Crash-Cork Airport
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I'm surprised there's so much discussion as to why they went below The DA of 200feet. They shouldn't have been anywhere near DA. They should not have gone below 1000 feet AGL as the RVRs precluded an approach for their aircraft.
They were flying illegally from 1000ft and below on each approach.
Why did they do that? That's what needs to be answered.
They were flying illegally from 1000ft and below on each approach.
Why did they do that? That's what needs to be answered.
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Yorkshire...
Irish...
.
The same, no?
But if an MDA is promulgated - Minimum Descent Altitude - then it is for the pilot to make his own Decision Height to take into account the sink before acceleration and climb start to take effect, one may not descend below MDA by even an inch.
MDA-not allowed one inch below-Think minimum DESCENT alt.
DA-takes into account loss of alt in a go around(30 feet they allow,I stand to be corrected)- Think DESCISION alt
DA-takes into account loss of alt in a go around(30 feet they allow,I stand to be corrected)- Think DESCISION alt
The same, no?
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Whıle much debate centres around the poor decısıon to make the last unstable approach, the realıty ıs the mıshandled go-around resulted ın the crash. Thıs can happen regardless of pılot experıence or equıpment type.
The most frequently repeated ıtems ın the sım are the two engıne GA and the RTO. The two engıne GA ıs on equıpment wıth FDs and APs so ıt ıs easy to comprehend how thıs can happen on the jurasıc technology these guys faced.
A correctly handled mıssed approach at just below 100 RA should not have been a problem, after all they had done thıs twıce before.
All the flıght sım experts suggestıng engıne faılures etc, complete nonsense, ıt ıs patently overcontrollıng and dısorıentatıon a key player here.
The US rules as far as I know, do not apply to JAR operatıons so thıs ıs poıntless verbage. The approach ban regs are clearly ın PAN OPs so there ıs no need for prıvate ınterpretatıon of the rules.
Mınıma ıs just that..mınıma, not some poınt ın space we pıck for the sake of ıt.
The most frequently repeated ıtems ın the sım are the two engıne GA and the RTO. The two engıne GA ıs on equıpment wıth FDs and APs so ıt ıs easy to comprehend how thıs can happen on the jurasıc technology these guys faced.
A correctly handled mıssed approach at just below 100 RA should not have been a problem, after all they had done thıs twıce before.
All the flıght sım experts suggestıng engıne faılures etc, complete nonsense, ıt ıs patently overcontrollıng and dısorıentatıon a key player here.
The US rules as far as I know, do not apply to JAR operatıons so thıs ıs poıntless verbage. The approach ban regs are clearly ın PAN OPs so there ıs no need for prıvate ınterpretatıon of the rules.
Mınıma ıs just that..mınıma, not some poınt ın space we pıck for the sake of ıt.
Last edited by Kirks gusset; 19th Mar 2011 at 13:11.
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bubbers44:
That is mostly correct, except the glideslope can't be intercepted prior to the precision-FAF (ILS) or FAF (NPA) and then apply the rule (FAR 121.651 (c) ). The intercept has to be at the official P-FAF point designated on the chart.
121.651 (c) If a pilot has begun the final approach segment of an instrument approach procedure in accordance with paragraph (b) of this section, and after that receives a later weather report indicating below-minimum conditions, the pilot may continue the approach to DA/DH or MDA. Upon reaching DA/DH or at MDA, and at any time before the missed approach point, the pilot may continue the approach below DA/DH or MDA if either the requirements of § 91.175(l) of this chapter, or the following requirements are met...
Continuing the approach if minimums go below is allowed in the US if you have intercepted the glideslope or FAF in a non precision approach but going below DH or MDA isn't.
121.651 (c) If a pilot has begun the final approach segment of an instrument approach procedure in accordance with paragraph (b) of this section, and after that receives a later weather report indicating below-minimum conditions, the pilot may continue the approach to DA/DH or MDA. Upon reaching DA/DH or at MDA, and at any time before the missed approach point, the pilot may continue the approach below DA/DH or MDA if either the requirements of § 91.175(l) of this chapter, or the following requirements are met...
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Now for the HF stuff
Having a look at the preliminary report I now hope the investigators concentrate on standards, operations, culture, training and so forth. Quoting rules, regulations and procedures won't stop this sort of this incident happening again. To prevent this type of reoccurrence we have to try and imagine what the "drivers" of the pilots were. For example, were they under commercial pressure? Were their jobs safe? How much were they paid and how much in debt were they? Was is standard to go below DH for these pilots? What are their SOP calls and were they made? What were they told about diversions? Unfortunately, too many small companies have large bullies at the top who expect their employees to give a little bit more than they are able. This company may have been one of those.
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The rules
I'm surprised there is so much debate about what is or isn't permitted. For all my time in the saddle it's never been open to question.
At MDA/DH you either have sufficient visual reference to continue to a safe landing or you go around; end of.
How come so many people don't seem to know that?
At MDA/DH you either have sufficient visual reference to continue to a safe landing or you go around; end of.
How come so many people don't seem to know that?
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Can the CVR transcript be found somewhere?
