Crash-Cork Airport
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and the icing on the cake for this terrible crash was the F/O was flying the aircraft when it crashed. The F/O was brand new and highly inexperienced, flying a low vis approach (which they should not have being doing with the rvrs less than 550m)......flying with no autopilot and no flight director......it just beggars belief of the Capts thought process. Irrespective of commercial pressures the final report will zone in on the LHS.
Barbie has it in one.
BarbiesBoyfriend Look guys. These pilots knew what they had to do.
They knew that they had to wait for their 550m.
They knew that they needed to hold until they got it.
They knew that there was an alternate airfield and that it was wide open.
They knew they had the fuel for their alternate.
They knew that starting an approach without their minimums was illegal.
Yet, still they flew NO LESS THAN THREE aproaches.
For fun? I think not.
Commercial pressures are one thing (that we all acknowledge) but a stronger urge drove these pilots.
I hope it is soon revealed.
Barbie has it in one.
BarbiesBoyfriend Look guys. These pilots knew what they had to do.
They knew that they had to wait for their 550m.
They knew that they needed to hold until they got it.
They knew that there was an alternate airfield and that it was wide open.
They knew they had the fuel for their alternate.
They knew that starting an approach without their minimums was illegal.
Yet, still they flew NO LESS THAN THREE aproaches.
For fun? I think not.
Commercial pressures are one thing (that we all acknowledge) but a stronger urge drove these pilots.
I hope it is soon revealed.
DB6,
I believe that this change came about because of the night when a fair few aircraft landed at STN below minima. This scenario is easier to administer when (like the STN incident), the minima is dictated by downgraded ground facilities.
I'm not sure if a Cat 1 aircraft's flightplans would show this, but our filed flightplans (Cat3b aircraft) show our minimum RVR of being 75m
I believe that this change came about because of the night when a fair few aircraft landed at STN below minima. This scenario is easier to administer when (like the STN incident), the minima is dictated by downgraded ground facilities.
I'm not sure if a Cat 1 aircraft's flightplans would show this, but our filed flightplans (Cat3b aircraft) show our minimum RVR of being 75m
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
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Bearcat - your profile gives no clues. Are you aware that it is routine and correct for 'new and highly inexperienced' co-pilots to operate the a/c approach (and g/a) in low vis procedures and would be a sensible way to handle this approach in this a/c if on Cat I LIMITS?
It is the 'descision' that needs to be looked at, not who was 'flying'. Apart from which we do not know that the F/O WAS flying the a/c when it crashed.
I cannot fault BBF's analysis.
It is the 'descision' that needs to be looked at, not who was 'flying'. Apart from which we do not know that the F/O WAS flying the a/c when it crashed.
I cannot fault BBF's analysis.
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and the icing on the cake for this terrible crash was the F/O was flying the aircraft when it crashed. The F/O was brand new and highly inexperienced, flying a low vis approach
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BarbiesBoyfriend:
Those are two profoundly fundamental and critical elements. But, there is a third equally important element: once commencing the approach (presumably with not less than RVR 550) they had to have an absolute discipline to not continue descent below the 200' DA unless one, or more of the required visual references were clearly visible and they were tracking centerline without any significant divergence, and their KIAS was stable and within specified value.
This is made significantly more difficult without a good, responsive flight director. During my past life we were not allowed to go below LOC-only MDA and associated visibility if both our flight directors were inoperative.
They knew that they had to wait for their 550m.
They knew that they needed to hold until they got it.
They knew that they needed to hold until they got it.
This is made significantly more difficult without a good, responsive flight director. During my past life we were not allowed to go below LOC-only MDA and associated visibility if both our flight directors were inoperative.
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Bearcat, normal for an FO to fly the approach in low vis; the captain is then in a better position to monitor the situation.
RWU, very true however the ILS 35 at Cork is only Cat 1 so minimum RVR for any aircraft 750m. Black and white illegal.
