Crash-Cork Airport
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sloppyjoe
in answer to your question, I resigned.
eventually I went on to a first class airline , but all airlines are being dragged down by the third rate places.
pay a pilot half pay of a first class airline, paint your planes a fun color, put on TV goofy ads and dumb people by the tickets because they are cheaper.
and that takes away from the first class airline.
in answer to your question, I resigned.
eventually I went on to a first class airline , but all airlines are being dragged down by the third rate places.
pay a pilot half pay of a first class airline, paint your planes a fun color, put on TV goofy ads and dumb people by the tickets because they are cheaper.
and that takes away from the first class airline.
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Colgan
Angelorange
Thankyou for the info on Colgan Q400, I had seen it referred to previously but had not researched it. It seems that such an event could sort out the cause of this crash and so all we are left with is the CRM aspects and we seem to know at least a possible scenario for that. So, who will be confident enough to predict the conclusions of the report now?
There is a mega opportunity here to really make a difference. I will be more wary of whom I fly with nowadays as a passenger but this is not a common ocurrence fortunately.
Thankyou for the info on Colgan Q400, I had seen it referred to previously but had not researched it. It seems that such an event could sort out the cause of this crash and so all we are left with is the CRM aspects and we seem to know at least a possible scenario for that. So, who will be confident enough to predict the conclusions of the report now?
There is a mega opportunity here to really make a difference. I will be more wary of whom I fly with nowadays as a passenger but this is not a common ocurrence fortunately.
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Sloppy Joe
I'm preparing a presentation on this to an interested group of non-aviators who may come to realise that all is not quite so rosy and spread the word accordingly.
I'm preparing a presentation on this to an interested group of non-aviators who may come to realise that all is not quite so rosy and spread the word accordingly.
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BOAC, Re your post #840, I think your haze is getting thicker in the memory.
It was Girona (if you are Catalan) Gerona (if you are Spanish)
Having been based there, and indeed still living here, I read the report very well, and know too the local stories, from those who were also here at that time.
I don't remember in the accident report, or indeed ever heard a rumour of, the Capt taking over and landing after a g/around was called, indeed if my memory serves me well, having not re-read the report for a couple of years, he was in fact the handling pilot.
Having made an approach on the reciprocal runway previously, there is a strong suspicion, denied by the controller, that the PAPI's/ Appr Lights may have been OFF (something I have seen myself a few times in GRO if we switched ends, so entirely plausible)
What appears to have happened (& strangely enough the electrical company could not provide details of power outages for the time period concerned
) is that a lightning strike to the airport that occurred just as they were about to land, put all the lights out momentarily.
In the shock/disorentation of losing sight of the runway ("possibly" just basic R/W lights too) immediately before the planned flare/touchdown in torrential rain to a near flooded poorly lit runway, the PF appears to have been disorientated into thinking that the loss of visual cues were due to the aircraft pitching up, and therefore applied a large forward application on the control column which resulted in a landing/crash , nose-gear first, resulting in damage which applied full power to 1 engine resulting in a psuedo g/around high powered bounce/hop into a field alongside the runway breaking the aircraft into 3 bits.Having taken a fairly substantial knock/injury to the head, during the "landing"he could not recall afterwards his actions, not surprisingly.
The only real blame one could attach, is taking wholly inadequate fuel reserves in the 1st place, bearing in mind the area forecast, but there is no official , or even unofficial ,claim around that I have heard , that the Capt tried to land off a go-around.
Another accident report with MANY lessons to be learned.
It was Girona (if you are Catalan) Gerona (if you are Spanish)
Having been based there, and indeed still living here, I read the report very well, and know too the local stories, from those who were also here at that time.
I don't remember in the accident report, or indeed ever heard a rumour of, the Capt taking over and landing after a g/around was called, indeed if my memory serves me well, having not re-read the report for a couple of years, he was in fact the handling pilot.
