Afriqiyah Airbus 330 Crash

[Neptunus Rex]

Disclosure

Whatever the host country chooses to reveal, or hide, Airbus Industrie has a huge vested interest in the outcome. You may be sure that they will do everything possible to protect their product and will make appropriate disclosure.

[Sitting Bull]

dear SaturnV and PBL

-the Alitalia crew made an official statement to the relevant authorities and it has not been made public
-no matter what their position was (actually exactly towards the approaching A330), they still remain the only people that witnessed the crash
-as stated in an earlier post: whatever happened before the A330 came into their view remains to be retrieved from the DFDR and the CVR (in progress)

if you allow me to offer my personal opinion on the suggestions that Libya might not release the accident report: I had the possibility to speak to several of the Libyans in charge of the investigation and I did not get the feeling that they will try to keep the results a secret. As a matter of fact they have conducted the investigation very professionally so far

[RetiredF4]

ELAC
If this should all prove to be the case, the sad irony is that some of the old dogs and grumbling grandpas will have got it entirely wrong. The airplane may well have crashed, not because the crew relied on the automation too much, but rather because at the critical moment, they relied on the automation too little.

I,m not fishing for compliments, however an "old dog and grumbling grandpa" and even a retired one (also my brain is still working) had this possible chain of events mentioned long ago, fact being with little attention of the younger "modern" pilots. I might have used the incorrect wording though.
One Question being, why they did not rely on automation?

post 357
Post 418

The question, wether the modern pilot used to max extent of automation is fully capable of taking over the workload of the computers (caused by deliberate act or by malfunction) concerning thinking, planing and handling (like the "old dogs" had to do due to lack of reliable automation) is legal. And nobody asking this question is wishing back the old days, but remembers his own flying skills.

I´m not suggesting yet that this has anything to do with the cause and outcome of this tragic accident.

franzl

[arc-en-ciel]

smooth go around !

Hi guys,
It is rather "easy" to **** up a go-around and hit the ground with high energy.

Step one : Do not set the Thurst levers in the TOGA detent : (this has happened very recently to an A320 of JetBlue and Air France)

Step two : Set the Auto-Pilot back On (As an AF A320 in Sept 2009 at CDG)

Result : The SRS mode will not be triggered and aircraft will still be in the approach mode, and consequently descend with engines spooling up, then in IMC if you don't read your FMA (like Jetblue and AF) the somographic illusion occurs... and you have very few seconds to react when you see the ground coming when breaking of the cloud base (the AF had a ceiling of 300ft as well, and they stopped the descend at 70 ft if I remember well, but this was an A320, easier may be to arrest the descend).

Then may be a sort of more or less "flat" ground contact. And bearing in mind that the Alitalia aircraft was at least at a 1000M from the crash scene, in dawn light and reduced visibility, they may not have a very clear view of the final aircraft attitude at ground contact.

[SLFinAZ]

ELAC,

I'm not trying to downplay the benefits of automation in any way, just the total apparent reliance that is becoming more and more evident. As automation takes on more and more of the work load it's readily apparent that the system is both to complex for at least a portion of the user base to manage under stress and that it's use is compromising basic skills to some significant measure.

Instead of automation leading to a net increase what we're seeing is an increase in the capability of one segment (automation) leading to the degradation of another (actual hand flying capabilities).

We're at a point where its possible for a pilot to log 80 flight hours and have less then 2 or 3 total hours (if that) actually hand flying a plane. Where I disagree with you in your interpretation of "decision making". That is exactly what hand flying is, making decisions. The alternative is observing a computer automatically make those minute corrections for you. After all isn't that what software does? It takes the raw data stream and applies a set of predetermined formula's and acts based on the resulting calculations.

If in fact AF447 was an upset at altitude due to the automation reaching a point it kicked out (pure speculation) then would not the lack of hand flying experience at altitude have severely hampered any attempts at recovery by the pilot flying since he had no real experience under such conditions.

This further compounded by a confidence in the automation that encouraged an altitude selection beyond what a hand flying pilot would be comfortable maintaining given the very narrow boundaries?

At the end of the day how can a competent pilot rely on automation "to little" . Nothing can be safer (and yes thats just my opinion) then actually hand flying an airplane. Otherwise lets just equip em all with a little "autosave" box...

Automation in place of training and proficiency is going to cause significant issues...just one persons opinion...
In event of emergency break glass, pull lever and sit back and enjoy the ride

[SaturnV]

Sitting Bull and C-SAR, thanks for the information you've been sharing.