N.B. I am not suggesting that ATC should routinely have to intervene, just that the knowledge that it will happen - as in the UK - may deter even the most reckless from trying.
RWU, very true however the ILS 35 at Cork is only Cat 1 so minimum RVR for any aircraft 750m. Black and white illegal.
N.B. I am not suggesting that ATC should routinely have to intervene, just that the knowledge that it will happen - as in the UK - may deter even the most reckless from trying.
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The Isle of Man Government seems to be wakening up to this disaster. An MHK (member of the House of Keys, the Manx Parliament) is to ask whether or not Manx2 is an airline or a ticket providor at the next session on Tuesday.
MHK seeks clarification over Manx2 status - Energy FM | Isle of Man
MHK seeks clarification over Manx2 status - Energy FM | Isle of Man
I haven't read this whole thread so sorry if it's been answered, but how did the aircraft end up inverted?
I don't see how it matters that they shot the approach when vis was below the minima when the aircraft was flipped over anyway.
I don't see how it matters that they shot the approach when vis was below the minima when the aircraft was flipped over anyway.
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Mr Karran is right to draw attention to their status.
I wonder how many people read this..
Manx2 : Terms and Conditions
I wonder how many people read this..
Manx2 : Terms and Conditions
Manx2 Ltd. is providing your tickets for this flight booking.
Van Air Europe As will be the main operator for flights from the Isle of Man to Blackpool, Belfast City and Galway. FLM Aviation will be the main operator for flights from the Isle of Man to Gloucestershire Airport, Jersey and Cardiff to Anglesey. Links Aviation will be the main operator for flights from the Isle of Man to Newcastle and Leeds. Please see our terms and conditions for full details or enquire at check in.
Van Air Europe As will be the main operator for flights from the Isle of Man to Blackpool, Belfast City and Galway. FLM Aviation will be the main operator for flights from the Isle of Man to Gloucestershire Airport, Jersey and Cardiff to Anglesey. Links Aviation will be the main operator for flights from the Isle of Man to Newcastle and Leeds. Please see our terms and conditions for full details or enquire at check in.
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Fonz121, you don't have to read the whole thread. Just read the FACTUAL Prelimenary Report. It will explain what you want to know. Here it is:
Air Accident Investigation UnitFull List of Reports
Air Accident Investigation UnitFull List of Reports
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A previous poster surmised that:
'maybe (the first officer) had a perception that this is the normal way of operating.'
Unlike many of us commenting here, I doubt very much that the captain had enjoyed the benefits of sitting in the RHS with an 'established' operator and the training, simulator facilities and the simple luxury of flying with and learining from experienced captains; namely, doing things the 'right' way.
I suspect that the captain had never worked anywhere else but in an outfit such as FCN, the likes of which dwell at the bottom of the airline food chain.
Consequently, he too, lacking the 'big airline safety culture', probably thought that:
'maybe (the captain) had a perception that this is the normal way of operating.'
I'm sure there are some very good, well run third level operators out there. Conversely, several contributors have testified to some of the practices and 'cultures' at similar operators.
I am in no way condoning the actions of a supposedly 'professional' crew but I'm sure there are a number of regulatory and supervisory failures that have directly contributed to this crash and it will be very interesting to see if the regulatory authorities have the guts to delve to the very roots of the matter and sort it out.
I'm also suprised that the 'experience' lobby ie post Colgan lobby and 1500hrs has not yet mobilised.
'maybe (the first officer) had a perception that this is the normal way of operating.'
Unlike many of us commenting here, I doubt very much that the captain had enjoyed the benefits of sitting in the RHS with an 'established' operator and the training, simulator facilities and the simple luxury of flying with and learining from experienced captains; namely, doing things the 'right' way.
I suspect that the captain had never worked anywhere else but in an outfit such as FCN, the likes of which dwell at the bottom of the airline food chain.
Consequently, he too, lacking the 'big airline safety culture', probably thought that:
'maybe (the captain) had a perception that this is the normal way of operating.'
