AF 447 report out
DW @franzl (RF4) and TD:
The test was primarily to determine *systems* behaviour, and does not attempt to answer questions outside of that scope. The question was whether forward stick would be enough to either overcome or counteract the THS position in the time available, for which the answer was affirmative.
The test was primarily to determine *systems* behaviour, and does not attempt to answer questions outside of that scope. The question was whether forward stick would be enough to either overcome or counteract the THS position in the time available, for which the answer was affirmative.
In addition, the recovery procedures we attempted were performed in the early phases of the stall - right after to the point where the THS rolled back. We did not hold the stall to the point where the sim behaviour would deviate significantly from the real thing due to the data from the real aircraft never having been gathered in those conditions.
It was an interesting experiment when no other values where available and BEA had its cards still hidden, but now the final report is out and i see no sense in supplementing the report with own non proofed experimental data like they are real hard facts. .
BEA clearly states that the aircraft was not tested outside its normal flight envelope and that no data are available, period. We have to accept that and work from there.
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"In the begining ..."
Lyman;
ICAO Convention Annex 13 provides that mandate to the State of registration for an aircraft lost in International waters. The BEA is the designated responsible entity in French law.
Any Search and Rescue response is that of the State in who's SAR AREA the accident occurred; in this case Brazil. The BEA was able to consult with Maritime experts and put together an initial TPL search for the ULBs without impinging on the Brazilian SAR efforts - be they misplaced or not. But in like vein, the BEA was able to enlist the naval and air resources of the French state to work with the Brazilian Military.
The BEA was always ultimately the legal custodian of any bodies or items recovered during the SAR phase or later. Not having the resources in the initial stages to handle/store recovered bodies, that task was left to the Brazilians. Once the Brazilians declared the SAR operation to be complete, the BEA was left unfettered to proceed at its leisure to instigate its own Search and Recovery plan. One small complication was the criminal investigation proceedings commenced in France, which gave the court the power to place evidence under seal.
I do not know who mandated the search be controlled by BEA, the Court?
Any Search and Rescue response is that of the State in who's SAR AREA the accident occurred; in this case Brazil. The BEA was able to consult with Maritime experts and put together an initial TPL search for the ULBs without impinging on the Brazilian SAR efforts - be they misplaced or not. But in like vein, the BEA was able to enlist the naval and air resources of the French state to work with the Brazilian Military.
The BEA was always ultimately the legal custodian of any bodies or items recovered during the SAR phase or later. Not having the resources in the initial stages to handle/store recovered bodies, that task was left to the Brazilians. Once the Brazilians declared the SAR operation to be complete, the BEA was left unfettered to proceed at its leisure to instigate its own Search and Recovery plan. One small complication was the criminal investigation proceedings commenced in France, which gave the court the power to place evidence under seal.
...the fact the crew never recognized they were in a stall and never attempted to remove themselves from the stall. Therefore the BEA is not obligated to speculate as to whether recovery from the stall could be achieved or not.
I for one would hope the report is there for the latter reason.
DontHangUp, I added the {brackets} for ease of reference
I'll nitpick slightly here and point out that while {A} looks to be true, {B} may not be so clear cut. Point being, if stall was at any point recognized, by either pilot he may not necessarily have said anything. All that they said is not all that they saw, experienced, and decided. It seems well established that the CRM and crew synergy wasn't at its best in this mishap, nor that the pilots were other than task loaded early on. There is also the impression I get of a frustrated PNF calling the captain back, perhaps thinking " I can't work with this guy!" but I am on thin ice with that.
Early on, you get the PNF asking, in re the crickets, "what's that?"
Is that an indication that at least one of crew was concerned with a stall, or approach to one? We can't be sure. Verbalization of that concern is not recorded, or if recorded was redacted. (<--- very unlikely)
Another tidbit shows us that early in the event, the PF set TOGA and the nose up (12-15deg?). He may have been trying to avoid a stall (crickets chirp finally gets through?) by using a low altitude response to stall warning, or he may have been applying a response to low altitude UAS, which procedure is tailored to landing and approach environment.
We don't know what was going through his mind.
I agree that best estimate is {A}, then {B}.