And my 50 cent; the cap was Spanish and the F/O Irish. Could there be communication issues in the cockpit that might have led to the crash?
And; no FA on the Metro?
And my 50 cent; the cap was Spanish and the F/O Irish. Could there be communication issues in the cockpit that might have led to the crash?
And; no FA on the Metro?
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Stall warner 7 secs before impact
"The AAIU says that 7s before impact a warning horn sounded, "which is believed to be the stall warning". The AAIU refers to a subsequent loss of control that led to a wingtip hitting the ground, after which the Fairchild SA227 Metro III came to rest inverted.
The Spanish-registered Metro (EC-ITP) had no autopilot or flight director, and the co-pilot was the pilot flying. The fatal approach was the third attempted with an instrument landing system, and the second for Runway 17. This runway has a Category II ILS, with a decision height of 100ft (30m), but the aircraft's decision height was 200ft.
When passing 200ft, the captain told the co-pilot to continue, and then called "go-around" just below 100ft.
Some 3s after the warning horn started, and just after the go-around call, says the AAIU, "recorded data shows that the aircraft rolled significantly to the left as the aircraft tracked towards the runway centreline. This was immediately followed by a rapid roll to the right which brought the right wingtip into contact with the runway surface."
It appears, some aspects similar to Turkish 737 at AMS although this was different in terms of visibility and pressure (3rd approach attempt).
Incipient stall recognition ( especially in approach config) and full stall recovery technique is still lacking in FAA and JAR training. Emphasis on miniumum height loss ( a windshear solution?) and teaching pilots to just add power will not cause a stalled wing to fly again. AoA (pitch attitude) is the main control in this regime and when near the ground it does not feel natural to push forward on the control column (see also Colgan Q400).
The Spanish-registered Metro (EC-ITP) had no autopilot or flight director, and the co-pilot was the pilot flying. The fatal approach was the third attempted with an instrument landing system, and the second for Runway 17. This runway has a Category II ILS, with a decision height of 100ft (30m), but the aircraft's decision height was 200ft.
When passing 200ft, the captain told the co-pilot to continue, and then called "go-around" just below 100ft.
Some 3s after the warning horn started, and just after the go-around call, says the AAIU, "recorded data shows that the aircraft rolled significantly to the left as the aircraft tracked towards the runway centreline. This was immediately followed by a rapid roll to the right which brought the right wingtip into contact with the runway surface."
It appears, some aspects similar to Turkish 737 at AMS although this was different in terms of visibility and pressure (3rd approach attempt).
Incipient stall recognition ( especially in approach config) and full stall recovery technique is still lacking in FAA and JAR training. Emphasis on miniumum height loss ( a windshear solution?) and teaching pilots to just add power will not cause a stalled wing to fly again. AoA (pitch attitude) is the main control in this regime and when near the ground it does not feel natural to push forward on the control column (see also Colgan Q400).
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I think, like so many other factors, cultural differences. . . to be politically correct 
may not have been helpful here.
Finally, both crew were licenced, and assumedly able to read an approach plate.
The generally accepted RVR for a Cat1 ILS is 550 or 600m.
They shot two approaches with RVRs around 350M. One was to an ILS with a minima of 750M. The 3rd app was , almost legal
So, they were either as thick as pigsh1t as regards the rules, or they didnt give a sh1t about the rules.
Neither is a very helpful attribute to a professional pilot.
In addition to this they have totally failed to understand the association between DA and minimum RVR, or in fact they did, which is why they descended to 100ft. . . the CAT2 minima,very appropriate since the RVR was CAT2. . . instead of going around at 200ft.
Regretably, neither they, nor their aircraft, nor their poxy airline was authorised to conduct CAT2 approaches.
Totally gash, unprofessional, and demonstrably criminal.
I hate to see companies, sometimes good ones, crash and burn financially after an accident.
In this case, I think it would not sadden me however, not in the slightest.
I think I understand implicitly the pressure these poor b@stards were under to GET THE JOB DONE.
Some of their AOC postholders should do time, but of course they wont.
may not have been helpful here.Finally, both crew were licenced, and assumedly able to read an approach plate.
The generally accepted RVR for a Cat1 ILS is 550 or 600m.
They shot two approaches with RVRs around 350M. One was to an ILS with a minima of 750M. The 3rd app was , almost legal
So, they were either as thick as pigsh1t as regards the rules, or they didnt give a sh1t about the rules.
Neither is a very helpful attribute to a professional pilot.
In addition to this they have totally failed to understand the association between DA and minimum RVR, or in fact they did, which is why they descended to 100ft. . . the CAT2 minima,very appropriate since the RVR was CAT2. . . instead of going around at 200ft.
Regretably, neither they, nor their aircraft, nor their poxy airline was authorised to conduct CAT2 approaches.
Totally gash, unprofessional, and demonstrably criminal.
I hate to see companies, sometimes good ones, crash and burn financially after an accident.
In this case, I think it would not sadden me however, not in the slightest.
I think I understand implicitly the pressure these poor b@stards were under to GET THE JOB DONE.
Some of their AOC postholders should do time, but of course they wont.
