AF 447 report out
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To be perfectly honest, at this stage I'm all "discussed out". For now I'm happy to assume that they know something I don't and leave it there.
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Iceman50:
There are those of us who are willing to criticize AB but aren't "decriers." Anyway, What is the Nightmare liner thread? I want to read it. 
Do not see any of you Airbus decriers over on the Lion Air thread or the Nightmare liner thread, wonder why that is?
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Originally Posted by Dozy
The aircraft was oriented such that the vertical airflow was fouling the pitot tubes
Last edited by HazelNuts39; 22nd May 2013 at 09:58.
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I think we all agree the PF was totally unqualified and the second pilot didn't do anything about it and let him do it. The captain came up too late to fix the situation so everybody died. End of story. Kind of sad isn't it? I don't think it would happen on our airline. I'm not saying US airliners are better just saying we wouldn't let a pilot do anything this stupid and not intervene.
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T7
AMM 34-20-00-019 - ADIRS - ADIRU AIR DATA FUNCTION
5. Corrected Angle of Attack (AOA)
The corrected AOA, from the AOA redundancy management logic is invalid when the CAS is less than 30 knots.
AMM 34-20-00-028 - ADIRS - SAARU AIR DATA FUNCTION
4. Corrected Angle of Attack (AOA)
The corrected AOA, from the AOA redundancy management logic is invalid when the CAS is less than 50 knots.
@ Cool guys:
The FWC (computer) didn't disable the stall warning, if no AOA data is available then the strip value will not be exceeded. (like the T7)
@ HN39:
Same location but some fuselage frames in between.
@ Dozy & HN39:
AMM 34-20-00-019 - ADIRS - ADIRU AIR DATA FUNCTION
5. Corrected Angle of Attack (AOA)
The corrected AOA, from the AOA redundancy management logic is invalid when the CAS is less than 30 knots.
AMM 34-20-00-028 - ADIRS - SAARU AIR DATA FUNCTION
4. Corrected Angle of Attack (AOA)
The corrected AOA, from the AOA redundancy management logic is invalid when the CAS is less than 50 knots.
@ Cool guys:
The FWC (computer) didn't disable the stall warning, if no AOA data is available then the strip value will not be exceeded. (like the T7)
@ HN39:
Does anyone know where the static ports of the -300 are located?
@ Dozy & HN39:
Last edited by A33Zab; 22nd May 2013 at 13:29.
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bubbers44
bubbers44
It “seems” you do have all the knowledge about flying, stalls, upset recovery, technical aspects from planes etc. etc. However I find it disrespectful how you talk about the crew in this particular flight and indirect your “colleagues”. Try to be positive, we all want to learn and make aviation safer. In my opinion this isn’t the right way.
It “seems” you do have all the knowledge about flying, stalls, upset recovery, technical aspects from planes etc. etc. However I find it disrespectful how you talk about the crew in this particular flight and indirect your “colleagues”. Try to be positive, we all want to learn and make aviation safer. In my opinion this isn’t the right way.
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disabled stall warning
Nevertheless it was bad luck the captain didnt get his chance to hear steady stall warning when he came into that confused cockpit . The last straw.
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.. disrespectful how you talk about the crew ..
They don't deserve respect. They didn't follow AF procedures. They caused the stall they didn't know they were in.
They dropped a perfectly flyable plane into the Atlantic.
They dropped a perfectly flyable plane into the Atlantic.
Last edited by toffeez; 22nd May 2013 at 15:44.
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Disagree - anyone can have a bad day at the office.
Trying to pin it on the crew is just as wrong-headed as trying to pin it on aspects of the aircraft's design in my book. The overall picture shows that the industry as a whole had become complacent when it came to handling stall situations.
Trying to pin it on the crew is just as wrong-headed as trying to pin it on aspects of the aircraft's design in my book. The overall picture shows that the industry as a whole had become complacent when it came to handling stall situations.
They don't deserve respect. They didn't follow AF procedures. They caused the stall they didn't know they were in.
