AF 447 report out

[Case One]

Originally Posted by Organfreak

apparently some Airbus crews need to read and understand their FCOMs

Which might be easier if Airbus started writing manuals in English instead of their traditional non-sensical "Franglish" mish-mash. It may also help if they stopped grossly oversimplifying their contents. The cheap but barely legible computer generated diagrams in the latest format change are not a giant educational leap forward either IMHO.

I am not sure that Airbus want crews to understand the aeroplane so much as just do as they are are told. This may be great for selling product, but does not produce the best pilots.

[deSitter]

A340 zoom-climb inquiry backs shock tactics

Jesus! "RETARD RETARD RETARD"

-drl

[Capn Bloggs]

Instead of shock tactics, how about Airbus remove the handle that startled pilots grab on to: the sidestick!

If a Boeing pilot gets a shock and yanks back on the prong, at least his oppo will shock him with a "WTF are you doing?!" as he gets hit in the guts, instead of "hmm, why is this aircraft suddenly climbing?? Hey Capn Bloggs, are you pulling on the sidestick or is the aircraft doing it by itself??".

[oldchina]

Bloggs

1) If you are right why did the FAA certify the plane ( + A320 family) as safe?

2) How come the other 60000 operational Airbus pilots are not complaining about the sidestick?

[Mac the Knife]

1) Because they thought it was

2) Because it hasn't yet happened to them

[noske]

Originally Posted by Clandestino

Originally Posted by DOVES
You loose the manual cotrol of throttles under 50 'R.A.

Not true. This is the one even I didn't hear of. Where did it come from?

Michel Asseline, possibly slightly misquoted, but I'm not going to look up what exactly his claim was.

Originally Posted by Clandestino

Originally Posted by DOVES
The autothrottle is excluded by removing the Flight Director/s

Huh? What are we talking about F/D off or F/D fail?

This must refer to the Bangalore crash. PF wanted autothrust in speed mode, but left PNF's F/D enabled. PNF noticed the mistake and pointed it out, but neither pilot corrected it. PNF (check captain) probably wanted to teach PF a lesson, but underestimated the danger this put them into.

Some (again including Asseline) have criticised the "both F/Ds off" logic as non-intuitive.

[hetfield]

2) How come the other 60000 operational Airbus pilots are not complaining about the sidestick?

How do you know?

After some years on A300 I flew A340 and A320 family, before I came back to A300 until my retirement. So I had the great opportunity to compare both flight control systems for years. From the LH seat as well as from the RH seat. I have to say I felt much more comfortable on A300 (Yoke). Especially on gusty approaches as PF and as well as PM.

But let's come back to the topic.

This accident would not have happened in a conventional plane like A300.

Why?

In a stall one would feel very soon what to do with the aileron, because stall is sooner or later accomplished by a wing drop. The aircraft will start to roll.

On AB FBW aircrafts, the FCCs will maintain a constant roll rate commanded by the stick, e.g. the pilot doesn't feel/see the aileron deflection, the FCCs will do the job!

Stick neutral doesn't mean ailerons neutral, they may be somewhere to maintain zero roll rate/wings level.

So AF447 went down like a leave in autumn. Most of the time wings level. The FCCs did a great job (sarcasm), as designed.

Again, never ever would this accident have happened on 747/767/757/A300 and so on.

[chubbychopper]

Difference between an operator and a pilot:

An operator will have no use of the information that "stick" or thrust lever position might provide him with.

By knowing how these controls are positioned, the pilot will know why the airplane is doing whatever it is, and what it is most likely to be doing soon after.

[ironbutt57]

This must refer to the Bangalore crash. PF wanted autothrust in speed mode, but left PNF's F/D enabled. PNF noticed the mistake and pointed it out, but neither pilot corrected it. PNF (check captain) probably wanted to teach PF a lesson, but underestimated the danger this put them into.

Some (again including Asseline) have criticised the "both F/Ds off" logic as non-intuitive.

Besides the fact they were descending in "open descent" mode away from the FCU set altitude...when they finally went TOGA, it simply didn't spool up in time

http://flightsafety.org/ap/ap_jan94.pdf

total confusion....automation mismanagement....lack of experience and understanding of operational procedures...

[jcjeant]

total confusion....automation mismanagement....lack of experience and understanding of operational procedures..

Exactly the same as for AF447 (Except for some differences place - time - altitude)

[glofish]

Before yo’alls go back into endlessly repeating what has been babbled on the other zillion AB threads, there’s time to tell that ol’AB joke again, at least we’ll have something to lol:

There’s that AB pilot in divorce talks with his wife, when she snaps at him: “By the way honey, I always faked my orgasms”. The next day he’s in his retirement meeting and the CP tells him: “By the way Joe, the sidestick was never connected”.

Take a break guys, reports have become food for the grandstand and the lawyers.