A post that I was referencing was this one by a Dutch reporter, who never received a post in reply in this forum. The reporter says that he was in email contact with the pilot of the Alitalia flight. Going from Italian to Dutch to English can leave a lot behind in translation, but I would assume that "backangle" means a tail down, nose up configuration.

I'm a reporter of a big Dutch newspaper and had brief contact through email with the pilot of AlItalia who was an eyewitness of the crash in Tripoli. He posted a message on what he saw on the forum of anpac.it. The press-officer of ANPAC told me one brief passage of his post: the plain had far too much speed and was touching the ground with a backangle of more than 20 degrees. A Dutch flight-expert told me that this indicates that the pilot must have been disorientated and that he tried to pull up the plane in the last seconds.

My question: are there any Italian pilots here who can login to the (closed) forum on the website anpac.it? If so, can anyone send me the passage this Italian pilot wrote? As you might know the majority of the victims is Dutch and relatives of them are very interested in everey detail there is to tell. Please leave your message here or send it to: ivar.penris at ad.nl.

http://www.pprune.org/5700833-post644.html

(And please note that post numbers can change over time.)

[lomapaseo]

A large degree of caution is urged in adopting photos, on scene interpretations, eye witness reports from aviation professionals and lastly DFDR raw data as conclusive affirmation that your pet theory about the chain of events is correct.

In an investigation like this many conflicts arise (nose down vs nose up impacts, etc.) that take time to sort out by matching sources of information with a degree of analysis (aircraft performance laws etc.)

The individual casual observers, like ourselves do not have the resources to resolve these conflicts, so while we may have experienced based opinions we have little credibility to conclude a chain beyond a single fact.

[Centaurus]

Pending other evidence being adduced, I'd suggest that an explanation fitting these few facts is a somatogravic illusion, the response to which sufficiently abrupt to place the aircraft into an unrecoverable attitude even if a recovery was attempted.

While I understand the medical side of so called somatogravic illusion, I cannot understand why a veritable stream of airliners are not crashing on take off after lift off (very marked acceleration) or from the thousands of IMC go-arounds that must take place in any one period throughout the world. In all cases one would think that the pilots would all be affected by the acceleration forces involved with speed increase after lift off or go-around.

Catapulting from an aircraft carrier at night or IMC would surely be the most dangerous risk from SI yet rarely do we hear of these aircraft crashing into the ocean after take off. Having flown early piston engine fighters (Mustang) as a young man with only 200 hours in my log book I don't ever recall experiencing SI at take off at night in that aircraft and in fact I have never experienced this phenomenon in my entire 60 year career as a pilot and that includes jet airliners.

If SI is as insidious and potentially dangerous as advertised in flight safety circles, it doesn't explain why thousands of pilots are apparently unaffected and therefore don't crash when faced with IMC take offs and go-arounds

[RetiredF4]

Having flown fast jet-fighters (F-4 Phantom II) i´ve expierienced it myself. Think about formation flying in IMC, the wingtip (not the fuselage) of the lead aircraft being the only available reference. The fact that i´m still living may prove in my case, that i could handle it like most pilots do.

When can it happen and why doesn´t it necessarily lead to an accident, like you are trying to argue? Because a human being has more then one sense giving information to the equilibrium and the sensory illusions asociated with limited availability of those informations should be well known to any pilot with a valid Instrument rating. So you stick to your instruments and wont get any trouble.

Therefore being in IMC or Night, on takeoff or doing a goaround while using the instruments as reference wont lead to those symptoms, because your brain is able to ovverride the wrong information. The more you are prepared for it, the less it will happen.

But being in a approach in VMC and suddenly and unexpectedly loosing sight of RWY and horizon, being forced to commence an unplanned goaround with lot of acceleration (which is even higher if the climb is not initiated immediately), calls for those sensory illusions. And even then you are not alone in the place and with qualified help it will work out fine.

But there are those days.........

However, as mentioned by others, its only one way to fly into the ground during a goaround, and we will hear later what the real cause was.

franzl

[TowerDog]

If SI is as insidious and potentially dangerous as advertised in flight safety circles, it doesn't explain why thousands of pilots are apparently unaffected and therefore don't crash when faced with IMC take offs and go-arounds

Agree, it has never affected me in 32 years of flying.
If indeed it was a big deal there would be wrecks scattered around the country side by the thousands..

A bit of basic instrument skills should mitigate any S.I. and S.I. should not be a reason or an excuse to fly an operable craft into the ground.

