AF 447 report out
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They tried TOGA at 37000 feet. That's a level of incompetence that is otherworldly. I'm not the litigious sort, but AF and Airbus should be sued for every sou they can be forced to disgorge
- TOGA and 5 ° pitch , above 5000 ft ...
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Carjockey...
Disagree. Many systems on aircraft are duplicate, but identical systems. Not just ASIs, but Altimeters, Engines etc. If we followed your logic, on a twin engine aircrraft, one would be RR, one GE etc.
Diaagree. Pilots are on aircraft to fly them, and the ability to be cope when the automatic systems fail. Not v-v. APs are there to reduce fatigue, increase capacity & accuacy (RVSM). After any major / multiple failure, if the integrity of the AFS cannot be assured, it should audibly and clearly "give up", as it did here, not try to fly the aicraft with incomplete / inadequate / non-verifiable data.
Insufficient. And I would say it was, and still is, in most airlines across the world. The majority of pilots do not have a solid depth of expeirence to fall back on, and of those that do, few get (or take) the opportunity to keep those skills current.
Well I won't, since it would break the T&Cs I work under. But if you really are anything to do with aviation you could work it out
As an aside, I have a military background, both jet instructing, and fast jet flying. I tend to manually fly, at work, to/below 20K'. I fly / display / compete and teach GA inc aerobatics and upset training. I teach / fly display ex-mil jet trainers / FJs. I am very lucky to be able to do that, and to have had the opportunity / luck to have the training I got. It is not available to all. It might be that background that leads me to hope I could have coped with the situation these guys found themselves in. It is that background to realise that many might not fair much better than this crew did.
The report covers it under "startle factor". Unless and until we take crews, in sims or aircraft, and regularly (say a <6 month cycle, not ~3 yrs) give them unanticipated multiple systems failures and expect their raw handling and management skills to cope, we will get (a few) such accidents.
@Nigel on Draft
Quote: Is their no backup system available in the event of pitot tube failure?
Quote:
Well, yes there is. The other 2 pitot tubes. Trouble is when there is a common problem affecting mroe than 1.
So that means that there is no effective backup system, correct?
Quote: Is their no backup system available in the event of pitot tube failure?
Quote:
Well, yes there is. The other 2 pitot tubes. Trouble is when there is a common problem affecting mroe than 1.
So that means that there is no effective backup system, correct?
That was my point, there are obviously major faults in the system design
But how effective was the training / skill / practice in this case?
Please do me a favour and tell me who you are and which airline you fly for, because I do not want to be on any flight under your control
As an aside, I have a military background, both jet instructing, and fast jet flying. I tend to manually fly, at work, to/below 20K'. I fly / display / compete and teach GA inc aerobatics and upset training. I teach / fly display ex-mil jet trainers / FJs. I am very lucky to be able to do that, and to have had the opportunity / luck to have the training I got. It is not available to all. It might be that background that leads me to hope I could have coped with the situation these guys found themselves in. It is that background to realise that many might not fair much better than this crew did.
The report covers it under "startle factor". Unless and until we take crews, in sims or aircraft, and regularly (say a <6 month cycle, not ~3 yrs) give them unanticipated multiple systems failures and expect their raw handling and management skills to cope, we will get (a few) such accidents.
Originally Posted by petrolhead
Why has no one asked what they were doing in that cloud in the first place?
Originally Posted by petrolhead
Why did they not take vectors like other aircraft?
Originally Posted by petrolhead
Was the radar display turned up so they could see it?
Originally Posted by deSitter
I mean, was there any evaluation at all of the weather ahead?
Originally Posted by deggers316
what wrong with flying "by the seat of ya pants"
Originally Posted by Organfreak
Once terminal velocity is achieved (can't fall any faster), vertical acceleration ceases, and thus no Gs are felt.
Originally Posted by soylentgreen
To me, the question is this:
Given an identical situation, what % of professional pilots (or perhaps '3 man groups of pilots') would flub it and crash the plane?
Given an identical situation, what % of professional pilots (or perhaps '3 man groups of pilots') would flub it and crash the plane?
Study you proposed has already been done. Results are in the final report. Your notion that:
Originally Posted by Soylentgreen
A big part of this was the human-machine interface, which did an extremely poor job of letting the pilots know what was actually going on.
Originally Posted by soylentgreen
Thanks to those who liked my post
Originally Posted by ChrisJ800
they are also flying close to coffin corner.