Given some of the actions taken, we are left in some doubt as to what was actually going on in two brain housing groups in the LH and RH seats.
... the fact {A}the crew never recognized they were in a stall and {B}never attempted to remove themselves from the stall.
Early on, you get the PNF asking, in re the crickets, "what's that?"
Is that an indication that at least one of crew was concerned with a stall, or approach to one? We can't be sure. Verbalization of that concern is not recorded, or if recorded was redacted. (<--- very unlikely)
Another tidbit shows us that early in the event, the PF set TOGA and the nose up (12-15deg?). He may have been trying to avoid a stall (crickets chirp finally gets through?) by using a low altitude response to stall warning, or he may have been applying a response to low altitude UAS, which procedure is tailored to landing and approach environment.
We don't know what was going through his mind.
I agree that best estimate is {A}, then {B}.
Given some of the actions taken, we are left in some doubt as to what was actually going on in two brain housing groups in the LH and RH seats.
Last edited by Lonewolf_50; 17th Jul 2012 at 14:40.
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Hi Lonewolf 50,
The above quote actually came from me in a post I made to Lyman. It was my words echoing what the BEA Final Report stated in the Synopsis:
and, in the CONCLUSIONS - 3.1 - Findings:
To the best estimates of {A}, then {B}, I would add a {C}. As the BEA stated:
The FDs were not turned off as they were supposed to be. You can read the discussions of this on pages 188 & 190, BEA Final Report. Also, you can read the discussion regarding the application of TOGA thrust on pages 180-181, BEA Final Report.
Quote:
... the fact {A}the crew never recognized they were in a stall and {B}never attempted to remove themselves from the stall.
... the fact {A}the crew never recognized they were in a stall and {B}never attempted to remove themselves from the stall.
- The crew not identifying the approach to stall, the lack of immediate on its part and exit from the flight envelope,
- The crew's failure to dianose of the stall situation and, consequently, the lack of any action that would have made recovery possible.
- The crew's failure to dianose of the stall situation and, consequently, the lack of any action that would have made recovery possible.
Quote:
- Neither of the pilots made any reference to the stall warning or to buffet.
- Neither pilots formally identified the stall situation.
- Neither of the pilots made any reference to the stall warning or to buffet.
- Neither pilots formally identified the stall situation.
The possibility that the FD is presenting handling instructions that are contrary to expected pilot actions for an approach to stall
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Lonewolf: "Early on, you get the PNF asking, in re the crickets, "what's that?" "... I don't think so.... I submit that is not a conclusion made by BEA. Though close in chronology, (I think "what's that..." is too close to the sound to allow for PNF's processing it. If he did mean to link it to the SW, I would think it was rhetorical, of course he knew what it was...Don't you also attribute a comment "it is impossible" to Captain on his return to cockpit? I think that is PF, late, after,"we are going to crash..."
Last edited by Lyman; 18th Jul 2012 at 00:59.
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Recoverability from a DeepStall Condition
One of the apparent "unknowns" is whether a deep stall is recoverable once an A330 is embedded in the condition. It was never flight-trialled by Airbus (i.e. neither the possibility nor the high altitude ballistic entry conditions with various trim states and engine powers). There would be many variables including weight, CofG, pitch attitude and pilot control inputs.
One paramount determinant would be the relative airflows once stabilized in a descent at greater than 40 degrees angle of attack. The effectiveness of a tailplane is a function of its lever arm and (even more vitally) the airflows across it. The Lever arm is its distance from the wing's Centre of Pressure (which "moment arm" itself changes at 40 + degrees angle of attack,
particularly with underslung engines at high power). Wind that trimmable horizontal stabilizer into a fully nose-up deflection and its chord-wise airflows are very adversely affected. At 40 degs AoA those chordwise flows would be minimal and so the tailplane's efectiveness would be greatly compromised.
In fact the whole Lift/ weight /thrust /drag relationship becomes significantly distorted for pitch-control, once "stuck" in this aerodynamically distorted flight regime. Elevator and tailplane pitch control authority are no longer a "given" at that excessive angle of attack. The "forward flight" model has now become a "falling leaf" model.... and the wind-tunnel is now an elevator shaft. A feather on a bird works well aerodynamically. A feather falling has no aerodynamic qualities whatsoever.