They dropped a perfectly flyable plane into the Atlantic.
They dropped a perfectly flyable plane into the Atlantic.
You cannot afford 'a bad day at the office' when you're flying an airliner.
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Originally Posted by AZR
Is that an "Airbus" design or an "Industry" design, i.e. same situation or comparable airliners (Boeings, Bombardier, Embraer...) ?
This is, I think, a question that was never answered.
This is, I think, a question that was never answered.
I take for granted what A33Zab said about it (unless someone else challenges his affirmations, with sourced material).
And actually, as CONF iture said, "10000 feet a minute is a good breeze enough for all AoA probes to indicate a pretty similar value."
Thanks A33Zab for the pics, too.
Now, why struggle to invent some kind of (over-?)complicated fail (un)safe feature for an AF447-like scenario? Solutions seem to exist already, for example combined pitot+AoA vanes on fighters (Rafale comes to my mind) that orient themselves into the wind i.e. continue to measure a "good" value. Perhaps it's more expensive, though?
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Solutions seem to exist already, for example combined pitot+AoA vanes on fighters (Rafale comes to my mind) that orient themselves into the wind i.e. continue to measure a "good" value.
Originally Posted by Beagle
You cannot afford 'a bad day at the office' when you're flying an airliner.
This takes us back to root cause issues, which is how AF put into that cockpit a crew not able to avoid the bad day at the office.
Pilots are not stamped out of a sheet of aluminum, nor forged from identical base material. The entire science of human factors and crew training is based on mitigating for the fact that you don't have identical input when you are trying to make an airline pilot, and ultimately, an airline captain.
Yes, the crew flew a flyable plane into the ocean. If you stop there, nothing learned, nothing done to prevent the next one.
What I learned in my time doing mishap investigations is that one must, when human error is involved, dig into how many holes are in the cheese, and what drilled those holes.
One of the previous posters noted (yet again) that a procedure in the book was not used for UAS. How did Air France arrive at the place that when a UAS event occurred, its crew did not properly respond?
I realize that point has been raised time and again as the hamster wheel has spun on this topic. Organizational cultural factors are worth looking into. If part of our aim in this conversation is furthering accident prevention by learning something from a fatal accident, then addressing the human factors chain as far down into the weeds as can be is imperative.
Yet again, I apologize for the rodent abuse.
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They don't deserve respect. They didn't follow AF procedures. They caused the stall they didn't know they were in.
They dropped a perfectly flyable plane into the Atlantic.
They dropped a perfectly flyable plane into the Atlantic.
"If the BEA thought that this accident was only down to the crew, we would not have made recommendations about the systems, the training... which means that this accident could no doubt have happened to other crews," Mr Troadec added.
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Lonewolf 50 has hit the nail firmly on the head in his last post. Obviously, the crew "screwed the pooch" (Urban Dictionary: screw the pooch) as a perfectly flyable airliner ended up pancaking into the Atlantic Ocean. But as he points out, the industry needs to comprehend what factors led a trained crew to make the errors that were indeed made. There are many factors involved and we have been hashing through them for a couple of years... disagreement in the pitot/static system leading to shutoff of automated systems. a stall warning system that turns off below a certain IAS, sidesticks instead of conventional control columns which may have provided better visual cues as to back pressure control inputs being made and so forth.
Training factors, crew rest factors, weather factors... really another example of the "holes in the cheese" lining up just so.
Training factors, crew rest factors, weather factors... really another example of the "holes in the cheese" lining up just so.
Last edited by RobertS975; 22nd May 2013 at 21:34.
You cannot afford 'a bad day at the office' when you're flying an airliner.
The trick, as Lonewolf has said, is how best to deal with them.
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You can't have a bad day at the office when you take the responsibility of flying hundreds of people through the sky, you have to make sure all of them are good and you know how to safely handle your aircraft. Simple stall recovery procedures were learned in the first five hours in all aircraft. Why do so many of you excuse this poor airmanship as ok?
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really another example of the "holes in the cheese" lining up just so.