Having made an approach on the reciprocal runway previously, there is a strong suspicion, denied by the controller, that the PAPI's/ Appr Lights may have been OFF (something I have seen myself a few times in GRO if we switched ends, so entirely plausible)
What appears to have happened (& strangely enough the electrical company could not provide details of power outages for the time period concerned
) is that a lightning strike to the airport that occurred just as they were about to land, put all the lights out momentarily.In the shock/disorentation of losing sight of the runway ("possibly" just basic R/W lights too) immediately before the planned flare/touchdown in torrential rain to a near flooded poorly lit runway, the PF appears to have been disorientated into thinking that the loss of visual cues were due to the aircraft pitching up, and therefore applied a large forward application on the control column which resulted in a landing/crash , nose-gear first, resulting in damage which applied full power to 1 engine resulting in a psuedo g/around high powered bounce/hop into a field alongside the runway breaking the aircraft into 3 bits.Having taken a fairly substantial knock/injury to the head, during the "landing"he could not recall afterwards his actions, not surprisingly.
The only real blame one could attach, is taking wholly inadequate fuel reserves in the 1st place, bearing in mind the area forecast, but there is no official , or even unofficial ,claim around that I have heard , that the Capt tried to land off a go-around.
Another accident report with MANY lessons to be learned.
Last edited by captplaystation; 24th Mar 2011 at 10:44.
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Mercenary Pilot,
Yes, I have read and followed the whole thread and looked at the report, however my post was aimed at what you had said in post 822, indicating in the go around, if they saw the runway you would expect them to land.
You also said you would expect them to make continuous approaches if they kept getting a glimpse of the runway. Please re read the whole of post 822, both the quote and your reply, I hope I don't find myself sitting behind you on a foggy day!
Yes, I have read and followed the whole thread and looked at the report, however my post was aimed at what you had said in post 822, indicating in the go around, if they saw the runway you would expect them to land.
You also said you would expect them to make continuous approaches if they kept getting a glimpse of the runway. Please re read the whole of post 822, both the quote and your reply, I hope I don't find myself sitting behind you on a foggy day!
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Gerona:
Stormy night with CBs all over Spanish coast. Fuel planned 15 mins extra. FO PF but Cpt takes over on the descent. CB activity over airfield leads to late runway change to VOR app in turn leading to GA due sudden wind shift. New APP to ILS with failure of APP lights at critical point, PF disoriented applies full forward control input, very hard landing touching down with NW first, control cables deformed and AC uncontrollable from that point on, bounce and skidded into nearby field behind an earth mound. Ac out of view from the tower hence large delay in emergency response.
Incredibly unlucky, lots of things to learn but no at all comparable to Cork. These guys did not break any rules but where very unlucky. Cork guys where very lucky twice but managed to make their own luck at the third attempt.
Stormy night with CBs all over Spanish coast. Fuel planned 15 mins extra. FO PF but Cpt takes over on the descent. CB activity over airfield leads to late runway change to VOR app in turn leading to GA due sudden wind shift. New APP to ILS with failure of APP lights at critical point, PF disoriented applies full forward control input, very hard landing touching down with NW first, control cables deformed and AC uncontrollable from that point on, bounce and skidded into nearby field behind an earth mound. Ac out of view from the tower hence large delay in emergency response.
Incredibly unlucky, lots of things to learn but no at all comparable to Cork. These guys did not break any rules but where very unlucky. Cork guys where very lucky twice but managed to make their own luck at the third attempt.
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One of the problems is the "Can Do" attitude - it exists in a number of industries (eg the oil drilling business, newspapers etc) and the basic default attitude is that only whimps back off, that unless you try nothing happens, "get on with it"
A lot of training in modern business is aimed at removing those attitudes - normally it works but somewtimes (ask BP) self imposed pressure leads people into error
A lot of training in modern business is aimed at removing those attitudes - normally it works but somewtimes (ask BP) self imposed pressure leads people into error
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if they saw the runway you would expect them to land
i.e. Im presuming that they DIDN'T see the runway and go-for-it otherwise I would have expected one have them to have made some kind of response or say something. I think when the PNF said continue, he had no contact and was continuing down anyway regardless in the hope of seeing it at lower altitude.
