Mid-Air Collision over Southern Germany (merged)
Rebel PPRuNer
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Russian PR
The Tu-154 crew could be completely blameless, but the Russians are not honouring their memory if they are putting out false info in an attempt to bury Skyguide, which a proper investigation with true facts may do in any case.
Seems like "getting your retaliation in first". That said, the Russians would probably say the attention given to the three calls to the Tupolev, implying the crew were ignoring ATC, was cause for getting in some digs at the Swiss.
Seems like "getting your retaliation in first". That said, the Russians would probably say the attention given to the three calls to the Tupolev, implying the crew were ignoring ATC, was cause for getting in some digs at the Swiss.
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Climbing from FL260 to fl360 is as per Rome / Zurich ACC letter of aggreement. Flight was departing from Rome FIR hence climbing to Fl260. Really don't think the russians made it up.
As for the 20 percent cut in capacity, Kudos to skyguide on this one. The controllers are under very real additional stress. Their collective future might be on the line here. Remember that Syguide exists both in Zurich and Geneva due to delegated foreign airspace.
As for the 20 percent cut in capacity, Kudos to skyguide on this one. The controllers are under very real additional stress. Their collective future might be on the line here. Remember that Syguide exists both in Zurich and Geneva due to delegated foreign airspace.
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Ferris,
Thank you for your reasoned response. I don’t claim to be anything, I am what I am.
Someone who takes the slightest criticism so badly perhaps should reflect very carefully. The point I was making, as I am sure you are aware, is that when two aircraft in climb/descent are planned to level and then cross on minimum separation AND one of them has an enormous rate of descent then you should be preempting the obvious result. That means trying to move one laterally so they don’t cross (no longer pointing at each other!) Alternatively why not ask the aircraft with an excessive rate of descent to reduce it or stop 2000ft above the traffic. Either way you would have avoided setting off the TCAS RA in your incident and saved a few grey hairs on the pilots involved, not to mention your own. If you had asked the 737 to reduce his ROD and he declined then he would have been a total as$hole (and realised so after getting the RA) TCAS is a very essential tool and shouldn’t be messed with. If you point two aircraft at each other with high vertical closing rates aiming to stop them 1000ft apart you are guaranteeing a TCAS TA and very likely an RA as in your case. We call it airmanship what do you call it?
Thank you for your reasoned response. I don’t claim to be anything, I am what I am.
Someone who takes the slightest criticism so badly perhaps should reflect very carefully. The point I was making, as I am sure you are aware, is that when two aircraft in climb/descent are planned to level and then cross on minimum separation AND one of them has an enormous rate of descent then you should be preempting the obvious result. That means trying to move one laterally so they don’t cross (no longer pointing at each other!) Alternatively why not ask the aircraft with an excessive rate of descent to reduce it or stop 2000ft above the traffic. Either way you would have avoided setting off the TCAS RA in your incident and saved a few grey hairs on the pilots involved, not to mention your own. If you had asked the 737 to reduce his ROD and he declined then he would have been a total as$hole (and realised so after getting the RA) TCAS is a very essential tool and shouldn’t be messed with. If you point two aircraft at each other with high vertical closing rates aiming to stop them 1000ft apart you are guaranteeing a TCAS TA and very likely an RA as in your case. We call it airmanship what do you call it?
Last edited by mole; 8th Jul 2002 at 01:01.
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P22
Totally agree with you, however in this case the 737 pilot obviously didn't show any so wouldn't this have been a very good time for some early ATC intervention? Ferris apparently believes he shouldn’t intervene for fear of a bwahahaha (whatever that might be) and I quote:
“The rate you approach that level is up to you. Imagine this "Easy captain, I think you are descending too fast...." bwahahaha.
What on earth is wrong with “reduce your rate of descent” we are asked to increase it often enough and I don’t recall anyone replying bwahahaha on such occasions.
If Ferris is happy to watch two blips closing rapidly laterally and vertically and doesn’t even consider the possibility of an altitude bust then he is a much braver man than I. When climbing or descending towards opposite traffic with a planned separation of 1000ft I will always reduce vertical speed prior to level off, it does avoid the pucker effect. I believe the majority of ATC controllers act in a way which demonstrates a good knowledge of airmanship principals, on this occasion I just think Ferris left it a bit late. The RA occurred just before he spoke so I suggest it is fairly evident it was too late. He originally cited this incident as an example of ATC intervention being better then following an RA. He subsequently clarified what he meant in a reply to Standard Departure. So I guess everybody is now in agreement: early ATC intervention is better than waiting for an RA to occur. Fortunately the RA must have stopped at the same time as the 2 aircraft leveled off so no harm done just a few grey hairs.
