vested interests in particular sectors of Swiss aviation. Finally, there was Peter Siegenthaler, Director of the Federal Treasury and member of the board of Swiss International Air Lines; having finally realized his own conflict of interest he recently resigned and is to be replaced by his deputy at the Treasury, Peter Saurer.

The point in all this is that Skyguide's entire business philosophy is diametrically opposed to any pan-European integration. In order to further cement its insular position, Skyguide has integrated both civilian and military ATC, a unique situation in Europe. No country would agree to having its military ATC handled by a pan-European body.

[Standard_Departure]

Seriph.

OK..

Sorry if I was not "clear"

Wiley was saying that it "needs" to get sorted, continueing that line, I agreed.

What I meant by my "first hand experience" was that I had seen how the modern accuracy actually put us directly over and under opposite direction traffic, and I mean exactly. The discussion in the cockpit at that time was exactly about that.

As an ATC, I watch daily (continuously) how, on airways, opposite direction traffic cross over each other on the exact same track (in opposite directions).

I also think that the off-set tracks (on direct routings between waypoints and on airways) should be built in to the navigational equipment.

I am not a pilot, but I see the advantages of this method.

I do not see how my statements were "Bizare"

Best Regards.

[The Crimson Fruitbat]

Standard Departure

SD, I read your post on page 9 and thought it was pretty straight. Many posters are on the money with addressing the "accident chain" as opposed to nailing some poor driver posthumously (a common trait in the industry) or a controller.

However there are many prone to drivel that know nothing of ACC operations nor modern nav tolerances (or lack of as you have accurately described) as I noticed that you have described in your last post. For info, I did some research some time back into "offsetting" and at the time IFALPA appeared to condone it in some areas (eg Africa).

I have worked ATC dunnunda and now Nth America and have a degree majoring in HuFac (Prof Reason's or Helmreich's opinions might be too systemic after the forthcoming investigation and might not sate the blame hunters) and just thought that I'd give you my two bob's worth of support.

To the controller: may you find peace within yourself sooner rather than later...there are thousands of us around the world that deal with our own failures/foibles as humans, flawed procedures, questionable support/guidance from above, equipment failures/outages, "customers" non-compliance, their hearing but not listening, violation of instructions/clearances and and generally drivers not being aware of what it takes to keep the aluminium tubes moving with minimal separation (lack of SA/CRM "big picture") I (we?) hope you can get on with your life sooner rather than later.

There but for the grace of god go I...

[Ignition Override]

Maybe US TCAS facts have already been discussed on this thread.

As for US civilian TCAS requirements, only passenger planes have been required to install the expensive equipment, as far as I know. The FAA set a deadline for cargo jets to have it in the US, but FEDEX volunteered to install it in their jets. Did other US freight airlines also begin voluntary installation well before any FAA-imposed deadline?

Are many passengers on US airlines (or those on foreign planes over the US) even aware that the many cargo planes here were given a much later date for operational TCAS onboard?

Just a coincidence, but we were cleared for takeoff a few days ago in our two-engine passenger jet, with a 30 degree left turn (into a bright sun over Lake Michigan) from a very small upper midwestern airport's Runway 27 or 26, and given a turn towards a single-engine Cessna which left about three minutes before us. Both the tower and departure controllers never said a word about the traffic, not to mention its direction. Despite this, our assigned heading sent us towards the aircraft, passing it laterally by a half-mile or so on a parallel heading and a few hundred feet above. It was on our TCAS with relative altitude displayed, and the FO quickly saw it first (retired RF-4/F-4/F-15 fighter pilot) and kept us out of "deep klmchi".

Departure Control did not know what to say when I politely told him about passing the nearby parallel traffic, which we were not told about. Maybe the Cessna was not on the correct heading assigned, if any.

May Heaven help the survivors of the collision over Germany deal with their losses. I try not to even think about the poor parents.

[The Crimson Fruitbat]

Ignition

looking at stats I'd ALWAYS be keeping good SA down your way...post - 9/11 traffic be damned, the system is close to overload.....hence RVSM

[410]

I don't think Wiley will object if I attempt to answer the question you directed to him, Standard_Departure, since this subject is my pet passion.

What's his (and my) hangup about offset tracking? It’s this: I'm constantly amazed at the dogged resistance so many people in the industry exhibit towards this simple and no-cost procedure that increases safety margins exponentially.

71 people have died to prove that the unthinkable can happen even in ‘First World’ radar-monitored airspace. Although I accept that my suggestion would not have helped in this particular case, surely the master plan should be to break the error chain as early as possible?

Anyone with a modicum of imagination who flys the line internationally has been expecting an(other) incident like this in Africa or elsewhere in the Third World since the last two major midairs involving large jet transport aircraft. (I refer to the IL76 and the Saudia 747 out of Delhi in 1996 and the USAF C141 and the Luftwaffe Tupolov (96?) off the west African coast soon afterwards.)