Something that seems to be lacking in the BEA report is the sensory deprivation of the pilots in respect of what they'd normally expect from a stalled flight condition. Uppermost in that category would be airframe buffet. Because that would be quite absent in a deep stall (there being no bathing of the empennage in turbulent flows from the wings), the resultant eerily smooth flight would induce an atmosphere of "unreality" and nothing conducive to any perceptions (whatsoever) of stalled flight. A similar sensory deprivation occurs in a super-fast lift ascending or descending in the bowels of a skyscraper. The impression of vertical speed is quite lacking once acceleration stops. However, unlike the skyscraper analogy, in AF447 the initial downwards acceleration into the deep-stall was subliminal and undetectable. That was partly due to the inadvertently optimized pitch attitude at entry caused by an inexperienced pilot's unintended or incompetent sidestick input (as well as high power, thin air and a fully deflected THS).
To sum up, as I have said before in Pprune, the pilots were suddenly operating well beyond their experience in a very alien flight regime. It's unsurprising that they ended up non-plussed and quite out of ideas. The cutback-in of the aural stall warning amidst the cacophony of other alerts and alarms only served to confound them further. It was not conducive to any concerted (or even continued) attempts to lower the pitch attitude. In fact, it was a straight-out deterrent to doing so. That was one of the few tangibles that they had to work with, but it was lethally misleading and working 180 against the (otherwise) logical solution.
If you ever wanted to construct a labyrinthine, bizarre and Byzantine conundrum for an unprepared coterie of fat, dumb and happy long-haul cruise pilots, you'd have to go a long way beyond this pitot-ice induced nightmare of countervailing automation.
One paramount determinant would be the relative airflows once stabilized in a descent at greater than 40 degrees angle of attack. The effectiveness of a tailplane is a function of its lever arm and (even more vitally) the airflows across it. The Lever arm is its distance from the wing's Centre of Pressure (which "moment arm" itself changes at 40 + degrees angle of attack,
particularly with underslung engines at high power). Wind that trimmable horizontal stabilizer into a fully nose-up deflection and its chord-wise airflows are very adversely affected. At 40 degs AoA those chordwise flows would be minimal and so the tailplane's efectiveness would be greatly compromised.
In fact the whole Lift/ weight /thrust /drag relationship becomes significantly distorted for pitch-control, once "stuck" in this aerodynamically distorted flight regime. Elevator and tailplane pitch control authority are no longer a "given" at that excessive angle of attack. The "forward flight" model has now become a "falling leaf" model.... and the wind-tunnel is now an elevator shaft. A feather on a bird works well aerodynamically. A feather falling has no aerodynamic qualities whatsoever.
Something that seems to be lacking in the BEA report is the sensory deprivation of the pilots in respect of what they'd normally expect from a stalled flight condition. Uppermost in that category would be airframe buffet. Because that would be quite absent in a deep stall (there being no bathing of the empennage in turbulent flows from the wings), the resultant eerily smooth flight would induce an atmosphere of "unreality" and nothing conducive to any perceptions (whatsoever) of stalled flight. A similar sensory deprivation occurs in a super-fast lift ascending or descending in the bowels of a skyscraper. The impression of vertical speed is quite lacking once acceleration stops. However, unlike the skyscraper analogy, in AF447 the initial downwards acceleration into the deep-stall was subliminal and undetectable. That was partly due to the inadvertently optimized pitch attitude at entry caused by an inexperienced pilot's unintended or incompetent sidestick input (as well as high power, thin air and a fully deflected THS).
To sum up, as I have said before in Pprune, the pilots were suddenly operating well beyond their experience in a very alien flight regime. It's unsurprising that they ended up non-plussed and quite out of ideas. The cutback-in of the aural stall warning amidst the cacophony of other alerts and alarms only served to confound them further. It was not conducive to any concerted (or even continued) attempts to lower the pitch attitude. In fact, it was a straight-out deterrent to doing so. That was one of the few tangibles that they had to work with, but it was lethally misleading and working 180 against the (otherwise) logical solution.