You also said you would expect them to make continuous approaches if they kept getting a glimpse of the runway.
i.e. if on the first approach to 17, they had caught a glimpse of the runway or lighting then I would have expected them to make another approach to 17 seeing as it has better lighting, but they didnt they tried the 35 end and again went around. The third approach was then flown to 17. In my opinion, this indicates that they never saw the runway or anything else on those attempts as they went down to 100' (from TAWS Data) on all of their approaches.
I hope I don't find myself sitting behind you on a foggy day!
*Making more than 2 approaches to one runway.
or
*Trying to land after a go-around has been called.
What I'm trying to point too is that IMO they NEVER saw the runway at all and crashed due to a stall at 100' while looking for it, I DON'T think that they saw the runway at the last minute and went for a dirty dive which went wrong. This is the discussion point i was trying to take up with what sevenstrokeroll had said.
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Mercenary pilot
Probably all correct the way it's panning out.
The "landing" was the result of the inevitability of gravity - it doesn't sound like the aircraft was flying at that stage.
Frightening prospect that their "culture" had two aviators prepared to ignore the applicable DH!
Probably all correct the way it's panning out.
The "landing" was the result of the inevitability of gravity - it doesn't sound like the aircraft was flying at that stage.
Frightening prospect that their "culture" had two aviators prepared to ignore the applicable DH!
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I know I keep wittering on about training/experience, but I found the following quote on a website to be quite significant:
" In flight the MetroLiner was pitch heavy, roll dampened, and rudder sensitive. In addition control pressures changed with airspeed, thus you never really had the feel for the plane until you had around 100hrs flying it."
Not the place for a two week F/O in ?? visibility, at half of the legal DH with a captain who was possibly more preoccupied with visual cues than monitoring airspeed.
" In flight the MetroLiner was pitch heavy, roll dampened, and rudder sensitive. In addition control pressures changed with airspeed, thus you never really had the feel for the plane until you had around 100hrs flying it."
Not the place for a two week F/O in ?? visibility, at half of the legal DH with a captain who was possibly more preoccupied with visual cues than monitoring airspeed.
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I think the metroliner is a Piece of SHIRT ;-)
but, I don't think you can blame the plane this time.
all flight exams/tests whatever you call them in your part of the world demand one thing above all others...demonstrating mastery of the machine, showing that the pilot is flying the plane and not the other way 'round.
but, I don't think you can blame the plane this time.
all flight exams/tests whatever you call them in your part of the world demand one thing above all others...demonstrating mastery of the machine, showing that the pilot is flying the plane and not the other way 'round.
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Forgiveness requested, please, if similar estimates to those below have been made heretofore - can't find any such on the discussion, no doubt will be corrected - waiting for brickbats.
Anyway...
In the Accident Unit preliminary report, the TAWS is noted audibly signalling "Three Hundred" at 17 seconds before the end of the CVR recording.
It later calls "One Hundred" with 5 seconds to go. Thus indicating, roughly, an average descent rate of 1000fpm during that segment of the approach.
The subsequent 3-second/60ft interval from "One Hundred" to "Forty" would indicate an even greater descent rate: 1200fpm.
At 1200 fpm, the time span from "Forty" to impacting terrain, is two seconds.
However, in the normal course of events, per the approach plate: with a target threshold speed of say, 110 kts, (and a similar ground speed, given the HWC was neglible), maintaining the glideslope gradient on R17 requires a final stabilized descent rate of approx 580fpm.
In order to maintain the published gradient, descending at 1000/1200 fpm, the aircraft would have to be travelling at speeds in excess of 180kt, which is unlikely.
So - (Speculation): high on the glideslope - steep gradient - excessive descent rate - bust minima - last moment dive - recovery impossible.... ??