[Rockhound]

SLFinAZ,
Indeed, jcj - Rockhound's 'pilot' was talking out of his seat cushion.

Actually he was entirely correct.
So...in the early stages of the upset the statement is entirely correct...

The pilot in question was advocating this method of recovery for the last two minutes of flight, i.e. when AF447 was deep into the stall.

[infrequentflyer789]

Originally Posted by Capn Bloggs

Instead of shock tactics, how about Airbus remove the handle that startled pilots grab on to: the sidestick!

If a Boeing pilot gets a shock and yanks back on the prong, at least his oppo will shock him with a "WTF are you doing?!" as he gets hit in the guts,

Whereas the oppo on a turboprop will get hit in the guts and think "oh right, must get the flaps up" ??

And are we conveniently forgetting the several Boeing crews that are at the bottom of the ocean precisely due to a "yanks back on the prong" and stall ? Or are they maybe just guys who happened to be at the pointy end of a Boeing and not actually "pilots" in your definition ?

instead of "hmm, why is this aircraft suddenly climbing?? Hey Capn Bloggs, are you pulling on the sidestick or is the aircraft doing it by itself??".

PNF doesn't sound confused as to that - "you are climbing". And he was right.

[ironbutt57]

Airbii are fine as long as you adjust your thinking to their philosophy....little bit different, but this old dog managed to, so quite sure anybody can...

[lear60fellow]

A340 zoom-climb inquiry backs shock tactics

1.- Retard throttle
2.- trim up a little
3.- Don΄t disconnect the AUTOPILOT!!!!

It΄s basic, come and fly the LR60, overspeed is everyday issue = Plenty of rocket power in the back.

[Capn Bloggs]

Infrequent Flyer,

My post was half-tongue-in-cheek (don't the smilies work on your computer? ), but since you mentioned them...

are we conveniently forgetting the several Boeing crews that are at the bottom of the ocean precisely due to a "yanks back on the prong" and stall

Which accidents were those?

[rgbrock1]

OrvilleW wrote:

They are charged as professional pilots to mantain complete discipline and situational awareness in the cockpit at all times.

I have seen, in a combat environment, trained and disciplined soldiers (Both officers and noncoms) lose all vestige of said discipline and situational awareness.

when the **** really hits the fan, regardless of training, discipline and focus we don't really know how we're going to react. Most of us probably will react appropriately. Some however, and sadly, cannot. It's part of the "human equation" I suppose.

[infrequentflyer789]

Originally Posted by qquantum

SLFinAZ – you sound like the NTSB.

As expected, the BEA Report is comprised of carefully crafted smoke — placing blame on the pilots of course — and distraction from the real issues of airplane design and regulator oversight failure that truly were the causes of the accident:

A lot of stuff from one so new here, maybe you haven't read all the previous threads on the issues you raise, and you clearly haven't read the report.

In all, a "politically correct" report that omits analysis of significant factual information,

The facts are there, you just seem to have omitted to assimilate them.

1. The loss of airspeed information caused a change in the FCS mode, which the pilots seemed not to notice, as they made no mention of it;

False. Mode change noted and read out. Read the CVR in the report.

2. The FCS Mode change resulted in loss of the envelope speed and angle of attack (AOA) limits — no stall protection — no overspeed protection — no bank angle/pitch angle protection — again the pilots seemed not to notice, as they made no mention of it;

False. As above.

3. The inexperienced FO, who was flying, made a radical pitch control input (full aft stick), which was not noticed by the more experienced FO, as he could not see the opposite control stick in the darkened cockpit

False and false. Full back stick came much later when stalled. Initial climb was noted by PNF and he instructed corrections.

4. This drastic control input caused the trimmable horizontal stabilizer (THS) to automatically apply full nose‐up trim

False. The THS didn't wind up until they were already stalled, and there is no evidence autotrim failed - with nose down control inputs the THS would have followed allowing recovery (plenty of SIM sessions and theoretical models covering this on the tech log thread).

5. Examination of the Flight Data Recorder (FDR) data, (Final Report, Appendix 3) indicates that, incredibly, the stall warning ceased (as designed) while the airplane was still in a deeply stalled condition, then reappeared when recovery action was attempted, adding even more confusion to the situation.

Irrelevant - there is no evidence that stall was ever diagnosed - which is a pre-requisite for a recovery attempt. There was no recovery (from stall) attempt.

Conditions of high altitude stall and reversion to Alternate Mode have been very rarely encountered in airline operations, leading to a degree of complacency

Stall - rare. UAS and alt-law - not rare, known and discussed between mfr, airline and regulators. Chronology is in the report.

Two possibilities:
1. Crew was abnormally (in)competent - and that's the cause.

2. An averagely competent crew will turn uas + alt-law in cruise into a stall with an unacceptably high probability (say > 1 in 100). Cause - who assessed that risk (if anyone) and did they get it right ?