Both involved a large loss of life, particularly the Delhi accident, but neither involved large numbers of fare-paying Westerners, particularly Americans, so CNN didn’t run with them beyond the first few days and they were soon forgotten. And both were head on collisions, where the two aircraft did not, by a one in a million chance, (as occurred in the case we’re discussing on this thread), happen to unfortunately cross paths at the same instant. In both the other cases, the aircraft were on the same airway, occupying the same extremely accurate path across the surface of the earth, possibly for many hours, and it took just one mistake – for one aircraft to be at the wrong flight level – for a collision to become inevitable without split second, accurate and appropriate reaction on the part of both pilots.

Sadly, this latest tragedy has proven a point that I’ve been trying to make for some time now – that the reactions of even the most professional of us can’t be relied upon to be absolutely correct when a split second decision must be made. For God’s sake, ‘n’ number of times a day, we all approach other aircraft literally at the speed of a flying bullet. Is there anyone out there who thinks he can dodge a flying bullet, particularly if that ‘bullet’ may be manoeuvring unpredictably as well as it tries to avoid you?

I’m no Superman. I’d rather not have to manoeuvre if someone makes a mistake in what I consider to be the most likely scenario for the next major enroute disaster. If we all flew offset, we’d get a traffic advisory in the event of most conflicts.

So can someone answer me this: given that no one procedure short of grounding the whole airline fleet is a panacea that will cover all eventualities, do they consider it safer to have traffic approaching with a closing speed of almost 1000knots absolutely aligned with them in azimuth, or would they consider it safer if such traffic was offset one or two miles to their left?

[Farside]

I posted the followong article over two years ago, and since we have had enough close calls it is perhaps time to get serious about it!!!!! For once I am always on the right side of the airway and it is very reassuring to see 99% of the crossing traffic well clear on your left side!!!

How many more “Close Calls”

The attached file is a copy of an article that appeared in last week’s USA Today. It describes another near miss over Indian Airspace and casually mentions in it’s closing paragraph that there had been some 20 near collisions in Indian skies since November 1996.
Now it doesn’t need an Einstein to realize that one of these days it won’t be a near miss but a full hit.
With “Freeflight” and the implementation of full Fans still a decade away, are we just going to sit and wait for a disaster to happen. The Airway system and communication system over India (and many more places in the world for that matter) are completely outdated and not capable of handling today’s traffic volume. A friend of mine, who is a leading design engineer in navigation equipment, told me that he sometimes had sleepless nights realizing that the equipment designed today was so accurate that, used in the present ATC environment, would one day contribute to a midair.
We cannot sit idle and wait for some beancounting bureaucrat in organizations like ICAO and JAA to change and adapt ATC procedures to create a safer environment, and avoid such disasters from happening. We all know that changes will not come soon, and only after several disasters will somebody wake up and actually start to do something.
I believe, and have argued this before, that we should start a discussion to come up with some ideas and/or procedures as to how to implement the legal and authorized changes in the present system. With the many aviation forums that we have today, often used only negatively (i.e. PPRUNE/Avweb), let us use these forums to encourage positive discussions, resulting in policy changes, and increased safety.
For the time being, Offset Tracking is an individual choice, to increase separation, and is being used by more an more pilots (as per several articles in Flight International). But as long as these procedures remain someone’s individual technique, it might and will work for that crewmember, but is not used to it’s full effect as long as it is not an official procedure.
Offset Tracking, Parallel-Oneway airways, direct INS and GPS routes are all procedures that can be implemented fairly easily and without great financial inputs. Why is it not happening, and what are the political forces stopping it from happening?
Where do we start, and what is the procedure to follow?
The irony of the situation is that, while we are flying a multi-million dollar piece of equipment into the 21st century, screaming at the top of our voices over some outdated piece of HF equipment, trying with 100 other flyers to get our position known to an Indian ATC controller, you can step back into our luxurious passenger cabins, where every passenger today can swipe his creditcard through his individual armrest satellite phone and have immediate 5/5 duplex phone connection with anybody in the world.
I wonder if we have got our priorities right.

[Farside]

Off set tracking

And to stay with it the following article was also posted by me on PPRUNE many many moons ago, so why don't we start it up again and see what we can achieve!



The recent mid-air between a Kazahk Il-76 and a Saudia 747 highlights a concern which we have been discussing between ourselves for months. While all the details may not apply; this disaster does dramatically illustrate
our concern.

The modern onboard GPS and/or DME updated IRS/INS navigational equipment has greatly enhanced the ease and accuracy of aircraft navigation. However, under certain circumstances, this accuracy could become a flight safety hazard.
Airline pilots spent untold hours EXACTLY in the centre of their 10 mile wide airways guaranteed only 1000 or 2000 feet separation from opposite direction traffic.
If there is a mistake during an altitude change by the crew of either aircraft, by the controller, with the communication between the two, or an autoflight equipment failure -- a disaster may occur..