Try a good scan instead.

[aterpster]

pbl:

Second, all investigators, everywhere, operate under non-disclosure agreements.

But, that is based on the premise that the aviation investigative authority for the host state will release the findings when the investigation, gathering of facts, and analysis and conclusions are complete. (i.e., let's speak with one voice, and not take untoward advantage of priviledged status until the investigation and related processes are completed.)

As someone else state, and I will word it differently, Airbus would be a corporate fool to not release the findings if Libya does not.

Finally, it is inconveivable to me that Libya does not have the resources to publish an accident report.

[jcjeant]

Hi,

Surprised we not have any news of the last seconds by the survivor (a little boy )
I remember in the case of the Comores accident the girl who survived had something to tell.
The medias reported a lot about her .. and here .. silence ...
It can be valuable ... or not.

[GarageYears]

Centaurus/TowerDog:

Agree, it has never affected me in 32 years of flying.
If indeed it was a big deal there would be wrecks scattered around the country side by the thousands..

A bit of basic instrument skills should mitigate any S.I. and S.I. should not be a reason or an excuse to fly an operable craft into the ground.

Isn't that a rather gung-ho position to take? For one there have been SI related crashes and the causes are well understood in medical circles. The human brain is a highly interconnected, particularly when it comes to ears-and-eyes. Our sense of balance is tuned to our normal physical function - walking, running, climbing, etc. Believe it or not humans have only been hurling ourselves around in the sky for what, a little over 100 years. So our normal senses are not designed for what can happen in an aircraft. I have seen people fall over in simulators (particularly with the motion turned off, and the visual on) simply because of SI.

SI is insidious since by the time you are aware of it, it may well be too late. To dismiss this at this point seems over-zealous.

Obviously most pilots, following normal procedures, instrument scans, etc, are not going to succumb, but that does not mean it doesn't happen - particularly when something unexpected occurs. In this case something appears to have initiated the crew to attempt a go-around, so something unexpected occurred - we don't know what - perhaps visibility. However that is exactly when an SI situation might be expected to occur.

It does frustrate me - just because it hasn't happened to you (yet) doesn't mean it never will, or won't happen to someone else. Evolution is something that takes thousands of years - or are you somehow different?

- GY

[ELAC]

I,m not fishing for compliments, however an "old dog and grumbling grandpa" and even a retired one (also my brain is still working) had this possible chain of events mentioned long ago, fact being with little attention of the younger "modern" pilots. I might have used the incorrect wording though.
One Question being, why they did not rely on automation?

Hi franzl,

Yes, I think yourself, PJ2 and perhaps others mentioned the possibility of somatogravic illusion earlier on and refrenced the GF crash. It had crossed my mind too as I've not been sold on the tail first contact hypotheses, but until Sitting Bull mentioned the info reported by the Alitalia crew there was nothing that particularly pointed in that direction. Now, while hardly the only possibility, there is a "fit" between facts reported by competent observers and the results of a somatogravic illusion response, so I think it's worth pointing that out, particularly in response to suggestions that the cause is rooted in automation or approach flying skill degradation.

Why they didn't rely on automation? If, and it is an "if" somatogravic illusion is the culprit I think that the answers would be both the powerful effect that it can have along with a lack of specific training to identify the potential for it to occur and the best piloting responses if it appears to be occurring.

The question, wether the modern pilot used to max extent of automation is fully capable of taking over the workload of the computers (caused by deliberate act or by malfunction) concerning thinking, planing and handling (like the "old dogs" had to do due to lack of reliable automation) is legal. And nobody asking this question is wishing back the old days, but remembers his own flying skills.

That in itself is a totally valid question. In the end an airplane is an instrument and the proficient pilot needs to know and be capable in all aspects of its operation. It is fair to have concern over possible degradation of hand flying skills without conflating the value of those skills with a perception that safety would be improved by a return to a greater emphasis on hand flying and a reduction in the levels of automation available or commonly used. The two concepts are not corollary and joining the two, in my opinion creates a misperception about what needs improvement and what provides the greater overall benefit to flight safety.

Tschüss!

ELAC

[Belgique]

It can happen to you - becaiuse I've been there, done it...

