Crash-Cork Airport
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makes you wonder as well how many times this had been done before because i am pretty sure it wouldn't have been the first time this was attempted commercial pressure or not there's no need to go and do this, as another poster said id rather have a Life and a license thanks
i think its also a case of pride and self respect of doing my job properly not trying to "cheat" the system to assist in the gains of others
i think its also a case of pride and self respect of doing my job properly not trying to "cheat" the system to assist in the gains of others
Last edited by Livesinafield; 18th Mar 2011 at 19:38.
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Lots of 'comercial presure' comments, but the most significant comment refers to how often has this been done before? (no crash therefore sucessfull landings but by what skin of teeth did this happen?)
Several factors here:
1. The captain leads and sets the tone for the flight - especialy with an inexperienced FO.
2. In this case he allowed either through action - we are going to have another go, continue untill I say go around, or inaction the FO kept on doing approaches off his own initiative and the captain did nothing about it.
Inaction is highly unlikley given the circumstances so it is more likley to be positive action on the captains part to continue with the illegal approaches.
3. In order for him to be in the state of mind where he felt that this was an acceptable course of action he must as an FO been exposed to these situations before with presumably sucessfull outcomes and to be comfertable with the idea that this was the norm.
4. Cast your mind back to when you were in the left seat for the very first time. Imagine being faced with the possibility of a divert on your very first sector. (Assume that if you were with a reputable company your very first cross country solo.) Imagine the preasures regarding how will I deal with the passangers, how will I pay for fuel, how will I pay for landing fees, etc etc.
5. Now think about how he has gained his experiance - all flights get in, we don't divert it cost money, youve seen how its done - when we promote you we expect the same.
So commercial preasure, exposure to a certain culture and a self induced presure to land at the scheduled destination. In all probability the legalities as highlighted by DB6 were never taken into account.
The number of hours do not matter so much as what you do with them and where.
Several factors here:
1. The captain leads and sets the tone for the flight - especialy with an inexperienced FO.
2. In this case he allowed either through action - we are going to have another go, continue untill I say go around, or inaction the FO kept on doing approaches off his own initiative and the captain did nothing about it.
Inaction is highly unlikley given the circumstances so it is more likley to be positive action on the captains part to continue with the illegal approaches.
3. In order for him to be in the state of mind where he felt that this was an acceptable course of action he must as an FO been exposed to these situations before with presumably sucessfull outcomes and to be comfertable with the idea that this was the norm.
4. Cast your mind back to when you were in the left seat for the very first time. Imagine being faced with the possibility of a divert on your very first sector. (Assume that if you were with a reputable company your very first cross country solo.) Imagine the preasures regarding how will I deal with the passangers, how will I pay for fuel, how will I pay for landing fees, etc etc.
5. Now think about how he has gained his experiance - all flights get in, we don't divert it cost money, youve seen how its done - when we promote you we expect the same.
So commercial preasure, exposure to a certain culture and a self induced presure to land at the scheduled destination. In all probability the legalities as highlighted by DB6 were never taken into account.
The number of hours do not matter so much as what you do with them and where.
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Overun... do you have eyes..? Our conversation is hereby closed.. I will not enter into a public slanging match with anybody, I don't know what your problem is with me but this stops here.
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.......I don't see how it matters that they shot the approach when vis was below the minima when the aircraft was flipped over anyway.......
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Yorkshire .. exactly.. minima are established for that very reason.. account is taken of the fact that the aircraft may descend through DA in the execution of the go-around but the bottom line is that you do not intentionally bust the minima for the approach.. if you do that then all bets are off
Forget about commercial pressures etc,
these guys were flying an aeroplane... It needed to land.
Primary Destination was out of limits, their first, second divert was also out of limits.
Another alternative (Kerry) was 10K vis. for whatever reason it was binned
these guys were flying an aeroplane... It needed to land.
Primary Destination was out of limits, their first, second divert was also out of limits.
Another alternative (Kerry) was 10K vis. for whatever reason it was binned
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.......the aircraft may descend through DA in the execution of the go-around..........
But if an MDA is promulgated - Minimum Descent Altitude - then it is for the pilot to make his own Decision Height to take into account the sink before acceleration and climb start to take effect, one may not descend below MDA by even an inch.
I think it has been already stated that continued descent when conditions fall below minimum is permissible in some instances, e.g. if the aircraft first starts an approach with the legal ceiling and visibility being reported, and after having passed the Outer Marker - or such position as is published in the absence of a marker beacon - either the ceiling or the vis. deteriorate, then it is permissible to carry on down to D.H. to 'have a look', but this wasn't the case here, as I read it, but it ain't the first time and regretably probably not the last.
( edited as a result of following comments - apologies )
Last edited by YorkshireTyke; 19th Mar 2011 at 03:23.
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@yorkshire
you are never allowed below MDA to "have a look", leave the statements to professionals please!
In general with the newest rules:
MDA-not allowed one inch below-Think minimum DESCENT alt.
DA-takes into account loss of alt in a go around(30 feet they allow,I stand to be corrected)- Think DESCISION alt.
you are never allowed below MDA to "have a look", leave the statements to professionals please!
In general with the newest rules:
MDA-not allowed one inch below-Think minimum DESCENT alt.
DA-takes into account loss of alt in a go around(30 feet they allow,I stand to be corrected)- Think DESCISION alt.