FMS navigation computers should be off set just 1 or 2 miles to the right of track. This would guarantee 2 to 4 miles lateral separation between opposite
direction traffic while all aircraft would still remain well within airways.
This would utilise the extreme accuracy of onboard navigational systems to both remain within airways and to provide additional traffic separation.

Had both aircraft been equipped with TCAS, the Delhi disaster would have been prevented. However, all aircraft world-wide are not so equipped.

Airline pilots almost daily will pass another aircraft with this 1000 feet clearance. Wouldn't it be much safer to also have at least 2 miles lateral seperation? Since equipment and people do fail, why not implement this fail-safe technique?

[arcniz]

One question that should be asked in the dissection of this catastrophe is whether the for-profit (or at least 'no-loss') oriented goals of Skyguide caused fewer people to be applied to the ATC watch than would have happened if a Federal bureau were running the shift.

The growing trend toward assigning final responsibility for national priorities to Non-Government Organizations in nations around the world is worrisome if the approach leads to cost-cutting in the wrong corners.

Having a supervisor on that ATC shift would cost well under 200K Sfr per annum....adding a different perspective and another set of ears and eyes. The settlement costs will undoubtedly be more than 300 million Sfr, suggesting that more than a thousand years of the third-man's time would have been comparably cost efficient.

I cannot help but think that if the Eidgenossiches Luftamt were running the operation, a supervisor would have been there - as a matter of course - to help out, and those children, the crews, and others onboard would be alive right now. Maybe these NGO's with their cute marketing names and highly artistic logos and politically padded managing boards are not such a good deal, after all.....

[Latte tester]

Yesterday, flying from LSGG to LFPB, level at FL260 I watched, intently, as a TCAS target cruised by, in descent, inside 2 miles 500 feet below.
I was VMC at the time, but just on top of a layer, the target was well hidden in the clouds.
I might add that I was given a left heading change to fly in behind said target, but no traffic information was given to me, I can't speak for the other guy/gal.
Is this 'the norm' for Europe now? No traffic information because everybody is 1000' apart (ish).
This is the second time that this similar thing has happened, the first time resulted in a TCAS RA to descend because of a target descending head on. Again no traffic info until we asked the controller, just before receiving the RA.

Maybe procedures need to be improved...

I much prefer FL 430 and above, it's just a bit exciting on the way up and down.

Having said that, I must add a 'well done' to the female Paris arrival controller, loads of inbounds, parallels at LFPG and a bunch of us into LFPB. She had 'it' together.
It is still comforting to know there are people like her around.

Latte time

[411A]

Personally believe that the safety implications of RVSM in European airspace (not on oceanic tracks) have not been fully appreciated, and coupled with the accuracy of onboard nav systems of today, will lead to many more "problems" in the future. My opinion only, but the trend seems to be fully established.

[Devils Advocate]

I did a flight to Turkey last night, and whilst sitting there in the dark in the FL300's I watched (for nearly an hour) what could at best be described as an unerringly accurate 'line-astern' formation being kept by the four aircraft in front of us - it was a visually fabulous example the accuracy of IRS (and GPS) navigation.

I too have to agree about including an 'offset' in as much that it surely can't hurt - albeit that some earlier version FMC's don't support this function.

But how about also turning 'right' (as we used to) when you get a TCAS RA ? The point being that if TCAS has determined that a line-of-constant-bearing (LOCB) exists between two aircraft and as such there is a risk of collision - which it attempts to resolve by telling one aircraft to descend and the other to climb, so providing vertical separation - it has not resolved the fact that both aircraft are still on a line-of-constant-bearing from one another, i.e. get an RA in clear skies, you descend, the other fella climbs, you might very well find that the other aircraft goes literally right over your head - chilling stuff !

So why not also attempt to break the line-of-constant-bearing - by having both aircraft turn as well as also comply vertically with any TCAS RA instruction ? Surely the logic for this could be built into the TCAS software ( and one would imagine that modern computer processors should be more than able to cope with doing the maths ) and thus as well as having the vertical separation you'd also hopefully be breaking the LOCB by having the TCAS co-ordinate 'roll' guidance to the Flight Director(s) on each aircraft - and whilst we wait for such a mod to be actioned why not have a SOP that dictates that in the event of an RA climb or descent you should also turn right by (say) 45 degrees ?

Uhm, now would this have helped over Germany, e.g. if the B757 had not only been descending, according to its RA, but also turning 'right' ? Well at least it would have been trying to break the LOCB and they might have then missed each other, though maybe not by much - but a miss is a s good as a mile.

Of course I'll admit that adding extra functionality to the TCAS logic will cost money (i.e. lots), but what price does one put on the lives of an aircraft full of children ?

Ah well, it's just a thought, any takers ?