I'm sure there are some very good, well run third level operators out there. Conversely, several contributors have testified to some of the practices and 'cultures' at similar operators.
I am in no way condoning the actions of a supposedly 'professional' crew but I'm sure there are a number of regulatory and supervisory failures that have directly contributed to this crash and it will be very interesting to see if the regulatory authorities have the guts to delve to the very roots of the matter and sort it out.
I'm also suprised that the 'experience' lobby ie post Colgan lobby and 1500hrs has not yet mobilised.
ATC + approaches.
There isn't a 'recording' apart from ATC tapes of what aircraft shot what approaches. For example if a plane shoots an approach, goes around and then diverts out, it'll likely be in the tower log, and potentially show as an approach in airport stats, but there isn't an admin log that says 'Blogs Air' flew two approaches to ILS 123, that is then subsequently forwarded to 'the authorities'.
CAP413 in DB6's post identifies that after a crew is identified as having descended past the 1,000ft for approach XYZ then reporting action (in the UK) will be taken. As mentioned previously ATC have to trust the crews to be truthful about their capability. An ILS radiates a signal capable of use by a Cat I/II/III equiped/qualified aircraft/crew. If a light twin says it's CatIII capable/qualified, it may seem unusual to a controller but they are unable to question it. They may emphasise the low RVR values as the APP controller appears to have done in the prelim report, in the hope that may be an aide memoir to a busy crew. I'd have thought a Metro making a Cat III approach very unusual, but it wouldn't have the same 'I wonder' factor if they were making a Cat II approach, as that type could reasonably be Cat II capable, based on my lack of knowledge, and an assumption on that same basis.
Unless you know the config/specs of each type you can't be the policeman, and I doubt many would want to be. At a busy unit in LVP's a controller has far more to think about than is the crew/aircraft mix 'right', so they have to trust the operators to be truthfull, just as the crew expect the RVR's to be accurately passed and full ILS airfield protection to be in place in low vis. Likewise a 737 can be Cat II or III, some operators put the RVR minima on the plan, but that doesn't show on the controllers printed strip, and I doubt is shown on an TWR/APP EFD display either.
There isn't a 'recording' apart from ATC tapes of what aircraft shot what approaches. For example if a plane shoots an approach, goes around and then diverts out, it'll likely be in the tower log, and potentially show as an approach in airport stats, but there isn't an admin log that says 'Blogs Air' flew two approaches to ILS 123, that is then subsequently forwarded to 'the authorities'.
CAP413 in DB6's post identifies that after a crew is identified as having descended past the 1,000ft for approach XYZ then reporting action (in the UK) will be taken. As mentioned previously ATC have to trust the crews to be truthful about their capability. An ILS radiates a signal capable of use by a Cat I/II/III equiped/qualified aircraft/crew. If a light twin says it's CatIII capable/qualified, it may seem unusual to a controller but they are unable to question it. They may emphasise the low RVR values as the APP controller appears to have done in the prelim report, in the hope that may be an aide memoir to a busy crew. I'd have thought a Metro making a Cat III approach very unusual, but it wouldn't have the same 'I wonder' factor if they were making a Cat II approach, as that type could reasonably be Cat II capable, based on my lack of knowledge, and an assumption on that same basis.
Unless you know the config/specs of each type you can't be the policeman, and I doubt many would want to be. At a busy unit in LVP's a controller has far more to think about than is the crew/aircraft mix 'right', so they have to trust the operators to be truthfull, just as the crew expect the RVR's to be accurately passed and full ILS airfield protection to be in place in low vis. Likewise a 737 can be Cat II or III, some operators put the RVR minima on the plan, but that doesn't show on the controllers printed strip, and I doubt is shown on an TWR/APP EFD display either.
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'An ILS radiates a signal capable of use by a Cat I/II/III equiped/qualified aircraft/crew'
No it doesn't at Runway 35 at Cork for christ's sake!