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I hate to see companies, sometimes good ones, crash and burn financially after an accident.
In this case, I think it would not sadden me however, not in the slightest.
I think I understand implicitly the pressure these poor b@stards were under to GET THE JOB DONE.
In this case, I think it would not sadden me however, not in the slightest.
I think I understand implicitly the pressure these poor b@stards were under to GET THE JOB DONE.
As I'm sure you are aware, low flight deck experience is very common throughout most European airlines these days, the low cost carriers especially, and it isn't uncommon to see Turboprop operators having sub 2500 hours as the TOTAL experience of both pilots on their flight decks. Maybe this has improved slightly over the last couple of years but only because the job market dried up for a while.
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eh mercencenary pilot, save us all the bluff, bluster and waffle.......experience or not it's not rocket science to say ehhh rvr's are 300m we can't do it. It was a disgrace what happened.......period.
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Ask anyone with a CPL/ATPL, what is the min RVR for a CAT1 ILS ?
I think 99.9% of them will reply, without hesitation, 550/600M.
I dont think experience comes into it.
Either you are, per se, a cowboy, or you work for a cowboy outfit and are therefore frightened to lose your job.
I reckon its the latter.
I rest my case.
I think 99.9% of them will reply, without hesitation, 550/600M.
I dont think experience comes into it.
Either you are, per se, a cowboy, or you work for a cowboy outfit and are therefore frightened to lose your job.
I reckon its the latter.
I rest my case.
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eh mercencenary pilot, save us all the bluff, bluster and waffle.......experience or not it's not rocket science to say ehhh rvr's are 300m we can't do it. It was a disgrace what happened.......period.
If the pressure of being a professional pilot is too much, then walk away. To bust minima, crash your aircraft and sadly in this case, kill your passengers is completely inexcusable.
I dont think experience comes into it.
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Incipient stall recognition
"Incipient stall recognition ( especially in approach config) and full stall recovery technique is still lacking in FAA and JAR training."
Not true. The JAA syllabus, and skill test for PPL and CPL requires the following -
1. Enter the clean, power-off stall, keep it there, until the instructor/examiner says "recover", then the student/candidate must recover with miminum loss of height.
2. Approach the stall in the initial approach configuration, using 20 degrees angle of bank, and demonstrate the ability to recognise the approaching stall, and recover with minimum height loss, without any word from the examiner
3. Approach the stall in the final approach configuration, with full flap, and recognise the approaching stall, and recover efficiently.
These are very appropriate skills, since the majority of stall/spin accidents occur in the approach to land phase, and have to be demonstrated successfully, to achieve a pass. As far as I know, this is well understood by UK CAA schools and examiners - maybe not guaranteed in other JAA countries.
Not true. The JAA syllabus, and skill test for PPL and CPL requires the following -
1. Enter the clean, power-off stall, keep it there, until the instructor/examiner says "recover", then the student/candidate must recover with miminum loss of height.
2. Approach the stall in the initial approach configuration, using 20 degrees angle of bank, and demonstrate the ability to recognise the approaching stall, and recover with minimum height loss, without any word from the examiner
3. Approach the stall in the final approach configuration, with full flap, and recognise the approaching stall, and recover efficiently.
These are very appropriate skills, since the majority of stall/spin accidents occur in the approach to land phase, and have to be demonstrated successfully, to achieve a pass. As far as I know, this is well understood by UK CAA schools and examiners - maybe not guaranteed in other JAA countries.
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I was prepared to give them the benefit of the doubt that the pressure instruments were 100' optimistic compared to what the investigators recovered from the TAWS GPS data.
However, TAWS: "MINIMUMS MINIMUMS", PNF:"‘Ok, minimum, continue", is not a phrase I've personally ever seen in a manual or heard used on a monitored approach before.
However, TAWS: "MINIMUMS MINIMUMS", PNF:"‘Ok, minimum, continue", is not a phrase I've personally ever seen in a manual or heard used on a monitored approach before.
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@Calypso
While your scenario may or may not have been a factor, it has a high degree of plausibility.
And, whatever the specifics of this event, such a situation can be further compounded, not mitigated, by there being two crew on the flight deck.
One of those cases where MCC can backfire when the rules are broken.
And there lies the rub of this accident. At DA you look out... if you see nothing but thick fog and yet you continue to look out and descent you will become disoriented as there is nothing to see out of the window. If you press on you will eventually hit something or see something but by that time you may be displaced off the runway or in a steep bank or nose high or possibly all three. While looking out you have no clue of the attitude or trajectory of the airplane.
And, whatever the specifics of this event, such a situation can be further compounded, not mitigated, by there being two crew on the flight deck.
One of those cases where MCC can backfire when the rules are broken.
I have agonized over this but at the end of it all...
It would seem that the drivers stuffed it.
It will be interesting to see what the final report has to say on why they took such a Cavalier approach to a challenging situation, given that Kerry was all but CAVOK.
It would seem that the drivers stuffed it.
It will be interesting to see what the final report has to say on why they took such a Cavalier approach to a challenging situation, given that Kerry was all but CAVOK.