(edited for spelling)
Anyway...
In the Accident Unit preliminary report, the TAWS is noted audibly signalling "Three Hundred" at 17 seconds before the end of the CVR recording.
It later calls "One Hundred" with 5 seconds to go. Thus indicating, roughly, an average descent rate of 1000fpm during that segment of the approach.
The subsequent 3-second/60ft interval from "One Hundred" to "Forty" would indicate an even greater descent rate: 1200fpm.
At 1200 fpm, the time span from "Forty" to impacting terrain, is two seconds.
However, in the normal course of events, per the approach plate: with a target threshold speed of say, 110 kts, (and a similar ground speed, given the HWC was neglible), maintaining the glideslope gradient on R17 requires a final stabilized descent rate of approx 580fpm.
In order to maintain the published gradient, descending at 1000/1200 fpm, the aircraft would have to be travelling at speeds in excess of 180kt, which is unlikely.
So - (Speculation): high on the glideslope - steep gradient - excessive descent rate - bust minima - last moment dive - recovery impossible.... ??
(edited for spelling)
Last edited by justanotherflyer; 24th Mar 2011 at 23:15.
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I'm wondering about the "exclamation" by the crew at T-2 on the CVR transcript (I think we can all make a reasonable guess as to the word they used) - was it in response to something that they saw (the runway/approach lighting, perhaps), or something the aircraft did (like snap rolling past inverted)?
justanotherflyer - the stall warning was sounding from T-7. I'm thinking the PF would instinctively firewall the throttles (as evidenced by the engine power increase confirmed by the FDR) & push forward on the column, thus increasing the rate of descent as confirmed by your calculations.
Then perhaps at T-2 he saw the runway approaching rapidly & overcontrolled on pulling up, thus stalling the aircraft which then snap rolled into the ground.
justanotherflyer - the stall warning was sounding from T-7. I'm thinking the PF would instinctively firewall the throttles (as evidenced by the engine power increase confirmed by the FDR) & push forward on the column, thus increasing the rate of descent as confirmed by your calculations.
Then perhaps at T-2 he saw the runway approaching rapidly & overcontrolled on pulling up, thus stalling the aircraft which then snap rolled into the ground.
Last edited by Sillert,V.I.; 24th Mar 2011 at 20:51.
Then perhaps at T-2 he saw the runway approaching rapidly & overcontrolled on pulling up, thus stalling the aircraft which then snap rolled into the ground
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(removed isle of man reference) but the descent rates mentioned don't make sense...unless the terrain is rough/undulating, hilly. The radar alt callouts or whatever they are might be affected by the terrain and not the true rate of descent.
this plane would typically fly the approach between 120 knots and 140 knots depending on flap configuration...anyone know the flap configuration found?
this plane would typically fly the approach between 120 knots and 140 knots depending on flap configuration...anyone know the flap configuration found?
Last edited by sevenstrokeroll; 25th Mar 2011 at 07:10.
Regarding rates of descent -
a. the crash was in Cork, Ireland, not Isle of Man. Isle of Man topography is irrelevant.
b. Cork topography DOES apply - approaching rwy 17, one is traveling over RISING terrain from a river estuary at near sea level to the airport elevation of 502' ASL. About 125 feet per mile climb on average, but I believe the actual terrain is a slow climb with a sharper rise close to the airport.
Already mentioned earlier in the thread. Actually, rather similar to the terrain situation in the Polish Presidential crash in Russia.
a. the crash was in Cork, Ireland, not Isle of Man. Isle of Man topography is irrelevant.
b. Cork topography DOES apply - approaching rwy 17, one is traveling over RISING terrain from a river estuary at near sea level to the airport elevation of 502' ASL. About 125 feet per mile climb on average, but I believe the actual terrain is a slow climb with a sharper rise close to the airport.
Already mentioned earlier in the thread. Actually, rather similar to the terrain situation in the Polish Presidential crash in Russia.