Originally Posted by deSitter
And I just can't imagine a pilot who has no interest in airplanes
Originally Posted by Rengineer
Could any of you professionals here explain what knowledge of flight physics is taught to pilots in their training
Originally Posted by Rengineer
how much most of them will remember after ten or so years on the job?
Originally Posted by Rengineer
I would have thought that any pilot, in instrument conditions, would monitor basic things like their artificial horizon and variometer, displayed on the primary flight displays.
Originally Posted by Rengineer
Do we have to conclude that these don't give enough of a clue to diagnose a high-altitude stall?
Originally Posted by JOE-FBS
I was taught (over simplifying slightly for discussion) that if you don't know what is happening with the airspeed, set cruise power and put the AI in the middle with the wings level and things will settle to a point where you are in control again. Does that work at M0.8 at FL350?
Originally Posted by lomapaseo
It's impossible to train for every specific malfunction as it is impossible to annunciate every specific malfunction. Somehow there must be a balance.
Who?
My point exactly.
Originally Posted by fireflybob
Flying is very simple but there are a lot of people around trying to make it as complicated as possible.
Originally Posted by carjockey
Is their no backup system available in the event of pitot tube failure?
Originally Posted by ATC Watcher
The answer to that one was given during the BEA debrief/press briefing : There was a sudden Christmas tree with lots of warning , sounds including ice pellets hitting the windows and most probably the PF concentrated his action looking at one thing only and erasing all others, especially the sounds. This is a normal physiological reaction apparently.
Originally Posted by chuks
I have noticed with interest the sort of stall recovery training given in two-crew aircraft. Where once we were taught, in little airplanes, to get the nose well down and accept a loss in altitude, the advanced way to do this was presented as a call-out of 'Stall!' at the first indication, going to full power, but putting the nose on the horizon reference and powering out with no or very little loss of altitude.
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The July 6 edition of The Globe and Mail, Canada's so-called "national newspaper", carried what I thought was a poorly-written, incomplete and therefore misleading story on AF447 and the BEA report. Be that as it may, it included the following:
For the last 10000 m of freefall, the last two minutes, only test pilots might have pulled off the sort of dramatic, aggressive effort needed to save the plane. That might have involved throttling back one engine to force a wing drop, to drag the nose out of its 40-degree up angle into a dive.
A letter to the editor appeared next day from a pilot who claimed to "have flown and instructed on all classes of aircraft from the most primitive biplanes to the most sophisticated transports and fighters". In regard to the above quote, he wrote:
"All that was needed was full power on all engines and a release of elevator back pressure and the plane would have flown out of it in seconds. You do not "drag" an aircraft out of a nose-up condition - you basically let go of it, and it will drop its nose all by itself.
Maybe this suggestion has been covered in a previous thread, in which case, apologies, but I'm not a pilot and would be interested to hear what the experts have to say.
For the last 10000 m of freefall, the last two minutes, only test pilots might have pulled off the sort of dramatic, aggressive effort needed to save the plane. That might have involved throttling back one engine to force a wing drop, to drag the nose out of its 40-degree up angle into a dive.
A letter to the editor appeared next day from a pilot who claimed to "have flown and instructed on all classes of aircraft from the most primitive biplanes to the most sophisticated transports and fighters". In regard to the above quote, he wrote:
"All that was needed was full power on all engines and a release of elevator back pressure and the plane would have flown out of it in seconds. You do not "drag" an aircraft out of a nose-up condition - you basically let go of it, and it will drop its nose all by itself.
Maybe this suggestion has been covered in a previous thread, in which case, apologies, but I'm not a pilot and would be interested to hear what the experts have to say.
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Posted by deSitter
True, if you were headed to Rio, not true if you were headed from Rio (moon position in the sky that night). Anyhow, they were in the cloud when things started going awry.
Posted by TampaSLF
Only hunch you would have had was the angle of the wine in your glass sitting on the tray table.
Posted by qqantum
Read page #3 of the BEA's Final report. No blame is placed on the pilots per-se, only a report out of what they did or didn't do during the course of the event. Of course, this leads to cause or probable cause of the accident. I might add, ISASI's Forum Magazine - July/Sept 2012 issue, read Patrick R. Veillette's article on LOC. A LOC accident is defined as "An aircraft put into an unrecoverable position due to aircrew, aircraft or environmental factors, or combination of these." I am not sure the use of the word "unrecoverable" is correct in all incidences of LOC, but in this instance the aircraft was not recovered.