If you ever wanted to construct a labyrinthine, bizarre and Byzantine conundrum for an unprepared coterie of fat, dumb and happy long-haul cruise pilots, you'd have to go a long way beyond this pitot-ice induced nightmare of countervailing automation.
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That is a very well said piece. I have one question. Since the return of Stall Warn may have seemed to alert to Stall entry why did the pilot Pull Up when it first came in through the "back door"? May be a nit pick relative to your choice of wording, but rather than confused, wasn't his response confusing?
In other words, he may have been confused, but his actions were wrong either way the Stall Warn fired? In a way, it did not matter, whichever way the SW appeared, he acted similarly.
At 60 knots IAS, or at actual Vsw, the horn should mean "reduce incidence"?
In other words, he may have been confused, but his actions were wrong either way the Stall Warn fired? In a way, it did not matter, whichever way the SW appeared, he acted similarly.
At 60 knots IAS, or at actual Vsw, the horn should mean "reduce incidence"?
Last edited by Lyman; 18th Jul 2012 at 02:27.
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AF 447
I have been avidly and carefully following this thread since the fateful,terrible loss of AF 447 between Rio and France,with all of her crew and passengers.Shocking.
The posts seem to go on and on ad inifininitum,but one fact is clear----the crew screwed up through lack of training combined with the (slightly) lesser malfunction of the pitot tubes which were unable to cope with the ice incursion.
There seems to be little wrong with the Aircraft---it seems to be a "fly the Aircraft" situation which was not followed in real time.....surely its now time to put this to rest?On and on by armchair scientists.....it was an "accident",which are certainly never intentional!Move on everyone and let the Litigators sort it out money-wise,as sharp as they are....There is nothing wrong,it seems,with AB or Boeing or whoever.Lets put this to sleep.....
The posts seem to go on and on ad inifininitum,but one fact is clear----the crew screwed up through lack of training combined with the (slightly) lesser malfunction of the pitot tubes which were unable to cope with the ice incursion.
There seems to be little wrong with the Aircraft---it seems to be a "fly the Aircraft" situation which was not followed in real time.....surely its now time to put this to rest?On and on by armchair scientists.....it was an "accident",which are certainly never intentional!Move on everyone and let the Litigators sort it out money-wise,as sharp as they are....There is nothing wrong,it seems,with AB or Boeing or whoever.Lets put this to sleep.....
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Loerie:
B-but......then.....what would we do all day???
Here's an idea! let's all chip in and buy Loerie a space bar for his keyboard.
.....surely its now time to put this to rest?On and on by armchair scientists.....it was an "accident",which are certainly never intentional!Move on everyone and let the Litigators sort it out money-wise,as sharp as they are....There is nothing wrong,it seems,with AB or Boeing or whoever.Lets put this to sleep.....
Here's an idea! let's all chip in and buy Loerie a space bar for his keyboard.
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TheShadow;
I don't believe the tailplane was as compromised as you posit. AF447 - Thread No.6 will provide you with an alternative viewpoint.
Wind that trimmable horizontal stabilizer into a fully nose-up deflection and its chord-wise airflows are very adversely affected. At 40 degs AoA those chordwise flows would be minimal and so the tailplane's efectiveness would be greatly compromised.
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The BEA did nothing wrong during that investigation
Quote:
8. If you think vegatable pilots are bad, imagine vegetable engineers, people who never had any desire to create new things, and are perfectly happy to do little besides playing office politics. Yes the corporate engineering is full of those...
Not when developing new products in aviation you don't.
8. If you think vegatable pilots are bad, imagine vegetable engineers, people who never had any desire to create new things, and are perfectly happy to do little besides playing office politics. Yes the corporate engineering is full of those...
Not when developing new products in aviation you don't.
Not quite, THS remained at full nose-up
Care to elaborate?
Now we have nearly the same constellation for the AF447 investigation. But as I said, I see absolutely no indication for any irregularities this time.
Accident investigators have only the power of advice. Also their scope is limited to accident at hand.
Have a go at BEA's report.
Second: The other crews did not face the same situation, so not 100% comparable anyway.
Third: I referred to the captains abilities as opposed to the ones sitting in the front row during flight AF447, not opposed to other crews.