My point is this entire proximity event could have been avoided with timely intervention. Perhaps I should call this common sense rather than airmanship if I am to avoid censure by you once again P22!
Totally agree with you, however in this case the 737 pilot obviously didn't show any so wouldn't this have been a very good time for some early ATC intervention? Ferris apparently believes he shouldn’t intervene for fear of a bwahahaha (whatever that might be) and I quote:
“The rate you approach that level is up to you. Imagine this "Easy captain, I think you are descending too fast...." bwahahaha.
What on earth is wrong with “reduce your rate of descent” we are asked to increase it often enough and I don’t recall anyone replying bwahahaha on such occasions.
If Ferris is happy to watch two blips closing rapidly laterally and vertically and doesn’t even consider the possibility of an altitude bust then he is a much braver man than I. When climbing or descending towards opposite traffic with a planned separation of 1000ft I will always reduce vertical speed prior to level off, it does avoid the pucker effect. I believe the majority of ATC controllers act in a way which demonstrates a good knowledge of airmanship principals, on this occasion I just think Ferris left it a bit late. The RA occurred just before he spoke so I suggest it is fairly evident it was too late. He originally cited this incident as an example of ATC intervention being better then following an RA. He subsequently clarified what he meant in a reply to Standard Departure. So I guess everybody is now in agreement: early ATC intervention is better than waiting for an RA to occur. Fortunately the RA must have stopped at the same time as the 2 aircraft leveled off so no harm done just a few grey hairs.
My point is this entire proximity event could have been avoided with timely intervention. Perhaps I should call this common sense rather than airmanship if I am to avoid censure by you once again P22!
Last edited by mole; 8th Jul 2002 at 05:14.
Flying as I do a 4-jet which doesn't (yet) have TCAS fitted - we operate under 'state exemption', unfortunately - we have an SOP to reduce climb/descent rate to 500 - 1500 ft/min before reaching 1000ft of any cleared level in RVSM airspace. People remember it quite simply - 1000/1000 to avoid causing TCAS advisories to other (properly equipped) ac.
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P22/Mole
The 737 probably was not aware of the other aircraft until near the cleared level because the TCAS will only show 'other' traffic within 2700 ft above or below, too late to reduce the rate enough to prevent a TA/RA if you are climbing/ descending quickly.
Some aircraft do have the TCAS facility to look higher/ lower but any 737/757/767 I have flown did not.
The 737 probably was not aware of the other aircraft until near the cleared level because the TCAS will only show 'other' traffic within 2700 ft above or below, too late to reduce the rate enough to prevent a TA/RA if you are climbing/ descending quickly.
Some aircraft do have the TCAS facility to look higher/ lower but any 737/757/767 I have flown did not.
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From Radio Denmark newssite
In keeping with the rules of this site I shall refrain from pasting direct quotes. Since it's in Danish anyway I guess only a few here would be able to read it. Anyway, according to the www.dr.dk news site, a Danish controller, who was alone in the ATC centre at the time of the accident, has been hospitalized with a nervous breakdown.
Also according to the news site, and this part is most likely journalistic guesswork, the controller was so caught up in getting a line through to Friedrichshafen that he "forgot" about either the Tupolev or the Boeing, or even both.
The Danish controller was on duty with a Swiss collegue, who at the time was taking a break.
I feel for the guy, even if an investigation should come to the conclusion that ATC errors was a major component of the events leading to the accident.
Also according to the news site, and this part is most likely journalistic guesswork, the controller was so caught up in getting a line through to Friedrichshafen that he "forgot" about either the Tupolev or the Boeing, or even both.
The Danish controller was on duty with a Swiss collegue, who at the time was taking a break.
I feel for the guy, even if an investigation should come to the conclusion that ATC errors was a major component of the events leading to the accident.
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Mole- we all live and learn. But you should get your head into a centre some time, and see just what we can and cant do. (for info- for me to work out you have increased rate of descent, I have to be sitting watching the level changes on your label for a good 4 sweeps, something I don't necessarily have time for. Rates of descent are a nice-to-know, not a need to know once you have a standard in place).
We seem to have gone off on a tangent to my original intention, which was to point out that currently ATC doesn't know of TAs or RAs unless told about them.
Until that episode, I didn't know TCAS would issue RAs to CROSS levels, and when I found out it sent a shiver up my spine, because we are working to prevent that. It really scares me that I could be working to oppose an RA, whether that RA is necessary or not.
Hopefully something will come out of this Swiss enquiry. Surely it couldn't be too hard for the TCAS to tell the transponder to alter it's squawk when it issues an RA?
We seem to have gone off on a tangent to my original intention, which was to point out that currently ATC doesn't know of TAs or RAs unless told about them.