IMO, they avoided late. There was no lightning or severe turbulence, review the turbulence and time table contained in the final report.
The experienced FO knew what the less experienced FO flying was doing. Review the CVR tape and words to the effect "Go down", "No, you are going up", etc.
Know how the mechanics of the aircraft works. Stick back, elevators respond, THS moves to relieve pressure on elevators. Conversely, stick forward, elevators respond, THS moves to relieve pressure on elevators. You can see the trim wheels move and you can see the actual degrees, up or down, it is positioned at.
Well there was a quite gibbous Moon that night, should have provided plenty of visual stimulus with the lights dimmed.
Posted by TampaSLF
Would have been scary in that 330 having a hunch what was happening.
Posted by qqantum
As expected, the BEA Report is comprised of carefully crafted smoke — placing blame on the pilots of course — and distraction from the real issues of airplane design and regulator oversight failure that truly were the causes of the accident:
A review of the CVR transcript (Final Report, Appendix 1) plainly indicates the confusion in the cockpit that resulted from the total loss of airspeed indication, which occurred at a time when they were attempting to avoid the worst of the weather (icing, lightning, and severe turbulence).
The inexperienced FO, who was flying, made a radical pitch control input (full aft stick), which was not noticed by the more experienced FO, as he could not see the opposite control stick in the darkened cockpit (the A330 has independent control sticks, and so the normal means by which one pilot will instantly know what the other pilot is doing with his control stick
This drastic control input caused the trimmable horizontal stabilizer (THS) to automatically apply full nose‐up trim — a condition that while dangerous, in that it seriously compromised any attempt at recovery, was not detected by the pilots, as they made no mention of it;
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"All that was needed was full power on all engines and a release of elevator back pressure and the plane would have flown out of it in seconds. You do not "drag" an aircraft out of a nose-up condition - you basically let go of it, and it will drop its nose all by itself.
Already explained at long in many messages here and in the Tech Log forum ......
"have flown and instructed on all classes of aircraft from the most primitive biplanes to the most sophisticated transports and fighters"
Last edited by jcjeant; 8th Jul 2012 at 16:17.
DOVE
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AF 447 report out
As expected, the BEA Report is comprised of carefully crafted smoke — placing blame on the pilots of course — and distraction from the real issues of airplane design and regulator oversight failure
1. The loss of airspeed information caused a change in the FCS mode,
2. The FCS Mode change resulted in loss of the envelope speed and angle of attack (AOA) limits — no stall protection — no overspeed protection — no bank angle/pitch angle protection —
3. The inexperienced FO… made a radical pitch control input (full aft stick), … not noticed by the ‘other’ FO, (the A330 has independent control sticks, and so the pilot doesn’t know what the other pilot is doing with his control stick);
4. This caused the horizontal stabilizer (THS) to automatically apply full nose‐up trim — …
5. The Flight Data Recorder (FDR) indicates that, incredibly, the stall warning ceased (as designed) while the airplane was still in a deeply stalled condition, then reappeared when recovery action was attempted, adding even more confusion to the situation.
1. The loss of airspeed information caused a change in the FCS mode,
2. The FCS Mode change resulted in loss of the envelope speed and angle of attack (AOA) limits — no stall protection — no overspeed protection — no bank angle/pitch angle protection —
3. The inexperienced FO… made a radical pitch control input (full aft stick), … not noticed by the ‘other’ FO, (the A330 has independent control sticks, and so the pilot doesn’t know what the other pilot is doing with his control stick);
4. This caused the horizontal stabilizer (THS) to automatically apply full nose‐up trim — …
5. The Flight Data Recorder (FDR) indicates that, incredibly, the stall warning ceased (as designed) while the airplane was still in a deeply stalled condition, then reappeared when recovery action was attempted, adding even more confusion to the situation.
Who knows how many glitches are hiding behind the automation of AB?
On our skin we discovered a few:
- You loose the manual cotrol of throttles under 50 'R.A.
- The Flight Path Angle was easily confused with the vertical speed.
- The autothrottle is excluded by removing the Flight Director/s
- The ground spoilers do not extend unless there is a weight of 1000 kg on both the landing gear,
Please feel free to correct me if I'm wrong.
Last edited by DOVES; 8th Jul 2012 at 16:30.