So: My point was that being a potentially great pilot (knowing intuitively how to get out of the situation once at the controls) does not automatically imply to be a good captain who has to actively regain control. Pilot in command (captain) should be ultimately in command, not just watching / advising. The fact that he still let the controls to the least experienced crew member when it was obviously already screwed up was bad crew management in itself.
My personal conclusion is something like that the PF indeed messed it up. But he was left alone by his captain (give comments is not enough), by his training, by crew structure, by checks, by PNF not insisting more to break his mental deadlock, by SOP (like only AP on if possible, never hand flying even in severe CAVOK), by almost everything.
Lonewolf - I'm having difficulty with the concept of pulling the nose up to 'avoid a stall'?
Given that I used to teach stalls and spins in smaller aircraft, I am as well.
What I understand is that, if you are in the low altitude/terminal environment, on approach, and you get a warning of approach to stall, the response isn't typically trained in AB 330 as "lower the nose" but instead (and I think the assumption here is in Normal Law) to set an attitude (nose above horizon) and max power and fly out of it and away from the ground.
With Normal Law, the protections would usually help you not stall in the process. That habit pattern, likely trained, and possibly even the most recent in terms of a sim event, would heavily inform the response of a pilot being surprised by a stall warning. But then, we are not so sure that "stall warning" even penetrated, and as BEA finds, it is not shown that it ever did.
Granted, more of the folks discussing this take the PF's actions as a sort of remedy to UAS ... but did the crew ever really declare and establish that they assessed UAS as their condition? That isn't clear either.
If I misunderstand the general response and actions action taken to avoid a stall when stall warning goes off, my apologies to AB pilots.
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It is obvious the PF was oblivious to what was going on but the PNF getting the captain back to the cockpit instead of taking over the aircraft puzzles me. Did he not have enough confidence to say " Ive got it". Take over the aircraft and worry about his job on the ground if it didn't follow company procedure?
I understand the left seat can push a button and the right SS will disengage.
I understand the left seat can push a button and the right SS will disengage.
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A maneuver the Airbus flight system performs is Escape from CFIT. I do not recall the part, if any, Stall Warn played...
If CFiT is imminent, in Normal Law, The stick can be pulled .back to to the stop, throttles to TOGA, and if a turn is needed, the stick moved to the stop either right or left.
The aircraft will fly on the edge of STALL, at maximum bank, and climb, turn at max allowable as determined by the a/c, not the pilot. It nibbles at STALL, and the a/c Escapes, or not, depending on the proximity of the obstacle.
It is an emergency maneuver, and since PJ2 was involved in the discussion, I take it to be accurate, as I can remember it...
I am assuming Approach to STALL can be taught in similar manner, (or confused with it), but I am unclear what effect the Warning has on the performance, or the LAW. I think this was one of the drills Asseline was going to perform. The a/C cannot suss obstacles, and at the time had issues with sequencing inputs when RA and wow became operant....my assumption is that the a/c, if healthy, can be flown at any AoA short of Stall, and will simply sink if thrust is not increased. Seems like a pretty impressive system...theoretically, I think, had there been no trees, the 320 would have sunk onto the runway, had there been one, or if throttle had been advanced sooner, the aC would have performed as advertised.
Please take this at face value, it is from memory, and may contain errors.
If CFiT is imminent, in Normal Law, The stick can be pulled .back to to the stop, throttles to TOGA, and if a turn is needed, the stick moved to the stop either right or left.
The aircraft will fly on the edge of STALL, at maximum bank, and climb, turn at max allowable as determined by the a/c, not the pilot. It nibbles at STALL, and the a/c Escapes, or not, depending on the proximity of the obstacle.
It is an emergency maneuver, and since PJ2 was involved in the discussion, I take it to be accurate, as I can remember it...
I am assuming Approach to STALL can be taught in similar manner, (or confused with it), but I am unclear what effect the Warning has on the performance, or the LAW. I think this was one of the drills Asseline was going to perform. The a/C cannot suss obstacles, and at the time had issues with sequencing inputs when RA and wow became operant....my assumption is that the a/c, if healthy, can be flown at any AoA short of Stall, and will simply sink if thrust is not increased. Seems like a pretty impressive system...theoretically, I think, had there been no trees, the 320 would have sunk onto the runway, had there been one, or if throttle had been advanced sooner, the aC would have performed as advertised.
