Posted by
deSitter
Well there was a quite gibbous Moon that night, should have provided plenty of visual stimulus with the lights dimmed.
True, if you were headed to Rio, not true if you were headed from Rio (moon position in the sky that night). Anyhow, they were in the cloud when things started going awry.
Posted by
TampaSLF
Would have been scary in that 330 having a hunch what was happening.
Only hunch you would have had was the angle of the wine in your glass sitting on the tray table.
Posted by
qqantum
As expected, the BEA Report is comprised of carefully crafted smoke — placing blame on the pilots of course — and distraction from the real issues of airplane design and regulator oversight failure that truly were the causes of the accident:
Read page #3 of the BEA's Final report. No blame is placed on the pilots per-se, only a report out of what they did or didn't do during the course of the event. Of course, this leads to cause or probable cause of the accident. I might add, ISASI's Forum Magazine - July/Sept 2012 issue, read Patrick R. Veillette's article on LOC. A LOC accident is defined as
"An aircraft put into an unrecoverable position due to aircrew, aircraft or environmental factors, or combination of these." I am not sure the use of the word "unrecoverable" is correct in all incidences of LOC, but in this instance the aircraft was not recovered.
A review of the CVR transcript (Final Report, Appendix 1) plainly indicates the confusion in the cockpit that resulted from the total loss of airspeed indication, which occurred at a time when they were attempting to avoid the worst of the weather (icing, lightning, and severe turbulence).
IMO, they avoided late. There was no lightning or severe turbulence, review the turbulence and time table contained in the final report.
The inexperienced FO, who was flying, made a radical pitch control input (full aft stick), which was not noticed by the more experienced FO, as he could not see the opposite control stick in the darkened cockpit (the A330 has independent control sticks, and so the normal means by which one pilot will instantly know what the other pilot is doing with his control stick
The experienced FO knew what the less experienced FO flying was doing. Review the CVR tape and words to the effect "Go down", "No, you are going up", etc.
This drastic control input caused the trimmable horizontal stabilizer (THS) to automatically apply full nose‐up trim — a condition that while dangerous, in that it seriously compromised any attempt at recovery, was not detected by the pilots, as they made no mention of it;
Know how the mechanics of the aircraft works. Stick back, elevators respond, THS moves to relieve pressure on elevators. Conversely, stick forward, elevators respond, THS moves to relieve pressure on elevators. You can see the trim wheels move and you can see the actual degrees, up or down, it is positioned at.