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Ooh, snarky!
Got something for everyone there, Clandestino?
What was presented as 'stall recovery training' was just what I wrote about, reacting to the first indication of a stall. That might be part of the problem, not going any further than that, showing, indeed, inability to differentiate between approach to stall and stall itself.
What works okay for recovery from an approach to a stall might not work for recovery from a stall itself. It seems to be that people want to keep things simple, perhaps a bit too simple?
What was presented as 'stall recovery training' was just what I wrote about, reacting to the first indication of a stall. That might be part of the problem, not going any further than that, showing, indeed, inability to differentiate between approach to stall and stall itself.
What works okay for recovery from an approach to a stall might not work for recovery from a stall itself. It seems to be that people want to keep things simple, perhaps a bit too simple?
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Thanks for taking the time to respond, Jcjeant and BOAC.
What about the following remedy for the situation?:
throttling back one engine to force a wing drop, to drag the nose out of its 40-degree up angle into a dive.
Rockhound
What about the following remedy for the situation?:
throttling back one engine to force a wing drop, to drag the nose out of its 40-degree up angle into a dive.
Rockhound
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Yes, it would 'upset' the stable condition, but it is unnecessary. All they had to do is push forward on the stick and lower the nose. 'Standard' normal aeroplane stall recovery - possibly not the way AB pilots are indoctrinated.
Originally Posted by chucks
What was presented as 'stall recovery training' was just what I wrote about, reacting to the first indication of a stall. That might be part of the problem, not going any further than that, showing, indeed, inability to differentiate between approach to stall and stall itself.
Stall recovery training was never on the repertoire of ordinary line pilots' type rating & recurrent training as far as I remember. Once you have mastered stalls during basic training, the idea was that your aerodynamics knowledge enabled you to recognize that what you could get away with in trainer is very risky business in transporter so you would react promptly and correctly as soon as warning signs were present. Basically: airline pilots were supposed to initiate prompt and correct recovery action when stall warning went off so they wouldn't get near the stall at all. Theory was confirmed in practice even with UAS on A330/340. Except once.
For further info, have a look at: "Case of TAM flight on 12 November 2003", page 87 of the report in English. Panic pulls were interrupted by panic pushes as the stall warning went off. Rollercoaster ride eventually evened out without stall.
Originally Posted by DOVES
1. The loss of airspeed information caused a change in the FCS mode,
Originally Posted by DOVES
The FCS Mode change resulted in loss of the envelope speed and angle of attack (AOA) limits — no stall protection — no overspeed protection — no bank angle/pitch angle protection
Originally Posted by DOVES
The inexperienced FO… made a radical pitch control input (full aft stick), … not noticed by the ‘other’ FO,
Originally Posted by DOVES
This caused the horizontal stabilizer (THS) to automatically apply full nose‐up trim
Originally Posted by DOVES
The Flight Data Recorder (FDR) indicates that, incredibly, the stall warning ceased (as designed) while the airplane was still in a deeply stalled condition, then reappeared when recovery action was attempted, adding even more confusion to the situation.
Originally Posted by DOVES
You loose the manual cotrol of throttles under 50 'R.A.
Originally Posted by DOVES
The Flight Path Angle was easily confused with the vertical speed.
Originally Posted by DOVES
The autothrottle is excluded by removing the Flight Director/s
Originally Posted by DOVES
The ground spoilers do not extend unless there is a weight of 1000 kg on both the landing gear,
Originally Posted by deSitter
Well there was a quite gibbous Moon that night, should have provided plenty of visual stimulus with the lights dimmed.
AF 447 report out
I am not an expert in flying large pax a/c. I am a retired ATCO. Therefore, I restrict myself to what I understand of the technicalities of this incident (very little ) & qualify that with my experience of life.
It would seem to me that in life very few people (or firms) are ready to shoulder the blame (the more so when the subject is a catastrophic incident). Most people & organisations seek to avoid blame & responsibility as best they can. All the more so when they have a vested interest.
So, professional pilots are reticent to acknowledge that their colleagues could possibly have made what seem to be elementary mistakes.
Airlines seek to avoid taking a share of blame which would expose them to litigation.
Aircraft manufacturers, the same.
The last 2 seek to put pressure on the investigation authorities to avoid them publishing anything (or too much of anything) which might facilitate or ease the process of litigation being initiated against them.