Accident Report
http://tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-report...6/a01c0236.pdf
The loss of visual references as the aircraft accelerated along the runway and past the lights of the community were ideal for the onset of somatogravic illusion in the pilot flying. Even 7 seconds prior to impact, the captain believed that he was climbing to 1000 feet above ground level. The captain’s performance was consistent with his being unable to distinguish the imposed acceleration as the aircraft speed increased from that of gravity and, although he probably thought the aircraft was climbing, it was not.
The first officer may also have been influenced by the somatogravic illusion. During the 30 seconds of the missed approach, his tasks were to react to the captain’s commands and to monitor the instruments. Apparently the first officer did not observe anything remarkable or he would have alerted the captain that the aircraft was not climbing.
It is possible that he was distracted by the sudden sound of the NDB identifiers just after the missed approach was initiated. The NDB receiver was turned off just prior to impact, and since the control head is on the first officer’s side of the cockpit, it was likely he who turned the NDB off. Given the short duration of the overshoot and the tasks that the first officer was performing, it is probable that he had a false perception that the aircraft was climbing.
Even though the conditions were present for the crew to be affected by somatogravic illusions, these illusions could have been overcome by at least one of the crew. During the visual approach, the pilots were able to fly with visual reference to the surface. However, pilots are required to transition to instruments when entering, or about to enter, weather or environmental conditions where visual flight conditions do not prevail, as was the case when
the overshoot was initiated. Had this transition been made, the fact that the aircraft was not climbing would have been evident.
The company SOPs for the missed approach was less stringent than those for the company’s training school. There was no stated requirement to use instruments during a missed approach nor a requirement to identify two positive rates of climb. The use of these two techniques would be a stronger defence against the possibility of somatogravic illusion and loss of situational awareness.
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
.
High acceleration during take-off and initial climb can cause an illusion of increasing pitch. Somatogravic illusion (aka the "pitch-up illusion") is an erroneous sensation of pitch (rotation in the vertical plane) caused by linear acceleration. Under normal conditions this sensation can be recognized and corrected by visual means; however, when a take-off (or go-round in particular) is being made on a very dark night, and toward an area that provides few visual references, this illusion will remain a powerful influence. A pilot's normal response to this pitch-up illusion is to apply forward pressure to the control column, and to reduce the aircraft's angle of climb. As the pilot unloads, so the acceleration forwards is reinforced by the negative g and so the illusion is thus progressively (and rapidly) enhanced.
.
Air Afriqiyah A330
Sudden loss of forward vision due to sunrise glare, accompanied by a fair expectation of regaining it momentarily, would deter a pilot from getting back on the clocks, particularly if he knew that he was quite close to the ground.
Sudden unexpected loss of forward vision in conditions of sunrise and sunset landings is not at all uncommon. Fly long enough and it will happen to you. If accompanied by an attempt to go round, then the light-weight aircraft's rapid acceleration during mandatory TOGA can suddenly become a player. The fact that both pilots can experience the phenomenon simultaneously (see above and GF072 Report) is also a factor. Consider also that if a non-handling captain is looking outside for visual cues when he experiences this overpowering illusion, he may well intervene and take drastic action - such as stuffing the nose down. At ow altitude an unrecoverable attitude is always likely to result.
.
Dark Night Takeoffs

http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/9199-...-illusion.html

Untitled Document

Transportation Safety Board of Canada - AVIATION REPORTS - 1996 - A96C0002

Untitled Document

http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/4...nce-gf072.html

Approach and landing illusions

Untitled Document

[TowerDog]

Ok, so the experts have solved the puzzle now.

Somatogravic illusion is the culprit, case closed...

It does frustrate me - just because it hasn't happened to you (yet) doesn't mean it never will, or won't happen to someone else. Evolution is something that takes thousands of years - or are you somehow different?

What frustrates you? That I have never experienced SI....?

If I did, perhaps I should hang it up.

[GarageYears]

TowerDog:

What frustrates you? That I have never experienced SI....?

No.... this does:

If indeed it was a big deal there would be wrecks scattered around the country side by the thousands

The implication (quite clearly) is that in your opinion SI is (at best) a non-issue (since there are evidently not thousands of wrecks).

No one said "case closed" (except you ). However, several others have, without sensationalism ("wrecks scattered by the thousands" ), stated that SI is something that will be considered as a possible contributor to the crash. That was all.

Take a deep breath, and realize that not everyone is the perfect pilot that you so obviously are....

- GY

[BOAC]

Somatogravic illusion - a grand expression to bandy around. I prefer to call it 'dis-orientation' or 'the leans', and I would be extremely cautious with ANY pilot with more than around 1000 hours who says he or she has 'never experienced it' at night, in cloud, in formation or in manoeuvre - it is a worrying thought that they might not have actually 'RECOGNISED' it. As said above, it is extremely common and a well-known aviation medicine topic.