Design Flaws
1. Failure of the FCS to remain in the Normal mode (with envelope protection) resulting from the loss of a single parameter (pitot‐static airspeed).

Designed as required for certification. AP & protections shall not operate on known-bad data.

If the design had incorporated synthesized speed – from GPS, IRS – which would be accurate enough – the pilot would not have been placed into

Airspeed != ground speed or GPS speed or inertial.

needless to say, the presentation of angle of attack (AOA) information (now planned for inclusion on Airbus airplanes) would have eased the burden on the pilot.

AOA already available on PFD via flight path display. Separate AOA already an option. Airlines do not take it, allegedly to avoid expense of training pilots to use it.

2. The design of the primary flight control controller such that it is possible for a pilot to make a sustained incorrect or dangerous input, without the awareness of the other crewmember(s).

Not proven - PNF was aware, see report.

Assessment of whether input is incorrect or dangerous is dependent on diagnosis / awareness of situation, which was not present. Pull back into stall happens on other control systems (see Colgan, Ethiopian, Birgenair etc.). Common thread is not control type but the lack of diagnosis of stall.

It can be readily appreciated that an FCS control design in which both controllers move in unison at all times (as in Boeing, MacDonnell Douglas, and most other airplanes) would have enabled instant detection (tactile) by the senior pilot (along with the probability of a sharp rebuke) and subsequent recovery of the airplane.

Not without diagnosis of stall, hearing and understanding the warning etc.

There are more Boeings at the bottom of the ocean due to this issue than 'buses.

now, however, the required technology has been available for several years, and because tactile communication between pilots is of such vital importance, parallel control should become mandatory on all future sidestick designs.

AB sidestick design pre-dates the technology. Future sidestick designs from other mfrs might go a different route. AB sidestick very unlikely to change as it is proven and changing it would break the cockpit commonality across the range.

3. The ability of the FCS to allow the Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer (THS) to move to a configuration that renders the airplane essentially unrecoverable, without appropriate warning to the pilot.

Trim wheel is visible and moves. Should it have additional audio warning - maybe, but consider they didn't hear (or process) prolonged stall warning.

Further, when AOA becomes greater than 30°, or Speed is less than 60kt, auto THS trim is turned off.

Reference ? Report contains no indication of autotrim ceasing to work.

4. The FCS design which allows the primary stall‐warning sensor to be declared invalid (when it is still capable of providing a correct indication) based upon another parameter (speed), of questionable validity.

Wrong. FCS has no bearing on this. ADIRU does. Be aware that other types also have ADIRUs...

SW computer ceased warning because its input AOA went "invalid" - airspeed did not factor (except at the ADIRU).

When the senior co‐pilot took control (although the junior FO did not relinquish it) and pushed forward on the stick in an attempt to recover, the stall warning again sounded – leading him to believe that his control input was not correct, thus causing him to release pressure on the stick to get rid of the stall warning.

No indication that stall was ever diagnosed.

By the time this warning issue occurred the crew had already ignored 1min of stall warning and had got to AOA > 40deg. They were far beyond where any sane test pilot would go in conditions no test pilot would test in.

Had they started looking at an analogue AOA gauge at that point it would have been pinned at max and appeared "stuck" anyway.

It's an interesting design issue, it's unlikely to be specific to the 'bus, but it's IMO academic for 447, by that time the outcome was already decided.

[qquantum]

Originally posted by kcockayne
Investigators are "mindful" of the repercussions which could occur to their national flagship manufacturers & airlines if they publish anything which pins the blame too firmly on the manufacturers or the airlines.
It is my suspicion that may be what happened here.

You've got it right. — a quote by a senior NTSB investigator (after hours in Hong Kong) circa 2001: " ...sometimes we have to burn a pilot to protect the local industry..." I heard it, but unfortunately didn't have a recording device...

Originally posted by Rockhound
For the last 10000 m of freefall, the last two minutes, only test pilots might have pulled off the sort of dramatic, aggressive effort needed to save the plane. That might have involved throttling back one engine to force a wing drop, to drag the nose out of its 40-degree up angle into a dive.

Quite true — IF he recognized and corrected the egregious THS setting. Should note that some bottom rudder with 90° of bank would also be helpful to get the nose pointed in the direction of energy (and therefore recovery).

[infrequentflyer789]

Originally Posted by deggers316

"Which accidents were those?"
yes waiting for that reply too.....

"The crew's failure to recognize the activation of the stick shaker as a warning of imminent entrance to the stall, and the failure of the crew to execute the procedures for recovery from the onset of loss of control."

"Contrary to any stall recovery procedure, the
control column was initially kept backward and gradually increased over the next 17”"

"when the stick shaker stall indicator started, the pilot-incommand stated that it was fictitious"

Ring any bells ?