& the Investigators are "mindful" of the repercussions which could occur to their national flagship manufacturers & airlines if they publish anything which pins the blame too firmly on the manufacturers or the airlines.
It is my suspicion that may be what happened here. I make no accusations; but, I draw on my experience in ATC & life in general when I suggest that no single element in this equation was particularly more to blame than any other.
I have seen, & been involved in, ATC incidents (of which I had a FULL understanding) & know that the investigators did not always get their conclusions totally correct. I do not know if these did.
My sympathies go to the crew, who faced a horrendous situation, & who, consequently seem to have "taken leave of their professional senses" - quite how & why is beyond me ! & to the passengers & their families.
Above all I hope that the full & exact reason for this crash is now publicly known & that a similar situation will never re-occur.
It would seem to me that in life very few people (or firms) are ready to shoulder the blame (the more so when the subject is a catastrophic incident). Most people & organisations seek to avoid blame & responsibility as best they can. All the more so when they have a vested interest.
So, professional pilots are reticent to acknowledge that their colleagues could possibly have made what seem to be elementary mistakes.
Airlines seek to avoid taking a share of blame which would expose them to litigation.
Aircraft manufacturers, the same.
The last 2 seek to put pressure on the investigation authorities to avoid them publishing anything (or too much of anything) which might facilitate or ease the process of litigation being initiated against them.
& the Investigators are "mindful" of the repercussions which could occur to their national flagship manufacturers & airlines if they publish anything which pins the blame too firmly on the manufacturers or the airlines.
It is my suspicion that may be what happened here. I make no accusations; but, I draw on my experience in ATC & life in general when I suggest that no single element in this equation was particularly more to blame than any other.
I have seen, & been involved in, ATC incidents (of which I had a FULL understanding) & know that the investigators did not always get their conclusions totally correct. I do not know if these did.
My sympathies go to the crew, who faced a horrendous situation, & who, consequently seem to have "taken leave of their professional senses" - quite how & why is beyond me ! & to the passengers & their families.
Above all I hope that the full & exact reason for this crash is now publicly known & that a similar situation will never re-occur.
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We all know this aircraft couldn't climb and still have 1.3 buffet protection so they lost IAS and climbed at an impossible 14 degree deck angle. What genius figured this checklist out? Nobody, it was the incompetent pilots that did it. We need to hire people that can control their aircraft, not monitors of autopilots.
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Indeed, jcj - Rockhound's 'pilot' was talking out of his seat cushion.
Actually he was entirely correct. The 1st step in unusual attitude recovery is to unload the airframe...period. No pilot...let alone "professional" pilot should maintain a particular control input for as long as the PF did. Obviously the trim issue becomes a significant complication and either manual trim or continued full deflection would be required to correct the trim.
Had the PF simply unloaded the airframe the moment the stall warning sounded the entire incident would most likely be one of the dozens of "recoveries" from this malfunction. Only his continued incompetence generated the stall then forced the trim so far out of sorts.
So...in the early stages of the upset the statement is entirely correct...
Actually he was entirely correct. The 1st step in unusual attitude recovery is to unload the airframe...period. No pilot...let alone "professional" pilot should maintain a particular control input for as long as the PF did. Obviously the trim issue becomes a significant complication and either manual trim or continued full deflection would be required to correct the trim.
Had the PF simply unloaded the airframe the moment the stall warning sounded the entire incident would most likely be one of the dozens of "recoveries" from this malfunction. Only his continued incompetence generated the stall then forced the trim so far out of sorts.
So...in the early stages of the upset the statement is entirely correct...
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All of us who fly for a living, or even just for pleasure, will eventually, experience a moment when tiredness, confusion, distraction, fear or any other human factor degrades our ability. Nevertheless, when that happens, it is all the more crucial that we fall back on our basic training of pitch and power. No matter how complex the aircraft - and an Airbus can be flown in its basic law like any other - those are our means of survival. This is just another example of a crew getting distracted by unexpected events and failing to do just that. My company, and I'm sure many others, are now revisiting basic upset recovery in the sim. These guys had everything they needed before them to tell them what the aircraft was doing, from attitude to groundspeed (available on the MCDU and independent of any pitot/static combination) The only thing they didn't have was the ability for one of them to see at a glance that the other guy was doing. That it the one major fault of the Airbus. Maybe the other guy's sidestick position should be shown on the PD.
