Originally Posted by chucks
What was presented as 'stall recovery training' was just what I wrote about, reacting to the first indication of a stall. That might be part of the problem, not going any further than that, showing, indeed, inability to differentiate between approach to stall and stall itself.
Closer, but not yet there.
Stall recovery training was never on the repertoire of ordinary line pilots' type rating & recurrent training as far as I remember. Once you have mastered stalls during basic training, the idea was that your aerodynamics knowledge enabled you to recognize that what you could get away with in trainer is very risky business in transporter so you would react promptly and correctly as soon as warning signs were present. Basically: airline pilots were supposed to initiate prompt and correct recovery action when stall warning went off so they wouldn't get near the stall at all. Theory was confirmed in practice even with UAS on A330/340. Except once.
For further info, have a look at: "Case of TAM flight on 12 November 2003", page 87 of the report in English. Panic pulls were interrupted by panic pushes as the stall warning went off. Rollercoaster ride eventually evened out without stall.
Originally Posted by DOVES
1. The loss of airspeed information caused a change in the FCS mode,
Surprise, surprise. What would you want autopilot to do? Follow possibly wrong data?
Originally Posted by DOVES
The FCS Mode change resulted in loss of the envelope speed and angle of attack (AOA) limits — no stall protection — no overspeed protection — no bank angle/pitch angle protection
What was it supposed to do? Air data are unreliable, that's why speed and alpha protections went off line. Attitude protections switched themselves off so not to eventually drive the aeroplane out of envelope when air data protections are off - these two groups really can't work without each other.
Originally Posted by DOVES
The inexperienced FO… made a radical pitch control input (full aft stick), … not noticed by the ‘other’ FO,
Who cares about input on the other stick? Where was he looking at? Attitude? Altitude? Perhaps, but then, notwithstanding the source of the upset, he did not understand what was going to happen to aeroplane flying near ceiling and climbing excessively at all.
Originally Posted by DOVES
This caused the horizontal stabilizer (THS) to automatically apply full nose‐up trim
Per design. As would full nose down stick make FCS try to achieve -1G so it would go full nose down with elevators and wind the THS down until this is achieved. You can't hit -1G in upright stall so full stick forward demand cannot be satisfied until the aeroplane is flying again.
Originally Posted by DOVES
The Flight Data Recorder (FDR) indicates that, incredibly, the stall warning ceased (as designed) while the airplane was still in a deeply stalled condition, then reappeared when recovery action was attempted, adding even more confusion to the situation.
Nice try but this is trying to have it both ways: first CM2 doesn't pay attention to stall warnings for 54 seconds, then all at sudden he can hear it but assumes "STALL STALL" means "pull-up!"
Originally Posted by DOVES
You loose the manual cotrol of throttles under 50 'R.A.
Not true. This is the one even I didn't hear of. Where did it come from?
Originally Posted by DOVES
The Flight Path Angle was easily confused with the vertical speed.
Modification to correct FCU display was effected more than a decade ago. As if it was easy to confuse normal three degree approach descent V/S of about 700 fpm with 3000 fpm on VSI.
Originally Posted by DOVES
The autothrottle is excluded by removing the Flight Director/s
Huh? What are we talking about F/D off or F/D fail?
Originally Posted by DOVES
The ground spoilers do not extend unless there is a weight of 1000 kg on both the landing gear,
As if it is normal to roll down the runway for 755 meters on just one main landing gear. Anyway, modification to spoiler logic that automatically prevent such an occurence were incorporated at least a decade ago.
Originally Posted by deSitter
Well there was a quite gibbous Moon that night, should have provided plenty of visual stimulus with the lights dimmed.
I have my reasons to believe AF447 operated under so-called "Instrumental flight rules" so outside visibility was not supposed to be a factor.