Until that episode, I didn't know TCAS would issue RAs to CROSS levels, and when I found out it sent a shiver up my spine, because we are working to prevent that. It really scares me that I could be working to oppose an RA, whether that RA is necessary or not.
Hopefully something will come out of this Swiss enquiry. Surely it couldn't be too hard for the TCAS to tell the transponder to alter it's squawk when it issues an RA?
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Beags,
I used to work for the dark side too. Current airline has an SOP to reduce the Rate of Climb/Descent in the last 1000' to avoid TCAS alerts.
Ferris,
There would have been no TCAS crossover requirement if the 737 crew had been operating sensibly. Period. Stay frosty dude!
In this mid-air it seems both aircraft had TCAS and so it is likely that if they had both followed co-ordinated RAs they would have missed (Nothing like superceding the investigation..). It isn't the box, its the implementation of its commands.
Beags,
Good job TCAS wasn't fitted to the Lightning just think of some of the commands that you could have invoked with proper Climb and Descent rates.
Ghost
I used to work for the dark side too. Current airline has an SOP to reduce the Rate of Climb/Descent in the last 1000' to avoid TCAS alerts.
Ferris,
There would have been no TCAS crossover requirement if the 737 crew had been operating sensibly. Period. Stay frosty dude!
In this mid-air it seems both aircraft had TCAS and so it is likely that if they had both followed co-ordinated RAs they would have missed (Nothing like superceding the investigation..). It isn't the box, its the implementation of its commands.
Beags,
Good job TCAS wasn't fitted to the Lightning just think of some of the commands that you could have invoked with proper Climb and Descent rates.
Ghost
Last edited by Ghostflyer; 8th Jul 2002 at 10:33.
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ferris,
Thanks for replying I think we are now on the same wavelength. TCAS is an excellent piece of kit but most of us do try to avoid hitting potential TA/RA trigger points by reducing vertical speed when approaching occupied levels. All I was trying to say was I hope you guys in ATC do the same when time permits you to do so (vectors when it looks tight.) TCAS is very neccessary and works well but only after the investigation will we know why it didn't do the job on that tragic night over the Bodensee.
Thanks for replying I think we are now on the same wavelength. TCAS is an excellent piece of kit but most of us do try to avoid hitting potential TA/RA trigger points by reducing vertical speed when approaching occupied levels. All I was trying to say was I hope you guys in ATC do the same when time permits you to do so (vectors when it looks tight.) TCAS is very neccessary and works well but only after the investigation will we know why it didn't do the job on that tragic night over the Bodensee.
Last edited by mole; 8th Jul 2002 at 11:18.
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No dramas.
You can squawk ident at the push of a button. Why not auto-squawk TA then RA (maybe with a manual overide option), so that ATC, and more importantly, your traffic, know that you are going to RA manouvre?
You can squawk ident at the push of a button. Why not auto-squawk TA then RA (maybe with a manual overide option), so that ATC, and more importantly, your traffic, know that you are going to RA manouvre?
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Ferris, I agree.
There should be;
1. Some way of ATC knowing that a/c are are on RA vertical Nav.
2. Regulations in place that mandate ATC response (or lack of) once they are aware of RA avoidance in progress, so that we can be (legally) absolved of Avoiding action requirements once RA avoidance takes over.
Sidenote: If I understand correctly, the advent of VDL Mode4 will greatly improve the automatic TX/RX if information between a/c and a/c as well as ATC and a/c.
SID
There should be;
1. Some way of ATC knowing that a/c are are on RA vertical Nav.
2. Regulations in place that mandate ATC response (or lack of) once they are aware of RA avoidance in progress, so that we can be (legally) absolved of Avoiding action requirements once RA avoidance takes over.
Sidenote: If I understand correctly, the advent of VDL Mode4 will greatly improve the automatic TX/RX if information between a/c and a/c as well as ATC and a/c.
SID
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VDL Mode 4 jury still out, I believe. Would be good to know the reliability and timeliness of this feature in the real world.
UA FANS equipage was, I hear, a bust.
There is some testing going on in Miami area, not sure if it is Center or TRACON
Eurocontrol marketing adverts say it is going in in Europe
My questions would be:
1. It is a VHF link, hence line of sight, what kind of infrastructure is needed to support it and when will it be in and do you trust your life to it.
2. how long does it take for a controller to create, send, and confirm receipt of a message by the intended addressee (or vice versa from air to ground)
3. how reliable is the VDL 4 link.
When the fecal matter hits the rotary air circulation device and the crew is dealing with TCAS RAs and possibly systems problems and trying to maintain the plot (excuse me, maintain situational awareness) the first thing they will want to do will be to type data link messages and read messages on the little screen ?