.It doesn't matter if it was Neil Armstrong and Buzz f**king Aldrin in an Airbus 380, an approach to Runway 35 at Cork in less than 750m vis is illegal, no ifs, no buts! Runway 17 ILS is Cat II so there might be an argument there, 35 is Cat 1 ONLY. They made approaches to both runways; there is no question they were illegal, and at 350m RVR not just slightly either.
No it doesn't at Runway 35 at Cork for christ's sake!
.It doesn't matter if it was Neil Armstrong and Buzz f**king Aldrin in an Airbus 380, an approach to Runway 35 at Cork in less than 750m vis is illegal, no ifs, no buts! Runway 17 ILS is Cat II so there might be an argument there, 35 is Cat 1 ONLY. They made approaches to both runways; there is no question they were illegal, and at 350m RVR not just slightly either.
Last edited by DB6; 18th Mar 2011 at 13:11.
DB6
No it doesn't at Runway 35 at Cork for christ's sake!
No it doesn't at Runway 35 at Cork for christ's sake!
I wasn't refering specifically to Cork. What I meant was if your aerodrome has a Cat III ILS, and the relevant procedures. The ILS I'm familiar with is Cat III or Cat I.
Obviously other installations in terms of aerodrome/approach lighting and nav aids are available.
I am probably going to regret this but has anyone given any consideration to consider the difference in nationality of the two pilots involved?
The reason I ask this question is that I have trained pilots from all over the world from the USA to Bangladesh.
There is no doubt in my mind that there is a sometimes a big difference in the outlook from pilots even from within the European Union.
In my last (multi national) company, we had a section that one of my friends described as "Pedro the Pilot".
They always managed to do flights that none of the rest of us could manage. For example, I can remember deadheading with Pedro one night on a route that I flew with monotonous regularity. With max payload it was always a bit difficult to get enough fuel on board.
So, this night, and I am a TRI/TRE on the aircraft concerned, Pedro comes in and orders X tonnes of fuel. Interested in my own safety, I ask your man what he is going to do if he ends up with a Max Payload.
"Ees never happened" was the answer.
On another occasion, I was on the jump seat when they threw the flaps out 50 knots too fast. The aircraft had to have a complete flap rebuild at Norwich with Air UK.
What I have to tell you is that when the rest of us have refused to do a flight, "Pedro the Pilot" was usually happy get out of bed to do it.
Brown envelopes had absolutely nothing to do with it.
The reason I ask this question is that I have trained pilots from all over the world from the USA to Bangladesh.
There is no doubt in my mind that there is a sometimes a big difference in the outlook from pilots even from within the European Union.
In my last (multi national) company, we had a section that one of my friends described as "Pedro the Pilot".
They always managed to do flights that none of the rest of us could manage. For example, I can remember deadheading with Pedro one night on a route that I flew with monotonous regularity. With max payload it was always a bit difficult to get enough fuel on board.
So, this night, and I am a TRI/TRE on the aircraft concerned, Pedro comes in and orders X tonnes of fuel. Interested in my own safety, I ask your man what he is going to do if he ends up with a Max Payload.
"Ees never happened" was the answer.
On another occasion, I was on the jump seat when they threw the flaps out 50 knots too fast. The aircraft had to have a complete flap rebuild at Norwich with Air UK.
What I have to tell you is that when the rest of us have refused to do a flight, "Pedro the Pilot" was usually happy get out of bed to do it.
Brown envelopes had absolutely nothing to do with it.
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I've met lots of 'Pedro the pilots' in my career only they were just as likely to be English, French, Scottish, Polish, German, Dutch, Scandinavian, South American, Yank etc etc etc
Poor airmanship is a state of mind not a state of Sovereignty.
Lets not forget it was a Brit at the controls, lack of experience is no excuse for going along with dangerous or illegal command decisions.
Poor airmanship is a state of mind not a state of Sovereignty.
Lets not forget it was a Brit at the controls, lack of experience is no excuse for going along with dangerous or illegal command decisions.