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your allowed below neither "to have a look", decision is made already once past minima at DA. You dont pass MDA minima.simple.
in the approach scenario you said of rvr changing, yes you may continue approach but not as you say to "carry on down below minima"
I have not confused anything, and even if you have it doesnt matter, you never go below except for loss of height during a go around.
in the approach scenario you said of rvr changing, yes you may continue approach but not as you say to "carry on down below minima"
I have not confused anything, and even if you have it doesnt matter, you never go below except for loss of height during a go around.
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I agree, I'm sorry, I was confusing being allowed to continue when the reported conditions have fallen below minimum during an approach, with deliberately deciding to descend below the published minimum, which one might in fact do slightly in the DH situation, but must not allow if it is MDA.
Apologies, I'll edit my original comment.
Apologies, I'll edit my original comment.
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At DH you are looking out, if you don't have the required visual cues at the call of "decide" you go-around, you will, due to inertia, break through the DH. This is not having a look, even if you were to have the required visual cues 30 feet below the DH, it is now too late as you are following the missed approach.
MDA is just that, MINIMUM descent altitude. Originated, I believe, with the dive and drive concept for NPA's. of course these days of efficiency, comfort etc we try to fly CDA's, a result of this is we add 50' to the MDA, so that at decision, if we have to go-around we do not go below MDA.
I believe, but stand to be corrected, that RVR is controlling.
MDA is just that, MINIMUM descent altitude. Originated, I believe, with the dive and drive concept for NPA's. of course these days of efficiency, comfort etc we try to fly CDA's, a result of this is we add 50' to the MDA, so that at decision, if we have to go-around we do not go below MDA.
I believe, but stand to be corrected, that RVR is controlling.
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And there lies the rub of this accident. At DA you look out... if you see nothing but thick fog and yet you continue to look out and descent you will become disoriented as there is nothing to see out of the window. If you press on you will eventually hit something or see something but by that time you may be displaced off the runway or in a steep bank or nose high or possibly all three. While looking out you have no clue of the attitude or trajectory of the airplane.
This unfortunate accident reminds me of a cockpit discussion I had with a white haired captain a decade ago. He suggested busting the minima, it took all my diplomatic skills to wriggle out of that one. The one thing I was grateful for was that he gave me notice rather than spring it up on me at minimums.
In this case they tried it THREE times. They clearly set out to bust the minimums. The company culture must be sooo wrong and I hope the directors, at all the different layered companies involved, are pursued for corporate manslaughter but you cannot get away from the responsibility of the captain in first instance and the FO for going along with it.
This unfortunate accident reminds me of a cockpit discussion I had with a white haired captain a decade ago. He suggested busting the minima, it took all my diplomatic skills to wriggle out of that one. The one thing I was grateful for was that he gave me notice rather than spring it up on me at minimums.
In this case they tried it THREE times. They clearly set out to bust the minimums. The company culture must be sooo wrong and I hope the directors, at all the different layered companies involved, are pursued for corporate manslaughter but you cannot get away from the responsibility of the captain in first instance and the FO for going along with it.
Last edited by calypso; 19th Mar 2011 at 07:51.
How many times?
I have read some comments here about how many times do some people push the limits and get away with it so therefore consider it to be alright.
Many years ago I was on a Flight Safety course (before it was called CRM) where the instructor was discussing a large cargo aircraft CFIT which was allegedly trying to sneak in under MDH on a non-precision approach. The very last words on the CVR were allegedly from the FO in a jovial manner "You know, we are going to kill ourselves doing this one day"
I hope that is enough said.
Many years ago I was on a Flight Safety course (before it was called CRM) where the instructor was discussing a large cargo aircraft CFIT which was allegedly trying to sneak in under MDH on a non-precision approach. The very last words on the CVR were allegedly from the FO in a jovial manner "You know, we are going to kill ourselves doing this one day"
I hope that is enough said.
This of course was the motive behind BEA's introduction of the Monitored Approach at the end of the 50's ( I think ? ) whereby one pilot flies the descent and approach solely and firmly on instruments, whilst the other steadfastly looks out of the window.
If at DH the looking pilot has got the runway in sight, he takes over and lands, but if not the instrument flying pilot doesn't look up but carries on flying the overshoot, being still in the instrument flying frame of mind.
This removes the difficulty of a transition from Instrument flying to Visual flying at a very critical phase of the flight in difficult conditions.
The procedure was well criticised throughout the airline pilot world at the time, tho' I think it is pretty standard procedure now (?) the difficulty of getting 'the feel' of the controls at that late stage was cited many times.
I was once in Customs in New York around that era, when a grizzled PanAm Senior Captain approached us, " PanAm have always had a Monitored Approach procedure " he said. " Oh, really " I said in surprise. "Yes" he said " I fly, he monitors " !!
CRM would have given him a heart attack !!
If at DH the looking pilot has got the runway in sight, he takes over and lands, but if not the instrument flying pilot doesn't look up but carries on flying the overshoot, being still in the instrument flying frame of mind.
This removes the difficulty of a transition from Instrument flying to Visual flying at a very critical phase of the flight in difficult conditions.
The procedure was well criticised throughout the airline pilot world at the time, tho' I think it is pretty standard procedure now (?) the difficulty of getting 'the feel' of the controls at that late stage was cited many times.
I was once in Customs in New York around that era, when a grizzled PanAm Senior Captain approached us, " PanAm have always had a Monitored Approach procedure " he said. " Oh, really " I said in surprise. "Yes" he said " I fly, he monitors " !!
CRM would have given him a heart attack !!