Anyway, if we can now leave this topic for a while? Back to the thought-provoking post by JoeMo - even allowing for the fact that cameras do fore-shorten things, is the 'forward fuselage section' not too close to the tail section to fit the tail strike/break off tail/nosedive theory? Can anyone pinpoint its exact position along the 09 approach in the wreckage trail?

[ELAC]

SLF,

... the total apparent reliance that is becoming more and more evident.

It is? How so?

... it's readily apparent that the system is both to complex for at least a portion of the user base

Really? Based on what metric? It certainly can't be based on accidents as we had plenty more of those with less complex equipment. To the extent that there's an issue is it not perhaps one of MMI (Man-Machine Interface) "ergonomics" for one and adequate training for another as opposed to the concept of automation in itself?

... it's use is compromising basic skills to some significant measure.

Well, first off, what is the basic skill? Is it not the ability to take the aircraft aloft and return it to the ground safely? If so, our overall skill at doing so has increased, in large part because we use all the aircraft's systems competently, not just the yoke or stick and rudder.

...Instead of automation leading to a net increase ...

But, automation has led to a net increase in the safety of flight operations. The statistics on that are fairly indisputable. There are accidents that include automation or degraded manual skills as a causal factor, but these are far fewer than the accidents that newer technologies have helped us avoid. One telling statistic that you'll never find is a tally of all the "saves" that automation has provided us that resulted in accidents that didn't happen (and consequently you never got to read about).

...Where I disagree with you in your interpretation of "decision making". That is exactly what hand flying is, making decisions. The alternative is observing a computer automatically make those minute corrections for you.

You're not serious are you? The actual motor skills in controlling the aircraft manually are for the most part completely seperate from the decision making functions related to flying. The motor skill is simply one way of translating the decision into action. Sometimes it is the best way (gusty crosswinds and windshears come to mind), but you are doing the same thing when you use the autopilot to achieve the same result. At a guess, for most airline pilots 95% of all the decisions they will make during the course of a flight, including most of the truly critical ones, will occur with the autopilot on. If you believe that manually making those "minute corrections" is the epitomy of pilot decision making then your understanding of the nature of the job is so far removed from mine we might as well be on different planets. On that disparity I can only offer that my perception is informed by many years at the pointy end. How have you come by your conclusions?

If in fact AF447 was an upset at altitude due to the automation reaching a point it kicked out (pure speculation) then would not the lack of hand flying experience at altitude have severely hampered any attempts at recovery by the pilot flying since he had no real experience under such conditions.

This further compounded by a confidence in the automation that encouraged an altitude selection beyond what a hand flying pilot would be comfortable maintaining given the very narrow boundaries?

Pure speculation indeed. As was dealt with in the relevant thread, the altitude selection of the AF aircraft was well within the normal operating boundaries of the aircraft, and not particularly narrow at all. If that in itself was a causal factor then we should be rethinking the entire approach to flying jet aircraft above FL300. Certainly I recall many occasions of being much closer to the edge of the envelope while operating the 727, and on some instances having to hand fly it at those altitudes as well (the "rocker" a/p on old 72's not being the most reliable of beasts). The altitudes we select to fly at are not "encouraged by a confidence in automation" but rather informed by a knowledge of the aircraft's operating envelope along with an appreciation of the environmental characteristics particular to the situation.

At the end of the day how can a competent pilot rely on automation "to little". Nothing can be safer (and yes thats just my opinion) then actually hand flying an airplane. Otherwise lets just equip em all with a little "autosave" box...

Well you know what they say about opinions ...

If you actually believe without qualification that "Nothing can be safer than actually hand flying an airplane." you have absolutely no business contributing to a professional level discussion about the causes of an aircraft accident. Put simply, you lack an adequate level of appreciation of what the job entails to make an informed contribution.

Automation in place of training and proficiency is going to cause significant issues...just one persons opinion...
In event of emergency break glass, pull lever and sit back and enjoy the ride

You are right in the sense that it isn't automation that's really at issue. The question is what training and what proficiency? My guess is that you and I have fundamentally different answers.

ELAC

[TowerDog]

Take a deep breath, and realize that not everyone is the perfect pilot that you so obviously are....

You jumped to the wrong conclusinon there garage, I am just mr. average Joe pilot, not better or worse than the majority of us.

If a working pilot is affected by SI he or she may have a medical condition that makes them unfit to fly.