UA FANS equipage was, I hear, a bust.
There is some testing going on in Miami area, not sure if it is Center or TRACON
Eurocontrol marketing adverts say it is going in in Europe
My questions would be:
1. It is a VHF link, hence line of sight, what kind of infrastructure is needed to support it and when will it be in and do you trust your life to it.
2. how long does it take for a controller to create, send, and confirm receipt of a message by the intended addressee (or vice versa from air to ground)
3. how reliable is the VDL 4 link.
When the fecal matter hits the rotary air circulation device and the crew is dealing with TCAS RAs and possibly systems problems and trying to maintain the plot (excuse me, maintain situational awareness) the first thing they will want to do will be to type data link messages and read messages on the little screen ?
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Both TCAS worked properly !
In a recent anouncement to the press, the relevant german authorities stated that the TCAS of the Russian plane ordered the crew to "climb,climb" --some seconds later the ATCO in Zurich ordered the crew to descent immediatly with the phrase "expedite descent to FL 350".
Some more info to come later on in a press conference.
Some more info to come later on in a press conference.
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Re: Both TCAS worked properly !
The latest data given at the BFU press conference is available on their German language news page by now. ( http://www.bfu-web.de/aktuinfo-d28.htm )
According to the BFU, both CVR tapes have been repaired over the weekend, data are in excellent condition and first results have been obtained.
Early investigation of the CVR tapes indicates that both TCAS systems were working properly. About one minute before collision (times are not accurate yet), both crews received a TCAS TA. Approx. 15 secs later, the 757 TCAS commanded a "descend,descend " RA while the TU-154 RA was "climb, climb". 1 sec after this RA Zurich AACC issued a "decend level 350, expedite descend" command, followed by a "expedite descend level 350" 14 seconds later (that's approx. 30 secs prior to collision, 15 secs after the initial TCAS RA).
Again, interesting questions arise....
There is yet another report from the German Air Traffic Control DFS on the same news page. This report states that at 21:33:24 UTC, 2min 9 sec before the planes collided, Short Term Conflict Alert got triggered on one of the radar screens of the Karlsruhe UAC of Rhine Radar. Both airplanes were visible on this radar screen prior to the STCA alert. 9 seconds later, until collision, the controller tried to contact Zurich ACC about this, but was unable to get through to him on the direct connection, even using the priority button. At times, the lines was busy, later the line was apparently available. The controller expected relief when one Mode C readout changed to lvl 361 but this was only temporary for one sweep.
Failing to get a connection on the direct line, he tried a call by conventional postal phone lines, but time ran out on this, unfortunately. Very sad, and probably a nightmare to watch the collision without being able to change fate.
E_o_D
According to the BFU, both CVR tapes have been repaired over the weekend, data are in excellent condition and first results have been obtained.
Early investigation of the CVR tapes indicates that both TCAS systems were working properly. About one minute before collision (times are not accurate yet), both crews received a TCAS TA. Approx. 15 secs later, the 757 TCAS commanded a "descend,descend " RA while the TU-154 RA was "climb, climb". 1 sec after this RA Zurich AACC issued a "decend level 350, expedite descend" command, followed by a "expedite descend level 350" 14 seconds later (that's approx. 30 secs prior to collision, 15 secs after the initial TCAS RA).
Again, interesting questions arise....
There is yet another report from the German Air Traffic Control DFS on the same news page. This report states that at 21:33:24 UTC, 2min 9 sec before the planes collided, Short Term Conflict Alert got triggered on one of the radar screens of the Karlsruhe UAC of Rhine Radar. Both airplanes were visible on this radar screen prior to the STCA alert. 9 seconds later, until collision, the controller tried to contact Zurich ACC about this, but was unable to get through to him on the direct connection, even using the priority button. At times, the lines was busy, later the line was apparently available. The controller expected relief when one Mode C readout changed to lvl 361 but this was only temporary for one sweep.
Failing to get a connection on the direct line, he tried a call by conventional postal phone lines, but time ran out on this, unfortunately. Very sad, and probably a nightmare to watch the collision without being able to change fate.
E_o_D
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TCAS for ATC?
Agreed E_o_D, what a nightmare.
So it does seem that if ATC had known of the TCAS readings in the two aircraft, a conflicting instruction may not have been given.
Hmmmmm?
So it does seem that if ATC had known of the TCAS readings in the two aircraft, a conflicting instruction may not have been given.
Hmmmmm?
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Here is the URL to the english version.
English report from BFU
This is so sad, there were even other ATC's watching it and they could not do anything.....
English report from BFU
This is so sad, there were even other ATC's watching it and they could not do anything.....