Please take this at face value, it is from memory, and may contain errors.
Last edited by Lyman; 18th Jul 2012 at 22:55.
CFIT is not the same as a stall, nor is response to stall necessarily related to stall near the ground, though it can be. A colleague of mine died thanks to an OCF condition that was recovered but then ended up not so nice due to an accelerated stall during recovery. 
I was in no way relating a CFIT escape with an approach to stall response. I suppose that both would be related in that you'd tend to approach the limit of AoA for the condition during both maneuvers, but it would vary with situation.
I have also lost friends to CFIT. Two were on low level nav missions. Each hit something, which was not part of the plan for that mission.
I lost another friend in an A-6 that Stalled low over the ocean when he overcorrected a high closure rate on his lead, low altitude rendezvous. Not CFIT either. Ejection not in time.
Typical CFIT scenario is an unstalled aircraft hitting the ground due to any number of errors that get it there unintentionally. The Escape maneuver you refer to, robot assisting or not, has as its purpose to FLY away from the terrain using the best performance the aircraft can give you.
A stall ends your flying and begins your plummeting.
It may also end up with aircraft meeting terrain, unintentionally, but the C part is no longer in application, as you are no longer in Controlled Flight when stalled. You could call it OCFIT (Out of Control Flight into Terrain) or simply a crash. Dead no matter what you call it, absent an ejection seat.
Thus, if you are WARNED that you are approaching a stall, you FLY your plane at an AoA and attitude and power setting that both
a) avoids a stall (because as soon as you stall you begin to fall, more or less, and are not really flying)
b) gets you away from the ground (which you wish to encounter under more frienly circumstances a bit later on)
Are we clear on the difference?
I didn't drag CFIT into this, and would like it to stay out. Plenty of post for that over in the thread regarding the Islamabad crash recently.
I was in no way relating a CFIT escape with an approach to stall response. I suppose that both would be related in that you'd tend to approach the limit of AoA for the condition during both maneuvers, but it would vary with situation.
I have also lost friends to CFIT. Two were on low level nav missions. Each hit something, which was not part of the plan for that mission.
I lost another friend in an A-6 that Stalled low over the ocean when he overcorrected a high closure rate on his lead, low altitude rendezvous.
Not CFIT either. Ejection not in time. Typical CFIT scenario is an unstalled aircraft hitting the ground due to any number of errors that get it there unintentionally. The Escape maneuver you refer to, robot assisting or not, has as its purpose to FLY away from the terrain using the best performance the aircraft can give you.
A stall ends your flying and begins your plummeting.
It may also end up with aircraft meeting terrain, unintentionally, but the C part is no longer in application, as you are no longer in Controlled Flight when stalled. You could call it OCFIT (Out of Control Flight into Terrain) or simply a crash. Dead no matter what you call it, absent an ejection seat.
Thus, if you are WARNED that you are approaching a stall, you FLY your plane at an AoA and attitude and power setting that both
a) avoids a stall (because as soon as you stall you begin to fall, more or less, and are not really flying)
b) gets you away from the ground (which you wish to encounter under more frienly circumstances a bit later on)
Are we clear on the difference?
I didn't drag CFIT into this, and would like it to stay out. Plenty of post for that over in the thread regarding the Islamabad crash recently.
Last edited by Lonewolf_50; 18th Jul 2012 at 23:05.
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@Lyman,
You are asking questions that are part of training for Airbus pilots as well as how the aircraft (A330) performs and is controlled. Perhaps this Airbus A330/340 Flight Crew Training Manual will help you understand more and answer many of your questions:
http://www.dream-air.ru/new/pilotam/FCTM_ENV_LR-1-.pdf
You are asking questions that are part of training for Airbus pilots as well as how the aircraft (A330) performs and is controlled. Perhaps this Airbus A330/340 Flight Crew Training Manual will help you understand more and answer many of your questions:
http://www.dream-air.ru/new/pilotam/FCTM_ENV_LR-1-.pdf