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Originally Posted by Clandestino
Quote:
Originally Posted by Rengineer
Could any of you professionals here explain what knowledge of flight physics is taught to pilots in their training
This: CDBDA AADCD BAADC CADCB BABCD AACDB BACDA. I kid you not
Originally Posted by Rengineer
Could any of you professionals here explain what knowledge of flight physics is taught to pilots in their training
This: CDBDA AADCD BAADC CADCB BABCD AACDB BACDA. I kid you not
Originally Posted by Turbine D
Posted by deSitter
Quote:
Well there was a quite gibbous Moon that night, should have provided plenty of visual stimulus with the lights dimmed.
True, if you were headed to Rio, not true if you were headed from Rio (moon position in the sky that night). Anyhow, they were in the cloud when things started going awry.
Quote:
Well there was a quite gibbous Moon that night, should have provided plenty of visual stimulus with the lights dimmed.
True, if you were headed to Rio, not true if you were headed from Rio (moon position in the sky that night). Anyhow, they were in the cloud when things started going awry.
Originally Posted by DOVES
- You loose the manual cotrol of throttles under 50 'R.A.
- The autothrottle is excluded by removing the Flight Director/s
- The autothrottle is excluded by removing the Flight Director/s
Originally Posted by Clandestino
Quote:
Originally Posted by DOVES
1. The loss of airspeed information caused a change in the FCS mode,
Surprise, surprise. What would you want autopilot to do? Follow possibly wrong data?
Originally Posted by DOVES
1. The loss of airspeed information caused a change in the FCS mode,
Surprise, surprise. What would you want autopilot to do? Follow possibly wrong data?
Originally Posted by Clandestino
Quote:
Originally Posted by DOVES
This caused the horizontal stabilizer (THS) to automatically apply full nose‐up trim
Per design. As would full nose down stick make FCS try to achieve -1G so it would go full nose down with elevators and wind the THS down until this is achieved. You can't hit -1G in upright stall so full stick forward demand cannot be satisfied until the aeroplane is flying again.
Originally Posted by DOVES
This caused the horizontal stabilizer (THS) to automatically apply full nose‐up trim
Per design. As would full nose down stick make FCS try to achieve -1G so it would go full nose down with elevators and wind the THS down until this is achieved. You can't hit -1G in upright stall so full stick forward demand cannot be satisfied until the aeroplane is flying again.
And again I'm afraid:
Originally Posted by Clandestino
Quote:
Originally Posted by DOVES
The Flight Data Recorder (FDR) indicates that, incredibly, the stall warning ceased (as designed) while the airplane was still in a deeply stalled condition, then reappeared when recovery action was attempted, adding even more confusion to the situation.
Nice try but this is trying to have it both ways: first CM2 doesn't pay attention to stall warnings for 54 seconds, then all at sudden he can hear it but assumes "STALL STALL" means "pull-up!"
Originally Posted by DOVES
The Flight Data Recorder (FDR) indicates that, incredibly, the stall warning ceased (as designed) while the airplane was still in a deeply stalled condition, then reappeared when recovery action was attempted, adding even more confusion to the situation.
Nice try but this is trying to have it both ways: first CM2 doesn't pay attention to stall warnings for 54 seconds, then all at sudden he can hear it but assumes "STALL STALL" means "pull-up!"
Airbus make a good product, but their philosophy was radical and is over a quarter of a century old now. It is high time for a comprehensive review based on operational experience, not just tinkering and more AB Coolade. They could start by surveying pilot opinion of various features of their products.
Won't happen, business as usual.
Last edited by Case One; 9th Jul 2012 at 04:56. Reason: Insomnia.
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Well sir, I think "shock tactics" is a bit of unfortunate colorful journalism, but the actual idea contained in the article, of "training for surprise" and "startle factor" is timely, if not already too late. It's been mentioned previously that it's not gonna be EZ to startle/frighten some guys in a sim, for obvious reasons. Maybe if I strolled in, with my hair down to here, and announced that I was in charge? Would that do it?
Also, as stated here a brazillian times, apparently some Airbus crews need to read and understand their FCOMs, and receive upset recovery training pronto. Maybe they wouldn't be quite so scared if they knew WTH was going on!
Also, as stated here a brazillian times, apparently some Airbus crews need to read and understand their FCOMs, and receive upset recovery training pronto. Maybe they wouldn't be quite so scared if they knew WTH was going on!